# Operation Moshtarak



## 7point62 (Feb 13, 2010)

*Lima 3/6 leading the assault*

From the LA Times:

Thousands of U.S., British
and Afghan troops
moved to seize the Taliban
stronghold of Marja early
Saturday in what the Marine
general leading the assault
called a “big, strong and
fast” offensive aimed at challenging
the insurgency’s grip
on a key southern Afghan
province.
Rounds of tracer fire
lighted up a starry, predawn
sky as waves of troops, ferried
in by helicopters, descended
on the farming districts
that surround the
town. Transport and Cobra
attack helicopters also
dropped rounds to illuminate
the ground.
Troops initially met only
modest return fire from inside
Marja.
Sporadic firefights had
broken out throughout the
day Friday on the periphery
of Marja as Marine units
probed Taliban defenses.
The commander, *Marine
Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson,
had for weeks telegraphed
the military’s plans for the
offensive, one of the largest
since the war began in 2001.*
The United States and its
allies hope the assault, the
biggest joint operation by
Western and Afghan troops
to date, will prove to be a
turning point in the conflict
with the Taliban and other
militants that have carved
out swaths of territory in Afghanistan.
Military leaders expected
about 7,500 coalition
troops to occupy Marja by
nightfall, with 7,500 more
supporting the mission from
elsewhere in the Nad Ali district
of Helmand province.
Marines, led by battalions
from Camp Pendleton
in California, Camp Lejeune,
N.C., and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii,
attacked from multiple
directions in an effort to confuse
and overwhelm Taliban
fighters. Each Marine battalion
was paired with an Afghan
battalion.
The offensive is seen as a
test both of the fighting spirit
of the Afghan army and
the ability of the government
of President Hamid Karzai
— with the help of NATO
forces and a large corps of civilian
workers — to quickly
establish a working government
in Marja, a town of
about 85,000.


Why "telegraph" plans weeks in advance? WTF?


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## Ranger Psych (Feb 13, 2010)

because you don't want to make contact...


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## Crusader74 (Feb 13, 2010)

Britain hits grim milestone before major attack 
Operation Moshtarak 
Britains death toll in the conflict 256— above the number of Britons lost in the Falklands war of 1982. 
_Respect to all Allies involved._
[BBC image]






[/QUOTE]


Improvised explosive devices are stopping Afghan civilians leaving a town where UK troops will launch a huge operation, the defence secretary says.
Bob Ainsworth spoke ahead of Operation Moshtarak to clear Taliban fighters from Marjah in Helmand province. 
Thousands of coalition soldiers are involved in the offensive. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8506137.stm
last updated at 16:09 GMT, Tuesday, 9 February 2010



http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8513665.stm

Best of luck to the lads over there.






http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8500903.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8513665.stm[/QUOTE]


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## Teufel (Feb 13, 2010)

+1.  Also I am assuming with all the media attention over civilian casualties, everyone wants to reduce the probability of collateral damage.  Even if that means not making contact with the enemy.


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## 7point62 (Feb 13, 2010)

You mean you've got 15,000 guys & helos and vehicles burning millions of dollars in gas in Helmand for nothing more than a PR dog & pony show?


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## Rapid (Feb 13, 2010)

So what does everyone think of the decision to warn everyone in such advance? Good for the civilians, but plenty of time for the actual enemy to prepare themselves and get away (all while laying down some nasty surprises).


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## KBar666 (Feb 13, 2010)

*SAS and SEALs Take Out 50 Taliban*

Merged to keep all Operation Moshtarak posts together.


The joint attacks with US special forces over the past two weeks have helped prepare the ground for the biggest battle in Afghanistan yet - when 4,000 British troops will go into action.

Special forces dealt the deadly blow to the Taliban by taking out scores of their top field commanders in the build-up to the massive offensive.

SAS men and US Navy SEAL teams killed the 50 insurgent leaders in a series of dramatic covert operations deep inside southern Afghanistan's Helmand badlands.

Their objective was to destroy the Taliban command structure - and military sources labelled the daring raids "a great success".

Precise details remain a secret but it is known that the elite forces spearheaded a "shaping operation" to soften-up the enemy before the biggest offensive since the conflict began in 2001 is launched.

Other British units have also been heavily engaged in the operations to disrupt the Taliban.

Scots Guards uncovered a bomb-making factory and destroyed more than 20 deadly devices.

Grenadier Guards pushed south, hunting for insurgents.

But the Taliban fled rather than fight, leaving booby traps behind.

The Grenadiers left the way clear for dozens of local Afghan National Army and police to flood in and begin the process of bringing security to the district.

Lethal

Major Jim Green, one of the Grenadier officers who planned the shaping operation, told The Sun: "This phase was all about putting the insurgents on the back foot.

"The lads down there have done some incredible things. This has been a great success. It was an operation to free the local people from the Taliban's grip."

Meticulous planning stretching back weeks would have gone into the SAS raids which struck the first blow against the Taliban - and put fear in their hearts.

Patrols of around four men would have used the tried and tested "find, fix, strike" method to locate and destroy their prey.

Their tactics are veiled in secrecy. But they would have moved by night, covering their tracks as they went. Then they would strike with lethal force before vanishing to seek new targets.

The full allied assault, labelled Operation Moshtarak, will involve up to 15,000 troops - at least 4,000 of them British.

Fighting in the Taliban- controlled Nad e-Ali area of Helmand is expected to be ferocious.

Insurgents have even hung from trees blood-stained uniforms discarded by British troops as a taunting warning.

Major Green said the presence of British troops alongside Afghan National Army soldiers in operations so far was welcomed by people living in the insurgent stronghold.

And when the big assault gets under way, a similar tactic will be used, with Our Boys and Afghan forces going in side by side.

This is the first time Afghan troops have been engaged with the international force on such a scale.

Commanders hope it will help reassure locals in Taliban hotspots that their ordeal is almost over.

The build-up to Operation Moshtarak continued at Britain's Camp Bastion HQ yesterday.

Surge

So many helicopters and transport planes are now using the air base there that it is officially busier than Essex's Stansted Airport, an RAF officer revealed.

Squadron Leader John Parfitt is Senior Air Traffic Control Officer at the base.

And when the generals give the order for the big push to start, he and his colleagues will co-ordinate helicopter movements in and out of Camp Bastion.

He said: "We currently have more than 550 movements a day.

"And during the op we will see a surge in movements. It will be the busiest day of our careers."

He described the mood as "businesslike but confident".

THE Taliban's leader in Pakistan did die of wounds received in a US missile attack on his stronghold in Waziristan last month, Interior Minister Rehman Mali said yesterday.

Ruthless Hakimullah Mehsud, 28, was behind bomb attacks that have killed more than 600 people.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?174251-SAS-and-SEALs-Take-Out-50-Taliban


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## Teufel (Feb 14, 2010)

What dog and pony show?  They are going to take and hold Marjah and deny the enemy a safehaven with minimal coalition force and civilian casualties.  Why assault the machinegun bunker if you can convince the enemy to give it to you?


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## QC (Feb 14, 2010)

Whoa, that is the shit.

Free can take up the slack on that one, but personally I think it's ok.


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## QC (Feb 14, 2010)

Agreed. This has been on the go for some time. Third tread on this...not that I'm complaining.


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## Crusader74 (Feb 14, 2010)

Queens Cadet said:
			
		

> Free can take up the slack on that one, but personally I think it's ok.


 
I wouldn't be happy with it.. Already two have died from IED's  that probably as Rapid mentioned left because of the prior notice..just my opinion.


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## AWP (Feb 14, 2010)

Queens Cadet said:
			
		

> Free can take up the slack on that one, but personally I think it's ok.


 
I'm sorry, I don't get this line...some Commonwealth vernacular that I'm missing?

---

We can "what if" this whole thing (prior notice vs. a surprise attack) but we'll never know what the casualty figures for an all-out attack would be both in service members and civilians. What I'm curious about is: how many slipped out of the net and what blocking forces were in place, is this a "one off" scenario and then we revert back to surprise attacks, and then what next: how many Civil Affairs, TRAINED ANP/ ANA, and NGOs are  arriving in Marjah as I type this? Great, we took a village, yay, throw a party or whatever.....but not only can we keep it, but can we build on it so that our success this week "infects" the surrounding areas? If we can't do that, then Moshtarak was a failure.


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## Crusader74 (Feb 14, 2010)

The operation is to clear the area of Marja, in the Nad Ali district of Helmand Province. When fully underway, it is expected to involve around 15 000 troops from 6 nations; the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France, Estonia, and Afghanistan.



























All above images are MoD releases of the troops preparing for the operation.[/QUOTE]


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## Crusader74 (Feb 14, 2010)

12334


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## 7point62 (Feb 14, 2010)

Teufel said:


> What dog and pony show? They are going to take and hold Marjah and deny the enemy a safehaven with minimal coalition force and civilian casualties. Why assault the machinegun bunker if you can convince the enemy to give it to you?


 
Yes, sir, I understand...I just thought hostiles being forewarned are free to go elsewhere and live to fight again; and holding ground--denying a safehaven--is only good if you can stay. With the terrain in Helmand it probably makes perfect sense, but I am naturally wary of the "enclave" strategy where blue forces occupy population centers and the enemy the hinterland.

BTW, apologies for yet another thread...I missed the others, my bad...

Good thread. Too bad I didn't find it B4 running my suck about the Marjah show up on the "General" forum.


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## pardus (Feb 14, 2010)

Rapid said:


> So what does everyone think of the decision to warn everyone in such advance? Good for the civilians, but plenty of time for the actual enemy to prepare themselves and get away (all while laying down some nasty surprises).


 
While It is obviously better to attack without warning, in today's world with all the focus on avoiding civi casualties I think it's near unavoidable in a large operation like this.
I also don't think there is much chance of an attack like this remaining secret even if we wanted it to be so. :2c:



> Britains death toll in the conflict 256— above the number of Britons lost in the Falklands war of 1982.





How long did the Falklands War last? How long has the UK been fighting in the current war?

Why bring that up?  Fucking media...


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## Crusader74 (Feb 14, 2010)

hope this works..Excellent piece from UK's Channel 4 on a patrol that gets contact..


http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1184614595?bctid=66448008001


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## JJ sloan (Feb 14, 2010)

Quoted from Teufel: "Why assault the machinegun bunker if you can convince the enemy to give it to you?"

Because they will not give it to you, they will escape into PK only to return after we give up ground.  Wow... this is strangely familiar.  What is the point?  Our country has no idea how to fight anymore.


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## Ranger Psych (Feb 14, 2010)

We telegraphed our punches as little as possible, and the few times that we couldn't help but do it, we had stuff set up a week prior so any shitbags rolling from the area would be spotted and handled.

Hopefully they've done the same thing this time.


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## AWP (Feb 14, 2010)

If this seems to be a little disjointed it is because I've merged the threads .

Happy posting.


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## Teufel (Feb 14, 2010)

JJ sloan said:


> Quoted from Teufel: "Why assault the machinegun bunker if you can convince the enemy to give it to you?"
> 
> Because they will not give it to you, they will escape into PK only to return after we give up ground.  Wow... this is strangely familiar.  What is the point?  Our country has no idea how to fight anymore.


 
My take is that higher's intent is not to kill Taliban, the objective is to take and hold Marjah.  Afghanistan is so sensitive to collateral damage we would do more harm than good if we just rolled into the city.  Besides you can't plan an operation of this size without the Taliban getting wind of it.  We all know they aren't going to stay and fight thousands of CF and ANSF troops, at least this way they look like cowards for running.  General Nicholson is a very smart man and I am sure he knows what he is doing.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Feb 14, 2010)

JJ sloan said:


> Our country has no idea how to fight anymore.


 
I could not agree more with you...


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## 7point62 (Feb 14, 2010)

Teufel said:


> My take is that higher's intent is not to kill Taliban, the objective is to take and hold Marjah.  Afghanistan is so sensitive to collateral damage we would do more harm than good if we just rolled into the city.  Besides you can't plan an operation of this size without the Taliban getting wind of it.  We all know they aren't going to stay and fight thousands of CF and ANSF troops, at least this way they look like cowards for running.  General Nicholson is a very smart man and I am sure he knows what he is doing.




When I first read that article, I could only see logic in broadcasting our intentions if we'd be able to track and target enemy forces, herd them into some kind of killbox as they withdrew from the AO, a blocking force as FF has mentioned. And UK/US SOF units apparently _have_ been engaging Taliban leadership in and around Marjah the past few weeks. The larger plan, as you say, is not to kill Taliban and entails the emplacement of Afghan security and infrastructure personnel in the city, police, Army, government offices and all the bureaucracy that goes with it, to transform Marjah from a badguy hideout into a pro-government bastion. I hope it works. It's just that giving the enemy a chance to save themselves goes against my nature.


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## JJ sloan (Feb 14, 2010)

Teufel said:


> My take is that higher's intent is not to kill Taliban, the objective is to take and hold Marjah.  Afghanistan is so sensitive to collateral damage we would do more harm than good if we just rolled into the city.  Besides you can't plan an operation of this size without the Taliban getting wind of it.  We all know they aren't going to stay and fight thousands of CF and ANSF troops, at least this way they look like cowards for running.  General Nicholson is a very smart man and I am sure he knows what he is doing.


 
I see your point brother.  The problem is that these commanders who are "very smart [men]" are following a flawed strategy because they are unsure of what to do.  This strategy of chasing the enemy into Pakistan is not doing anyone any good.  The people here need security, when they see the Taliban running across the border to Quetta, there is no doubt that the talibs will return even stronger.  They see this as a major weakness on America's part.  Showing weakness in Afghanistan is a collosal mistake!  It only aggrivates the situation by encouraging the populace to support the insurgency, which is not what we want... right?  It is time that someone explains the meaning of COIN to our country and explain the true meaning of COIN to our commanders and soldiers.  COIN is not a light-handed approach, as the commanders of today think it is.  When has there ever been a counter-insurgency that was kind and with mercy?  Never.  We must crush the insurgency with no remorse, for as long as it takes; there is no time limit to victory.  Just the way we did in the beginning of the war, we _must_ release the hounds.  Once this is done, then it is time to be kind and merciful, not before.  Sure, people are going to die and mistakes are going to be made.  This is a war, it will get worse before it gets better.  The enemy does not look like cowards for running, this is an American mind-set.  To the people here, the Taliban looks like a growing insurgency, which has the chance to win, and when they do win they will behead everyone who has helped Americans.  This tactic is extremely flawed and is born out of risk aversion, not tactical prowess!


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## QC (Feb 15, 2010)

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/new...icity-blitzkrieg/story-e6frg6z6-1225830246589

FEW offensives have been as well advertised as the battle for Marjah, which US forces have heralded for weeks as the biggest operation of the eight-year war. 
Military strategists were puzzled that the enemy was being given so much detail. But the battle launched on Saturday, local time, is as much for headlines as for territory. "What Marjah is really about is turning around the perception that we're losing," says an adviser to Stanley McChrystal, NATO commander in Afghanistan.

Taking the dusty town of Marjah was never going to be hard. Coalition forces have consistently defeated the Taliban in set-piece battles and this is the biggest display of force since the 2001 invasion.

Most fighters are thought to have melted away, leaving a few diehards and a lot of improvised explosive devices. Some reports were of as few as 50 Taliban in Marjah. Even if there were the 400 or so claimed by US officers, they did not amount to much resistance against 15,000 US Marines, British forces and Afghan troops.

"Nothing in the past eight years of combat supports the notion that the Taliban are suicidal fools," says John McCreary, a former intelligence analyst for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Many in the US intelligence community believe Marjah is about convincing Afghans that the Taliban is not invincible and impressing the sceptics back home.

"It's an attempt to retake the information war," says one officer.

"This is all a war of perceptions," said General McChrystal earlier this month. "This is not a physical war in terms of how many people you kill . . . This is all in the minds of the participants."

The assault follows a series of briefings by McChrystal that NATO forces are "turning the tide" against the Taliban, despite little evidence of this.

The briefings prompted a senior official to warn British Prime Minister Gordon Brown not to be taken in as there could be bloody months ahead.

By talking up the importance of Marjah, the US commander hopes to announce a decisive victory, achieved with a display of firepower capable of convincing Taliban foot soldiers to switch sides. He also wants to use it as a showcase for a shift in focus from killing Taliban to protecting civilians and improving governance.

The real test of Marjah is what subsequently happens to the town and its 70,000-strong population. Under the counter-insurgency strategy of "shape, clear, hold and build", the first two stages have always been fairly straightforward. But as British forces have found in Helmand, the real problem comes with holding. As soon as the foreign forces withdraw, the Afghan forces run away or do deals with the Taliban.

In this instance, British officials say, they have been training special police. An Afghan governor has been imported from Germany, and US and British advisers are standing by. "We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in," says McChrystal.

The US has millions to transform Marjah, which has no paved roads and few schools or clinics.

While Marjah will see a victory, the Taliban may well have shifted elsewhere. NATO officers say they have sealed off escape routes, but the Taliban has never taken coalition forces head-on in Helmand, preferring to stick to guerilla tactics.


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## LongTabSigO (Feb 15, 2010)

JJ sloan said:


> Our country has no idea how to fight anymore.



Our country has no idea what it is allowed to do in the realm of fighting anymore.

I'd like to take the gloves of and just go medieval, if for no other reason than to remind the American People (and everybody else) what the more violent side of this COULD look like.  Then maybe there'd be a greater appreciation for the care by which we actually are trying to fight this thing.


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## LongTabSigO (Feb 15, 2010)

pardus said:
			
		

> We (the ORs/enlisted ranks) have more than the capability to win this but the Officers/politicians won't let us through their cowardliness/incompetence.



All generalizations (generalisations) are false.  But then again, we can't expected the "ORs/enlisted ranks" to understand or appreciate the difference.  :)


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## Crusader74 (Feb 15, 2010)

]Consolidation and stabilisation begin on Operation MOSHTARAK[/SIZE][/B]

*A Military Operations news article*

14 Feb 10

*Operation MOSHTARAK, the Afghan-led initiative to assert government authority in central Helmand province, has completed its first clearing operations, with 'hot stabilisation' already underway in the UK area of operations.*







http://www.militaryphotos.net/forum...[Image: SSgt Mark Jones, Crown Copyright/MOD]F Company (Fire Support) 1 Royal Welsh play their part in Operation MOSHTARAK 
[Image: SSgt Mark Jones, Crown Copyright/MOD]


UK Military spokesman Major General Gordon Messenger gave a comprehensive account of events on Operation MOSHTARAK over the past 24 to 48 hours at a press briefing in London on Sunday 14 February 2010. 
Maj Gen Messenger set out the context.  The Regional Command (South) plan for the south of Afghanistan has three phases: Phase one was to rearrange forces around Kandahar so as to improve security around the city and its routes, so improving freedom of movement of the people. Phase two, currently underway, was focused on securing the population in central Helmand. Phase three would involve sending forces back to Kandahar to support Government influence in the city and developing the capacity of the police.
There were three reasons for signalling the operation in Central Helmand in advance. First, to give the Taliban a choice. Second, to make the population aware that the operation was about to unfold. Third, it allowed a much greater level of Afghan involvement and ownership, and subsequently Afghan participation.
Afghans had been involved early on, and at all levels. The operation was briefed to President Karzai some weeks ago, and Governor Gulab Mangal had led Shuras beforehand. Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police were heavily involved in the planning.
The Major General explained that the operations were broadly about expanding security and Afghan Goverment influence to the areas of Chah-e-Anjir, Western Babaji - otherwise known as the PEAR, Trikh Nawa, and Marjah. Without these areas being cleared, stabilisation operations in the area would have been vulnerable.
Shaping operations had begun before the start of Operation MOSHTARAK. A US Task Force had secured Five-Ways Junction and crossing points along Canal 56.  

At the same time the the Household Cavalry and Danish Leopard Tanks conducted operations in the Bolan Desert to safeguard the area around Lashkar Gah and disrupt insurgents' freedom of movement to the East. 

The Scots Guards had isolated key aras in South Nad Ali, and Task Force Leatherneck had conducted shaping operations to isolate Marjah and secured key lines of communication to support civilian freedom of movement.
Overnight on 12 and 13 February, 1/3/201 Afghan National Army and a Company of 1 Royal Welsh had conducted air insertion into the Chah-e-Anjir Triangle.  A Company Group also of 1 Royal Welsh had gone into Western Babaji, and a combined force of ANA and USMC had conducted air assaults against multiple objectives in central Marjah.
There had been simultaneous and corresponding movements on the ground to link up with these air insertions: from the East, Coldstream Guards with 6/2/215 ANA had conducted a ground link-up operation into the Babaji 'PEAR'; a combined force of 1/3/215 ANA and 1 Grenadier Guards plus Estonian Forces had moved into the Chah-e-Anjir Triangle west of Babaji; and a combined force of ANA and US Marine Corps (USMC) had conducted a ground movement into Northern Marjah. 

About the same number of troops had been inserted over ground as by air, with just under 1,000 in each of the major movements.








http://www.militaryphotos.net/forum...gif&alt=Briefing Slide on Operation MoshtarakOperation Moshtarak - UK briefing from 14 February 2010
[Image: Crown Copyright/MOD]


The theme for UK Forces in the past 24 hours had been consolidation. 
Patrols had been sent out into the areas that the original insertions did not cover. There had been successful searches for IEDs and IED components, with the ANA and Royal Welsh finding 13 pressure-plate IEDs in one compound. Such searches were often directed and indicated by the locals. 
Forces had been securing secondary objectives, such as securing crossings of canals and chokepoints.
They had also begun initial engineering work, such as bridge-building and rapid Force Protection engineering works at the bases now being established.
Finally, they were providing security for the Shuras (meetings of elders) that were taking place across the area. For example, a Shura had been held at Showal, north west of Chah-e-Anjir, yesterday attended by around 150 locals, with another even larger Shura today. 
Maj Gen Messenger said that the ANA had asserted Afghan authority: 
"Showall had been the seat of Taliban shadow government in the area. The Taliban flag was taken down and the Afghan National flag was put in its place."​The air element of the combined operations had been significant, but very stringent requirements were in place before air weapons could be dropped.
Maj Gen Messenger stated:
"There have been no bombs dropped in the UK area of operations, there has been no artillery fired in the UK area of operations, there have been no reports of civilian casualties in the UK area of operations."​Just one Apache Helicopter Hellfire missile had been fired in the UK area of operations. A Household Cavalry patrol was engaged by insurgents near a compound. The UK Apache helicopter fired warning shots into an open field, as was normal practice, but the insurgents had continued to fire at the patrol and so a Hellfire was used.

Maj Gen Messenger said that the operation was not short of complexity, given the aviation, ground and multinational elements, but that Commanders on the ground were very much of the view that the operation had gone according to plan. 
There had been, and remained, very little Taliban interference. There had been small arms attacks from a distance which had tested the patrols, but nothing had stopped the mission from progressing or Shuras from taking place. 
The local elders had expressed confidence that this was not simply a 'mowing the grass' operation, but that ANA and ISAF were here to stay. The Afghan Government were already forward, making contact and conducting Shuras. Initial interaction was done via the ANA, but Afghan Government representatives from Lashkar Gah had already come forward.






http://www.militaryphotos.net/forum...[Image: SSgt Mark Jones, Crown Copyright/MOD]Soldiers from 1 Royal Welsh cross a waterway during the clearance phase of Operation MOSHTARAK
[Image: SSgt Mark Jones, Crown Copyright/MOD]


Maj Gen Messenger spoke of the mood of British troops on the ground:
"There is no complacency. It is not unusual for the Taliban to melt away and then come back at us once they've had time to catch their breath."​The next stage of the operations would be continued clearance and consolidation, with "hot stabilisation" called forward as local conditions permitted.
A number of stabilisation projects had already been agreed and were now underway. These would not tip the balance, the Maj Gen Messenger said, but were an important early part of showing ANA/ISAF intent to stay.
The Major General explained that initial planning had thought that the early stages of stablilisation in the UK area would be taken up with compensation claims for damage caused as a result of the operations. But this had proven largely unnecessary, and stabilisation efforts had been accelerated. "Cash for work" projects had already been indentified at local level, and would begin recruiting as early as tomorrow.
Maj Gen Messenger said that early indications were positive on the key objective of winning the support and engagement of the local population:
"[British Task Force Commander] Brigadier James Cowan is very pleased, he had just returned form the Shura when I spoke to him under an hour ago, and he senses genuinely that the population are prepared to give it a go."
"No-one is saying that the immediate stuff, useful though it is, necessary though it is, is going to be the game-changer. The game-changer is the residual security that is provided there, and continued confidence of the locals that the Afghan Government in the area is going to provide for them. 

"Security first, enabling Afghan-led stabilisation over a period of months, that's the secret."​The Major General summarised his briefing:
"Everyone understands that what has happened over the last 24-48 hours is the easy bit. The hard bit, the challenge, is the enduring effort, is delivering the security which allows the Afghans to start providing for their people. 
"I fully accept that the success of this operation will be judged on that, not on the last 48 hours."​


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## Crusader74 (Feb 15, 2010)

*



*
*This key shows what happened during the first 24 hours of Operation MOSHTARAK: 1 Consolidation of Security. 2 UK/ Danish Forces continue to disrupt insurgent Freedom of Movement in desert. 3 Security of crossings of Canal 56. 4 Combined Force helicopter insertions. 5 US helicopter and ground insertions into Marjah
* 
*Nato-led Op MOSHTARAK is the largest counter-insurgency operations since the conflict began in 2001. 15,000 ISAF troops from Britain, Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, the US, France and Estonia have begun the clearing phase.*

The operation aims to remove insurgents from areas of central Helmand previously untouched by ISAF forces. It demonstrates the Afghan Government's commitment to increasing responsibility for securing the country's future.
Objectives of Op MOSHTARAK are to improve security and freedom of movement within the main population areas of central Helmand province and are intended to:

secure areas routinely used by the Taliban as a base from which to launch attacks against ISAF troops and the Afghan civilian population;
build on the progress made by operations in 2009, which have already played a part in the gradual process of security in central Helmand;
help the Afghan Government take more responsibility for the security and stability of the province.
By securing these key population centres, Afghan security forces and their ISAF partners will pave the way for greater economic development and growth of governance.

*Protecting the civilian population is key*
This operation has been publicised in advance in order to reduce the risk to ordinary Afghans by allowing them to make arrangements to ensure their safety.
Protecting the civilian population is absolutely key to our success and is at the heart of this operation, which is designed to make both the Afghan people and our own troops safer.

http://army.mod.uk


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## Crusader74 (Feb 15, 2010)

CNN footage.. 


http://www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/world/2010/02/14/vo.afghan.marjah.day.two.cnn.html


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## Teufel (Feb 15, 2010)

JJ sloan said:


> I see your point brother.  The problem is that these commanders who are "very smart [men]" are following a flawed strategy because they are unsure of what to do.  This strategy of chasing the enemy into Pakistan is not doing anyone any good.  The people here need security, when they see the Taliban running across the border to Quetta, there is no doubt that the talibs will return even stronger.  They see this as a major weakness on America's part.  Showing weakness in Afghanistan is a collosal mistake!  It only aggrivates the situation by encouraging the populace to support the insurgency, which is not what we want... right?  It is time that someone explains the meaning of COIN to our country and explain the true meaning of COIN to our commanders and soldiers.  COIN is not a light-handed approach, as the commanders of today think it is.  When has there ever been a counter-insurgency that was kind and with mercy?  Never.  We must crush the insurgency with no remorse, for as long as it takes; there is no time limit to victory.  Just the way we did in the beginning of the war, we _must_ release the hounds.  Once this is done, then it is time to be kind and merciful, not before.  Sure, people are going to die and mistakes are going to be made.  This is a war, it will get worse before it gets better.  The enemy does not look like cowards for running, this is an American mind-set.  To the people here, the Taliban looks like a growing insurgency, which has the chance to win, and when they do win they will behead everyone who has helped Americans.  This tactic is extremely flawed and is born out of risk aversion, not tactical prowess!


 
No sweat man, it's not my op after all.  I'm just saying that is what I think the commanders are going for.  Who knows how it will be received.  I think most of the Taliban in that area are home grown to be honest, you never know, this could really work.  I mean who thought the tribal awakening would ever work in Iraq?  In any event General Nicholson has the ball now and who knows what constraints are being put on him.  He is a phenomenal officer with a good track record when he was the 5th Marine Regiment CO in Iraq during the surge.


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## Crusader74 (Feb 15, 2010)

http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/201...HAN_index.html

Photo slideshow of the Marines in Marjah


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## Crusader74 (Feb 15, 2010)

*From MP.Net.*

ESTCOY-9 embedded with ANA coy.















[/QUOTE]


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## pardus (Feb 15, 2010)

LongTabSigO said:


> All generalizations (generalisations) are false.  But then again, we can't expected the "ORs/enlisted ranks" to understand or appreciate the difference.  :)


 
I should have been clearer, and said senior Officers/Generals in particular/Politicians.

IMO, they are more interested in their careers and job prospects outside of the Military than they are in doing the job properly and looking after their men, there are exceptions to the rule of course but I haven't seen too much evidence of it.

We are in the position we are now in Afghanistan in no small part because certain Generals after the Taliban were defeated wouldn't let their guys out to patrol etc..., gave the Taliban time to recover and return unmolested.


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## AWP (Feb 15, 2010)

pardus said:


> We are in the position we are now in Afghanistan in no small part because certain Generals after the Taliban were defeated wouldn't let their guys out to patrol etc..., gave the Taliban time to recover and return unmolested.


 
I can think of one in particular, and he picked up a third star for his efforts.


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## Scotth (Feb 16, 2010)

> *Top Taliban commander captured, U.S. official says*
> 
> 
> The Taliban's top military leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, has  been captured, a senior administration official told CNN late Monday.  This is a "huge deal," CNN National Security Analyst Peter Bergen  said. "This guy ... is the number two political figure in the Taliban"  in addition to being the group's top military commander.
> Baradar was captured several days ago in a secret  joint operation by Pakistani and American intelligence forces in  Karachi, Pakistan, according to American government officials, the New  York Times reported.


http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/02/15/taliban.commander.captured/index.html?hpt=T1

So for the less informed is this guy a big deal or is this being hyped for the publicity value?


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## LongTabSigO (Feb 16, 2010)

pardus said:


> I should have been clearer, and said senior Officers/Generals in particular/Politicians.
> 
> IMO, they are more interested in their careers and job prospects outside of the Military than they are in doing the job properly and looking after their men, there are exceptions to the rule of course but I haven't seen too much evidence of it.
> 
> We are in the position we are now in Afghanistan in no small part because certain Generals after the Taliban were defeated wouldn't let their guys out to patrol etc..., gave the Taliban time to recover and return unmolested.



Concur all - well said.  I'd add that there is a segment of the Civ/Mil Senior leadership apparently so desirous of CYA that any casualty yields the tactical leader a reprimand.  (e.g. Battle of Wanat investigation(s)).
 Not a way to run a railroad and, as I heard on a radio show the other day, sets the conditions for all sorts of internal strife within the military.


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## The91Bravo (Feb 16, 2010)

I would like to think we had a loose perimeter around the AO, so that when the 'warnings' went out, and the inevitable, mass exodus exfil of bad guys occurred, that we were scooping up squirters and throwing sandbags on their melons while moving them out for interrogations.

I think that would work.  If we did that, I guarantee we got some valuable intel from those captured BEFORE our offensive began.

My .02 from the outside looking in.

Steve


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## 7point62 (Feb 16, 2010)

The last I heard there were a half dozen firefights going on in the town and TB were infiltrating into previously cleared positions to fire on our flanks & rear. Apparently, broadcasting our battle plan weeks before the attack didn't scare enough of them away, and this is a point I'd like to make: these are tough motherfuckers. They've been fighting long enough to know scare tactics when they see them and scare tactics just piss them off and challenge them to try to kick your ass. These people are veterans of hard warfare, hard living, deprivation makes them strong, they respond and adapt. You cannot coddle these people, you cannot let up, you can't take your boot off their throat. You have to fucking kill them. Give them an opening and they will take it. Hinder your own troops with ridiculous ROE and the enemy will take advantage of it. The first and foremost principle of COIN is to *kill insurgents*, make it unprofitable and extremely dangerous for them to trespass in your AO. And never, never, never, ever underestimate an enemy just because he's some scrawny illiterate Third-World goat-eating peasant. There are thousands of American and British boys who've been killed by scrawny Third World peasants. Consider this: maybe, just maybe, announcing your intentions to attack weeks in advance, instead of making your enemy flee in fear, might forewarn him enough to plan and prepare a reception.


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## pardus (Feb 16, 2010)

I've read a couple of posts here now about how we should be focusing on killing to win in COIN warfare.
Fighting is important but it is not the most important thing and should not be the focus of any COIN operation.

The fighting is done to stabilize in order to buy timeto conduct the main effort which is winning the hearts and minds of the populace of the country you are trying to secure.

You can kill all day and achieve nothing but strengthen the enemy, by resolve if not by manpower.

Don't get me wrong, we must kill but more than that we need to get the locals on our side.


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## 7point62 (Feb 17, 2010)

pardus said:


> I've read a couple of posts here now about how we should be focusing on killing to win in COIN warfare.
> Fighting is important but it is not the most important thing and should not be the focus of any COIN operation.
> 
> The fighting is done to stabilize in order to buy timeto conduct the main effort which is winning the hearts and minds of the populace of the country you are trying to secure.
> ...




I agree but by fighting and killing you establish security. Security has to come before hearts and minds. Civic action and political efforts mean nothing if the locals are still afraid of insurgent retribution. And once you've established security--by killing efficiently enough to make the insurgents terrified of stepping foot into your AO--you can begin winning the locals over...while maintaining aggressive action to keep the pressure on the enemy. Just my :2c: I think we are on the same page maybe different paragraphs. It's also important to accept the reality that no American and no Briton--unless T.E. Lawrence rises from the grave-- is going to win anybody's heart or mind. Only the indigs can win the H&M of their countrymen and they've got to do it right.. 

As far as telegraphing intentions, announcing plans for your offensive in advance, if I were a Taliban, I'd be thinking hey, it took me a long long time to grow this beard...these guys are insulting my manliness by telling me they are going to attack my city and expect me to leave and hand it over to them. Allah Akbar...I'm going to use these two weeks they are generously giving me to arrange a reception by planting IEDs, preparing ambush sites, fallback positions and exfil routes. I am also going to take maximum advantage of the Marine's "classified" ROE...which, of course, has been classified so I can't take advantage of it but which of course I can because you can't keep classified something this restrictive that every swinging dick 0311 and 0331 has been bitching about openly and vehemently for the past 6 months.


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## 7point62 (Feb 17, 2010)

It's also become abundantly clear as this operation progresses that it doesn't matter how many civilians are accidentally killed--200, 20 or 2--we are still going to get hammered for it by the media. Yesterday's Tampa Tribune, (a newspaper delivered daily to CENTCOM/SOCOM), pretty much went apeshit with every article focused on collateral casualties and MacChrystal apologizing. And a whole feature story on a 7-year old boy shot in the chest. It doesn't matter who shot him, it's our fault. You're fucked if you do and you're fucked if you don't.


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## pardus (Feb 17, 2010)

7point62 said:


> I agree but by fighting and killing you establish security. Security has to come before hearts and minds. Civic action and political efforts mean nothing if the locals are still afraid of insurgent retribution. And once you've established security--by killing efficiently enough to make the insurgents terrified of stepping foot into your AO--you can begin winning the locals over...while maintaining aggressive action to keep the pressure on the enemy. Just my :2c: I think we are on the same page maybe different paragraphs. It's also important to accept the reality that no American and no Briton--unless T.E. Lawrence rises from the grave-- is going to win anybody's heart or mind. Only the indigs can win the H&M of their countrymen and they've got to do it right..


 
You have missed the point of my post and I believe COIN warfare with this post.

The locals are often the insurgents or related to the insurgents.
By killing them you do nothing but turn the locals against you.

e.g. you kill habib the insurgent, good he's gone, problem solved... right? Wrong, Habib happens to be the son of the village chief and married to the village Iman's daughter and has an extended family of over 50 people in the valley that he was born.
You not only didn't establish security by killing Habib but you just turned over 50 people who were sitting on the fence when it came to loyalty to either the insurgency or the govt into confirmed insurgents.
You turned a valley that was teetering on the edge of loyalty into a safe haven for not only the Taliban but Al Qaida as well.

A valley that will now undoubtably kill American and Allied troops when they try to secure it after you have gone.
A valley that will remain hostile for decades if not longer.

Your plan will only work when used against the Al Qaida insurgents, it could be a disaster if used against the Taliban.

That doesn't mean we stop fighting the Taliban, it means we get a whole lot smarter about it.


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## 7point62 (Feb 17, 2010)

Actually, I did and didn't miss your point.  Because I've posted much the same thing on other threads. But I look at it a little differently than you do. A lot of these villagers can be pretty pragmatic about about warfare, especially if they've become used to it, as in Vietnam or Afghanistan. Cousin Habib--as much as we love him--he was also a rash young man who is at least partially responsible for digging his own hole when he decided to leave our village and seek excitement with the Taliban. So, we are not going to be all that surprised if we find out that cousin Habib got zapped. I don't agree that killing cousin Habib is automatically going to turn his extended family against you. I do believe, however, that if you kill or mistreat or degrade or maliciously injure innocent villagers, you _will_ turn that village against you.


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## 7point62 (Feb 17, 2010)

Pardus, I need to explain my last post...I had to run out to pick up my son and didn't expand enough...please bear with me for a bit.

The scenario you describe is textbook COIN. There's a big difference between textbook COIN and reality COIN. In reality COIN, we have a village based on agriculture. Farming is the business of the village. If you decide to leave the village and go join a bunch of Pakistanis in the Taliban, or a gang of bandits--or even the Afghan National Army, for that matter--you are deviating from the age-old business of the village, and choosing, of your own free will, a lifestyle of great risk and of no real practical or immediate value to the village. Most peasant farmers are _not_ political animals. They don't care who's running things, they just want the guys with guns to leave them alone. They want to make a living, put food on the table for their family and enjoy their downtime. As a general rule, they are not happy when guerrilla fighters come into the village at night demanding food; and they are equally unhappy when government troops come into the village during the day to demand information about the guerrillas. If I am a peasant farmer and my neighbor's son decides to go off and fight--for anybody, it doesn't matter who--I may really like the kid, but I'm not going to avenge his death. His cause is not my cause. My cause is farming. If _your_ neighbor's son decides to rob a bank at gunpoint and dies in a shootout with police, you may have loved the kid, but you're not going to fuck up your own life and shoot the next cop you see. This is the point. It's one thing to kill a warrior. It's another to kill a non-combatant. 

And as far as winning hearts and minds go--and I swear I will hijack this thread no longer-- if you _really_ want to help a primitive people,  _*give them a doctor*_. Nothing wins people over faster than curing their kids, relieving their aches and pains, treating their afflictions, fixing their teeth...You take good care of a woman's sick baby and you will have won a friend.


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## pardus (Feb 17, 2010)

7point62 said:


> Pardus, I need to explain my last post...I had to run out to pick up my son and didn't expand enough...please bear with me for a bit.
> 
> The scenario you describe is textbook COIN. There's a big difference between textbook COIN and reality COIN. In reality COIN, we have a village based on agriculture. Farming is the business of the village. If you decide to leave the village and go join a bunch of Pakistanis in the Taliban, or a gang of bandits--or even the Afghan National Army, for that matter--you are deviating from the age-old business of the village, and choosing, of your own free will, a lifestyle of great risk and of no real practical or immediate value to the village. Most peasant farmers are _not_ political animals. They don't care who's running things, they just want the guys with guns to leave them alone. They want to make a living, put food on the table for their family and enjoy their downtime. As a general rule, they are not happy when guerrilla fighters come into the village at night demanding food; and they are equally unhappy when government troops come into the village during the day to demand information about the guerrillas. If I am a peasant farmer and my neighbor's son decides to go off and fight--for anybody, it doesn't matter who--I may really like the kid, but I'm not going to avenge his death. His cause is not my cause. My cause is farming. If _your_ neighbor's son decides to rob a bank at gunpoint and dies in a shootout with police, you may have loved the kid, but you're not going to fuck up your own life and shoot the next cop you see. This is the point. It's one thing to kill a warrior. It's another to kill a non-combatant.
> 
> And as far as winning hearts and minds go--and I swear I will hijack this thread no longer-- if you _really_ want to help a primitive people,  _*give them a doctor*_. Nothing wins people over faster than curing their kids, relieving their aches and pains, treating their afflictions, fixing their teeth...You take good care of a woman's sick baby and you will have won a friend.


 
You are not talking about the Pashtun people of Afghanistan...

Read this...

http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/09/24/the-dirtiest-war/print/



> “If I kill someone with this gun,” says Abdul Qadeer Khan, a 47-year-old militiaman and father of two young boys, “then his family will seek revenge against my family. Then my family will have to seek revenge against his, and so on."





> Army officials admit this is part of their strategy, to divide the Taliban and then eliminate groups one by one with the help of the militias. But there is an underlying flaw in this approach: much of the Taliban ranks are drawn from local communities. Kill a Taliban and you are also killing a member of a clan.



The Pashtun virtue of  *Badal*  demands revenge for the death of family/etc...

Your last paragraph goes along with what I was saying.


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## 7point62 (Feb 17, 2010)

Goddammit, you are right. I overstepped my bounds. I tried to apply COIN from SE Asia and S. America to Afghanistan and all I did was embarrass myself. I'm a wanker. I hate myself. Please delete my posts. I've made a fool of myself and I want to die. I am an asshole. A know-it-all fucking asshole. Please, pardon my pedantic posts. Shoot me. Just fucking kill me.


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

....


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

Marines


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

Marines


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

1324546


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

12234356


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

213242546


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

123434


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

122345


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

12345


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

12345


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## Crusader74 (Feb 17, 2010)

12345
















Pictures from the Ministry of Defence, and the BBC


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## 7point62 (Feb 24, 2010)

Like I said...I don't think it's ever a good idea to announce your intentions to your enemy...because they never do what you want them to do.


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## Crusader74 (Feb 28, 2010)

11 min vid..recommended watching


http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid62612474001?bctid=67312757001


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## 7point62 (Feb 28, 2010)

Excellent vid. There's far too little of this kind of reporting on US TV. In fact, in most of the main stream media here the war has taken a backseat.


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