# Japanese Threat To Oceania



## SpitfireV (Dec 7, 2010)

Continued from a previous thread.

Now, in that thread there were assertions that the USA guaranteed an Australian's freedom of speech because of the US actions in the Pacific.

I have a particular thought that this isn't strictly true- the Pacific war from the US side was dependant on Australian (and to a lesser extend New Zealand) bases of operation for repairs, training, R&R etc. So the benefit was mutual. In fact the US government was so thankful to the NZ government that they offered to build an eight lane highway right down the middle of the country- an offer the government stupidly turned down.

I've heard that the Japanese didn't have the capacity to invade Australia by the time they got there but personally I don't know anything about this.

Let's roll.


----------



## Marauder06 (Dec 7, 2010)

Not your freedom of speech per se, your freedom of not speaking in Japanese ;)

I don't know why we're still talking about this, here is the real reason WWII was won:


----------



## Manolito (Dec 7, 2010)

Mara has restricted commenting on wars we didn't fight in. My Dad was in the Pacific. I have posted an article and highlighted some of the article in red. 
It appears the Mother country could not help New Zealand so the US stepped in and helped. Mara not my comment the articles comment. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_New_Zealand_during_World_War_II

The RNZAF in the Pacific
The presence of German raiders led to the formation of New Zealand based air-combat units — initially using re-armed types like the Vildebeest, and hurriedly converting impressed airliners such as the DH86 to carry bombs. RNZAF obtained Lockheed Hudsons early in 1941 to take over this role. 5 Squadron with Vickers Vincents and Short Singapores was sent to Fiji to protect that colony.








Flying boats of 5 Squadron RNZAF
In December 1941 Japan attacked and rapidly conquered much of the area to the north of New Zealand. New Zealand had perforce to look to her own defence as well as help the "mother country". Trainers in New Zealand such as the North American Harvard, Hawker Hind and even the de Havilland Tiger Moth were camouflaged and armed. Hudsons moved forward, while 5 Squadron in Fiji, commenced operations against the Japanese despite its obsolete equipment.
The Imperial Japanese Navy demonstrated the vulnerability of New Zealand when submarine-launched Japanese float-planes overflew Wellington and Auckland (where a Tiger Moth gave chase ineffectually[_citation needed_]) in March and May, 1942. As few combat-capable aircraft were available at home, and Britain was unable to help, so New Zealand turned to the United States and signed a lend-lease agreement. Gradually at first, America was able to supply New Zealand with aircraft for use in the Pacific Theatre.
The early lend-lease aircraft, obsolescent models, had difficulty holding their own against the skilled and well-equipped Japanese pilots, but as soon as pilots had mastered the lend-lease aircraft, they went into action.



 



Restored RNZAF Corsair
From mid-1943 at Guadalcanal, starting with No 15 and No 14 squadrons, several Kittyhawks units fought with distinction. Several RNZAF pilots became aces against the Japanese, including Geoff Fisken, the Commonwealth's leading ace in the Pacific war. Other squadrons flew the elderly but effective Douglas Dauntless and later the big, modern Grumman Avenger torpedo-bomber.
The RNZAF took on a major part of the maritime reconnaissance task too, with Catalina (and later Sunderland) flying-boats and Hudson bombers.
The role of the RNZAF changed as the allies moved off the defensive. The Americans, prominent amongst the Allied nations in the Pacific, planned to bypass major Japanese strongholds, but instead to capture a handful of island bases to provide a supply-chain for an eventual attack on Japan itself (see island hopping). The Allied advance started from the South Pacific. The RNZAF became part of the force tasked with securing the line of advance by incapacitating the bypassed Japanese strongholds.
As the war progressed, more powerful modern aircraft replaced the older types; Kittyhawks gave way to Corsairs and Hudsons to Venturas. At its peak in the Pacific, the RNZAF had 13 squadrons of Corsair fighters, six of Venturas, two each of Catalinas and Avengers, two of C-47 Dakotas, one using Dauntless dive bombers, mixed transport and communications squadrons, a flight of Short Sunderlands and nearly 1,000 training machines. By 1945 the RNZAF had over 41,000 personnel, including just over 10,000 aircrew who served with the RAF in Europe and Africa.


----------



## AWP (Dec 7, 2010)

I think both arguments have merit. The Japanese xpansion across the Pacific was as much to combat the Americans (and our navy) as to deny access to Australian bases. If Midway goes in the opposite direction the American navy has some serious problems, Guadalcanal doesn't happen and the Japanese have months to consolidate gains around PNG. They can isolate or severely restrict Austalia's and New Zealand's involvement in the war. Now, those nations played a critical role in the South Pacific, one that mainstream historians fail to point out, but it isn't unreasonable to think that if the American navy is defeated or destroyed in '42 then Australian/ New Zealand can be left to die on the vine.

We needed them as much as they needed us.


----------



## ÉIREGOBRÁCH1922 (Dec 8, 2010)

Great reads.


----------



## Mac_NZ (Dec 8, 2010)

From memory the mother country would not let us pull troops back from the desert to defend NZ, the Aussies gave the UK the big fuck you and pulled theirs back anyway.

Hence why we (NZ) didn't have much of an effect in the Pacfic, pity as quite a few Vietnamese found out the hard way 30 years later you do not fuck with Kiwis in the J.


----------



## SpitfireV (Dec 8, 2010)

That's right and it didn't do our stock a whole lot of good with the Aussies, either.

RN even got attached to the USN for a few years after the Oriental ports fell.

Free, your point about Midway is an interesting one. Thinking about it, the whole Pacific war seemed to be very delicate for the first two years or so, any one of a number of battles could have turned the favour the Japanese way very easy. Much more so than Europe anyway.


----------



## AWP (Dec 8, 2010)

Consider that the Japanese lost 40% of her mechanics, flight deck crews, and technicians along with 25% of her carrier-qualified pilots. The loss of 4 fleet carriers left only 2 to undertake offensive actions with a smaller carrier to accompany them. Japan's remaining carriers weren't as effective for offensive operations and of a limited value. When the battle was over the US was down to one undamaged fleet carrier (Enterprise). The subsequent battles in and around the Solomons broke the back of Japan's naval aviators.

I don't think it unreasonable to conclude if things go the other way that the US campaign in the Solomons and subsequent PNG campaign either end very differently or don't happen at all. As is, the US Navy left the Marines on Guadalcanal without the bulk of their provisions or equipment and were mauled at Savo Island. Without US carriers to help the Navy return and with the 3-4 Japanese fleet carriers to survive Midway, the Marines are probably overrun if they can even land in the first place. Australia's northern flank is now owned by the Japanese and suddenly shiat gets very real in WWII.


----------



## pardus (Dec 8, 2010)

Mac_NZ said:


> From memory the mother country would not let us pull troops back from the desert to defend NZ, the Aussies gave the UK the big fuck you and pulled theirs back anyway.
> 
> Hence why we (NZ) didn't have much of an effect in the Pacfic, pity as quite a few Vietnamese found out the hard way 30 years later you do not fuck with Kiwis in the J.



It was actually a NZ govt decision to stay in Europe and leave ourselves undefended IIRC.

And yes, during the Vietnam war, no one could touch the Kiwis in the J.

Though I will say that one of my instructors during my Lead Scouts course who was a lead scout in VN (fucker was still sharp as a scalpel blade in the bush). Told me that after a one year build up in Singas, then one year in VN, they exercised with the Gurkha's back in Malaya, they were put through an observation lane, told there was X number of objects and one person on the lane.
The Kiwis all went through and named all of the objects. When asked about the person on the lane, the Kiwis said "there was none there"

The Gurkha instructor told them to look at their boots, every Kiwi Grunt had a red paint mark on their boot from a Gurkha that was lying on the lane.


----------



## JBS (Dec 8, 2010)

SpitfireV said:


> Continued from a previous thread.
> 
> Now, in that thread there were assertions that the USA guaranteed an Australian's freedom of speech because of the US actions in the Pacific.



Here are the assertions:



> Assange is an idiot who might quite possibly not even speak any English,  let alone enjoy any of his  "freedom  of speech" if it weren't for the  American blood spilled all over the Pacific Theater in WWII.





> I just find it ironic that Assange is releasing information- the  principle beneficiaries of which are Iran and Al-qaeda respectively-  while hiding behind this facade of being a whistle blower and claiming  "freedom of speech."
> 
> Oh that oppressive USA.





> 2. The fact is I don't know how much clearer I could be with my comment  about Assange attacking the wrong side.  Gratitude, or "we saved your  ass" is not where I intended to go with that comment.  The irony of him  attacking the nation that guaranteed his "freedom of speech" is the  point.





> Barring an intervention by the Allies (and principally the US carrier  groups), there would likely be a Japanese flag flying over Australia.   Japanese post-war testimony is very clear on what the long term strategy  was, and although invasions were ruled out by the Emperor, demanding  the submission of Australia was always on the agenda after a  consolidation of the other gains.   I suppose one can make the point  that overlooking Australian military forces is a mistake, but in terms  of numbers, resources, and firepower, I interpret this intervention in  history (by the US forces Assange is attacking) to be a fundamental  reason why* 26 years* after the end of WW2, Julian Assange was born  into a completely free and independent Australia.



I stand 100% behind my comments, as the testimony of Japanese officers after the war, plus the extensive amount of planning on the part of the Japanese support my position.  Some critical background data:




> in March 1942 the Japanese military adopted a strategy of isolating Australia from the United States by capturing Port Moresby in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia.[96] This plan was frustrated by the Japanese defeat in the Battle of the Coral Sea and was postponed indefinitely after the Battle of Midway.[97] While these battles ended the threat to Australia, the Australian  government continued to warn that an invasion was possible until  mid-1943.[95]





> In February 1942, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, who had planned the successful attack on Pearl Harbor, proposed an immediate invasion of Australia. He had just implemented his bombing raids on Darwin in the Northern Territory. He pleaded with the Japanese General Staff, to land two Japanese Army Divisions on the northern coastline of Australia which was very poorly defended. They were to follow the north-south railway line to Adelaide, thus dividing Australia into two fronts. Once Adelaide had been taken, a second force would land on the south east coast of Australia and drive northwards to Sydney and southwards to Melbourne.
> 
> 
> Yamamoto's plan appeared to be a diversionary invasion plan rather than a plan to occupy Australia. He wanted to draw large American forces away from launching attacks on the Japanese Island chain far to the north of Australia.
> ...








			
				SpitfireV said:
			
		

> I have a particular thought that this isn't strictly true- the Pacific war from the US side was dependant on Australian (and to a lesser extend New Zealand) bases of operation for repairs, training, R&R etc. So the benefit was mutual.



While Australia and New Zealand were without a doubt vital both to the US Navy and the outcome of the rest of the war, the testimony of Japanese officers are very clear that the reason the Japanese Navy did not invade prior to Coral Sea conflict was because of the reach of the B-17 bombers- which could potentially complicate the desired invasion or even cripple it, and the greater urgency for the Japanese command to consolidate and defensively fortify the islands they had already taken.   Thus the invasion of Australia was not viable, and the plans were shelved.  Attention was shifted to fortification of the previously gained territory against a rapidly advancing American carrier force, which their intelligence suggested posed a grave threat.   Extensive construction of pillboxes and bunkers continued 24 hours a day on those islands.  Here's a real interesting website that chronicles many of the Japanese Navy's preparations for an eventual invasion of Australia.  Much of the reconnaissance was done ahead of time, and formal plans were drafted.  Japanese deep reconaissance were on the ground in Australia at several points on multiple occasions.

http://www.ozatwar.com/japsland/japsland.htm


In summary, it seems plainly clear, both through circumstantial evidence vis-à-vis the extensive preparation and groundwork, and also through testimonial evidence after the war, that _what prevented the invasion from coming to fruition was the offensive threat of the American carrier forces._  Further, it seems likely that if the Allies had chosen an alternate path- such as choosing to tolerate Japanese consolidation of previous conquests, or deferring to some other regional strategy, it is evident that the Japanese may have opted to fortify those positions and then moved onward to forcefully demand the submission of Australia, or even revived the shelved invasion.  All the Allied intelligence pointed to a lingering threat from Japan until 1943.

Later, I'll post some of the Japanese testimony.  Makes for interesting reading.


----------



## JBS (Dec 8, 2010)

Here is a nice "reconstructed" map of their battle plan for the Battle of The Coral Sea:


----------



## AWP (Dec 9, 2010)

The Japanese vastly overstated the ability of the B-17 to stop an invasion.

Our light and medium bombers (A-20, B-25) are a different story. :)


----------



## SpitfireV (Dec 9, 2010)

The A-20 is one of my favourite ac of all time.

JBS, that's a hell of a post. Let me work my way through it and get back to you.


----------



## SpitfireV (Dec 12, 2010)

JBS, I would say that the fact that the PM vetoed the plan would have been more of a factor than the US carriers, no?


----------



## JBS (Dec 13, 2010)

SpitfireV said:


> JBS, I would say that the fact that the PM vetoed the plan would have been more of a factor than the US carriers, no?


Surely, except there'd have been no veto without a very real and clear threat from the US carriers.  The dissent amongst Japanese leadership came from their differing assessment of the gathering Allied threats- principally the carriers and the air power- not from any lack of desire to own Australia.


----------



## pardus (Dec 13, 2010)

JBS said:


> Surely, except there'd have been no veto without a very real and clear threat from the US carriers.  The dissent amongst Japanese leadership came from their differing assessment of the gathering Allied threats- principally the carriers and the air power- not from any lack of desire to own Australia.



That was my thinking as well.


----------



## SpitfireV (Dec 13, 2010)

That's fair.

Please don't think I'm trying to be a dick about these things; I just find all this really interesting and like to explore the different options.


----------



## JBS (Dec 13, 2010)

I don't think that at all.  A dick- no.  A homo, yes.



If it weren't for the ability to debate, and try to substantiate a viewpoint, threads like this would be boring.  I like when I have to dig for the answer to something.   That's good stuff.


----------



## Marauder06 (Dec 14, 2010)

SpitfireV said:


> That's fair.
> 
> Please don't think I'm trying to be a dick about these things; I just find all this really interesting and like to explore the different options.



No one thinks you're a dick.  Well, not because of this thread, anyway.


----------



## Manolito (Dec 14, 2010)

Why did New Zealand refuse to join NATO. I haven't found an answer. help would be appreciated.
Bill


----------



## 0699 (Dec 14, 2010)

Manolito said:


> Why did New Zealand refuse to join NATO. I haven't found an answer. help would be appreciated.
> Bill



Probably because they aren't in the North Atlantic area. They were members of SEATO...


----------



## Manolito (Dec 14, 2010)

My findings indicate they were offered a seat but refused. You are probably right I will keep looking. I am interested in how and why the US got such a shitty reputation even with our "Friends" I know most think it is arrogance but we don't hold a corner on that market.
Bill


----------



## 0699 (Dec 14, 2010)

Manolito said:


> My findings indicate they were offered a seat but refused. You are probably right I will keep looking. I am interested in how and why the US got such a shitty reputation even with our "Friends" I know most think it is arrogance but we don't hold a corner on that market.
> Bill



I'm confused.  Are you saying we (Americans) have a shitty relationship with NZ?


----------



## Marauder06 (Dec 14, 2010)

We had a falling out with NZ over them not wanting our nuke ships in their harbors.  That's why they dropped off the "five eyes" list for a while.


----------



## Marauder06 (Dec 14, 2010)

Marauder06 said:


> We had a falling out with NZ over them not wanting our nuke ships in their harbors.  That's why they dropped off the "five eyes" list for a while.



ETA:  Here I found this, about a quarter of the way down:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Zealand_–_United_States_relations


----------



## pardus (Dec 14, 2010)

Manolito said:


> Why did New Zealand refuse to join NATO. I haven't found an answer. help would be appreciated.
> Bill



Makes no sense for NZ to join NATO.



> The Parties of NATO agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them *in Europe or North America*http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO#cite_note-Tropic-9 shall be considered an attack against them all. Consequently they agree  that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the  right of individual or collective self-defence will assist the Party or  Parties being attacked, individually and in concert with the other  Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed  force, to restore and maintain the security *of the North Atlantic area*. *
> *​Such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force  does not necessarily mean that other member states will respond with  military action against the aggressor(s). Rather they are obliged to  respond, but maintain the freedom to choose how they will respond. This  differs from Article IV of the Treaty of Brussels (which founded the  Western European Union) which clearly states that the response however  often assumed that NATO members will aid the attacked member militarily.  *Further, the article limits the organization's scope to regions above  the Tropic of Cancer,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO#cite_note-Tropic-9which explains why the Falklands War did not result in NATO involvement*.



So NZ would be committing to fight northern wars without any reciprocation.

Besides NZ had SEATO, ANZUK, ANZUS (off the top of my head) to keep us involved and occupied.


----------



## Manolito (Dec 14, 2010)

Pardus thanks I think I see how the puzzle goes. Did NZ  take on the NATO standards for military ammunition etc? I thought in the 90's was when jooining NATO was considered. What is the feeling of the average NZ citizen towards the US? Was the no nuke ships a big deal? or was it the media that made something out of nothing? In 1948 was NZ still a part of the Commonwealth? The date of independance is hard for me to figure.
Thanks
Bill


----------



## Mac_NZ (Dec 14, 2010)

We use the NATO standard for most things and everything has an NSN number.

We have always been part of the commonwealth.  There was another part to the ANZUS debacle which was when French agents bombed the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour.  France was part of NATO at the time and noone took them to task so it fucked the general population off a wee bit and the government a lot.

I'm in no way shape or form keen about the hippies and if the surrender monkeys had asked us nicely boat troop probably would have sunk the damned thing for them.  However you don't rock into a friends house and slash his car tires and then act all mates about it.  You also expect your mates to tell him he's a prick.

Personally I can understand why, France is quite geographically important for the next time the Hun invades them and the world has to save their arse.  got to keep them on side.

Behind the scenes things are business as normal, we send people their, you send people here.  Cross training on a larger scale will be online soon.

The FTA with US, AU and NZ would be a good thing for all, I'm sure someone in Washington could put the expected $5 billion gained to good use bailing out another bank.  That and I might be able to buy a F150 without having to sell all my limbs.

We can however be a funny little ally, the average Kiwi doesn't like the idea of nukes whatsoever.  You guys have grown accustomed to them whereas joe bloggs in Timaru thinks they are the devil.

We also tend to be choosy about where we will get stuck in, if they cause is just its all on.  In WWII 67% of males aged 18-45 served and we had the highest number of casualties amongst the colonies in the commonwealth.  In most things with us its quality over quantity, we will send you the very best we have as opposed to flooding the area with morons.


----------



## Manolito (Dec 14, 2010)

Mac thanks for the input. I am trying to put together a picture of truth. If I told you what we were taught about New Zealand in school you would never quit laughing.
Nukes are what they are. I think they saved a lot of good peoples lives both japanese and Allied. I certainly understand and respect NZ stand on having Nukes themselves.
We can always use money there are people in executive positions that had to drive themselves to work last week. I don't know how our farmers would feel about all your agricultural goods hitting the US market. Probably not.
Your support in Viet Nam buys you a place at the head of the table at my house or my families house at any time.
Funny about the rainbow warrior I always thought it was NZ that sank it for another country.
Lastly I consider all allys the same the giving of a human life in the defense of a friend is the same for a big country or a smaller country.
Thanks again Mac
Respectfully,
Bill


----------



## SpitfireV (Dec 14, 2010)

I couldn't care less they bombed the Rainbow Warrior, what pisses me off is that our wharf got taken out of action. And then the French had the Gaulle (boom pish) to strongarm us over butter exports if their officers weren't released.

With regard to the nukes, that was the nation been taken for a ride by a very Left Prime Minister. The legislation is worded IIRC that nuclear weapons are banned, not ships. To be quite honest I'd feel better if an Ohio were in port and had the nukes to strike back. At least, until I got incinerated in the fire 

With regard to the average person...let me think on that. I've got a few thoughts but I need to mash them out a bit.


----------



## pardus (Dec 14, 2010)

Good post Mac, I was and am still pissed over the Rainbow Warrior incident, unforgivable IMO.
I thought then and I still think now that NZ should have executed those two French spies.

France was not a member of NATO at that stage, they left back in 1966.

The no nuke policy fucked the NZDF and that was disastrous but I doubt NZ will allow nukes there for the foreseeable future, the population simply won't allow it.
The policy was a big deal at the time, I think it's kind of forgotten now but forgotten with the happy knowledge that there are no nukes in NZ.

Yes NZ does need to be convinced a scrap is the right thing to do but we do tend to go balls out once we get the green light.

Despite what you see on this board Kiwis are fairly amicable people and Americans are a white, christian colonial people at heart with the same basic values so there will always be a kinship there.
Some people do think the US can be or is arrogant and ignorant in some things and there some justification for that but that is coming from a friend not a stranger or enemy, big difference.

It is a wish of mine that NZ starts combat operations with regular troops in A'stan etc...
There would need to be US/NATO financing for that because NZ doesn't have shit for a budget but I think it would benefit all parties.



Manolito said:


> Nukes are what they are. I think they saved a lot of good peoples lives both japanese and Allied.



Absolutely correct! No doubt at all.


----------



## SpitfireV (Dec 14, 2010)

The US is often viewed as being arrogant and a bully because of their size and power, but that's what large countries do. Hell, some of the ways the USG have even treated the British (and that's supposed to be the closest of relationships) has been bullying and at the expense of the Brits.

All that said, I'd rather you lot than the Sov- Russians or the Chinese. Awwww. Group hug time!


----------



## Mac_NZ (Dec 15, 2010)

Cheers for the clarification T.

And yeah Tony is right, don't judge the whole nation based on us 3 lol.


----------



## Manolito (Dec 15, 2010)

http://images.search.yahoo.com/sear...ge&fr=chr-frontier-s&va=new+zealand+sheepdogs
NZ has the one thing I lust for in my heart. I own two border collies and one queensland and work sheep. Two of my dogs have to be retired for age the heart is willing the flesh is weak. The trouble is getting a dog shipped here from NZ is harder than getting a gun shipped here .


----------



## pardus (Dec 15, 2010)

Bill can you not get them here in the US?


----------



## Manolito (Dec 15, 2010)

I am working on a source right now. http://www.kiwikennels.com/contactus.htm I haven't driven up to see the dogs yet. The problem with Huntaways and Border collies is the breeding. As you know new stock from Europe is needed. With agility trials and shows the collies is not working as much as showing. If you have any US sources I would appreciate a link.
Bill


----------



## pardus (Dec 15, 2010)

Sorry, I don't know of anything.

I grew up in farming areas in NZ, those dogs are all over the place there.


----------



## Mac_NZ (Dec 15, 2010)

Yeah I used to have a pack of 7 of the buggers.  I can get you some gogo juice for artificial insemination but you would need a bitch of decent pedigree.


----------



## QC (Dec 15, 2010)

I didn't know about the bombing of Kiwi cities, but Sydney harbor was bombed and attacked by midget subs which is well documented. There was another flotilla which went south, launching a seaborne aircraft which flew over Melbourne. Most Australians know or firmly believe now that a Japanese invasion was on the cards. Strategically, Gen. McArthur was a little concerned when he was given a precis of what we had to do the job after his bug out from the P.I. as there wasn't much here to work with.  As decisive as the US at Midway on the sea, were the Australian Kokoda battles on land, and the combined effort in the Coral Sea.


----------



## SpitfireV (Dec 15, 2010)

No bombings IIRC but I think one of those subs was spotted this way + floatplanes.

Germans sent one or two U Boats this way after about 1943 too.


----------



## pardus (Sep 27, 2014)

Brushing some cobwebs off this thread!

I'm really glad to see the USA and NZ exercising together again!
When I was last in NZ I was told by several people how they had armed US Soldiers patrolling the streets of the city I'm from during a large international exercise there. 

I'd be remiss to not mention that despite the falling out in the 80's, NZ still remains the USA's base for Antarctic operations.


----------



## Flagg (Sep 28, 2014)

I've seen some US uniforms about in the last year, 2 of my guys got the chance to jump in on an EX up north about 12-18 months ago with the USMC and had some good training, got a lift in an Osprey, TXT'd from the Marines ranges about how big and awesome they were, and had an even better time out and about on local leave.

The only "bad" thing I heard was one of the RF fellas(amongst a section that was up for the same EX) jokingly complaining about being stuck in the worst spot of an overstuffed Marine amphibious vehicle by a broken exhaust and everyone taking the piss out of him because it turned him black.

I've also seen some bling on the walls that tells me even though we weren't tight in some ways, we were discretely carrying on in other ways. ;)

The best bit for me personally was taking the family to see the "Battle of the Bands" tour between USMC Band, Pacific going up against the NZ Army band.

Awesome…..especially the part where the 3 war Marine(WWII, Korea, Vietnam) widower who married a Kiwi lady and has lived in NZ for a long time was treated like a rock star by the Marines in their dress blues.

Great show they put on(and an even better marketing/advertising/hearts&minds effort) to signify the changing relationship.

There's a bit the USMC Band does where they come to attention before playing that is SO snappy the whole crowd goes "ooooOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOoooooo". :)

The show I attended was a packed house of about 600 and everyone left with a raging case of Semper Fi.

Good stuff.


----------



## AWP (Sep 28, 2014)

JBS said:


> While Australia and New Zealand were without a doubt vital both to the US Navy and the outcome of the rest of the war, the testimony of Japanese officers are very clear that the reason the Japanese Navy did not invade prior to Coral Sea conflict was because of the reach of the B-17 bombers- which could potentially complicate the desired invasion or even cripple it, and the greater urgency for the Japanese command to consolidate and defensively fortify the islands they had already taken.   Thus the invasion of Australia was not viable, and the plans were shelved.
> In summary, it seems plainly clear, both through circumstantial evidence vis-à-vis the extensive preparation and groundwork, and also through testimonial evidence after the war, that _what prevented the invasion from coming to fruition was the offensive threat of the American carrier forces._


 
If we're going to necrothread...

Reading Shattered Sword recently, the invasion of Australia was covered by the authors. Some points:
- The Japanese advance was faster than they planned and so they hadn't seriously considered what to do afteer Java and Malaysia fell.  
- The Japanese Army and Navy couldn't agree on a strategy. The Army started the war in China and was loathe to pull any men from that theater. The Navy's Special Landing Teams (analogous to our Marines) were small in number.
- Thus the Army didn't have the manpower to conquer Australia and actively blocked the Navy's efforts to expand the war. They lacked the manpower and logistics. Japan neglected to build a tanker and cargo fleet. Even a win at Midway wouldn't allow them to invade Midway or sustain a force even if they could capture the island. Australia would be no different.
- The compromise of invading PNG was reached, but the Army wasn't enthusiastic about the plan because it was focused on China and the IJN on the US Navy. That, along with some arrogance or "victory disease" on the part of the Japanese, led to the Battle of the Coral Sea and invasion of PNG.
- Coral Sea was a disater for the IJN. The loss of a light carrier was inconsequential, but the damage to Carrier Division 5 (Shokaku and Zuikaku, the IJN's newest and largest carriers) reduced Kido Butai's offensive power at Midway.
- Yamamoto wasn't the genius we think him to be. He made several critical strategic and tactical errors, the Navy's participation in Coral Sea among them.
- The B-17's effectiveness was greatly overstated by the Japanese. In practice, using a B-17 in an anti-shipping role is pure folly. Of all of the bombers at Midway, the B-17's scored zero hits against IJN carriers, even when attacking from below 3,000 feet. One was low enough it strafed a carrier and killed a few of the exposed anti-aircraft crews. Bomb damage though was zero. The 5th AF's medium bombers were the real threat, particularly once they adopted skip bombing and "gunship" versions of the B-25 and A-20.
- Australia wasn't seriously considered by the Japanese Army because of manpower and logitical issues. Hindsight's 20/20, but the threat to Australia was more our creation than actual fact. The best the Japanese could hope for was to maybe occupy a slice of Australia, but even the Army could see that wasn't feasible. Rather, occupying PNG, Somoa, Fiji, etc. would allow them to isolate Australia.
- Because of the divide between the Army and Navy, the Japanese esentially fought two wars in the Pacific.


----------



## JBS (Oct 5, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> If we're going to necrothread...
> 
> Reading Shattered Sword recently, the invasion of Australia was covered by the authors. Some points:
> - The Japanese advance was faster than they planned and so they hadn't seriously considered what to do afteer Java and Malaysia fell.
> ...



Very, very interesting post.  Two things I take away:

1. the actual threat to Australia and NZ can be argued as authentic, or as a creation of American propaganda.  The author of Shattered Sword holds the opinion that threats were exaggerated or altogether American propaganda.   I'm persuaded otherwise.  Exaggerated- perhaps- but still authentic.

2. _"That, along with some arrogance or "victory disease" on the part of the Japanese..."_   I find that phrase very interesting and I'd love to read more about the role of hubris in the formation and success rates of military strategy.   I wonder where we draw the line between "audacious / daring" and arrogance.   I'd suspect the difference is going to be (as some here would automatically reply) the quality of - and ability to analyze- intelligence. 

Could make a great thread.


----------



## AWP (Oct 5, 2014)

JBS said:


> Very, very interesting post.  Two things I take away:
> 
> 1. the actual threat to Australia and NZ can be argued as authentic, or as a creation of American propaganda.  The author of Shattered Sword holds the opinion that threats were exaggerated or altogether American propaganda.   I'm persuaded otherwise.  Exaggerated- perhaps- but still authentic.
> 
> ...


 
The threat to Austalia seemed real enough at the time. Until May 1942 the Japanese went wherever and did whatever they wanted. The Army knew it couldn't take or hold the continent; it lacked the manpower. Any Japanese designs on Australia were by staff officers or wishful thinking, but no serious plans were ever considered. The Japanese had no real strategy for post Java/ Malaysia, so from Coral Sea/ PNG onward they were making it up as they went along.

"Victory disease" was used by the authors of Shattered Sword, but I'm unsure if that phrase is used elsewhere. The Japanese had done what it set out to do and believed they were unstoppable. Despite the Philippines taking longer and more manpower than it planned, the Japanese military still had this belief that its troops were unbeatable. This partially explains their tactics on Guadalcanal. Some IJN estimates even thought up to 5 US carriers would be present at Midway, yet the Japanese sent 4. They simply had no concept of defeat because they had never lost.


----------



## Gunz (Oct 5, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> ..."Victory disease" was used by the authors of Shattered Sword, but I'm unsure if that phrase is used elsewhere. The Japanese had done what it set out to do and believed they were unstoppable. Despite the Philippines taking longer and more manpower than it planned, the Japanese military still had this belief that its troops were unbeatable. This partially explains their tactics on Guadalcanal. Some IJN estimates even thought up to 5 US carriers would be present at Midway, yet the Japanese sent 4. They simply had no concept of defeat because they had never lost....


 

The Japanese had a lot of strange notions about fighting that stemmed from _Bushido, _the samurai warrior's code. And it screwed them up. For instance, they neglected to provide sufficient escorts for their convoys (the lifeline of any island nation) because escort duty was seen as _demeaning; _the proper place for any naval officer in the IJN was on the bridge of a warship engaged in battle. It wasn't until late in the war when US subs were decimating the Japanese merchant fleet that somebody figured it might be a good idea to swallow some of that samurai arrogance and pride. But by then it was too late.

The Marines on Guadalcanal grew contemptuous of the fighting skills of the Japanese soldier. At the Ilu river, they slaughtered the Japanese, who continued to charge across open ground, standing upright in close packed groups, screaming, waving swords. "Whoever told these dumb bastards they were soldiers?" in the famous words of one Marine...and the soldiers who were slaughtered were considered some of Japan's best. The _Banzai _charge...a ridiculous waste of life, a hold-over from samurai days. It had no place in an age of automatic weapons. Again, it wasn't until later in the war when the high command forbid suicidal charges and ordered defenders to dig in and fight to the last man.

And another odd trait in Japanese warfare of the period was their inflexibility...and their penchant for complicated battle plans that required synchronized maneuver on the part of numerous elements, plans that looked brilliant on paper but had no chance in hell of coming off because they tended to neglect basic tactical and logistical considerations. Terrain. Weather. Communications. Ammo. Food. And once things started to unravel, their rigid adherence to doctrine prevented them from improvising and adapting to a rapidly changing battlefield.


----------



## AWP (Oct 5, 2014)

Ocoka One said:


> The Japanese had a lot of strange notions about fighting that stemmed from _Bushido, _the samurai warrior's code. And it screwed them up. For instance, they neglected to provide sufficient escorts for their convoys (the lifeline of any island nation) because escort duty was seen as _demeaning; _the proper place for any naval officer in the IJN was on the bridge of a warship engaged in battle. It wasn't until late in the war when US subs were decimating the Japanese merchant fleet that somebody figured it might be a good idea to swallow some of that samurai arrogance and pride. But by then it was too late.
> 
> The Marines on Guadalcanal grew contemptuous of the fighting skills of the Japanese soldier. At the Ilu river, they slaughtered the Japanese, who continued to charge across open ground, standing upright in close packed groups, screaming, waving swords. "Whoever told these dumb bastards they were soldiers?" in the famous words of one Marine...and the soldiers who were slaughtered were considered some of Japan's best. The _Banzai _charge...a ridiculous waste of life, a hold-over from samurai days. It had no place in an age of automatic weapons. Again, it wasn't until later in the war when the high command forbid suicidal charges and ordered defenders to dig in and fight to the last man.
> 
> And another odd trait in Japanese warfare of the period was their inflexibility...and their penchant for complicated battle plans that required synchronized maneuver on the part of numerous elements, plans that looked brilliant on paper but had no chance in hell of coming off because they tended to neglect basic tactical and logistical considerations. Terrain. Weather. Communications. Ammo. Food. And once things started to unravel, their rigid adherence to doctrine prevented them from improvising and adapting to a rapidly changing battlefield.


 
You are on the money with your last paragraph. The Navy in particular was very guilty of complex plans with many moving parts. They never really learned their lesson even after Midway. Look at the naval battles around the PI in 44-45.

I disagree with your premise behind the lack of an ASW capability. While that and prestige (Why should I command a destroyer when I can command a battleship?) played a role the Japanese were guilty of other greater sins. I think foremost, and they did this throughout the war as well*, is that they projected their doctrine or capabilities upon the US. For example, the IJN considered subs to act as scouting vessels. Despite the experience of the UK (and obvious parallels to Japan), the IJN never considered convoy raiding to be a sub's main focus. They were still viewed as scouts and why worry about ASW when the enemy is sending scouts after you? They tied their hands by assuming we would use our sub force int he same manner as the IJN. Their second great failing is that they assumed the war would be short-lived, another reason they had no long term plans. You don't have to devote finite resources to ASW if the war will be over in a year. They weren't behind us in technology because they were stupid, near-sighted, buck-toothed savages, but because they believed with one or two decisive battles our will to continue the fight would crumble. Hence they didn't concernt hemselves with sonor or radar until it was too late. Radar was just entering the fleet in June 1942, though none of the ships had it at the battle, unlike the American navy. Japanese naval doctrine was built around sending a massive blow at long range, hence aircraft without armor or self-sealing fuel tanks. The IJN could launch and recover a strike before our ships could close the distance which was part of the plan.

* - We've done it too. Our historians tend to look at what the other guy did or didn't do by basing their actions on ours. Carriers in the UK, USA, and Japan were all different with different strengths and weaknesses (particularly the air groups), so we tend to assume that carrier operations are the same the world over and that isn't the case. Look at Soviet and UK carriers in the 80's when compared to the US. The former have a very limited offensive capability whereas our carriers are the backbone of our navy. Ships of the same classification don't have the same capabilities and people tend to forget that.


----------



## JBS (Oct 5, 2014)

Just ordered Shattered Sword.  

Looks like an awesome read.


----------



## Gunz (Oct 6, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> I disagree with your premise behind the lack of an ASW capability. While that and prestige (Why should I command a destroyer when I can command a battleship?) played a role the Japanese were guilty of other greater sins. I think foremost, and they did this throughout the war as well*, is that they projected their doctrine or capabilities upon the US. For example, the IJN considered subs to act as scouting vessels. Despite the experience of the UK (and obvious parallels to Japan), the IJN never considered convoy raiding to be a sub's main focus. They were still viewed as scouts and why worry about ASW when the enemy is sending scouts after you? They tied their hands by assuming we would use our sub force int he same manner as the IJN. Their second great failing is that they assumed the war would be short-lived, another reason they had no long term plans.


 
I probably gave too much emphasis on dignity. But as you say it did play a role. IJN sub captains were more prone to go after warships than merchant vessels or transports. I wonder what would've happened had they mounted wolfpack-style tactics on convoys to Australia and NZ?

Yamamoto, who had spent considerable time in the US, was well aware of our industrial potential.  And he knew that Japan would have to deliver a crushing blow to our Navy within the first 6 months if they were to force us to the negotiating table. And that's the real delusion. The admiral was savvy enough to realize that once our industry got on a war-footing, Japan's free ride would be over--but he and many others in the IJN held on to this fantasy idea that America would want to negotiate a settlement once her naval power was crippled in the Pacific. And the easy victories Japan enjoyed from China through Singapore (Victory Disease) only helped to cloud their vision and perpetuate unrealistic assumptions. As you say, no long-term plans. They figured if they stung us bad enough we'd leave their Co-East Asia Prosperity Sphere alone and go away to fight the Germans.

(BTW Free, has Shattered Sword delved into the problems with the exploder on the American Mark 14 torpedo? The saga is akin to that of the M16 controversy of the Vietnam War.)


----------



## AWP (Oct 6, 2014)

Ocoka One said:


> (BTW Free, has Shattered Sword delved into the problems with the exploder on the American Mark 14 torpedo? The saga is akin to that of the M16 controversy of the Vietnam War.)


 
Briefly. One of the many books I've plowed through in the last few years had a much better write-up of that saga, but I forget which one. Sword covered it enough to provide the reader with some familiarity, but not an in depth explanation.

IIRC, one somewhat ironic contribution of our sub force was an early attack led a destroyer to depth charge it. After holding the sub down, once the carriers left its area, the DD then took off at high speed to rejoin the fleet. One of our air groups spotted that ship's wake and then flew down that azimuth, thus discovering the carriers.


----------

