# Special Operations Command Seeks Bigger Role in Conflict Prevention



## Ravage (Jan 17, 2013)

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=983







U.S. special operations forces are the nation’s most celebrated terrorist killers. But they also have underutilized skills that could help prevent wars, officials said. 

The war against al-Qaida and other Islamic extremist groups has become more complex since the 9/11 attacks, said Army Lt. Gen. John Mulholland, deputy commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. Navy SEAL raids and precision drone strikes alone will not be enough to defeat these enemies, he said.

“We have known for a long time that we are not going to kill our way to victory,” Mulholland said Nov. 28 at a Defense Strategies Institute conference, in Alexandria, Va.

What is needed, he said, are “preemptive efforts before the fight starts.”

Counterterrorism is “much broader than direct action,” he said. SOCOM Commander Adm. William McRaven is a strong believer in indirect methods of fighting terrorist groups, Mulholland said. 

McRaven would like to see special operations forces take on a larger role in the training of foreign allies — an activity known in military-speak as “building partner capacity.” Strengthening the internal security of friendly countries where al-Qaida and its affiliates are recruiting members would help counter these groups’ influence, and possibly prevent a wider conflict, SOCOM leaders believe. 

Army Special Forces, or Green Berets, have been deployed in these capacity-building roles for decades, but a more sustained effort is needed, said Mulholland. SOCOM’s skills and resources should help the United States stay “to the left of problems,” he said, instead of having to intervene later and put U.S. military forces in harm’s way.

Since McRaven took charge of SOCOM in 2011, he has sought to expand the command’s authorities in several areas, one of which is building partners’ capacity. The current process is “suboptimal,” Mulholland said, because it is rooted in the Cold War, when the world was bipolar. “We don’t believe it gives us what we need today to build capacity in areas of the world that matter,” he said. SOCOM would like more flexibility to establish long-term relationships with partners that are facing threats from al-Qaida and its affiliates, he said. “We lack the ability to deliver a program to a country that needs help. We’re looking for authorities to get at that challenge more meaningfully.”

Africa, particularly, is an area “where we should invest,” he said. Weak internal security in several African nations is raising concerns about these countries becoming safe havens for terrorist groups, Mulholland noted. A case in point is Mali, where al-Qaida's North African wing has taken over significant portions of the country.

SOCOM sees Mali as a cautionary tale. “We know what needs to be done with partners,” said Mulholland. “But we don’t have the tools.” 

SOCOM’s request for broader powers to fight terrorism has stirred controversy inside the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. It was the topic of a House Armed Services Committee emerging threats subcommittee hearing in July. Linda Robinson, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on special operations forces, told the panel that SOCOM’s proposal had merit.

SOF units that currently are training partner militaries are “not properly resourced, organized or supported to fully maximize their potential,” she said. “Successful employment of the indirect approach requires both proactive involvement and patience for the effort to produce results.”

SOCOM officials recognize that Congress tends to be skeptical of open-ended efforts, and that their plan might be a tough sell.

“It requires placing SOF teams out in troubled regions for extended periods so they can gain familiarity, knowledge and relationships and then begin to execute solutions with the resident partners,” said Robinson. “This runs counter to a common tendency to wait until crises are full blown and action is imperative.”

She cited Colombia and The Philippines as examples of successful preemptive actions by SOF. In Colombia, more than a decade of “sustained, small footprint advisory assistance helped that country to greatly weaken the narco-terrorist insurgency known as the FARC,” Robinson said. “The Philippines is another case worthy of study to build a template for successful application of the indirect approach and achievement of enduring results.”

SOCOM’s desire for enhanced authority to deploy training teams in vulnerable countries is only one piece of a sweeping transformation that McRaven is seeking in how SOF units are employed worldwide.

The admiral raised hackles in Washington last year when he asked for direct control over the so-called theater special operations commands. TSOCs currently report to the geographic combatant commanders. But McRaven has argued that the TSOCs should be overseen directly by SOCOM to ensure they are sufficiently staffed and resourced to provide meaningful help to regional commanders. 

Robinson said TSOCs have “chronically lacked adequate staff and resources” and are considered “career-ending assignments.” TSOCs should, instead, be the place where SOF skills and regional expertise should come together, said Robinson.

McRaven has proposed that TSOCs become sub-unified commands of U.S. SOCOM. He has argued that this is not a power grab by the command, but rather an attempt to better support geographic commanders. “It does create for the first time a coherent connection between TSOC and mother SOCOM,” Mulholland said. He insisted that McRaven’s plan will allow SOF to respond to crises in a timely manner. When the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi was attacked Sept. 11, a SOF company assigned to U.S. Africa Command — known as “cinc in-extremis” force — was located at the U.S. Naval Air Station in Sigonella, Italy. 

“Those forces worked as advertised. They were in position,” Mulholland said. But they were physically too far from the action to be able to intervene quickly enough. Mulholland declined to discuss the particulars of the events in Benghazi but he did suggest that if SOCOM were given more discretion to move forces around based on anticipated threats, SOF quick-reaction units could be far more effective. “To be relevant in this security environment, you have to be ahead of the crisis,” he said.

If a geographic commander needs SOF assistance today, he has to submit a request for forces to the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. “That takes time,” said Mulholland. McRaven wants to be able to short-circuit that process and provide immediate help. If necessary, he would move forces horizontally from one theater to another.

Mulholland noted that only 6 percent of SOF are assigned to theaters. The majority of the 66,000-strong command is based in the United States and reports directly to SOCOM headquarters, in Tampa, Fla.

“Today McRaven doesn’t have a formal relationship with TSOCs. It’s bizarre,” Mulholland said.

McRaven’s proposed reorganization requires a revision to the Unified Command Plan. The president must approve any changes to the UCP, which was last updated in April 2011. "The current review process is still underway, but I don't have an estimate for its completion," Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. James O. Gregory told National Defense.

“We think it’s going well,” said Mulholland. But he cautioned against counting chickens before they hatch. “We think it will be successful. COCOMs [combatant commanders] support it.”

SOCOM is seeking expanded responsibilities at a time when the command is busier and bigger than ever. With 66,000 members — including both military personnel and civilians — SOCOM has doubled since 2001. Its budget of $10.5 billion is more than twice its 2001 inflation-adjusted budget of $4.2 billion.

“SOF operators have never been held in higher regard by our nation, by the public, by our international partners and, more importantly, by our adversaries,” said Garry Reid, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

SOCOM will grow to 71,000 members by 2018, Reid told the Defense Strategies Institute conference. 

Reid endorsed McRaven’s plan to bolster theater-based forces. “We need to regain some regional specialization,” he said. Before 9/11, SOF were spread around the world. But during the past decade, 85 percent of SOF has been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, in support of U.S. Central Command. “That comes at a price,” said Reid. “We want to get back to understanding other areas and languages.”

Even as current wars wind down, the demand for SOF will no subside, said Reid. In addition to traditional SOF assignments, “there’s an increased appetite for SOF ‘liaisons’” at embassies and across U.S. and foreign government agencies, he said. “That’s a lot of 04s and 05s [field grade officers] that come out of the operational force,” said Reid. “We have a bulge of requirements.”


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## DA SWO (Jan 17, 2013)

I thought FID was already part of the METL?


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## Marauder06 (Jan 17, 2013)

Mulholland (in the picture) was my first commander at 5th Group and I was in JSOC a bit of the time he was there.

It's interesting to me that there's a push to make the TSOCs more relevant.  I was told that in many cases, "TSOCs are where SOF officers' careers go to die," meaning that in many cases "the best" officers, especially in units like SF, go not to TSOCs but to stateside units, like Groups.  I guess that isn't the case after all.  There are certainly exceptions; IIRC McRaven commanded the European TSOC, and he ended up doing OK career-wise.  

My personal experience with the TSOCs (and I definitely didn't work with all of them) was that they were largely searching for relevancy and legitimacy in the face of organizations like the Ranger Regiment, all of the Groups, and JSOC.


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## DA SWO (Jan 17, 2013)

The problem with TSOC's is they have no operational authority.  The are(or were, when I was active) planning staffs that stay in place and watched CONUS based units come in and establish a C/JSOTF as needed.

They have been USSOCOMs unfunded, we can cut from the budget source for years.  This makes what, the 3rd or 4th attempt at making TSOC's relevant.  They become relevant the second we make them the nucleus of the deployed JSOTF.


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## Marauder06 (Jan 17, 2013)

I think that's the problem.  Why would anyone make a TSOC the nucleus of a CJSOTF?  It makes much more sense to have a Group do it (if they were properly organized and prepared for it, especially on the enabler side).  A Group has a very robust staff, it has organic combat, combat support, and combat service support elements, it has more credibility within the SOF community, and everyone is used to working together.  Unless we are going to make each TSOC a Group, I don't see a role for them in a CJSOTF instead as individual augmentees for jobs Groups can't fill internally.


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## AWP (Jan 17, 2013)

Marauder06 said:


> I think that's the problem. Why would anyone make a TSOC the nucleus of a CJSOTF? It makes much more sense to have a Group do it (if they were properly organized and prepared for it, especially on the enabler side). A Group has a very robust staff, it has organic combat, combat support, and combat service support elements, it has more credibility within the SOF community, and everyone is used to working together. Unless we are going to make each TSOC a Group, I don't see a role for them in a CJSOTF instead as individual augmentees for jobs Groups can't fill internally.


 
How many TSOC's are there? 7 Groups, even running 2 or 3 TSOC's, means that the Group can't do its job. If Group is staffed well enough to chop personnel to a TSOC and still function, then why are those pax at Group to begin with? Are we going to have a version of the Navy's Blue and Gold crews for Group's HHC?

Conversely at the detachment level, I'd chafe at going from working with X or Y Group's staff, personalities, and mindset stateside to an entirely new structure and personalities. I'm sure it already happens, but I can't see it being very beneficial to the involved parties.

I kind of have to wonder if part of this is the result of shoe-horning different SOF elements together, elements which weren't designed to work together like they are today. The Joint concept is broken down here in the tree level so I don't see it improving much at the forest.

This almost becomes a chicken/ egg discussion.


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## Marauder06 (Jan 17, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> How many TSOC's are there? 7 Groups, even running 2 or 3 TSOC's, means that the Group can't do its job. If Group is staffed well enough to chop personnel to a TSOC and still function, then why are those pax at Group to begin with? Are we going to have a version of the Navy's Blue and Gold crews for Group's HHC?
> 
> Conversely at the detachment level, I'd chafe at going from working with X or Y Group's staff, personalities, and mindset stateside to an entirely new structure and personalities. I'm sure it already happens, but I can't see it being very beneficial to the involved parties.
> 
> ...


 
I'm not sure what you're talking about here, brother.  Groups don't run TSOCs, or vice-versa.  They are totally separate entities.  Groups run CJSOTFs forward, and AFAIK there are only like three of these.


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## Karoshi (Jan 17, 2013)

Your font size selection, it sucks.


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## AWP (Jan 17, 2013)

Marauder06 said:


> I'm not sure what you're talking about here, brother. Groups don't run TSOCs, or vice-versa. They are totally separate entities. Groups run CJSOTFs forward, and AFAIK there are only like three of these.


 
I think I misead your original post. I thought you were arguing that a Group would form a TSOC instead of CJSOTF.

I really shouldn't post before my afternoon nap.


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## amlove21 (Jan 17, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> I think I misead your original post. I thought you were arguing that a Group would form a TSOC instead of CJSOTF.
> 
> I really shouldn't post before my afternoon nap.


Pfffft, old people.


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## RackMaster (Jan 17, 2013)

amlove21 said:


> Pfffft, old people.


 
Don't bad mouth the afternoon nap.  Some day it will become essential to your survival and you will need to have them more than just the afternoon.   Then you die. :dead:


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## AWP (Jan 17, 2013)

amlove21 said:


> Pfffft, old people.


 
I'm pretty sure I'm not taking a ration of shit from a supposed barrel-chested freedom fighter who uses "product" in their hair. Is personal grooming included in "crew rest" or is that an extra 4 hours a day you don't have to work?

I have other questions, but you probably need to spend more time in the AFSOC forum answering gear questions or going down to the LRS, punching your supply NCO in the dick for ordering "gel" instead of "fiber". Actually, I do have a question:

Belt or drop holster...for your hair dryer?

:troll:


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## amlove21 (Jan 17, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> I'm pretty sure I'm not taking a ration of shit from a supposed barrel-chested freedom fighter who uses "product" in their hair. Is personal grooming included in "crew rest" or is that an extra 4 hours a day you don't have to work?
> 
> I have other questions, but you probably need to spend more time in the AFSOC forum answering gear questions or going down to the LRS, punching your supply NCO in the dick for ordering "gel" instead of "fiber". Actually, I do have a question:
> 
> ...


Full disclosure- I had absolutely ZERO insight to the actual thread- there were so many things I didn't understand I actually forgot how to do math just reading it. 

THAT being said- YOWZA hit a nerve with the nap comment eh Free? 

My personal grooming is done both on my own time and during work hours. That's a little something I like to call "Excellence in all I GROOM." And yes, I have now spent roughly 40-50 hours in PM, giving my sizes and personal likes to a group of "Airsoft Badasses", to ensure correct mannequin display. Did I think it was creepy when he asked about my genitals? Yes. Did I still send pics? OF COURSE. I take the "Airsoft Mentor" forum very very seriously. 

And what kind of day 1 question is that? Fiber. IWB holster. Why would I want to draw attention from my short shorts?!


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## AWP (Jan 17, 2013)

amlove21 said:


> Full disclosure- I had absolutely ZERO insight to the actual thread- there were so many things I didn't understand I actually forgot how to do math just reading it.
> 
> THAT being said- YOWZA hit a nerve with the nap comment eh Free?
> 
> ...


 
I'm not old, I'm big boned. Or something. Yeah, that sounds right.

Besides, war profiteering with a lack of morals dictates that if I can't take more than 3 sodas from the DFAC, I can at least stick it to the man by catching a quick, post lunch, 45 minute chair nap. If I don't sleep on shift, who's going to do it?  Last night's snow forced me to go outside, in the cold, to clean antennas (or _antennae_ if you prefer) so that the mightiest air force on the planet can deliver AIR POWER to the foes of freedom.

This is war, son, sacrifices must be made and I made mine.

I gave up a nap for freedom. Can you say the same thing?

Now get off my lawn.


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## amlove21 (Jan 17, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> I'm not old, I'm big boned. Or something. Yeah, that sounds right.
> 
> Besides, war profiteering with a lack of morals dictates that if I can't take more than 3 sodas from the DFAC, I can at least stick it to the man by catching a quick, post lunch, 45 minute chair nap. If I don't sleep on shift, who's going to do it? Last night's snow forced me to go outside, in the cold, to clean antennas (or _antennae_ if you prefer) so that the mightiest air force on the planet can deliver AIR POWER to the foes of freedom.
> 
> ...


Bahahahah touche. Well played.


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## reed11b (Jan 17, 2013)

amlove21 said:


> Pfffft, old people.


At first I "liked" this, and then I realized "wait a minute, I'M old!" Then I "hated" it. I'll get you next year zoomie! 
Reed


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