# In Afghanistan, A U.S. Special Forces Major's Meteoric Rise And Humiliating Fall



## Ravage (Mar 24, 2014)

http://myemail.constantcontact.com/...-Fall.html?soid=1114009586911&aid=9ymLXDgt8bI







*A once-promising strategy for stability in Afghanistan ended badly two years ago, along with the career of its author and chief proponent, Army Special Forces Maj. Jim Gant. His gripping story is detailed in a new book, American Spartan, by Ann Scott Tyson, the former Washington Post war correspondent who interviewed him for anadmiring story in late 2009. They fell in love. Tyson eventually joined Gant in an Afghan village, where he built a reputation mobilizing local tribes against the Taliban.*

*A tough, wiry Special Forces soldier, Gant was decorated and recommended for promotion over 22 continuous months of combat in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011. But in the end, the iconoclasm and disdain for military protocol that enabled Gant's success were instrumental in his eventual downfall.

At his peak, Gant, now 46, posed such a threat to al Qaeda's objectives that Osama bin Laden personally demanded his head, Tyson writes. Gant's lows came later, when he was accused by the military command of drinking and other violations, including keeping a "paramour," and using tactics that recklessly endangered the lives of his troops. At the heart of the military's discomfort, Gant believes, was his insistence that he could trust his life, and those of his men, to the tribal Afghan fighters he'd trained and armed to reverse the Taliban's spread across eastern Afghanistan.

To reach these tribes, Gant took a few seasoned Special Forces warriors "downrange," deep into rural communities where the Taliban held sway. He spent hours drinking tea and listening to village elders. He and his men grew beards. They wore Afghan clothing and learned to speak Pashto. They trained and armed village tribesmen and pledged their lives to one another. In the nonconformist tradition of the Green Berets, Gant shrugged away the U.S. military bureaucracy, with its thickets of regulations, codified as official Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Among them: rules for specific combat operations that dictate the number of troops, types of vehicles and types of weapons used -- requirements often ignored by Special Forces teams, and especially by Gant.

Soon, Gant's teams of Green Berets and Afghans -- the beginning of what is known today as the Afghan Local Police (ALP) -- were operating against the Taliban together. His methods were risky -- Gant said he once drove with his team into a Taliban stronghold, dared them to attack, then stole their white flag when they refused. Sometimes, he said, he convinced Taliban fighters to join the local forces.

In Afghanistan, commanders allowed him the unusual freedom to operate as he saw fit. He was considered by then-Gen. David Petraeus and other top military commanders to be one of the leading counterinsurgency experts in the American military.

But his unconventional tactics and flouting of the rules eventually proved too much. In the spring of 2012, Gant was abruptly fired, stripped of his prized Special Forces insignia and forced into humiliating retirement. His work fell into disrepair.

Gant and Tyson, now married, expanded on their story in hours of exclusive interviews with The Huffington Post.





Journalist Ann Scott Tyson and Special Forces Maj. Jim Gant (front), in eastern Afghanistan in 2012.

Gant's introduction to Afghanistan came in 2003 and 2004, when he led a hunter-killer team and began to develop his ideas on arming and fighting alongside local tribes against the Taliban. He was sent next to Iraq, where he served two bloody tours, leading a U.S.-Iraqi commando team. Gant was awarded the prestigious Silver Star for gallantry in action, after an extended firefight in which he deliberately drove over and detonated three IEDs to protect his troops behind him. Back in the states as a Special Forces instructor, he began to realize that the killing wasn't working.

"I am in a group of outliers that really, really, really enjoyed combat, to include killing -- to hunt another human being down and shoot him in the face," Gant told me. "But if all you're doing is killing, and you're not gaining security, something is wrong. You have to relook [at] what it is that you're doing."

"War is not passing out candy," Gant said. "You're gonna have to kill. But ... at some point you have to do something different."

He knew that local tribes were Afghanistan's political, cultural and social center, built on intense loyalty to brother warriors, family and village, and a willingness to die to protect them from outsiders -- Taliban, Americans or the central government in Kabul. The tribal fighters offered, and demanded, respect, loyalty and honor.

Rather than propping up a weak and corrupt central government, Gant thought, the U.S. should be working bottom up: building trust with the tribes, then providing the pay and weapons for their own self-defense.

It was a bold concept. He detailed it in a paper, "One Tribe at a Time," which went online in the fall of 2009. The idea of using local manpower for security had been around for a while, but without a champion. Gant's proposal was an immediate hit in Washington: the Obama administration was searching for a way to win the war it had inherited in Afghanistan.

Pentagon brass were pressing for huge troop reinforcements. But Gant was pushing a low-cost and speedy solution, using Special Forces teams of Green Berets.

"In a situation where you're working feverishly to accelerate the development of the host nation capabilities -- and we knew there was a limited amount of time -- we had to get on with it, and this was one of the few ways we could get on with it," said a former senior commander in Afghanistan. He spoke on condition that he not be identified because of the lingering official sensitivity about Gant's career.

Inserting small Green Beret teams deep into remote villages, far from reinforcements, would be risky, Gant realized. "American soldiers would die, some of them alone, with no support," he wrote in the paper. "Some may simply disappear. Everyone has to understand that from the outset."

But, he observed, "We are losing in Afghanistan."

His ideas caught the attention of two powerful four-star officers: Adm. Eric Olson, then head of the Special Operations Command, and Gen. David Petraeus, then commander of U.S. Central Command. In short order, Gant was back in Afghanistan to put his ideas into action in June 2010.

Working in insurgent-controlled valleys in Konar Province, Gant and his teams of American and Afghan fighters operated far beyond the reach of reinforcements or air support. Their own security: absolute trust that each would fight to the death for the others.

Tyson went with them. She took a leave of absence from The Washington Post in September 2010, and flew to Afghanistan, where she gathered material for the book. Under Gant's supervision, Tyson learned to fire "almost every weapon" the Special Forces team used, she writes. On missions with Gant and his team, she wore U.S. military fatigues and tucked her hair up under a ballcap. Her job in a firefight was to pass ammunition to the turret gunner.

They'd visit villages and listen respectfully to the elders' ideas -- a time-consuming tactic not always practiced by other American soldiers. Gant's own personality evidently pleased Afghan villagers: polite, engaging and a careful listener, he values honor above all else, and is quick to bestow his friendship and trust -- but equally quick to erupt in violence if warranted.

"They knew, from back in '03 and '04, that I had smoked a lot of people. And they knew I'd burn the whole frickin' place down," Gant said. "But I'd also tell them, 'Hey -- I did not come to fight this time,' and I think that resonated with them."

Inevitably, they would encounter villagers who were fighting for the Taliban, and they'd talk. "I was more interested -- much more interested -- in talking to the Taliban than killing them," Gant said. On one mission, Gant and his men fought alongside an Afghan who had previously been a top Taliban commander. Like other defectors, his priority was to protect his home village turf, not to be part of an ideological movement directed from Pakistan.

Soon, officially sanctioned ALP units were forming across the country. In eastern Afghanistan by mid-2011, Gant and his teams had built ALP forces numbering some 1,300, up from zero the previous year, according to an official review in June 2011. Petraeus, then the senior military commander in Afghanistan, helicoptered in to award Gant an Army commendation medal for "exceptionally meritorious achievement" that enabled "the unprecedented advancement of the campaign in Afghanistan," the award citation states.

But trouble was brewing. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, concerned at the growing political clout of ALP commanders, seized control of the program
	
 and the U.S.-funded supplies for the ALP. Inevitably, Tyson writes, pay, fuel and ammunition intended for ALP units began to disappear inside the corrupt Afghan logistics system. Critics charged that the program was merely empowering vicious and untrustworthy warlords. There were accusations against some ALP units for human rights abuses.

The Special Forces command in Afghanistan, which often brought visiting brass and congressional delegations to admire Gant's operations, began to chafe at his bending of the rules, according to Tyson's account. Command started investigating Gant's lifestyle and his habit of thumbing his nose at official regulations, Tyson writes, including a prohibition on drinking and possession of painkillers, sleeping pills and other pharmaceuticals. He was accused of keeping a "paramour," a reference to Tyson. While their living arrangement was unusual, they argue in the book that her presence was a useful link to village women and helped cement ties between the Americans and the Afghans.

Gant also kept classified material in his room; it should have been kept "in a General Services Administration-approved security container and placed under continuous (i.e., 24/7) control by U.S. government personnel," according to a statement by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). To no avail, Gant responded to command that he kept drugs as the acting medic for his troops, and that there was nowhere else to store classified papers.

Asked whether it was common for Special Forces soldiers living in austere combat outposts to have access to alcohol, a USASOC spokesman, Lt. Col. Dave Connolly, wrote in a carefully worded email that soldiers are expected to obey the prohibition on alcohol and "are aware of the ramifications if caught."

Things got worse. Petraeus and other senior commanders who had supported Gant had gone home, Petraeus to take over the CIA. The commanders who remained, Gant said, resented his breaching of regulations and high-profile successes. On the basis of what Gant considers trumped-up charges of drinking, keeping drugs, living with Tyson and endangering the lives of his men due to his disregard for standard military procedure, in March 2012, Gant was plucked from his American and Afghan team and flown back to the states, where he received a severe, career-ending reprimand from Lt. Gen. John F. Mulholland, commander of the Army Special Operations Command. In a letter dated July 2012, Mulholland acknowledged Gant's "record of honorable and valorous service." But he said Gant's conduct had been "inexcusable and brought disrepute and shame to the Special Forces" and "disgraced you as an officer and seriously compromised your character as a gentleman."

The village where Gant had based his operations was abandoned by the U.S. command.

Maj. Gant was demoted a rank, to captain, and then allowed to retire. His security clearances were revoked. But what stung the most, he said, was the humiliation and betrayal of the trust he'd built with the Afghans, and his repudiation by senior Special Operations commanders, of whom he speaks bitterly. He feels he was railroaded out of the Green Berets by officers who valued by-the-book military procedure over successful warfighting.

"Yes, I broke those rules and I never say I didn't," Gant said, acknowledging that he drank and used sleeping pills and pain medication. "But I mean, we're not talking rape, murder, stealing property. I went to the extremes to protect my men. I loved them every day. I never lost a man. I'm proud. I can look in the mirror. If I went back and did it again, not one thing would I change."

Mulholland, now head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, declined to comment, through a spokesman.

Gant's work, while controversial, is still held as exemplary in many parts of the military. His operations "played a pivotal role in stabilizing .... an area that until very recently was under insurgent control," a superior wrote in June 2011. "His unprecedented success ... has had a strategic impact on our operations in Afghanistan."

"We needed Special Forces to be intrepid, to take risks, to feel that some rules didn't apply to them," the former senior commander in Afghanistan told me. "His strength, the strength of a lot of guys in those environments, was their willingness to push the envelope of the bureaucracy, to live with much less protection.

"But at the end of the day, it appears that he broke quite a few rules that shouldn't have been broken." Gant, this commander said, "felt he was exempt."

Thus was lost a promising initiative, one that might have matured into an inexpensive and self-sustaining movement to enable Afghans to help stabilize their own country. Gant's dramatic rise and fall calls into question whether even the Special Forces -- expected to excel in unconventional warfare -- can ever operate effectively in tricky conflicts like Afghanistan, where strict U.S. military procedures may not fit the environment or leave any room for rule-breaking mavericks.

In his 2009 paper, "One Tribe at a Time," Gant wrote that his gravest concern was that once his ideas were adopted and good relations were established with the Afghans, the U.S. would then abandon them and the ALP units. "By far the worst outcome we could have," he wrote, is that "the tribes to whom we have promised long-term support will be left to be massacred by a vengeful Taliban."

The latter has not happened, at least on a large scale.

Today in Afghanistan, there are close to 27,000 ALP in 29 of the country's 34 districts, according to Army Lt. Col James O. Gregory, a spokesman for the Special Operations Joint Task force in Afghanistan. But with the drawdown of U.S. troops and a withdrawal deadline at the end of this year, "few" Green Beret teams are embedded at the village level, Gregory said.

In cases where ALP positions have been overrun by the Taliban, Gregory wrote in an email, "they have the ability to call for direct assistance from neighboring [Afghan National Army] and [Afghan National Police] if needed."*


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## Marauder06 (Mar 24, 2014)

I'm deeply suspicious of this entire read.


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## RackMaster (Mar 24, 2014)

Found the HuffPost link.

http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/5008520?utm_hp_ref=politics&ir=Politics


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## Marauder06 (Mar 24, 2014)

He kept unauthorized drugs, alcohol, and a civilian woman in his room and wonders why he got fired?


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## Etype (Mar 24, 2014)

OMFG.  

Here we go...


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## AWP (Mar 24, 2014)

Marauder06 said:


> He kept unauthorized drugs, alcohol, and a civilian woman in his room and wonders why he got fired?


 
Who does he think he is? A contractor?


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## DA SWO (Mar 24, 2014)

Marauder06 said:


> He kept unauthorized drugs, alcohol, and a civilian woman in his room and wonders why he got fired?


Alcohal with an ODA/B  who da thunk it?
Guy must have thought it was 2002.


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## Teufel (Mar 24, 2014)

http://www.amazon.com/American-Spartan-Promise-Mission-Betrayal/dp/0062114980


Here is the link to the book.  Must be nice to have a reporter wife/paramour to stir up a media frenzy for you.


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## Marauder06 (Mar 25, 2014)

Etype said:


> OMFG.
> 
> Here we go...



Could you elaborate on that?


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## TLDR20 (Mar 25, 2014)

Marauder06 said:


> Could you elaborate on that?



I know Maj Gant is a sore subject with most SF guys.


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## TheSiatonist (Mar 25, 2014)

Some pics from his book _One Tribe at a Time_:

http://www.shadowspear.com/vb/threads/us-army-sof-photos.4172/page-6#post-54104


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## Marauder06 (Mar 25, 2014)

TLDR20 said:


> I know Maj Gant is a sore subject with most SF guys.


I'm actually really interested to hear about it.  I don't know the guy and I hadn't heard anything about him before this book (written by his wife) broke.  

The book and its reviews seem to gush about what a great guy he was and how he got screwed over, while he was in the process of winning the war single-handedly or whatever.  But in looking at the severity of the punishment, and the things he was doing, I wonder if he kind of deserved what happened.


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## AWP (Mar 25, 2014)

Marauder06 said:


> what a great guy he was and how he got screwed over, while he was in the process of winning the war single-handedly or whatever.


 
I'm not saying the good MAJ is on the exact same plane as my examples, but that's Idema's story or that of posers or guys like Mike Yon.....these people develop a cult of personality around them where they can do no wrong. Their supporters then become the attack dogs needed to beat down any influence. By accident or design, this is kind of what's happening. This tale plays out in countless movies and books: good guy who is the best of the best, but is then screwed over by the very system he served and blah, blah, blah.

*I don't know the MAJ and I don't know the details*, but the narrative is painfully familiar. Another example: people still defend the Cups of Tea jerkwad.

Without a ton of supporting evidence and witnesses these tales of woe and misery obfuscate the truth over time. In the end, just like busting posers, people believe whatever they want to believe and the facts are irrelevant.


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## Ravage (Mar 25, 2014)

Kinda reminds me of another 'superhero' type character that grew a legend thicker than he wore a beard... or a 'stache in this case.


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## DasBoot (Mar 25, 2014)

If you replace the mentions of Maj. Grant with Col. Walter Kurtz, this whole thing reads like a remake of Apocalypse Now. I agree with @Freefalling that this sounds like a lot of other "modern" military stories- this is all definitely in the same vein as Col. Hackworth and even Marcinko.


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## DA SWO (Mar 25, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> I'm not saying the good MAJ is on the exact same plane as my examples, but that's Idema's story or that of posers or guys like Mike Yon.....these people develop a cult of personality around them where they can do no wrong. Their supporters then become the attack dogs needed to beat down any influence. By accident or design, this is kind of what's happening. This tale plays out in countless movies and books: good guy who is the best of the best, but is then screwed over by the very system he served and blah, blah, blah.
> 
> *I don't know the MAJ and I don't know the details*, but the narrative is painfully familiar. Another example: people still defend the Cups of Tea jerkwad.
> 
> Without a ton of supporting evidence and witnesses these tales of woe and misery obfuscate the truth over time. In the end, just like busting posers, people believe whatever they want to believe and the facts are irrelevant.


Billy Beer Carter, etc; they start to believe more in what they read about themselves and lose sight of reality?  That kind of cult?


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## BloodStripe (Jun 24, 2014)

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/jim-gant-top-green-beret-officer-forced-resign/story?id=24266710 I will withhold comment on this as I don't know anything about this other than this article. It sounds as though he was extremely effective at his job.


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## AWP (Jun 24, 2014)

Threads merged.


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## TLDR20 (Jun 24, 2014)

I am pretty sure he was never the "top Green Beret officer"


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## Viper1 (Jun 24, 2014)

Marauder06 said:


> I'm actually really interested to hear about it.  I don't know the guy and I hadn't heard anything about him before this book (written by his wife) broke.
> 
> The book and its reviews seem to gush about what a great guy he was and how he got screwed over, while he was in the process of winning the war single-handedly or whatever.  But in looking at the severity of the punishment, and the things he was doing, I wonder if he kind of deserved what happened.



I'll send you a PM and put Etype and TLDR20 on there as well.  I can elaborate a little on this story, maybe they can as well.


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## DA SWO (Jun 24, 2014)

Marauder06 said:


> I'm actually really interested to hear about it.  I don't know the guy and I hadn't heard anything about him before this book (written by his wife) broke.
> 
> The book and its reviews seem to gush about what a great guy he was and how he got screwed over, while he was in the process of winning the war single-handedly or whatever.  But in looking at the severity of the punishment, and the things he was doing, I wonder if he kind of deserved what happened.


I wonder if he was as awesome as poppa panda bear sexy pants.
Seriously though, I would like to hear the truth on this, but I doubt the Maj(?) will be saying much.
Guess he could always join 20th SFG.


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## Viper1 (Jun 24, 2014)

SOWT said:


> I wonder if he was as awesome as poppa panda bear sexy pants.
> Seriously though, I would like to hear the truth on this, but I doubt the Maj(?) will be saying much.
> Guess he could always join 20th SFG.



Nope, he's retired as a Captain.


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## DA SWO (Jun 24, 2014)

Viper1 said:


> Nope, he's retired as a Captain.


Interesting.
Grade determination board?
Was he prior enlisted?


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## AWP (Jun 24, 2014)

SOWT said:


> Guess he could always join 20th SFG.


 
It has enough fucked-up officers and I believe its FY15 quota is already met.


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## BloodStripe (Jun 24, 2014)

SOWT said:


> Interesting.
> Grade determination board?
> Was he prior enlisted?



He was called a disgrace, stripped of his Green Beret, reduced in rank to Captain, and given a discharge. 

I would love to hear the other side of the story (the Army's side) and not a story written by a journalist who loves him.


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## Viper1 (Jun 25, 2014)

SOWT said:


> Interesting.
> Grade determination board?
> Was he prior enlisted?



The most up to date article I could find so far.  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...-disgrace-allegations-alcohol-drug-abuse.html

Bottom line: it's one thing to break the rules.  It's another to break the rules and flaunt them frivolously in front of your men and your superiors.  This is what rubs guys wrong in so many ways.


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## Ooh-Rah (Jun 25, 2014)

SOTGWarrior said:


> He was called a disgrace, stripped of his Green Beret <snip>



So what does this mean, symbolic?  Or he can no longer consider himself a former Green Beret and is erased from the history?


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## Red Flag 1 (Jun 25, 2014)

SOTGWarrior said:


> http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/jim-gant-top-green-beret-officer-forced-resign/story?id=24266710 I will withhold comment on this as I don't know anything about this other than this article. It sounds as though he was extremely effective at his job.



Interesting interview.


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## x SF med (Jun 25, 2014)

Ooh-Rah1069 said:


> So what does this mean, symbolic?  Or he can no longer consider himself a former Green Beret and is erased from the history?




It means his tab was revoked.  His record still shows him as being trained as a Special Forces Officer, but his name is stricken from the rolls of the Regiment and he cannot claim to have served honorably as an SF Officer.  He's been PNG'd.  It's very similar to exiling someone.

It's not symbolic at all, you have to really screw up to get your tab revoked - a criminal offense or bring dishonor/shame upon the Regiment are the biggest reasons for revocation/PNG.


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## pardus (Jun 26, 2014)

On the face of it, it sounds like an effective guy was fucked due to jealously/narrow  mindedness/big army BS.

I'd like to see the Army's take on this and why they did what they did.

Drank? Who gives a fuck, this doesn't happen with SF on deployments? Please...
Drugs? Were they illegal? If they came through the system and given by a medic, no case.
The Chick? Really, who gives a fuck?

Brought down by a 1st LT... Hmmm... 

Deserved it because he broke the rules? Really? with the fucking hypocrisy prevalent in the military you really think fucking a Soldier who is doing an outstanding job is a good thing? Yeah, proof the US Army has never stopped being a peacetime Army.

That's how it looks to me, from what I can see now, with what I've seen so far.


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## TLDR20 (Jun 26, 2014)

pardus said:


> On the face of it, it sounds like an effective guy was fucked due to jealously/narrow  mindedness/big army BS.
> 
> I'd like to see the Army's take on this and why they did what they did.
> 
> ...



All those things may go on, but openly flaunting a disregard for those things will get you eventually.


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## AWP (Jun 26, 2014)

TLDR20 said:


> All those things may go on, but openly flaunting a disregard for those things will get you eventually.


 
Before you make waves, ensure that your boat doesn't have any leaks...
---

I seriously doubt his tab was pulled over some booze and a woman. A kindler, gentler Kurtz is still a Kurtz....


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## pardus (Jun 26, 2014)

TLDR20 said:


> All those things may go on, but openly flaunting a disregard for those things will get you eventually.



Sure, but still hypocrisy right?



Freefalling said:


> Before you make waves, ensure that your boat doesn't have any leaks...
> ---
> 
> I seriously doubt his tab was pulled over some booze and a woman. A kindler, gentler Kurtz is still a Kurtz....



And Kurtz is a bad thing?


------------------------------------------

Bottom line, Do we want to win or do we want to uphold puritan values at all costs?


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Jun 26, 2014)

Hmmm, rules are the rules, flaunting your following or failure to is besides the point. If you cannot conduct the mission within the rules set by the higher ups, than you inform them, do your best to change them, but you don't go out and break them on purpose. If you do, you face the consequences, and take the punishment like a man.

Everyone breaks a rule here and there. It happens, but there is a big difference between fucking up, and going off and writing your own rule book.

$.02


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## Copenhagen (Jun 26, 2014)

Seems as though he was in the wrong area of the government...


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## AWP (Jun 26, 2014)

pardus said:


> Bottom line, Do we want to win or do we want to uphold puritan values at all costs?


 
Again, I seriously doubt his tab was pulled because of booze and tail. If the Regiment did that they would cut 7 Groups down to about one battalion. I doubt what's in the press is the full story, but even if it is where he really screwed the pooch was by drawing attention to himself and his "message." Like I said, he made waves in a leaky boat.

I'm not saying people aren't screwed over by the system or men in power, but I'm deeply skeptical when they essentially marry their own PR firm and then admit zero wrong doing.


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## pardus (Jun 26, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> Again, I seriously doubt his tab was pulled because of booze and tail. If the Regiment did that they would cut 7 Groups down to about one battalion. I doubt what's in the press is the full story, but even if it is where he really screwed the pooch was by drawing attention to himself and his "message." Like I said, he made waves in a leaky boat.
> 
> I'm not saying people aren't screwed over by the system or men in power, but I'm deeply skeptical when they essentially marry their own PR firm and then admit zero wrong doing.



Yeah it wouldn't surprise me in the slightest if there was more to the story. Like I said earlier, my comments are based solely on what I've read in this thread.


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## Ranger Psych (Jun 26, 2014)

It's one thing to sneak some shit in and sneak a nipper here and there. It's another to go full alcoholic.

It's one thing to have reality kick your ass and need some medical assistance. It's another to go full addict regardless of the source.

It's one thing to sneak some poon if you're both interested. It's another to cohabitate while deployed in a combat zone while both married to other people.

That's a pretty good list of fucked up from the floor up regardless of where you're at, and all the performance in the world doesn't change that you're a fucking yardsale of a soldier doing that shit.... and if you think it's kosher, you should get the fuck out anyway. Sorry.


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## ScribblerSix (Jun 26, 2014)

Ranger Psych said:


> It's one thing to sneak some shit in and sneak a nipper here and there. It's another to go full alcoholic.
> 
> It's one thing to have reality kick your ass and need some medical assistance. It's another to go full addict regardless of the source.
> 
> ...



I worked near his AO for a long while, and you know what, I thought the same when I first heard about this guy and then the allegations. A lot of guys did. But then I realized, we all know the army bureaucracy is backward, that there are rebels in the military, but we might even need guys go "native" (with a litany of successful figures far beyond the likes of Lawrence of Arabia) to win wars. A lot of people have argued people like Gant are needed, people who will live in the village, basically become part of it. If he breaks the rules... who cares? If he's successful, that's what matters.

The fact that he was successful in his AO while he was there, that his tribal militia he helped stand up is one of the most feared in the province to this day, that has always hated guys like him army (guys like Travis Patriquin for example) et all cannot be over looked. Shit like this, believe me, it wins wars.

From Malaya where British Special Branch agents went native, to Northern Ireland where Englishmen went totally Irish (one example of someone like Gant is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Nairac), Iraq, the list goes on, people like Gant win wars like the one in Afghanistan.I mean, I don't want to dis rangers but night raids don't win wars that can last 20 or 30 years, they just win battles.


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## Ooh-Rah (Jun 26, 2014)

ScribblerSix said:


> I worked near his AO for a long while, and you know what, I thought the same when I first heard about this guy and then the allegations. A lot of guys did. But then I realized, we all know the army bureaucracy is backward, that there are rebels in the military, but we might even need guys go "native" (with a litany of successful figures far beyond the likes of Lawrence of Arabia) to win wars. A lot of people have argued people like Gant are needed, people who will live in the village, basically become part of it. If he breaks the rules... who cares? If he's successful, that's what matters.
> 
> The fact that he was successful in his AO while he was there, that his tribal militia he helped stand up is one of the most feared in the province to this day, that has always hated guys like him army (guys like Travis Patriquin for example) et all cannot be over looked. Shit like this, believe me, it wins wars.
> 
> From Malaya where British Special Branch agents went native, to Northern Ireland where Englishmen went totally Irish (one example of someone like Gant is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Nairac), Iraq, the list goes on, people like Gant win wars like the one in Afghanistan.I mean, I don't want to dis rangers but night raids don't win wars that can last 20 or 30 years, they just win battles.



No.  I cannot agree with this - getting past the uncanny _Apocalypse Now_ scenerio you describe as being okay, you cannot go completely native on the bit.  I'm more pissed right now because I was not SOF and cannot describe in "I was there" detail as to why your post upsets me so much, (I do not have the correct words and references), so I am hoping one of my big brothers will come by soon and help me articulate what it is I am trying to say...


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## ScribblerSix (Jun 26, 2014)

Ooh-Rah1069 said:


> No.  I cannot agree with this - getting past the uncanny _Apocalypse Now_ scenerio you describe as being okay, you cannot go completely native on the bit.  I'm more pissed right now because I was not SOF and cannot describe in "I was there" detail as to why your post upsets me so much, (I do not have the correct words and references), so I am hoping one of my big brothers will come by soon and help me articulate what it is I am trying to say...



What's point of comparing Gant to Apocalypse Now? By that logic, he was going to take charge of an Afghan militia and carve out his own fiefdom. 

On the contrary, he tried to weave himself into the social fabric of the tribes he helped lead to gain their trust. There's nothing more patriotic than, as Captain Patriquin once said, to learn about another people so you can help them help America. And if you new Pashtun society you'd realize that it is fucked up -- you can only imagine how fucked up you would need to be in order to weave yourself into that mix. It's a society where women have no value, there's no voting, 10% literacy rates, I mean come get out of our warped realities and realize that like Mike Martin (a good friend of mine), and a British officer who also went native, this is what's required. In many ways, Gant is definitely not an exception but the rule to winning wars like this. You can find dozens of this guys in the past few wars breaking rules and doing what they do best.


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## TLDR20 (Jun 26, 2014)

@ScribblerSix , you are right, but that time isn't now. It isn't that he was doing it, it is that he got caught and then said "so what". Sometimes taking your medicine is more about the person punishing you. You can't tell me he couldn't have gotten his America on without some chick co-habitating with him while he is married and rubbing it in leaderships face. He could still be doing great things if he hadn't gone so cowboy.


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## ScribblerSix (Jun 26, 2014)

TLDR20 said:


> @ScribblerSix , you are right, but that time isn't now. It isn't that he was doing it, it is that he got caught and then said "so what". Sometimes taking your medicine is more about the person punishing you. You can't tell me he couldn't have gotten his America on without some chick co-habitating with him while he is married and rubbing it in leaderships face. He could still be doing great things if he hadn't gone so cowboy.



If you're saying it isn't a good time now, can I ask when do we know when it is a good time? 

And as for the shit he did, the infidelity, the alcohol abuse, the drugs, it often seems that as long as the leadership don't mind it's alright, but we all know the State Department (I know not big army but still) had those lavish parties (http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article104809), contractors would be high all the time on K (http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/10/18...ontractors-drunk-and-on-drugs-in-afghanistan/) and the infidelity, my god from Lara Logan to the (from my own personal knowledge) to a female terp who would fuck the brains out of a commander of a 4th ID brigade in Kandahar back in KAF, we all know this stuff is absolutely rampant in-country where people feel there are no rules -- and this kind of stuff often happens in big bases.

Now, all of a sudden, we go to a COP with SF as the battlespace owners where there are literally very few stringent rules, and we throw the book at him for this? Come on. Which, again, we know is going on all the time.

I'm not saying Gant shouldn't have followed the rules, but why can't the army throw the book at him after the war? 

It seems the big army just loves throwing the baby out with the bath water sometimes -- and this was the wrong time to do it.


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## TLDR20 (Jun 26, 2014)

ScribblerSix said:


> If you're saying it isn't a good time now, can I ask when do we know when it is a good time?
> 
> And as for the shit he did, the infidelity, the alcohol abuse, the drugs, it often seems that as long as the leadership don't mind it's alright, but we all know the State Department (I know not big army but still) had those lavish parties (http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article104809), contractors would be high all the time on K (http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/10/18...ontractors-drunk-and-on-drugs-in-afghanistan/) and the infidelity, my god from Lara Logan to the (from my own personal knowledge) to a female terp who would fuck the brains out of a commander of a 4th ID brigade in Kandahar back in KAF, we all know this stuff is absolutely rampant in-country where people feel there are no rules -- and this kind of stuff often happens in big bases.
> 
> ...


He was high visibility brother, you don't write a book and stay under the radar.


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## TLDR20 (Jun 26, 2014)

I'm also not saying this was right, or that I agree with what went down, just that I understand how this happened and it doesn't surprise me.


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## ScribblerSix (Jun 26, 2014)

TLDR20 said:


> I'm also not saying this was right, or that I agree with what went down, just that I understand how this happened and it doesn't surprise me.



Alright, big apologies for not getting what you said the first time.


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## pardus (Jun 26, 2014)

This is definitely a case of big boys rules.  He knew what he was doing wasn't kosher so regardless of whether everyone else is doing "it" or whether he deserved it or not, he can't really bitch about being caught too much.


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## DA SWO (Jun 26, 2014)

TLDR20 said:


> @ScribblerSix , you are right, but that time isn't now. It isn't that he was doing it, it is that he got caught and then said "so what". Sometimes taking your medicine is more about the person punishing you. You can't tell me he couldn't have gotten his America on without some chick co-habitating with him while he is married and rubbing it in leaderships face. He could still be doing great things if he hadn't gone so cowboy.


Didn't know he was married, thought he married the reporter.
I think the co-habitation finally did him in.
We just shit-canned a BG for the same offense, no way a mere SF Maj/Capt will be allowed to get away with it.


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## Ranger Psych (Jun 27, 2014)

ScribblerSix said:


> I worked near his AO for a long while, and you know what, I thought the same when I first heard about this guy and then the allegations. A lot of guys did. But then I realized, we all know the army bureaucracy is backward, that there are rebels in the military, but we might even need guys go "native" (with a litany of successful figures far beyond the likes of Lawrence of Arabia) to win wars. A lot of people have argued people like Gant are needed, people who will live in the village, basically become part of it. If he breaks the rules... who cares? If he's successful, that's what matters.
> 
> The fact that he was successful in his AO while he was there, that his tribal militia he helped stand up is one of the most feared in the province to this day, that has always hated guys like him army (guys like Travis Patriquin for example) et all cannot be over looked. Shit like this, believe me, it wins wars.
> 
> From Malaya where British Special Branch agents went native, to Northern Ireland where Englishmen went totally Irish (one example of someone like Gant is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Nairac), Iraq, the list goes on, people like Gant win wars like the one in Afghanistan.I mean, I don't want to dis rangers but night raids don't win wars that can last 20 or 30 years, they just win battles.



Congratulations, you worked near his AO as a derpterp. 

SF. Not regular army, not anyone else, SHITCANNED THE MOTHERFUCKER. That right there says VOLUMES about the situation. Don't try to put this shit on "Big Army" because they didn't have a lick of say in it.

THE
SF
REGIMENT
STRIPPED HIS FUCKING GREEN BERET AND TAB OFF HIS ASS

thats not just some slap on the wrist thing dude, and if you think that's just some backward bureaucracy in action you just proved exactly how uninformed you are.

You also don't understand Ranger anything, obviously. The only motherfuckers that have BEEN IN THIS ENTIRE GODDAMN WAR, Longer than Rangers, is SF.  My Regiment was doing night raids every fucking night AND DAY plus engaging the populace prior to the fucking war going Big Army, well before your ass came along and became a self proclaimed expert on COIN/FID/ETC as a fucking useta-could supposed inderpreter that ain't even a soldier.


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## ScribblerSix (Jun 27, 2014)

Ranger Psych said:


> Congratulations, you worked near his AO as a derpterp.
> 
> SF. Not regular army, not anyone else, SHITCANNED THE MOTHERFUCKER. That right there says VOLUMES about the situation. Don't try to put this shit on "Big Army" because they didn't have a lick of say in it.
> 
> ...



Right, I mean USASOC relieved him of command. Ask a friend of mine, terminal and former group guy Col. Jeff Goble (https://www.linkedin.com/pub/jeffrey-goble/b/511/4b8) and he'd argue that USASOC is now part of the big army in the way it functions and the people in it. It's no different from the other larger commands now, sad but true. Ask Linda Robinson at Rand and she'd say the same thing. 

Why? When Gant talks about "army bureaucracy" he's referring to organizations like USASOC, so there's no point in trying to separate it and say that it was his own brothers and peers who kicked him out. That's simply not true. USASOC is just one big machine too and I'm sure a lot of guys on this forum can point that out too.

As for night raids, we all know that Afghans hate night raids. There's absolutely nothing that Pashtuns, specifically, hate than troops coming in at dusk doing targeted killings, invading their houses, their villages, killing specific people, etc. You know there's an argument there. Also, what happens to the soldiers in the AO who have to pick up after the mess the night raids sometimes create? We all know that some night raids lead to increased rather than decreased activity in specific AOs -- and for all the wrong reasons.

I think Maj Gant was trying to correct that by taking a different, in my opinion and in the opinion of some other guys like Mike Martin or other SF guys still in group, the right approach by disowning the use of large-number of "every night" night-raids. I think there's a valid and fair argument to be had that sometimes they make things worse, a lot worse. Sometimes they're useful, but not in the area that Gant was operating or in Southern command as a whole. As for the whole CT vs COIN thing, that's a different question and I don't think anyone wants to get into it, but I'm just trying to point out that to this day people are questioning whether if Gant's approach versus the use of night raids, in his AO, were strategically superior.


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## DA SWO (Jun 27, 2014)

ScribblerSix said:


> Right, I mean USASOC relieved him of command. Ask a friend of mine, terminal and former group guy Col. Jeff Goble (https://www.linkedin.com/pub/jeffrey-goble/b/511/4b8) and he'd argue that USASOC is now part of the big army in the way it functions and the people in it. It's no different from the other larger commands now, sad but true. Ask Linda Robinson at Rand and she'd say the same thing.
> 
> Why? When Gant talks about "army bureaucracy" he's referring to organizations like USASOC, so there's no point in trying to separate it and say that it was his own brothers and peers who kicked him out. That's simply not true. USASOC is just one big machine too and I'm sure a lot of guys on this forum can point that out too.
> 
> ...



Your buddy was a JTAC when?

Night raids are effective, and they bitch because they know we will react.

Your telling me the Taliban or A-Q operate at night?  BS Flag on that one.

USASOC has always been big-Army.  Look at the non-SF Officers walking around that HQ and tell me that SF is the big guy in the room.

Ask your buddy why the outpouring of support from the MOS 18 Community is lacking?  That alone says volumes.


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## TLDR20 (Jun 27, 2014)

Also 


ScribblerSix said:


> Why? When Gant talks about "army bureaucracy" he's referring to organizations like USASOC, so there's no point in trying to separate it and say that it was his own brothers and peers who kicked him out. That's simply not true. USASOC is just one big machine too and I'm sure a lot of guys on this forum can point that out too.
> 
> .


Just to be clear, the only person that has the authority to strip a tab is the commander of JFKSWCS. That person is always a fellow SF soldier. So like RP said, to get your tab taken away is most certainly a SF thing. Why don't you slow down telling people how it is, when you really have no fucking clue.


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## ScribblerSix (Jun 27, 2014)

TLDR20 said:


> Also
> 
> Just to be clear, the only person that has the authority to strip a tab is the commander of JFKSWCS. That person is always a fellow SF soldier. So like RP said, to get your tab taken away is most certainly a SF thing. Why don't you slow down telling people how it is, when you really have no fucking clue.



Well, I just want to be clear and I'm not trying to disagree with you guys for the sake of it, but I' not making this up. 

I asked a few friends and from reading Tyson's book it does fit Gant's assessment: it was BG Haas was the one who did relieve him of his SF tab (who is presently in charge of USASOC) and was in charge of U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) at the time (pg. 337-338 of the book). And I imagine given how high level it got to, it did require someone from USASOC to help authorize or indeed instigate that he was basically guilty before evidence was flooding in that most of his tactics were effective and his peers seemed to like him. 

Additionally, General Mulholland was the main one (commander of USASOC at the time) who met with him, confirmed that he was kicked out and (pg 343 of the book), and  explained to Gant that it was political. He could have stopped someone from SF command from taking away his tab but he didn't. I think when Gant refers to the "being treated unfairly" these are the parts of the "bureaucracy" he's referring to. 

It's not as simple as someone from JFKSWCs just stripping it away, but when it became a scandal of this proportion (and rightly so) a lot of the hunchos who were butting heads over how to resolve this were from far higher up, detached, in their ivory tower, and this was their unfortunate decision. To say that they weren't in their ivory tower off somewhere in Kabul, D.C., or elsewhere, making uniformed decisions about guys like Gant seems a bit off. 

As what SOWT mentioned, 

"Night raids are effective, and they bitch because they know we will react." 

I'm not saying they aren't, but as someone who I personally know Nate Fick and would use what he said on one talk that's better than the way I can put it (starting at 44:00) 



 that basically, if you're going to do it, you better get it right. Generally, the bar is so high that it makes night raids almost impossible to conduct, but that bar is there for good reason. 

"Your telling me the Taliban or A-Q operate at night? BS Flag on that one." 

They operate at night. 

"USASOC has always been big-Army. Look at the non-SF Officers walking around that HQ and tell me that SF is the big guy in the room." 

Yep, it's not good. Although the recommendation to replace them with regular army guys or SF guys, i.e. to replace the admin DOD civilians with soldiers and soldiers with some SF guys, seems impractical. 

"Ask your buddy why the outpouring of support from the MOS 18 Community is lacking? That alone says volumes." Ask Jack Murphy, the founder of SOFREP, what he thinks. The last time I spoke with him, I think he generally agreed with Gant's tactics. He's a former 5th group guy. As for current MOS 18 people... I imagine it's because they're scared of speaking out publicly because they'll be punished.

And was Jeff a JTAC? I'm not sure, I suppose he could have been.


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## Ranger Psych (Jun 27, 2014)

You love name dropping. Cool by association, eh?


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## policemedic (Jun 27, 2014)

@ScribblerSix  "My friend said..."

"When I spoke to..."

"I know this guy.  But not well enough to know what he specifically did..."

"I imagine that things work this way in an organization I'm not qualified to be a member of..."

And of course, many of these friends are high-ranking folks or are well placed within the SOF community.

Do you have any idea what you sound like?


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## medicchick (Jun 27, 2014)

policemedic said:


> Do you have any idea what you sound like?



Butter bar wife?:-"


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## Muppet (Jun 27, 2014)

F.M.


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## x SF med (Jun 27, 2014)

One point that seems to have been missed in the discussion of Gant's pecadilloes...  he armed a civilian female journalist with no clearance/ no need to know/no dog in the fight but his feelings toward her, and took her on missions, classified missions, while sleeping with her to spite command...  ya think any of those points might have come into play for stripping him of his SF Tab?   and who wrote his fucking book?  Um, she did...   And who cleared the discussions of the missions in that book.... um, nobody....  

@ScribblerSix ...  you sound like you are defending authors and journalists because you belong to the community - your "I heard from a friend", "I met this guy who said", "I know a guy from when I was embedded"  crap is getting old...


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## Viper1 (Jun 27, 2014)

ScribblerSix said:


> Right, I mean USASOC relieved him of command. Ask a friend of mine, terminal and former group guy Col. Jeff Goble (https://www.linkedin.com/pub/jeffrey-goble/b/511/4b8) and he'd argue that USASOC is now part of the big army in the way it functions and the people in it. It's no different from the other larger commands now, sad but true. Ask Linda Robinson at Rand and she'd say the same thing.
> 
> Why? When Gant talks about "army bureaucracy" he's referring to organizations like USASOC, so there's no point in trying to separate it and say that it was his own brothers and peers who kicked him out. That's simply not true. USASOC is just one big machine too and I'm sure a lot of guys on this forum can point that out too.
> 
> ...



Keep in mind, MAJ Gant was relieved and retired in 2012.  A year and a half ago...this isn't something new.  This is old news.

Ranger Psych is absolutely right.  It was the Regiment that made the final call, no one else.

USASOC is absolutely NOT like big Army in the way it functions or the missions that it has.  I don't care if one O-6 said it.  One person's opinion does not a trend make.  Linda Robinson is a journalist and author but she does not work in or for the headquarters on a daily basis.  USASOC is very different from the other major commands...not the least of which is due to the nature of missions it performs on a daily basis. 

Since I'm ranting about one person opinions, the Afghans I've worked with loved night raids, especially when they killed known bad guys.  Notice I didn't say capture...some Afghans did not give two squats about a known target being detained because they knew he might be released within days or weeks.  Afghans, from the local policeman to Provincial and District Governors were thrilled when night raids resulted in dead, known enemy leaders. Usually, there was no mess after a night raid, only jubilation and a sudden showing of Afghan Local Police recruits.  Picking up any mess after a night raid is part of the job and it is becoming easier to get in front of the IO campaign if you have a plan for those contingencies.  Just my experience but as you can see, it runs counter to your generalization.  Yes, some night raids DO lead to increased activity but for certain areas that is a measure of success.  The more the enemy shows themselves to fight, the easier they are for friendly forces to kill.

MAJ Gant's first book "One Tribe at a Time" is a wealth of information and knowledge.  Analyze what can be used for the future. The bottom line is that he, like many others before him, broke the rules, got caught, and took severe consequences.  We all know the rules and most of us accomplish the mission by playing within those boundaries.


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## Marauder06 (Jun 27, 2014)

This book everyone keeps talking about... this is the one written by the woman he was shacked up with in Afghanistan and is now married to?  Yep, sounds like a totally objective, totally authoritative source to me!  

Where is the official report on this whole sorry affair?  Someone post THAT and then we can have a meaningful discussion about this topic.


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## Viper1 (Jun 27, 2014)

http://www.amazon.com/One-Tribe-Time-Changed-Afghanistan/dp/1936891247

One tribe at a Time.  This is the original Gant work.

http://www.amazon.com/American-Spartan-Promise-Mission-Betrayal/dp/0062114980
American Spartan is the recent tome written by his wife.


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## JohnnyBoyUSMC (Jun 27, 2014)

I recall reading about this whole incident in "100 Victories" by Linda Robinson. I'll hold judgement as this is deff not my area of expertise and not being SF I do not and will not judge someone from that brotherhood without getting more info. I second wanting to see the official report. From what I've read so far it seems like he went a off reservation, though not knowing all the facts and details I leave it to my esteemed brothers in Army SOF to better clarify facts on the matter.


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## dmcgill (Jun 27, 2014)

pardus said:


> On the face of it, it sounds like an effective guy was fucked due to jealously/narrow  mindedness/big army BS.
> 
> I'd like to see the Army's take on this and why they did what they did.
> 
> ...



This.



Ranger Psych said:


> It's one thing to sneak some shit in and sneak a nipper here and there. It's another to go full alcoholic.
> 
> It's one thing to have reality kick your ass and need some medical assistance. It's another to go full addict regardless of the source.
> 
> ...



...But also this. Both are true and correct. Hard for me to take a solid stance on this one. I've read both books and accompanied articles. Don't know the guy, never been in his AO, not an SF soldier. That being said I think what he did was what it would take for us to win in Afghanistan. All the illegal shit aside. He could have done it without his drinking, drug taking, and frivelous/otherwise illegal behavior. He chose to do all of that on his own accord. But I imagine it is extremely hard to act as a Lawrence in this day and age and not piss everyone off around you who has no clue whatsoever as to what you're trying to accomplish, as per orders from higher. Special Forces are unconventional, this mission was un-military in a lot of ways. There are simply some hurdles and obstacles that simply cannot be overcome in certain situations. He was doomed from the start.


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## dmcgill (Jun 27, 2014)

Here's an interesting article, another viewpoint. Some of you guys have already seen it.

http://sofrep.com/33865/sof-got-screwed-conventional-force-lesson-jim-gant/


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## DA SWO (Jun 27, 2014)

dmcgill said:


> Here's an interesting article, another viewpoint. Some of you guys have already seen it.
> 
> http://sofrep.com/33865/sof-got-screwed-conventional-force-lesson-jim-gant/


Can you cut and paste, some of us are too cheap to get sofrep.


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## dmcgill (Jun 28, 2014)

SOWT said:


> Can you cut and paste, some of us are too cheap to get sofrep.



LOL oops. Sorry brother.

*How SOF got Screwed by the Conventional Force–A Lesson from Jim Gant*
  
By Kerry Patton

For years, I have known how bad conventional military leadership ruined any hope for Afghanistan. During the initial invasion, our special operations force did an exceptional job in removing the Taliban from power and forcing Al Qaeda’s Afghanistan base to shatter like a broken vase. But in time, to be more precise, within approximately one year after the initial invasion, conventional military leadership and their wisdom screwed the pooch in country.

For whatever reason, conventional military leaders took over the mission in Afghanistan which was once controlled by the special operations community. I have spoken to some former high ranking DoD officials who have stated that the special operations force was merely meant to shape the battlespace prior to the conventional boots on the ground mission. Sadly, I continue to scratch my head as I had when I first heard this and find myself asking, “And what mission was that?”

In the game of asymmetric warfare (note I do not use the term COIN here as I feel it has become an abysmal failure of a concept), conventional wisdom will not win. You must think unconventionally, or should I say asymmetrically. But to think unconventionally is not what Big Army/Big Department of Defense likes to do.

 
Major Jim Gant, US Army Special Forces (Ret.) whom some have claimed to be a Section-8, did think unconventionally. He wrote the paper One Tribe at a Time, which then-General Petreaus ensured all top military leadership read as he and many of his entourage fully respected and understood its value. Unfortunately, many conventional military leaders along with persons a select group within the Special Operations community looked down on Gant and his ideas to win the war in Afghanistan.

The war in Afghanistan started with SOF elements working closely with local indigenous forces but quickly turned into a whack-a-mole game of direct action which caused more damage than good. But to appease persons like Petreaus, DoD implemented half assed programs such as the Human Terrain System (which I was a part of  at one point) and Female Engagement Teams in an attempt to show some compliance with the tribal engagement concept Gant believed in.

These programs were utter failures for several reasons however the biggest failure came in the state that contrary to what Gant believed, risk aversion failed to allow coalition members belonging to such entities to actually live outside the wire among the local populace. Gant firmly believed it was critical to get troops outside the wire and to live and work alongside tribal elements.

Some may believe Gant’s idea closely resembled that of the Military Assistant Command, Vietnam—Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG). I would agree his concept of asymmetric warfare closely resembled such. But within the DoD, specifically out of US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), controversy ensued with some believing such approach was worthwhile while others believed MACV-SOG was not successful and therefore such a concept of warfighting would also not be successful in Afghanistan.

Solely out of speculation, I believe those opposed to the idea of what Gant deemed as Village Security Operations (VSO) necessity in living among the tribes were too scared to take the risk involved. They failed to realize that war in itself is a risk. They failed to realize that if you are not willing to take the risk, you are not committed to actually win.







Pissing contests unfolded between those of conventional leadership who “owned the battlespace” and those within the SpecOps community wishing to see Gant’s idea come to fruition. Sure, he was given the opportunity to do what he believed and he did it well building unprecedented trust among the villagers he worked closely beside. But doing the job well is just another thing that infuriates people who wish to see you fail.

Jim Gant’s successes in Kunar province where he initiated his operations created blowback. In fact, Gant himself became a target not just by Bin Laden himself, but worse, his own fellow soldiers holding leadership positions. In time, Gant would be ridiculed and actually investigated for violating several General Orders which included alcohol consumption in country, sexual contact (with a woman who would later become his wife), drug use, etc.

I know some military leaders do not wish to accept the fact that virtually every special operator will find alcohol in country if they want it. And many will actually consume such beverages. Drug use ranging from prescription abuse to illegal drugs has become relatively common as well which includes the use of steroids. And the rule not to have sex while in country is laughable. Name a unit that includes women who didn’t have at least one of their females return home early due to getting pregnant overseas? (Ok, I am being harsh on that last one but we all have heard or seen it).

Gant became a target and one of the reasons, a major reason, was because he was willing to take a risk and actually do his part to win the war in Afghanistan and in doing so, he was willing to take a twelve man team and live among the local indigenous population. He was a success while in Kunar province.

As noted though, being successful can be career ending in the military. It makes other leaders look bad. And Gant made many look like idiots. Then again, living among locals and bringing peace to a specific area of operation isn’t what too many military personnel want to see. Gant’s newly published book, _American Spartan:The Promise, the Mission, and the Betrayal of Special Forces Major Jim Gant, _explains all of this too well. I have been lucky enough to have obtained a review copy of the book.
Today’s war in Afghanistan has become a numbers war. Military leaders get promoted on a quantitative scale, not a qualitative. How many High Valued Targets got killed or captured? How many schools or clinics were built? How much money was spent?

Let that last one sit in for a second. How much money was spent? You think this is a joke but it’s not which is reason conventional units are fighting tooth and nail to begin a new journey in “train, mentor, and advise” operations in places like Africa. Doing so will ensure they obtain funding they could inevitably lose due to current budget cuts.

Ask yourself when you heard of conventional military personnel going through months of training in cultural advanced schoolings? How many attend courses like Robins Sage? Virtually none of them do. It’s a mission designed for US Army Special Forces, not conventional troops.

Unfortunately, many of today’s Special Forces soldiers could care less about their historic mission of “train, mentor, and advise.” They got used to the direct action mission and their leaders embrace such because again, it’s much easier to showcase success when you have numbers to validate what you did. Make no mistake that direct action missions allow the number game to be played. A cultural war exists within SOF today considering some understand and respect what Gant sought out to do however they are far outnumbered by those who wish to embrace today’s door kicking style of direct action.

Afghanistan is lost and a big part of that is owed to conventional military leadership and their desires to get a taste of the asymmetric game being played in country. A withdrawal of troops is about to begin in the very near future but that does not mean conventional military deployments will seize. The question is however, where will the conventional military go next and will they create more of a debacle in that place as they had in the land of the Pashtun? Personally, I believe that answer is an obvious yes and its disheartening knowing they will be taking the special operations force down the rabbit hole with them.


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## Crusader74 (Jun 28, 2014)

ScribblerSix said:


> I worked near his AO for a long while, and you know what, I thought the same when I first heard about this guy and then the allegations. A lot of guys did. But then I realized, we all know the army bureaucracy is backward, that there are rebels in the military, but we might even need guys go "native" (with a litany of successful figures far beyond the likes of Lawrence of Arabia) to win wars. A lot of people have argued people like Gant are needed, people who will live in the village, basically become part of it. If he breaks the rules... who cares? If he's successful, that's what matters.
> 
> The fact that he was successful in his AO while he was there, that his tribal militia he helped stand up is one of the most feared in the province to this day, that has always hated guys like him army (guys like Travis Patriquin for example) et all cannot be over looked. Shit like this, believe me, it wins wars.
> 
> From Malaya where British Special Branch agents went native, to Northern Ireland where Englishmen went totally Irish (one example of someone like Gant is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Nairac), Iraq, the list goes on, people like Gant win wars like the one in Afghanistan.I mean, I don't want to dis rangers but night raids don't win wars that can last 20 or 30 years, they just win battles.




Robert Nairac isn't the best example to use in this instance.. He was killed by the IRA after he entered a republican pub and got pissed drunk. It is rumoured he was minced and feed to pigs..


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## Poccington (Jun 28, 2014)

Robert Nairac was a moron that completely lost the run of himself. 

He was such a moron that he walked into a Republican pub, declared himself to be Danny McErlaine, a member of the Official IRA who was on the run from the Provisional IRA at the time, got pissed and jumped up on a table and started singing rebel songs. At the end of the night, he walked into the carpark of the pub, got attacked by the Provo's, abducted and killed.

If anyone thinks someone like that was conducting themselves the right way, or in a way that will help you win a war... They're off their head.


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## Poccington (Jun 28, 2014)

As for Gant, regardless of the good work he could well have been doing... He seems to have completely got caught up in his own legend. Add in substance abuse and deciding to have a wife in the middle of a warzone.... Well, something had to be done.

As has been mentioned already, the fact that he seems to have recieved very little support from the SF community speaks volumes.


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