# CSAR-X



## DA SWO (Jun 26, 2014)

Looks like CSAR-X will be a HH-60M.

Heads should have rolled when the original award was overturned.

http://www.sikorsky.com/About+Sikor...cmid=fb6bfa503f8d6410VgnVCM1000004f62529fRCRD


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## AWP (Jun 26, 2014)

Didn't the rescue community ask for anything but a -60 derivative?


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## amlove21 (Jun 26, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> Didn't the rescue community ask for anything but a -60 derivative?


 Well it depends on what "community" we are talking about.

The Helo guys and the Teams are two different entities, however, don't have the same backing or thrust in the conversation. Why we would ever continue to go with the 60 (light power, no altitude, minimal space, etc) over something like, I don't know, the 46/47 variant is just beyond me. Just smething bigger, stronger, faster than the 60. Maybe even something that could, you know, carry vehicles, or a security team, or anything that could help out during rescue ops.

But, again, what I want and what the helicopter community wants could be vastly different. I just wanna treat patients in a vehicle that can get me and 20 other fully loaded dudes there.


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## AWP (Jun 26, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> But, again, what I want and what the helicopter community wants could be vastly different. I just wanna treat patients in a vehicle that can get me and 20 other fully loaded dudes there.


 
And the other half is...


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## Muppet (Jun 26, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> And the other half is...



God fucking damn it Free! What can be seen cannot be unseen! 

F.M.


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## amlove21 (Jun 26, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> And the other half is...


I wish I had some clue. I know there are some smart dudes out there, but other than protecting the legacy, I just don't see what the difference in vertical lift platforms means to the 'rescue triad'.


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## DA SWO (Jun 26, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> I wish I had some clue. I know there are some smart dudes out there, but other than protecting the legacy, I just don't see what the difference in vertical lift platforms means to the 'rescue triad'.


Let me make a uninformed, semi-educated educated guess.
Money, or lack there of.
HH-60M is essentially a proven/known quantity that can be had relatively cheap.
I don't know the cost difference, but would think a HH-47 would take money from the KC-46/F-35 community (Thank you Sec Gates).

@amlove21   Was the H-92's performance better then the HH-60's?


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## amlove21 (Jun 27, 2014)

SOWT said:


> Let me make a uninformed, semi-educated educated guess.
> Money, or lack there of.
> HH-60M is essentially a proven/known quantity that can be had relatively cheap.
> I don't know the cost difference, but would think a HH-47 would take money from the KC-46/F-35 community (Thank you Sec Gates).
> ...


The MH 47 is a known quantity and proven. Fastest helo in the inventory w the most power. Thought to be a 'trash hauler' prior to OEF. 

As for the 92's performance- I liked it well above the 60. Issues,sure. But personal preference? 53. All day.


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## Ranger Psych (Jun 27, 2014)

53 or a 47 just seem like they'd be a good match for ya'lls mission, all things considered. Especially since those are the only 2 platforms that can bring something home versus having to blow the snot out of it hoping it gets destroyed enough, while having the room to work casualties inside "comfortably"


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## AWP (Jun 27, 2014)

Plus with a -47 you could carry some Security Forces to protect you. They could put the "combat" in "combat rescue."


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## DA SWO (Jun 27, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> The MH 47 is a known quantity and proven. Fastest helo in the inventory w the most power. Thought to be a 'trash hauler' prior to OEF.
> 
> As for the 92's performance- I liked it well above the 60. Issues,sure. But personal preference? 53. All day.


Then why do the pilots keep gravitating towards the smaller airframes?


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## amlove21 (Jun 27, 2014)

SOWT said:


> Then why do the pilots keep gravitating towards the smaller airframes?


No clue, really. I think it might be my ignorance, but I just can't see/understand why.


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## AWP (Jun 27, 2014)

SOWT said:


> Then why do the pilots keep gravitating towards the smaller airframes?


 
I have to wonder if it is a combination of fiscal, operational needs (probably a cheaper airframe and there's minimal retraining involved for aircrew and maintainers, plus facilities and squadrons are built around the -60 airframe), the mission isn't "sexy" or totally embraced by Big Blue (ACC to be specific),a dn the need for a large patient  capacity is discarded ("The GWOT is an aberration, PJ's don't do MASCAL scenarios, small crews = small PR airframes"). This could even be a political compromise/ vote-getter for all we know.

Cynically I have to wonder if the pilots don't like the -47 because it is a flying box and the Hawk is a bit more "sporty" looking to the eye.

As a non-aviator I understand the -47's performance exceeds the -60's and is more suitable for PR, but I'd place my bets on this coming down to money (training and existing facilities) and manpower (Hawk has 4, Chinook has a minimum of 5...and I can't speak to the maintenance manning requirements).


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## Red-Dot (Jun 27, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> Plus with a -47 you could carry some Security Forces to protect you. They could put the "combat" in "combat rescue."



Security Farces make me nauseous.


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## DA SWO (Jun 27, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> I have to wonder if it is a combination of fiscal, operational needs (probably a cheaper airframe and there's minimal retraining involved for aircrew and maintainers, plus facilities and squadrons are built around the -60 airframe), the mission isn't "sexy" or totally embraced by Big Blue (ACC to be specific),a dn the need for a large patient  capacity is discarded ("The GWOT is an aberration, PJ's don't do MASCAL scenarios, small crews = small PR airframes"). This could even be a political compromise/ vote-getter for all we know.
> 
> Cynically I have to wonder if the pilots don't like the -47 because it is a flying box and the Hawk is a bit more "sporty" looking to the eye.
> 
> As a non-aviator I understand the -47's performance exceeds the -60's and is more suitable for PR, but I'd place my bets on this coming down to money (training and existing facilities) and manpower (Hawk has 4, Chinook has a minimum of 5...and I can't speak to the maintenance manning requirements).


Good points.


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## Blizzard (Jun 27, 2014)

SOWT said:


> Then why do the pilots keep gravitating towards the smaller airframes?


It's not so much the pilots as it is the politicians.  The -60 won by default when the RFP was rewritten in a way that pre-determined the "winner".  The RFP process sucks...

The initial award of CSAR-X to the -47 was probably the right call given the offerings.   Let's see, the requested need was for:

Speed
Range
Cabin Space (3 PJs and 4 litters)
Survivability
Battlespace Awareness
All Weather Operability
And these are all strengths of this new -60 varaint?  Hmmm. 

SOAR doesn't seem to have an issues with their variant of the -47.

Sadly, rather than getting the right equipment down range for the mission, the cynic in me says "real" requirements appear to be:

Who has what current contracts; should Boeing get another?  or should it be spread around?
Who is the most power with the most constituents at risk should a contract not be awarded?
etc..


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## policemedic (Jun 27, 2014)

Red-Dot said:


> Security Farces make me nauseous.



Hater.


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## SkrewzLoose (Jun 27, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> Plus with a -47 you could carry some Security Forces to protect you. They could put the "combat" in "combat rescue."


Hmm, I seem to have heard that somewhere before...  
I trust my royalty check is in the mail.


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## Teufel (Jun 28, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> And the other half is...


Ahhhh Papua New Guinea.  Very familiar unfortunately


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## amlove21 (Jun 29, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> Plus with a -47 you could carry some Security Forces to protect you. They could put the "combat" in "combat rescue."


LOL. They tried once, and called it DAGR, and it failed. Miserably. I would prefer a force that knows how to do security, thats just me. 


Blizzard said:


> It's not so much the pilots as it is the politicians.  The -60 won by default when the RFP was rewritten in a way that pre-determined the "winner".  The RFP process sucks...
> 
> The initial award of CSAR-X to the -47 was probably the right call given the offerings.   Let's see, the requested need was for:
> 
> ...


BAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA.

Phew, thanks man, I haven't laughed like that since I was a little girl. Maybe they mean litters unfolded, or still in the SKEDCO bags....


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## DA SWO (Jun 29, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> LOL. They tried once, and called it DAGR, and it failed. Miserably. I would prefer a force that knows how to do security, thats just me.
> 
> BAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA.
> 
> Phew, thanks man, I haven't laughed like that since I was a little girl. Maybe they mean litters unfolded, or still in the SKEDCO bags....


OK,
Tell me more.
I knew the concept as SST, S(AR) Security Team (an acronym in an acronym, awesome x 2)


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## amlove21 (Jun 29, 2014)

SOWT said:


> OK,
> Tell me more.
> I knew the concept as SST, S(AR) Security Team (an acronym in an acronym, awesome x 2)


So there was a push for a while to get us out own SST (both your acronyms are correct) instead of requesting outside forces. Makes sense, right? Organic rescue force as a single package right?

I'll speak anecdotally (I was t there first hand), but from guys who were- they basically set up a training exercise for the joint forces. That training exercise went so badly that the idea literally died. 

From the several stories I have heard, the PJs involved offered to help with employment (fast roping, overland, helo work, etc) and the general response was "Thanks, but we are ground guys we got this." 

They didn't. And it showed, and that's why the 'infantry of the air force' does not provide security for a force that requests it from outside services.


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## DA SWO (Jun 29, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> So there was a push for a while to get us out own SST (both your acronyms are correct) instead of requesting outside forces. Makes sense, right? Organic rescue force as a single package right?
> 
> I'll speak anecdotally (I was t there first hand), but from guys who were- they basically set up a training exercise for the joint forces. That training exercise went so badly that the idea literally died.
> 
> ...


I'll blame the cops, AFSOC and ACC for this one.
The correct way would have been as assessment to select the best cops.  Then run those selected through an Advanced Skills Course to get them up to speed on SAR Tactics/Support procedures.

Too many folks think a Silver Flag-Alpha (or whatever it's now called) or Ranger Tab makes one an operator.

Another reason I tell folks to avoid Security Forces as an AFSC.  Lot of good folks, but non-existent leadership.


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## Kheenbish (Jun 30, 2014)

Did an exercise with these "DAGR" teams at Cannon while being part of OPFOR, one guy said he was picked because he failed out of the PJ indoc... another one of these high speed guys told me it was against the rules when I took his weapon as he put it through the window to clear the room.


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## amlove21 (Jun 30, 2014)

Kheenbish said:


> Did an exercise with these "DAGR" teams at Cannon while being part of OPFOR, one guy said he was picked because he failed out of the PJ indoc... another one of these high speed guys told me it was against the rules when I took his weapon as he put it through the window to clear the room.


The program is still around in some form or fashion, I just dont know what that is. I had heard it was completely done, but then started back up, whatever.

Many more of these types of stories vs. "Yea, I worked with them they were ok." And there are exactly ZERO "Those guys were locked on" stories.

ETA- I was wrong in the acronym. It's DAGRE


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## AWP (Jun 30, 2014)

From amlove's link above:



> They have all received certification from the Air Force's PHOENIX RAVEN program....


 
That may be a good program, but I've seen it utilized here* and all I can say is:







You can have all of the hard dicks in the world, all of them*, but if their leadership is jacked up then it doesn't matter. You're rockin' jello penis.

* - Pulling security while the aircrew eats pizza? You went to school for that?

* - I'm skeptical of Security Force's actual percentage, but I think it is pretty low.


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## DA SWO (Jun 30, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> From amlove's link above:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I think most of the good Airman leave security Forces at the 4-6 year mark (i.e. re-enlist for a new AFSC).  Weather TACP and a few other AFSC's get a lot of Cross-Trainees as SrA/SSgt's.

That leaves the wannabees to parade around and pretend to be Security Professionals.

I blame ACC and AMC for the low standards.


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## AWP (Jun 30, 2014)

SOWT said:


> I think most of the good Airman leave security Forces at the 4-6 year mark (i.e. re-enlist for a new AFSC).  Weather TACP and a few other AFSC's get a lot of Cross-Trainees as SrA/SSgt's.
> 
> That leaves the wannabees to parade around and pretend to be Security Professionals.
> 
> I blame ACC and AMC for the low standards.


 
We had a contracrtor do this and he ran into two problems:

1. Though he retired after 20 years, he didn't carry his AFSF time on his resume. The gov't frowns upon such things apparently (or at least whoever does the resume review prior to hiring). When asked about it he admitted that he was embarrassed to have that 6 year block on his resume. Which is probably true....

2. .....because when other techs found out he was in the dog house for a bit. "Something's wrong with him if he was Security Forces." Better or worse, there's a stigma attached and one site didn't take the guy precisely because of his background.

I personally think the guy is a goober, but he was a solid enough tech out here and should be judged on those merits (or lack thereof). For him to omit his AFSF time, it leads me to believe that it's caused issues before.


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## Kheenbish (Jul 1, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> The program is still around in some form or fashion, I just dont know what that is. I had heard it was completely done, but then started back up, whatever.
> 
> Many more of these types of stories vs. "Yea, I worked with them they were ok." And there are exactly ZERO "Those guys were locked on" stories.
> 
> ETA- I was wrong in the acronym. It's DAGRE


 
They explained it to me as the Phoenix Ravens who protect SOF Aircraft. They're awarded a number and a dagger at the end of their grueling training... A buddy of mine who is a Loadmaster/Gunner on the C-130 Gunships says they're  a bunch of guys who think there killer SOF security robot ninjas, and they prefer not to have them since he is just as qualified on the M4/M9 as they are.


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## amlove21 (Jul 1, 2014)

Kheenbish said:


> They explained it to me as the Phoenix Ravens who protect SOF Aircraft. They're awarded a number and a dagger at the end of their grueling training... A buddy of mine who is a Loadmaster/Gunner on the C-130 Gunships says they're  a bunch of guys who think there killer SOF security robot ninjas, and they prefer not to have them since he is just as qualified on the M4/M9 as they are.


I have had friends that were Ravens in the past- good dudes (and two girls that were some of the most squared away E4's I had ever met), but they knew the cup game they were playing. They were only cool because they had no pretension. 

Most of these other guys- read every single person in the 820th Security Forces Group or whatever- are awful to be around and engaged in a big dick game no one else cares to play cause they're too busy screwing the prom queen.


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## busdriver (Jul 2, 2014)

amlove21: In this case the 60 Mike was the only option due to fiscal constraints.  I think it was the right choice for the short term, what CSAR really needs is something more along the lines of Sikorsky's X-2; able to fly high and fast and in my opinion something 60 sized without the aux tanks is about right.  

First; we talk about larger PR and rightfully so, if we actually change the way we train AF Rescue can basically be a multi-mission QRF for the entire DoD.  But that isn't our designated mission, if we're honest with ourselves, our job is to pickup fighter pilots in a conventional war.  

That mission requires the ability to survive in a radar threat environment and big ass helos are a detriment to that.  Likewise inserting a large ground force that will be instantly surrounded and out numbered well behind enemy lines will be a detriment.  We have to design our force around our baseline mission, then explore what else we can do after addressing the baseline requirement.  If a lower intensity conflict allows and requires extended GA ground ops with larger teams, the correct answer is to deploy more helos not build them bigger.  

As to what you can actually expect from the CRH from your perspective: 
Increased cabin room: we'll have the same endurance in the CRH with a 200 gallon tank as with the Golf with dual aux tanks, so you'll get about two feet of cabin back
Slightly better high/hot performance: we'll have a bit better technical rescue capability at high altitude
Other than that, the CRH is essentially a band aide to keep the 60 flying for another 15 or so years.  It's not the future of rescue, just a hold over until the FVL program comes to fruition.


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## TLDR20 (Jul 2, 2014)

busdriver said:


> post .



Great post, too bad you cannot follow simple instructions. Post an introduction in the proper place and then you can post here.


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## amlove21 (Jul 2, 2014)

busdriver said:


> amlove21: In this case the 60 Mike was the only option due to fiscal constraints.  I think it was the right choice for the short term, what CSAR really needs is something more along the lines of Sikorsky's X-2; able to fly high and fast and in my opinion something 60 sized without the aux tanks is about right.
> 
> First; we talk about larger PR and rightfully so, if we actually change the way we train AF Rescue can basically be a multi-mission QRF for the entire DoD.  But that isn't our designated mission, if we're honest with ourselves, our job is to pickup fighter pilots in a conventional war.
> 
> ...


I can not wait to violently disagree with this post. Looking forward to you posting an intro and getting vetted.


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## Ooh-Rah (Jul 2, 2014)

...every once in a while I bump into a thread that I can offer no educated opinion on, but know that it will be well worth clicking the "watch this thread" tag.  This is one such thread...


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## xGenoSiide (Jul 3, 2014)

SOWT said:


> ...Another reason I tell folks to avoid Security Forces as an AFSC.  Lot of good folks, but non-existent leadership...



As a cop, I couldn't have said this any better myself.  It says something when the best commanders I've had were STO's, with the exception of 1 that was prior enlisted. 



SOWT said:


> I think most of the good Airman leave security Forces at the 4-6 year mark (i.e. re-enlist for a new AFSC).  Weather TACP and a few other AFSC's get a lot of Cross-Trainees as SrA/SSgt's.
> 
> That leaves the wannabees to parade around and pretend to be Security Professionals.
> 
> I blame ACC and AMC for the low standards.



Exactly what I'm trying to do now. After spending 4 years at an ST and seeing some of the amazing things that these guys can do and some of the impacts that they have had, I simply cannot go back to the monotony that is a base firing range or 'patrol.'  I would absolutely lose my mind.



amlove21 said:


> I have had friends that were Ravens in the past- good dudes (and two girls that were some of the most squared away E4's I had ever met), but they knew the cup game they were playing. They were only cool because they had no pretension.
> 
> Most of these other guys- read every single person in the 820th Security Forces Group or whatever- are awful to be around and engaged in a big dick game no one else cares to play cause they're too busy screwing the prom queen.



Just had this conversation this week, and can echo the fact that the cool guys are the ones who are aware that they aren't all that special, just have a bit more, or rather different, training.


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## busdriver (Jul 3, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> I can not wait to violently disagree with this post. Looking forward to you posting an intro and getting vetted.


I figured you would, and it's certainly not flawless in-argueable logic.  I remember when the HH-47 was the answer, we were really wondering how it would change our tactics in the terminal area, then again there were more than a few pilots I knew that thought it was a great answer.   However, in this particular case it really was about money.


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## amlove21 (Jul 4, 2014)

busdriver said:


> I figured you would, and it's certainly not flawless in-argueable logic.  I remember when the HH-47 was the answer, we were really wondering how it would change our tactics in the terminal area, then again there were more than a few pilots I knew that thought it was a great answer.   However, in this particular case it really was about money.


For sure. It seems (just like the new seats pictured here, that take away 20% of the back and 400lbs of weight) that this was an idea that wasn't passed to, you know, the primary user group for the sanity check.

Know what would have been even more cost effective? _Not buying an airframe at all and re-focusing our efforts logically and pragmatically in a cost conscious culture and fiscally restrained environment. _Who knows how the new budgets are going to shake out? We could be tight- or, with some measured and mature planning/budgeting, the 60 community could find themselves the lucky recipient of money freed up from programs, personnel, and fiscal cuts- which is what has happened across the GA community, and isn't showing signs of fading immediately, if not any time soon. 

For all to note- @busdriver  is an AF Rescue 60 pilot, and he and I have a pretty good amount of time together on the same aircraft over 2 or 3 different spots. I am personally excited to talk about some topics (Joint PR, CSAR-X, so forth), but we are going to wait until his vetting is complete and his tag is assigned. Just want to make sure those reading know it's on the level.   

@Ooh-Rah1069 you can keep the popcorn warm buddy!


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## SpongeBob*24 (Jul 4, 2014)

Famous last words: "I thought you said you were a pilot!!!!"


:blkeye:


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## DA SWO (Jul 4, 2014)

@amlove21 @busdriver 
Why treat it as a new program if thy just went the HH-60 route?
Why not just say we are buying new 60's to replace the older birds?


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## amlove21 (Jul 4, 2014)

SOWT said:


> @amlove21 @busdriver
> Why treat it as a new program if thy just went the HH-60 route?
> Why not just say we are buying new 60's to replace the older birds?


I am going to defer to @busdriver on this one. He has way more insider/actual info than I have. 

As for my *opinion*? From my side of the fence, this entire- 'packaging' we will call it- is starting to chafe the Pararescue and CRO community, and the CSAR-X platform/program is a great example. 

We keep getting told we are part of the 'Triad', and I know what you're thinking, but it's not the totally badass Asian gangs. The Rescue Triad refers to the 60's, 130's, and Pararescue/CRO squadrons, now called "Guardian Angel" squadrons. 

Seems simple, right? Pararescue/CRO's (with SERE and specialized support) are a "non-aircraft based weapons system...GA may be visualized as the ground element of the USAF Rescue triad, and functions in conjunction with the HH-60 and HC-130, the vertical lift and fixed wing elements, respectively. When tasked separately, such as during Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force (JPRTF) operations, GA can work autonomously or be integrated with joint or coalition vertical lift, airdrop, command and control, resupply, and other platforms or weapon systems."

Well- it's not that simple. Because Pararescue has been so inexorably linked to the airframe (PJ's were once the gunners as well, and still hold aircrew classification, vice for example Combat Controllers who are 'mission essential ground personnel') that there is a lot- a _lot- _of confusion about what/where exactly the 3 entities fit in terms of priority. We have Rescue Wings- and there hasn't been a CRO Wing Commander yet, and many of these decisions are labelled as "For the Rescue Community"- without equal/full  representation. 

So, let's bring it full circle. Why not just say we are buying new 60's to replace the older birds? There isn't the money for that. 

But there _is _money for an already-named "Combat Rescue Helicopter" replacement when said program supports "The Triad"- which is funny, cause 1/3rd of the Triad goes, "Why the HELL are we buying new 60's, to replace the old 60's, when we could just go literally any other direction we want?"

We get the, "Yeah, yeah, guys, let us handle the aircraft part. We will decide on the best vertical lift rotary wing platform." The reaction we get when we point out that we are "non-aircraft based" and _we _can handle the ground element tasks (to include insertion/extraction of forces) or when we broach the subject of PR happening without the two remaining prongs of 'the triad' (which is doctrinally supported)? I would use words from 'incredulous' in some cases to 'mocking' in others to describe the response. 

Anyway, that's just one dude's opinion.


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## busdriver (Jul 4, 2014)

SOWT said:


> @amlove21 @busdriver
> Why treat it as a new program if thy just went the HH-60 route?
> Why not just say we are buying new 60's to replace the older birds?


At one point that was actually the plan, I can only guess that politics and the AF's apparent inability to run a successful competition led us down the current path.

The CSAR-X was the AF's number 2 acquisition priority at one point, meaning we can dream big.  Not so much the case with CRH, which almost didn't happen.  Actually back in Jan the plan was to SLEP the 60G, staff didn't think there'd be money for new iron.  That's the crux of the problem, the current fleet has aircraft well past design life in flight hours.  Some of the oldest birds actually started out as alpha models before being converted.  In the current fiscal environment, there were only two options: SLEP or buy more 60M's.  The only reason I think the CRH is the better plan is if we SLEP'd the 60G, our SPO would be running that program and I have zero faith in our SPO; ref those stupid ass seats they bought.

When I say 60 sized  cabin (minus the aux tanks) being about right, I'm referring the the smallest cabin I think is acceptable as my min requirement is the ability to self-SAR.  Bigger is fine, with the caveat it needs to be survivable in a radar environment.  The bigger you make the radar cross section, the more robust you have to make your countermeasures.  As an example if I'm going to rely on a jammer to defeat radar threats I have to have a high enough jam to signal ratio, the larger the aircraft the larger the signal so I need a more powerful jam amplifier which requires larger generators, more weight, bigger aircraft, etc.  It's kind of like the Lotus sports car philosophy vs the Lamborghini philosophy.

The reality of the situation is that the ideal recovery vehicle for CSAR doesn't exist, and since we'll never have the money to one-off design our own aircraft we'll always be beholden to tagging onto Army designs.  The same issue meant AFSOC had to tag onto the Marine design for the MV-22.  If I was king for the day, we'd have a vertical lift aircraft that was pressurized, could cruise at 250 knots in the mid 20's with some RCS reduction measures, with a radar jammer and the ability to sustain at least 4g and standoff weapons with requisite sensor.  I want an A-10 that can hover like a helo.  Like I said, pipe dream.

@amlove21 I know we said we'd not go too far down the PR doctrine nerd hole, but part of my point needs some explaining.  We're tasked with PR for the air component, a sub set mission of that is CSAR (more specifically the AF's chosen methodology for conducting air component PR) so PR is recovering isolated people, CSAR is the gaggle of aircraft swirling overhead a downed fighter pilot in a major conventional war.  I intentionally didn't talk about the team in that sentence.  It's the dichotomy of the AF Rescue community, my hardest/ highest threat mission that drives my aircraft design is conversely one of the simplest missions for the team.  There are of course exceptions to that very general statement (BAT21b was recovered by a ground team) but when ground dudes wonder what the hell is going through the aircrew guys heads, it can usually get traced back to what's my most demanding mission, and what's yours?

I fucking hate the Rescue Triad term, it's ridiculous and pigeon holing.  By its very nature it makes us all single mission "platforms."  In an era where multi-mission is the name of the game, we're making ourselves irrelevant in the joint environment.  

As to the CROs commanding larger Rescue units, I'm still a bit floating in the breeze as to what I think the correct answer is.  I'm adamantly against CROs commanding flying squadrons, but that's rooted in my belief that a squadron commander needs to lead from the front and fly.  Once you get to the group and especially the wing level I'm basically agnostic.  Once a guy is at the O-6 level he should be able to understand and lead Airman, period.  If that means we deploy as separate squadrons, so be it.  But that goes back to deploying as tiny units, pigeon holed into a single role.  And clearly I'm at the point where I don't have well defined thoughts anymore so I'll close this post.


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## AWP (Jul 4, 2014)

busdriver said:


> When I say 60 sized  cabin (minus the aux tanks) being about right, I'm referring the the smallest cabin I think is acceptable as my min requirement is the ability to self-SAR.  Bigger is fine, with the caveat it needs to be survivable in a radar environment.  The bigger you make the radar cross section, the more robust you have to make your countermeasures.  As an example if I'm going to rely on a jammer to defeat radar threats I have to have a high enough jam to signal ratio, the larger the aircraft the larger the signal so I need a more powerful jam amplifier which requires larger generators, more weight, bigger aircraft, etc.  It's kind of like the Lotus sports car philosophy vs the Lamborghini philosophy.


 
As a non-aviator and from a purely perfromance standpoint, what's wrong with the MH-47G for PR? The RCS is higher than a -60? Faster, greater range, larger cabin, higher ceiling (hover height or whatever it is called)...

I don't have to be a PJ to see the -60's limitations. The PR mission appears to have out run the -60's design.


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## amlove21 (Jul 4, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> As a non-aviator and from a purely perfromance standpoint, what's wrong with the MH-47G for PR? The RCS is higher than a -60? Faster, greater range, larger cabin, higher ceiling (hover height or whatever it is called)...
> 
> I don't have to be a PJ to see the -60's limitations. The PR mission appears to have out run the -60's design.


@busdriver  Ill internalize your full response for a bit longer as well- but I think it's neither OPSEC nor incorrect to say that neither helo (46/47/60/53) nor tilt rotor (22) is going _anywhere _in any sort of CDO environment. Specific very limited "what if" sort of examples? Sure, nothing is absolute. But the overwhelming answer to that question is, "Not until we take care of the threats", and not "We can operate in spite of those threats."

Much seems to be made of the RCS of this airframe vs that, I guess that's das macht nichts to me, considering none of them are going to stealthily sneak into a truly capable IAD threat.

That's why we (TRT) have a host of other insertion options- HAHO/HALO, the new ground recovery vehicle in it's test phase, etc. And I am not repeat *not* saying the answer is unilateral AF ground force, because that's as much a foul as anything else. We would still need support- but that support exists and we use it often.


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## busdriver (Jul 5, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> As a non-aviator and from a purely perfromance standpoint, what's wrong with the MH-47G for PR?



The MH-47G is faster with a lot more power for high altitude operations.  From what I've been told the RF jammer is quite good, but I've seen no proof.  The IR signature is very hot, even with suppression and it relies on the DIRCM exclusively.  The larger size also means it's slower getting into the LZ, basic physics and all.  That said it could work, there are always ways to work around limitations.  However, as of now there is no requirement to justify that large of an aircraft, which means no justification for the much higher operating costs.


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## busdriver (Jul 5, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> @busdriver  But the overwhelming answer to that question is, "Not until we take care of the threats", and not "We can operate in spite of those threats."



Anyone who penetrates a MEZ without support without a good reason is just being silly.  That said, many of those threats are notoriously difficult to find.  Likewise the level of vulnerability drives how much support is needed and how long it has to work to get the desired effect.  A bigger aircraft could definitely work, but before we jump whole hog into the biggest helo we can find we need to actually define what is needed, with specifics based on assigned roles and responsibilities.


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## amlove21 (Jul 6, 2014)

So I had written a couple responses and sat on them, but after re-reading them they were a little tangental and not exactly related to the thread. So, instead, I boiled it down to questions, because the whole CSAR-X issue is the unanswered questions and it logically follows that these questions in fact lead me to believe that the project isn't a great idea or even well thought out. Keep in mind- I don't speak for anyone but myself on this one, however, these are mostly mine and some general gripes/complaints/issues the career field (CRO/PJ) have in general w/ the current platform.

So, in no specific order-

We have stated there are 'no requirements' for a larger or different AC. Where are those requirements listed? And from where did those requirements come? Using what prediction of future conflict? In what theater? With what threat picture?
Why was the 60M the 'only option'? What about not replacing helos at all? What about making enough upgrades for survivability of the fleet and then 'waiting for the FVL program'? If we have this program (FVL), and it is indeed coming, why spend money on the Mike model? What are we going to do with this new fleet of Mike models once the FVL _does _come on line? Outside of Rescue, TES, and the Weapons school, is there an AF user group for Mike models we are now going to discard for this new widget fleet of AC? Are the nuke guys or the PAG going to be pushing Ferrari's when all they need are minivans?
Why is there the perception that 'we are here to pick up fighter pilots in a conventional war'? Is this in line with GA 2021 or PR 2020 mission statements? (This seems to be more of a question for a discussion of PR, but since it seems to be a perception that drives materiel solutions, it's due examination.)
This one operates on a certain assumption- that we both agreed that anyone pushing into a MEZ without support is foolish, and that no rotary wing (tilt rotor or otherwise) is able to do so in an IAD/CDO environment- but if we allow that assumption, why are we even valuing the previous question's validity? If that isn't our mission, and we aren't able to operate in said environment unilaterally _anyway_ then why do we valuate that perception enough to spend the money?
Anyway, that's just off the top for the CSAR-X. Any insight would be appreciated!


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## Ranger Psych (Jul 6, 2014)

I gotta say, I'm with amlove21 on all of his comments and questions.


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## AWP (Jul 6, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> the new ground recovery vehicle in it's test phase,


 
Why develop a vehicle if your organic airframe can't deliver and recover said vehicle?


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## amlove21 (Jul 6, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> Why develop a vehicle if your organic airframe can't deliver and recover said vehicle?


Well, 1st, we have an organic airframe that can deliver it- the 130. The GAARV is meant to be airdropped. It's listed as "capable to load on 47's and 53's", but stuff like gross weight and equipment + team (not to mention space) would only be realistic via the 47 (which would be very, very tight. I'd have to see it)  or 130's.

2nd, you most likely wouldn't recover it to anything. The idea goes like this- CDO/MEZ/IAD environment. TRT drops in w Vehicle, executes rescue, bombs back to friendly link up (or close enough to be recovered) by either large and heavily armored ground force or to some sort of friendly control (be it a firebase, embassy, or some other 'safe zone'). Sure, this could be airfield for 130's (take vehicle with us) or helicopters (vehicle gets destroyed/left depending on situation). In the event that our own guys come and pick us up, team and target board small helicopters and leave vehicle. "Recovery and re-utilization" wasn't criteria for the vehicle, I suppose. 

And finally- we are developing this vehicle because there is a capability gap. We needed penetration into an IAD/CDO environment for that 'most dangerous mission', or the deep rescue where the helos we have can't go. We don't have an airframe that does it, so we got a vehicle that does. It's an answer that isn't very palatable to some, especially those in the Rescue community.


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## busdriver (Jul 6, 2014)

Some of the PR doctrine stuff won't be news to you, but I've included it in case others don't know.  Also, just one guy's opinions as well:

We have stated there are 'no requirements' for a larger or different AC. Where are those requirements listed? And from where did those requirements come? Using what prediction of future conflict? In what theater? With what threat picture?
The original CSAR-X requirement did call for a larger helo, but all the increased capabilities were dropped for CRH.  I have no idea why we even bothered with a "competition."  The program used to be called HH-60G re-capitalization, in other words buy more of the same to replace the worn out airframes.  

Why was the 60M the 'only option'? What about not replacing helos at all? What about making enough upgrades for survivability of the fleet and then 'waiting for the FVL program'? If we have this program (FVL), and it is indeed coming, why spend money on the Mike model? What are we going to do with this new fleet of Mike models once the FVL _does _come on line? Outside of Rescue, TES, and the Weapons school, is there an AF user group for Mike models we are now going to discard for this new widget fleet of AC? Are the nuke guys or the PAG going to be pushing Ferrari's when all they need are minivans?
SLEPing the current fleet presents the problem of old ass airframes and our terrible SPO would no-doubt screw up the SLEP (same guys that fielded those seats, MARS and a CORS cable that apparently was never rated to let a person clip into it).  

That said your point is not lost on me, I worry that having relatively new aircraft will make it that much harder to pickup the FVL as soon as possible.  Either way, FVL-Medium is planned to start rolling out in the early 2030's, so the youngest SLEP'd aircraft would be 33 years old, which is where our oldest birds are today.  But I alluded to it earlier, SLEP was the plan back in December of last year, no one thought CRH would survive sequestration.

Ironically enough, the missile site dudes have actively been trying to get Blackhawks for awhile.

Why is there the perception that 'we are here to pick up fighter pilots in a conventional war'? Is this in line with GA 2021 or PR 2020 mission statements? (This seems to be more of a question for a discussion of PR, but since it seems to be a perception that drives materiel solutions, it's due examination.)
It's coming from Joint PR doctrine, mainly that each component is responsible for it's own PR.  Since we're the air component, that primarily means picking up air component guys, and the most dangerous mission for the air component is MCO.  In other words picking up fighter/bomber guys, with the belief that if you can do that mission you should be able to handle the rest.  

It's not a perfect outlook for aircraft acquisitions to cover the range of military operations, but it's the one that prevails among many.

I'm not familiar with either of the future mission statements you mentioned, but I do know the PR core function master plan is about the most confusing thing I've ever tried to read.

This one operates on a certain assumption- that we both agreed that anyone pushing into a MEZ without support is foolish, and that no rotary wing (tilt rotor or otherwise) is able to do so in an IAD/CDO environment- but if we allow that assumption, why are we even valuing the previous question's validity? If that isn't our mission, and we aren't able to operate in said environment unilaterally _anyway_ then why do we valuate that perception enough to spend the money?
It's not just rotary wing, it's everything.  No aircraft goes into an IADS unsupported.  That said, we can operate in an IADS with the correct support.  Yes it requires the correct circumstances, much like driving the GAARV into that environment would require the correct set of circumstances.  

The entire argument is also faced with the reality of our budget situation.  Back in 2006, I think the H-47 was actually the best choice based on the lowest risk to get us something fielded quickly, not the ideal aircraft in my opinion but none of them were.  But, the AF screwed up the acquisition process and we're where we are today.

So our choices today were: SLEP in the hopes of FVL and risk program delays in the next gen aircraft.  Or by new build 60's and risk not being able to jump on the FVL bandwagon early.  Realistically the only other option would have been the AFSOC plan, which has issues with even lightly contested LZs and is very bad at high/hot environments.


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## DA SWO (Jul 6, 2014)

*ETA:Busdriver posted as I was typing.*

Caveat: I have been retired/out of the acquisitions business for many years, and am going off (a probably faulty) memory.



amlove21 said:


> So, in no specific order-
> 
> We have stated there are 'no requirements' for a larger or different AC. Where are those requirements listed? And from where did those requirements come? Using what prediction of future conflict? In what theater? With what threat picture?


IIRC the original ORD did ask for more cabin room, that's why Sikorsky used their model 92 for their bid submission.
That's also why Eurocopter thought they were competitive.
I think we would have HH-92's on the ramp today had AFSOC not screwed the pooch selecting a winner.



amlove21 said:


> Why was the 60M the 'only option'? What about not replacing helos at all? What about making enough upgrades for survivability of the fleet and then 'waiting for the FVL program'? If we have this program (FVL), and it is indeed coming, why spend money on the Mike model? What are we going to do with this new fleet of Mike models once the FVL _does _come on line? Outside of Rescue, TES, and the Weapons school, is there an AF user group for Mike models we are now going to discard for this new widget fleet of AC? Are the nuke guys or the PAG going to be pushing Ferrari's when all they need are minivans?


The final ORD was what? the 5th or 6th iteration of the original? 
I think the requirements kept getting weaker and the HQ AF folks saw the Army get new 60's without any Congressional pushback, so the final ORD (again IIRC) was essentially a UH-60 with AF mods.

Just a guess, but you are owned by ACC, and despite HQ statements, ACC if fighter centric and nothing emerges from ACC unless you can show how it benefits the fighter community.



amlove21 said:


> Why is there the perception that 'we are here to pick up fighter pilots in a conventional war'? Is this in line with GA 2021 or PR 2020 mission statements? (This seems to be more of a question for a discussion of PR, but since it seems to be a perception that drives materiel solutions, it's due examination.)
> !



Finally a few random comments:

The original ORD/selection was essentially staffed by AFSOC H-53 crews; guys who were losing their ride with the retirement of the PAVE LOW and the AF desire not to be involved in the SOF rotary wing mission.  I have on good source that a lot of folks thought HH-47 could pony into the SOF arena and they'd be "back in the business".

There was a lot of HQ head scratching when the HH-47 was announced as the winner.

Eurocopter and Sikorsky both filed protests, Eurocopter's protest was thrown out (more on that later) and Sikorsky's accepted.

Sikorsky claimed they did not submit the H-53 because the ORD was for a medium helicopter and the H-53 and H-47 were "Heavy" helo's. That was accepted.

Eurocopter was disqualified because they were having design/QC issues and the selectors did not think they could meet the timeline (probably a correct assessment.

As the selection process was nearing the end, AF issued and ORD for a HH-1 replacement. That ORD was staffed/shelved.  We then staffed/shelved a Joint ORD (JORD) for a Navy/AF HH-1/HH-60/SH-60 replacement.

IIRC the Navy eventually went with their MH-60 to replace most, if not all, of their 60's.

The AF then restarted (twice?) the CSAR-X with requirements getting dumbed down with each revision.  The final revision was such that Eurocopter didn't even bid (IIRC) as it written (pretty much) to reflect a H-60 requirement.

We had a chance (when the war was hot) to get a good compromise between a smaller aircraft favored by Pilots (per Busdrivers posts) and a larger cabin favored by the PJ's. 

The program was essentially doomed when AFSOC mis-managed it, and Sikorsky won their protest.

Again, I've been retired for a few years, and may have forgotten a few facts.  Likewise I am sure the ORD changed a few times after I left, but I believe my comments are pretty spot on regarding the acquisitions process.  My time as an Acquisitions Officer was (thankfully) short, but I learned a lot during that time.


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## busdriver (Jul 6, 2014)

SOWT, that's pretty close to what I heard back in my co-pilot days.  Basically the AF didn't calculate life cycle costs in the manner they said they would, if they had the 47 would have dropped down multiple pegs as it's a very expensive helo to operate.  That said, in my opinion it was actually canceled by Gates and Young because they were of the opinion that it was a gold plated single mission platform.  Too bad, whichever aircraft ended up getting selected would have been a very cool aircraft.

Incidentally, I realize my posts have been a bit schizo.  I've tried to provide some insight into what I think is the thought process up at staff and amongst pilots as well as provide my own personal opinions, if that's muddying the waters I apologize.


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## busdriver (Jul 6, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> And finally- we are developing this vehicle because there is a capability gap. We needed penetration into an IAD/CDO environment for that 'most dangerous mission', or the deep rescue where the helos we have can't go.


Seriously, I really really want to drive the GAARV.  But I'd think it would be way more useful in a tyranny of distance situation, like Africa which is a logistical monster to try support PR across.

Not saying there's no place for extended ground operations in night one of a big war scenario, but speaking in generalities that's every bit as risky and situation specific as helo rescue with limited support within an IADS.


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## AWP (Jul 6, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> Well, 1st, we have an organic airframe that can deliver it- the 130. The GAARV is meant to be airdropped. It's listed as "capable to load on 47's and 53's", but stuff like gross weight and equipment + team (not to mention space) would only be realistic via the 47 (which would be very, very tight. I'd have to see it)  or 130's.
> 
> "Recovery and re-utilization" wasn't criteria for the vehicle, I suppose.
> 
> And finally- we are developing this vehicle because there is a capability gap. We needed penetration into an IAD/CDO environment for that 'most dangerous mission', or the deep rescue where the helos we have can't go. We don't have an airframe that does it, so we got a vehicle that does. It's an answer that isn't very palatable to some, especially those in the Rescue community.


 
I was semi-rhetorical with my question, but I understand where you're coming from. I figured the 130 could drop it, but how does it go back? A specific mission allowing it to ground recover? Okay, got it. Then I see where recovery wasn't a criteria for the vehicle (or maybe it was, but low on the list and you're being facetious which I understand) and the program loses me. A high-speed vehicle we'll dump if needed? I guess I shouldn't be surprised given the disposable nature of the MRAP's and M-ATV's here in Afghanistan.

I'm smart enough to know you're hosed the second you require assets outside of the Wing, hence my original comment. I also recall Rescue's..."issues" during Desert Storm. AFSOC won't come off a -22 unless forced and the staffing required is almost cost and time prohibitive unless executed well in advance. "One team, one fight" usually means someone's getting raped, you know? Maybe I'm naive, but I think a RQW should be reasonably self-sufficient, particularly given Big Blue's "warm" support for the mission...


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## amlove21 (Jul 6, 2014)

busdriver said:


> ...entire post...


Fair enough. I don't think there is a right/wrong in this conversation- but sheesh. The amount of "not great" calls in the last 4-5 years of this thing has been monumental. 


Freefalling said:


> I was semi-rhetorical with my question, but I understand where you're coming from. I figured the 130 could drop it, but how does it go back? A specific mission allowing it to ground recover?


My b. I totally missed the rhetorical part! Don't think of it as "a specific mission to ground recover", more like, "you guys are balls deep in threat rings- if we drop you and the vehicles, can you use the vehicles to get the hell out of there and closer to 'not so many threat rings'? Ok, then let's do this." It's just another tool for flexibility, that's all. 


Freefalling said:


> I'm smart enough to know you're hosed the second you require assets outside of the Wing, hence my original comment. I also recall Rescue's..."issues" during Desert Storm. AFSOC won't come off a -22 unless forced and the staffing required is almost cost and time prohibitive unless executed well in advance. "One team, one fight" usually means someone's getting raped, you know? Maybe I'm naive, but I think a RQW should be reasonably self-sufficient, particularly given Big Blue's "warm" support for the mission...


This. Twice. And once in the morning on Sunday. 


busdriver said:


> Incidentally, I realize my posts have been a bit schizo.  I've tried to provide some insight into what I think is the thought process up at staff and amongst pilots as well as provide my own personal opinions, if that's muddying the waters I apologize.


No worries, you're good. Plenty of insane people on this board. At least you can spell...


busdriver said:


> Seriously, I really really want to drive the GAARV.  But I'd think it would be way more useful in a tyranny of distance situation, like Africa which is a logistical monster to try support PR across.
> 
> Not saying there's no place for extended ground operations in night one of a big war scenario, but speaking in generalities that's every bit as risky and situation specific as helo rescue with limited support within an IADS.


Me too! We are barely allowed to say the word until test ok's it and fields it. Can't wait, that thing is a beast. 

That sort of environment- Africa/extended surface ops- is exactly where it would be most useful. Team bombs out 5-600 miles away, drops, recovers, and starts on the way back to meet AC package moving towards them (although slower). It definitely has uses in more intense scenarios, but that would be the main one.


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## busdriver (Aug 2, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> Maybe I'm naive, but I think a RQW should be reasonably self-sufficient, particularly given Big Blue's "warm" support for the mission...


Late to this, I know.  I agree with the first part, but we run into roadblocks within our own leadership.  We have money issues and leaf eater issues.  Discussion of adding more offensive weapon capabilities to the helos/130s results in rolled eyes.  Even discussing advanced tactics usually results in some kind of comment about it just being too hard.  When in reality we just train inefficiently. 

The second part is entirely dependent on what type of war we're fighting.  I think we've come a long way from Desert Storm, back then TAC was training to fight WW3, recovering dudes was almost a foregone conclusion.  I do get pissed off when I read Gen Glosson's comments about how AFSOC conducted CSAR.

That said, CSAR and PR have gained a lot of attention lately.  The shock of the potential loss of the A-10 has made the rest of the CAF realize they may not have that security blanket much longer and everyone else may have to step up a bit.  A friend reports from the latest Red Flag, multiple times O-6s would ask "that sounds good, tell me more about your CSAR plan?"  That's a bit of a paraphrase, but the intent was clear that everyone needs to get on board with a larger awareness of PR.


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## amlove21 (Aug 4, 2014)

busdriver said:


> Late to this, I know.  I agree with the first part, but we run into roadblocks within our own leadership.  We have money issues and leaf eater issues.  Discussion of adding more offensive weapon capabilities to the helos/130s
> The second part is entirely dependent on what type of war we're fighting.  I think we've come a long way from Desert Storm, back then TAC was training to fight WW3, recovering dudes was almost a foregone conclusion.  I do get pissed off when I read Gen Glosson's comments about how AFSOC conducted CSAR.
> .


Doctrinally and logically, we both know that PR is conducted primarily as a subset of DA inside of the 9 tenets of SOF. I'm in this with you. However, saying an AFSOC General is wrong in saying they conducted CSAR (and that should say PR) is like saying the unit that picked up O'Grady "wasn't doing CSAR" because we don't approve of their personnel, methods, or exfil platform.

THIS is the issue. It's process oriented (ACC) and product oriented (AFSOC/EVERYONE ELSE).

The DoD says- "Bring everyone home, all the time, no matter what. Leave no stone unturned. Americans, dead or alive, come home."

ACC says- "Let's go get those that need help- as long as we can do it on OUR aircraft, in OUR command, with only OUR crews, under OUR rules."

I am in no way throwing down a gauntlet here. But I want to make this publicly clear- I don't give a shit how people return to their families. Marines, AF, Army- I dont care. And I mean that to the core of my being. I mean it to mean, "I will set aside my ego, my team, my friends, my very self- if it means that IP comes home."

At this point- I don't feel as if my command shares that view.


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## reed11b (Aug 5, 2014)

amlove21 said:


> Doctrinally and logically, we both know that PR is conducted primarily as a subset of DA inside of the 9 tenets of SOF. I'm in this with you. However, saying an AFSOC General is wrong in saying they conducted CSAR (and that should say PR) is like saying the unit that picked up O'Grady "wasn't doing CSAR" because we don't approve of their personnel, methods, or exfil platform.
> 
> THIS is the issue. It's process oriented (ACC) and product oriented (AFSOC/EVERYONE ELSE).
> 
> ...


 Would it it help if SOCOM recognized PR or CSAR as a specific SOF mission. Would that move PJ's out of the ACC? It seems to be a SOF mission in most NATO countries. My 2 cents.
Reed


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## AWP (Aug 5, 2014)

reed11b said:


> Would it it help if SOCOM recognized PR or CSAR as a specific SOF mission. Would that move PJ's out of the ACC? It seems to be a SOF mission in most NATO countries. My 2 cents.
> Reed


 
SOCOM can claim the mission, that doesn't mean ACC would yield the personnel, budget, and airframes. That fight would probably go to the SECDEF level. ACC protested a move to AFSOC a few years ago. There was some arrangement like "AFSOC while deployed, ACC while at home station" or...something odd. I've seen the term "Half-SOC" used to describe the relationship.


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## busdriver (Aug 5, 2014)

Sorry, not what I meant.  AFSOC *was *assigned CSAR in support of DS.  Buster Glosson (CENTAF Director of Plans) was a Vietnam vet and expected AFSOC to throw helicopters at every rescue opportunity, despite the CAOC not apportioning the appropriate assets to actually give the helo/team guys the support they needed to actually do that.  CSAR in Desert Storm by Darrel Whitcomb is a great read.  There was certainly many other issues with rescue in DS.

I think part of the CSAR vs CSAR thing comes from AFDD-1, basically "CSAR" is the TTPs used to recover an isolated person.  Which is somewhat ridiculous, since logically you would think if you're searching and rescuing someone in combat =CSAR.  Likewise you could take the CSARTF template and use it to conduct a direct action mission, just wouldn't be the best technique to do it.  Likewise in your example of Scott O-Grady, the basic way the Marine corps TRAP model works in my understanding is basically using an air assault template to rescue a dude, so there really isn't much search.  It also plays back to service mindset, AF CSAR tends to be very air centric, because the predominance of assets are air assets.  The Marine corps is a very ground centric organization, so an assault mindset.  That said, I've worked with Marines recently and their views on TRAP are much closer to the AF CSAR model than in times past.

All that said, I agree that I don't really give a shit who actually goes and does the mission as long as it is the best solution for the guy isolated on the ground.


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## busdriver (Aug 5, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> SOCOM can claim the mission, that doesn't mean ACC would yield the personnel, budget, and airframes. That fight would probably go to the SECDEF level. ACC protested a move to AFSOC a few years ago. There was some arrangement like "AFSOC while deployed, ACC while at home station" or...something odd. I've seen the term "Half-SOC" used to describe the relationship.


At one point we were AFSOC, but when deployed we were still owned by the Air Component Commander, hence Half-SOC.  I have no idea what would have happened long term had we remained aligned under AFSOC, but it's a moot point as Gen Moseley put us back into ACC almost overnight after a closed door meeting with SOCOM general(s).  I've heard all sorts of rumors about what was said, but I have no real data.  

Rescue in SOCOM/AFSOC vs ACC comes up every couple years.  Personally, I think ACC is the right place, I think the issues amlove has are not a result of ACC but our own internal leadership.  That said, we need to embrace the fact that being capable of conducting CSAR (at least from the aircrew side) effectively means that those same skill sets translate to a multitude of missions.  

In a shrinking fiscal environment I'd be stupid to say that I only do one niche mission that has a low probability of actually happening, regardless of how important it is.  Instead my message needs to be that my primary mission is X, therefore I have the following skill sets: A,B,C, so I can also accomplish missions Y&Z so I will also train to those.


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## Blizzard (Jun 17, 2015)

Just read this article on the CRH in the latest edition of Air Force Magazine:
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/June 2015/Rescue’s-Future.aspx

It left me with a number of questions (most were already brought up and discussed earlier in this thread)...

*  Moving to a HH-60W model.  Why?  How about a truly new, revolutionary platform?

*  The HH-60W is not a new platform, even by the admission of it's closest supporters (even uses same engines and weapons as G model).  It's not revolutionary in any way; it's an evolution.  That being the case, why must it take ~6+ years before it will be declared operational?  Why so long?   Our procurement and development lifecycle seriously needs to be reviewed.  Speed is life.
Note:  the basic HH-60 airframe is already over 3 decades old, entering service in 1982.  It will be nearly 40 years old before the first Whiskey model even enters service!

*  This is being billed as the "new" rescue helicopter.  To me, that implies, don't hold your breath for anything else for quite some time (see comment above about airframe age).  Yet, as far as I can tell, this "new" model only marginally moves the needle in a positive direction for a couple areas:  payload and weight - only increases gross capacity by 500 lbs., glass avionics declutter things slightly, and possibly a slightly higher hover?  Hmmm.

*  Contract is for 112 airplanes at at a cost of $7.9 billion.  By my public school math, that's a cost of ~$70.5+M each.  According to the USAF Fact Sheet, the per unit cost of the HH-60G in FY11 was $40.1M.  CBA anyone?

Anyway, though the article might be of interest to those that hadn't seen it.


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## AWP (Jun 17, 2015)

You get a new airframe, you get a new airframe, and you get a new airframe, everyone gets....oh, sorry, not you Rescue. You get some pseudo rebranded shyte because we spent all of our money on fixed-wing assets using a broken acquisition process.
Hugs!
ACC


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## TLDR20 (Jun 17, 2015)

All these acquisition threads make me remember how bad it is to work in a large bureaucracy... I don't miss it.


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## busdriver (Jun 18, 2015)

- Short answer: lack of money and Moseley got fired.  I may have mentioned this, but the program was originally called H-60 re-cap (ie buy more 60's) since the airframes we're flying now are falling apart due to wear and tear.  The Kirtland aircraft are actually a bit scary.

- The HH-60W is a "new" aircraft, in as much as it isn't a configuration flown anywhere and the avionics integration requirements are unique.  Those two things plus a deliberate decision to reduce risk makes the whole contract longer.  A shorter timeline would have increased programmatic risk, which DoD acquisitions has proven to be poor at managing.  But yes, the system is slow and unresponsive.  Check this link out Government Money, as an example we just laid out a bunch of aircraft modifications requirements a couple months ago for FY18.

- The "next" Rescue aircraft will in theory be part of the FVL program.  But that is vaporware at this point.

- There's more in the contract than just 112 aircraft, simulators as an example.

Ironically, budget problems killed the MH/HH-60D which was what the Air Force tried to buy back in the 80s.  That aircraft was an integrated cockpit Hawk with a TF radar and glass cockpit.


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## DA SWO (Jun 18, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> You get a new airframe, you get a new airframe, and you get a new airframe, everyone gets....oh, sorry, not you Rescue. You get some pseudo rebranded shyte because we spent all of our money on fixed-wing assets using a broken acquisition process.
> Hugs!
> ACC


AFSOC had a hand in this one too.

That said, evolutionary designs often work well. (look at the C-130 and F-16).


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## AWP (Jun 19, 2015)

DA SWO said:


> AFSOC had a hand in this one too.
> 
> That said, evolutionary designs often work well. (look at the C-130 and F-16).



This first point is interesting since AFSOC doesn't own the airframes, or I've missed something. I understand about other airframes and evolution, but is the 60 right for this or a flawed stopgap with the potential to drag on for decades? The J's don't seem to like the -60 and Afghanistan has shown the a/c's limitations. Better engines can make up for some of that, but aren't better solutions out there?

Given the AF's track record of late, I'm skeptical this is the right answer. The only one the Rescue community has, but that doesn't make it "right." The guys will make it work and do what they have to as they've done for years, but that doesn't make it right. We'll have our warfighters making do because the system and shoddy leadership put them in that place.


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## Blizzard (Jun 19, 2015)

The world we live in today is quite different than the world we lived in even 15 years ago.  Technology advances much more quickly today.  We have "competitors" building forces at a rate not seen in decades, sometimes doing so with technology gleaned from us, thus reducing their development lifecycles. What may've passed as an acceptable stop gap measure in the past isn't necessarily acceptable today or in the future.  

The procurement process needs innovation and retooling to meet not only today's needs but tomorrow's needs as well in a quickly evolving world.  This, of course, also requires adjustment to political and public attitudes but that's another topic.  Look back in history to WWII and consider how quickly new designs were brought from ideation to operational.  We need to recapture that mindset.  As I mentioned previously, we live in a world where speed is life.


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## DA SWO (Jun 19, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> This first point is interesting since AFSOC doesn't own the airframes, or I've missed something. I understand about other airframes and evolution, but is the 60 right for this or a flawed stopgap with the potential to drag on for decades? The J's don't seem to like the -60 and Afghanistan has shown the a/c's limitations. Better engines can make up for some of that, but aren't better solutions out there?
> 
> Given the AF's track record of late, I'm skeptical this is the right answer. The only one the Rescue community has, but that doesn't make it "right." The guys will make it work and do what they have to as they've done for years, but that doesn't make it right. We'll have our warfighters making do because the system and shoddy leadership put them in that place.


CSAR-X was first run when AFSOC owned the mission.  They tested the EH-101, S-92 and  MH-47 with all the (recently grounded) Pave Low evaluators giving the 47 two thumbs up.  Problem was the specs were written for a smaller aircraft allowing Sikorsky to successfully challenge the selection.  IIRC Gates was SecDef and he made the AF jump through numerous hoops design-wise before they could start round two.
Surge ended, budgets got cut and CSAR-X lost it's money; so round three (and the easy fix) was to buy new HH-60s (with the specs written so only the 60 would qualify).
Sad really.


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