On the link it says ...These “left of bang” type of areas include setting up and securing aircraft landing zones, drop zones and assault zones, among other special interest areas."
More about use of ambiguous 'left of bang' terminology than about SOWT-Special Reconnaissance.
'Left of Bang' implies prior to commencement of main operations more so than during and after. Area is where an operational capability is put to do something, while what is being done is identified the how and cause for the when is lacking. It will be interesting how 'left of bang' translates into being the operational capability being justified, validated, and funded.
The vagueness of 'Left of Bang' brings with it a mystical attachment that leaves too much high risk potential operational utilizations to imagination in a way that feeds a desired operational capability for an operational capability gap that may not exist or because of operational risks factors seldom being utilized as was hoped or imagined.
Some definitions to consider:
high-risk personnel — Personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets. Also called HRP. See also antiterrorism. (JP 3-07.2)
operational necessity — A mission associated with war or peacetime operations in which the consequences of an action justify the risk of loss of aircraft and crew. See also mission. (JP 3-04)
operational preparation of the environment — The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the operational environment. Also called OPE. (JP 3-05)
operational reach — The distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)
Planned risk. (DOD) The possibility of mission failure and/or high casualties when assessing military operations. When judging deliberate military plans, planned risk is described by the following gradients:
a. unacceptable risk. Mission failure is the likely outcome. Huge public outcry over casualties and/or unacceptable collateral damage in relation to the planned objective will occur. A costly protracted engagement is assured. Even under the most fortunate of conditions, mission success is only probable.
b. high risk. Mission failure and mission success are equally likely outcomes. Under favorable conditions, mission success is likely. High casualties and/or extensive collateral damage are likely. A protracted engagement is to be expected.
c. moderate risk. Mission success is likely, even if some conditions are not favorable. High levels of casualties and significant collateral damage may occur. A protracted engagement is possible.
d. low risk. Mission success is virtually assured, even if executed under somewhat unfavorable conditions. Probability of a protracted engagement is minimal. Minimal casualties and/or collateral damage expected. (CJCSM 3122.03A/JOPES Vol. II)
risk assessment — The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process). Also called RA. (JP 3-07.2)
risk management — The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. See also risk. (JP 3-0)
Risk Management (RM)/Decision Making. Includes risk assessment, the risk management processes (Deliberate, Real Time RM)/tools, breakdowns in judgment and flight discipline, problem-solving, evaluation of hazards, and control measures. Identify contingencies and alternatives, gather all available decision data, and clearly state decisions.