This thread will be a work in progress as I read more of the book. I wanted to share some details as I read, so that even if you dont' buy the book you can pick up a few things.
Authors: Jonathon Parshall and Anthony Tully
The book makes extensive use of Japanense accounts, documentation, and interviews from surviving members of the IJN. It appears to be well researched and written. The authors have already demonstrated the great divides within the Japanese military and within the IJN itself and how Midway was partially the result of being too successful in the opening days of the war. Japan didn't have a solid plan following Malaya and the Dutch East Indies which suddenly caused a lot of internal turmoil. Yamamoto isn't presented as the genius we see in the West and how Japan's rigid society promoted men based on senority vice merit, sometimes with disasterous results. One interesting myth they've dispelled: the attack on the Aleutians wasn't a diversionary attack, but its own operation planned to coincide with Midway; something driven by internal politics.
They briefly covered Japanese naval and carrier doctrine along with air group composition and even carrier size plus strengths and weaknesses. They've managed to do so without it being to dry or technical. One main point in doing so is that Western authors imprint Japanese carrier operations against the USN's for the same period. In fact, doctrine, air group composition, and carrier size drove Japanese tactics, so comparing them tot he West is a bit futile. They've also covered the airgroups at the time of sailing for Midway and how they were very experienced, but the IJN's naval aviation was already tired. Aircraft production in 1942 only delivered 59 carrier aircraft which left every squadron below its authorized strength or even some smaller carriers without aircraft. They've even covered how the IJN knew America would produce far more carriers than it could, while Japan wouldn't see a new carrier until 1944. In short, they had great aircrews, but were understrength and with no depth in ships.
Politically, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander of the carrier striking force, wasn't an advocate of carrier operations. He shared a "big gun" background with his counterpart at Midway, Ray Spruance, but Spruance was calm and handled carriers well, taking the time to learn what he could about carrier operations while Nagumo was more or less detached. Yamamoto's force of personality was pushing the operation and no one was able to stand up to him. Becuase he was viewed as a driving force in Japan's early victoriies, he was politically bulletproof even as those around him could see the operation's shortcomings. He was so focused on forcing a decisive battle that he overlooked one basic assumption in Japanese doctrine: the decisive battle should take place in the western Pacific, not the central where American land-based airpower could be brought to bear on the fleet. Moving against Midway left him without a proper reconnaisance force while the Americans had over 30 patrol aircraft on Midway alone.
The Japanese sub force, intended as a screen to warn of the American carriers, left their anchorage late and didn't even have a plan. It was literally, "be here at this time" and that's about all. Their commander was married to the Emporer's niece and has escaped condemnation, particularly in post-war Japan, because of his royal connection.
In other words, by the time the IJN fleet left Japan, they were already behind the 8-ball and didn't know it.
Great book so far.
Authors: Jonathon Parshall and Anthony Tully
The book makes extensive use of Japanense accounts, documentation, and interviews from surviving members of the IJN. It appears to be well researched and written. The authors have already demonstrated the great divides within the Japanese military and within the IJN itself and how Midway was partially the result of being too successful in the opening days of the war. Japan didn't have a solid plan following Malaya and the Dutch East Indies which suddenly caused a lot of internal turmoil. Yamamoto isn't presented as the genius we see in the West and how Japan's rigid society promoted men based on senority vice merit, sometimes with disasterous results. One interesting myth they've dispelled: the attack on the Aleutians wasn't a diversionary attack, but its own operation planned to coincide with Midway; something driven by internal politics.
They briefly covered Japanese naval and carrier doctrine along with air group composition and even carrier size plus strengths and weaknesses. They've managed to do so without it being to dry or technical. One main point in doing so is that Western authors imprint Japanese carrier operations against the USN's for the same period. In fact, doctrine, air group composition, and carrier size drove Japanese tactics, so comparing them tot he West is a bit futile. They've also covered the airgroups at the time of sailing for Midway and how they were very experienced, but the IJN's naval aviation was already tired. Aircraft production in 1942 only delivered 59 carrier aircraft which left every squadron below its authorized strength or even some smaller carriers without aircraft. They've even covered how the IJN knew America would produce far more carriers than it could, while Japan wouldn't see a new carrier until 1944. In short, they had great aircrews, but were understrength and with no depth in ships.
Politically, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander of the carrier striking force, wasn't an advocate of carrier operations. He shared a "big gun" background with his counterpart at Midway, Ray Spruance, but Spruance was calm and handled carriers well, taking the time to learn what he could about carrier operations while Nagumo was more or less detached. Yamamoto's force of personality was pushing the operation and no one was able to stand up to him. Becuase he was viewed as a driving force in Japan's early victoriies, he was politically bulletproof even as those around him could see the operation's shortcomings. He was so focused on forcing a decisive battle that he overlooked one basic assumption in Japanese doctrine: the decisive battle should take place in the western Pacific, not the central where American land-based airpower could be brought to bear on the fleet. Moving against Midway left him without a proper reconnaisance force while the Americans had over 30 patrol aircraft on Midway alone.
The Japanese sub force, intended as a screen to warn of the American carriers, left their anchorage late and didn't even have a plan. It was literally, "be here at this time" and that's about all. Their commander was married to the Emporer's niece and has escaped condemnation, particularly in post-war Japan, because of his royal connection.
In other words, by the time the IJN fleet left Japan, they were already behind the 8-ball and didn't know it.
Great book so far.
