# "An Officers' Corps That Can't Score"



## Marauder06 (Apr 18, 2014)

Posted for your information and comment.

http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/an-officer-corps-that-cant-score/

"The most curious thing about our four defeats in Fourth Generation War—Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—is the utter silence in the American officer corps. Defeat in Vietnam bred a generation of military reformers, men such as Col. John Boyd USAF, Col. Mike Wyly USMC, and Col. Huba Wass de Czege USA, each of whom led a major effort to reorient his service. Today, the landscape is barren. Not a military voice is heard calling for thoughtful, substantive change. Just more money, please."

...and it kind of goes downhill from there.


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## MOTOMETO (Apr 18, 2014)

Marauder06 said:


> Today, the landscape is barren. Not a military voice is heard calling for thoughtful, substantive change. Just more money, please."
> 
> ...and it kind of goes downhill from there.



From an enlisted perspective it always seemed that the higher ranking officers were content with maintaining the status quo because it enhanced their chances of moving up the chain. If you don't agree with the people above you, then you're at a disadvantage. 

My last CO hated the way things were being ran in our battalion, but couldn't do anything about it. He was all about taking care of his Marines and doing away with idiotic policies, but the people above him made his job more difficult for no reason. He got out. I also think Gen. Mattis got passed over for Commandant because he wasn't a " yes man" type of guy, but would've ran things the way he saw fit.


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## AWP (Apr 18, 2014)

I thought it was a solid article. The Comments section made my brain hurt, but I thought it was a solid article.

One of the many issues I've noticed is the "Copy-Paste" mentality. "It worked for my predecessor so why should I change it?" The flip side is then "I'll change this to make it 'better'." Too many officers don't realistically look at what change does for their organization. They change a few things, enough to generate some bullets for their OER, and damn the consequences. Everyone plays it safe for the next pay grade instead of thinking. They cookie cutter their way to the next level and I see this at O and SNCO levels.

The decision by committee was spot on. I've worked with one organization, ONE, where a decision was made quickly: 3rd Marines. They did in 3 hours what AFCENT couldn't do in 12 months.

Something else to think about: look at the "revolutionaries" listed in the article; they all top out at O-6. Go along to get along and you pin on stars. Think for yourself and O-6 is as good as it gets. Besides, we have O's who believe we've won in Iraq and Afghanistan and thus there's no reason to think or change because we're already on top of our game. Vietnam is behind us. Rejoice! This type of logic reinforces failure.

But hey, the emporer's new clothes are FABULOUS!

Good article. Chance of it meaning anything: 0%.


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## DA SWO (Apr 18, 2014)

I still think we promote Officers too quickly, to many that promotion is a pay raise and nothing else.

(AF side) I talk to many Jr O's who do not know why their job is importent in the big picture, they sit in their cube and meet Sqdn taskers, never knowing why they do what they do.


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## Mac_NZ (Apr 18, 2014)

There's a point Os and even SNCOs hit where they get the duck test from those who built the empire above them.  If you don't conform then you aren't passing go and picking up $200.

It's not a conspiracy thing, it's simply survival instinct of the mediocre shit bags that have built the nest.


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## Board and Seize (Apr 28, 2014)

This article reminds me a lot of a letter that I wrote to General Amos shortly after he took office at the end of 2010.  Remember that this was before we (those of us who didn't know him, at least) learned what he was like.  There was quite a bit of hype that he was going to be a transformational Commandant rather than just a caretaker (and what a poor job he has made even of that...).  It is actually a little painful to look back at my naivete.

Letter follows:
********************************************************
January 20, 2011
Name Redacted
III MEF SOTG

General Amos,

  This letter is in response to the Marine Corps Times articles of December 10th regarding your vision for the Corps.  They relate some of your ideas including several potentially radical concepts - if they are followed to a logical conclusion.  However, I fear that the machinery and bureaucracy of our organization will rally to oppose any substantive changes to institutional culture and the status quo.

  The first thing that caught my eye was the title of the secondary article, “'Red cells' advance Amos' goal of striking first.”  Red cells?  Next, I noticed the subtitle of the main article, “Among Amos' priorities: keeping the best Marines, building cohesive units.”  I then eagerly read both articles.  By the time I read the following passage I was sold: _“_The purpose of this cell is to challenge prevailing notions, rigorously test current [tactics, techniques and procedures] and *counter group-think*,” [emphasis mine].  What an utterly stunning statement from the one man with the position, authority, and investment to shape the future course of the Marine Corps.  I was at this point launched into exploratory research that led me quickly from your Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), to the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, to the Naval Research Advisory Committee study you commissioned in 2008.  I was, and remain, simply astounded by the good fortune the Corps has had in your naming as our latest Commandant.

  Before I get to the heart of things, please allow me to explain why I am writing this letter.  If nothing else, I hope that I can demonstrate that you have the wholehearted support of at least one troop, and offer to you moral support as you seek fight against the machine.  However, in this letter I will offer something of an indictment against practices that are commonplace to the point of being a defining characteristic of many Marines.  Naturally these types of Marines would find it in their own interest to prevent such a document from reaching your eyes.  Unfortunately, most Marines (those “B” players from Welch's Vitality Curve) could fall into at least one of the categories I will lay out.  Bearing this in mind, there is no official channel that I know of, through which this letter could pass unmolested, if at all.  And almost every official channel I can image would result, not only in this document being suppressed, but in some form of punitive retribution against me – even if only in the altered command environment resulting from all my subsequent actions would be viewed through the lens which assumes I am some sort of trouble-maker or agitator.  Indeed, I know of a fellow Marine who even suffered because of a letter he sent to the Marine Corps Times, which a senior Marine, not from his command, found to be personally offensive due to an offhand comment regarding the state of chow halls.

There exists, at this moment in time, a rare confluence of forces and agendas, events and ideas,  that together create the opportunity space to implement real change in this organization.  The war in Iraq is essentially over, and the end of the war in Afghanistan is in sight.  With the American economy in a weakened state, and a fresh batch of eager Representatives in Washington, there will be ever increasing pressure to make cuts in the defense budget.  There is a growing consensus that Irregular, or Fourth Generation, Warfare (IW) is likely to characterize our conflicts for the foreseeable future, yet training for a potential High Intensity Conflict (HIC) must be maintained.  In the awareness amongst the ranks that the Marine Corps is transitioning to look towards the future, there is a crucial and potentially dampening of the incredible and insidious organizational inertia that resists change.

  As many disparate threads have woven together to create this emerging pattern of progress and change are the reactionary blades arrayed against its eventual completion.  The forces appear to be more or less balanced.  As we all know, in the event of a tie, the home team wins, and the status quo carries the day.  And yet, this is why I initially became excited. 

  In any sizable bureaucracy, the internal or organic forces of inertia almost always overpower those of change.  Inevitably, the impetus for changes taken originates outside of the usual day-to-day machinery.  Those positions with enough gravitas to impose their will upon the organization start at the top (Commandant), and work up (to the Presidency).  Of those, only the Commandant typically has enough personal investment in, and relevancy to the Corps, to have a real will to impose (with some exceptions, for example Secretary Rumsfeld coercing the Corps to finally join SOCOM).  This leaves you, Sir, uniquely positioned to generate meaningful impact.  Furthermore, with the balancing of forces, your will can become the tie-breaking vote, creating a tipping point as the careerists and bureaucrats ironically rush join the new, emerging status quo.

  I desperately hope that you take full advantage of your unique position in this organization and in history; take the idea you developed for your Red Cell to “counter prevailing notions... and counter group-think” and apply it to the Corps at large.  In order to achieve maximum effect, everything must be on the table, and sacred cows must be, in the words of House Appropriations Committee Chairman Hal Rogers, “extinct.”  In order to give form to this vague desire, I will detail several major points that I feel deserve your attention:


'*The Marine Corps is not welfare’*
  This potentially inflammatory title seems to be self evident, and yet it touches upon a number of deep-seated issues that most Marines would accept without out question if they ever even articulated them clearly, but to me seem indicative of decadence and rot.

  This discussion bears a brief look at the nature of a bureaucracy, and the realization that the Marine Corps is unquestionably a system of nested bureaus.  There is a phenomenal Rand Corporation paper by Anthony Downs, _Inside Bureaucracy_, which is followed by the more succinct, _a Theory of Bureaucracy_.  There we find definitions of both bureaucracies and bureaucrats.  One could replace every instance of the word 'bureaucrat' or 'official' in the text with Marine or careerist, and it would read with conviction.  The important thing to take away from these papers is that the actions of the careerist or bureaucrat are perfectly rational from their perspective and derivative of the system.  This means that any indictment of these behaviors reflects flaws or shortcomings in the system, not the individuals.  As a corollary, any change in these behaviors requires cultural and institutional reformation.

  First we have the fiction that the Marine Corps is a meritocracy, when it is in fact more of a mediocracy and chronotocracy (both made up words, but I believe they adequately convey their meanings).  Promotions (enlisted – I will not touch on DOPMA) are based on a few key ingredients that have little in common with an individual's merit.  If you manage to stick around long enough, without getting into any real trouble, and 'hit the right wickets' (postings to include 'B' billets, completion of PME, meeting annual training requirements, and, insidiously, end of tour awards), chances are very high that you will be promoted.  The higher a person rises in rank (consequent to the longer they have been in), the less likely they are to receive negative marks on a fitness report or counseling for barely adequate, or even slightly deficient performance, lest their career be damaged.  As a result, there are many examples, past and present, of leadership personnel being woefully inadequate or wildly out of touch with the troops. 

  Contributing further to the disease is the policy of Up or Out, which ensures that any enlisted Marine (who makes a full career of it, and manages to 'hit the wickets') will be promoted beyond their capability and into incompetence (unless their innate ability exceeds that required by the ranks of E-9).  Perhaps one solution would be a grade scale more like the General Schedule system, with many steps within each grade. This would allow career development (and increase in salary) while not promoting personnel into positions above their ability.  Why shouldn't a phenomenally talented and constitutionally suited squad leader be able to make a career in that position?

Climbers, motivated to advance their rank lest they be forced out with less retirement benefit than desired (accumulating the highest level of retirement pay possible seems to be the primary goal for many Climbers), are encouraged by the system to be risk averse.  Conservers avoid rocking the boat by nature.  Substantial achievement is not required, merely the absence of substantial failure (most of the time).  We end up with a system that reinforces group-think, rewards inertia, and punishes innovation.  These behaviors fit tightly into the various sorts of bureaucrats defined by Anthony Downs in his “a Theory of Bureaucracy”.

  I am reminded of Stephenson’s 1967 experiment on rhesus monkeys which went anecdotally like this:  Five monkeys are placed in a cage.  Also in the cage is a banana hanging from the ceiling above a ladder.  Predictably, the monkeys attempt to retrieve the banana.  However, the researchers sprayed all of the monkeys with ice-cold water before they manage to get the banana.  This procedure is repeated until the monkeys have leaned how not to behave.  At this point one trained monkey is replaced with a naïve one who hasn’t learned the rules.  He sees the banana, and goes to get it.  The other four monkeys promptly beat him up to avoid being sprayed with the water.  This process is repeated until none of the original monkeys who were sprayed remain.  One more monkey is replaced, and the new one goes for the banana.  He is beat up by the other four – none of whom ever witnessed the original situation or reason for avoiding the banana.  They have knowledge without understanding.  And that knowledge is quite possibly flawed.

  This story of monkeys is a beautiful analogy for the Marine Corps that operates on several levels.  There is the obvious; the rampant mentality that we do things the way we do because that is the way we do them.  Or, someone did it to me when I was a young Marine, so I’m going to do it to you.  There are the undertones of group-think, which is alive and well in this organization.  Indeed, I very nearly fell victim to one of its symptoms when considering this letter: “self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus.”  And finally there is the issue of learning by rote.  You may have noticed the quotes I placed around the phrase ‘hit the wickets’.  (I doubt that there are many Marine that have any idea this is a reference to a cricket term, which is itself a reference to a gate)  This is just one example of many phrases or words that are used often by Marines on a daily basis; one of many that are clearly not understood by the person using them.  ‘With a grain of salt,’ ‘beat a dead horse,’ ‘orientate,’ the list goes on and on.  Not that these phrases or terms are so vital that a deep understanding is crucial, but they serve to illustrate a point.  This organization is rife with knowledge without understanding.  The rote style of learning is ingrained in Marines from the first day of boot camp.  Critical thinking skills are actively suppressed (although resident PME has begun to makes noises about using the skills) on a daily basis through most of the official and unofficial behavioral reinforcement training techniques throughout the Corps.  This only increases susceptibility to group-think.  Yes, Pavlov’s dog might instantly respond with a motivating ‘How High?’ upon the command ‘Jump,’ but he is unlikely to successfully solve a challenging and unfamiliar problem.  Rote learning can only take a person so far.  Eventually a person needs to learn how to _think_, especially given the future security environment that we face.

  The Marine Corps provides a huge safety net to Marines in terms of job security.  Everything is provided, from food to health care to housing.  As such, it is treated by many as a form of non-stigmatized social welfare.  Whether motivated by rational bureaucratic logic, a lack of opportunity in the civilian sector, or the promise of retirement before the age of forty, few want to risk losing the ultimate entitlement program.  This mentality compounds the already strong tendency in large bureaucracies towards a culture of group-think. To combat it, first the idea of the Corps as welfare must be countered at its roots: Tenure, Forced Incompetence, Bureaucratic Behaviors, and Mindless Memorization.


‘*The problem of Risk Aversion*’
  As a result of factors listed above, aversion to risk has been ingrained and institutionalized at virtually every level.  The framework provided by our Operational Risk Management (ORM) system should, in theory, prevent the worst excesses of risk avoidance.  After all, ORM is all about identifying the acceptable level of risk in a given situation, and mitigating the rest.  In practice, it becomes a tool to legitimize them.  These excesses lead to scapegoating, a ‘cover your ass’ mentality, and over-regulation.

  If there are acceptable levels of risk, and there have to be, (if safety was truly ‘paramount’ no one would ever leave bed in the morning) then it stands to reason that the risked outcome will actually and inevitably occur some percentage of the time.  If we accept that a certain amount or percentage of mishaps are therefore acceptable, then why is there a need to excoriate someone when they occur?  This almost impulsive resort to scapegoating can relieve some individuals and organizations of blame (at the expense of others), but it creates a self-destructive environment of blame shifting and ass covering.  What started out as ORM ends up closer to Operational Liability Management, with the reduction and displacement of liability becoming ‘paramount.’

  Consider the Commanding General’s Inspection (CGI) and Range Safety Officer (RSO) requirements as two examples:  Long before any CGI is due, everyone knows about it.  This also applies to most unit inspection or certification events.  With no element of surprise involved, the unit uses that time to cover or hide things in order to present whatever face it wants, without having to make any real changes.  For certifications, units are often provided with full schedules and warning orders in advance of the event itself.  Clearly in both of these situations, the desire is to avoid the appearance of failure or deficiency, not to demonstrate competence.  Then there is the over-regulation of range safety and any dealings with small arms ammunition and explosives.  The sheer quantity of regulations involved absolutely precludes the ability of any normal person, who is an RSO only in service to their actual job, to be cognizant of them all simultaneously, _and_ at the same time effectively conduct training.  In fact, it is so out of hand that full-time civilian positions have been created so that there can be someone with the time to dedicate to understanding them all.  He is further tasked with finding violations of the rules and writing new ones!  As a contractual position that could be eliminated if it was shown to be redundant or unnecessary, this seems to be a massive conflict of interest.  The greater the minutiae are regulated, the more infractions can be found.  The more infractions that are found, the more rules need to be created to ‘fix the deficiencies’.  This creates a vicious cycle.  (As an example, all ammo storage containers must be grounded.  Just in case they happen to get struck by lightning.  To prevent the lightning from detonating the rounds.  Never mind that there might not be a cloud in the sky.  If the RSO is caught not enforcing this regulation by a safety expert, he can be penalized for it!  Even if he was very safety minded, the fact that the scenario this preventative regulation was created for is potentially so unlikely means it would not occur to him.)  Anthony Downs predicted that any attempt to regulate or control a bureaucracy will only spawn new ones.  In this case, he is shown to be correct.


‘*Waste Management*’
  In the current environment of austerity, every means of reducing fiscal waste is being considered.  There was even a recent and serious discussion in congress to remove retirement benefits for veterans until they reach 57 or even 60 years of age!  As Representative Hal Rogers said, the “budget axe will swing wide and true, and no area of the federal government will be immune from … scrutiny and cuts.”  The Marine Corps too, can find ways to increase efficiency and eliminate waste, squeezing the most value from each taxpayer’s dollar.

  Incentivization, I believe, is the first step in this particular quest.  Individuals and units can both be persuaded to find efficiencies with the right incentives.  The Marine Corps could adopt something similar to the Air Force’s Innovative Development Through Employee Awareness (IDEA) Program.  The IDEA Program allows Airmen to submit ideas they have for increasing efficiency or improving processes.  If an idea is implemented, then the Airman who submitted it is rewarded with a percentage of the savings.  A similar system would tap into the latent creativity of the Marine Corps.  Every day across the Marine Corps, thousands of junior Marines come up with new ways to do things; some are good, some bad.  The vast majority of these ideas are born in casual group discussions (“Man, I wonder if we did it like this…” or “This sucks, this would be way easier if we…”) and then die swiftly as everyone goes back to business as usual.

  At the end of every fiscal year there is a mad scramble to spend money.  Units can “use it, or lose it.”  The current system actually encourages organizational waste!  I don’t know if the statistics on spending show how much is spent on each day of the year, but I believe that they would be dramatic.  Altering the current system to allow units to keep their unspent funding across fiscal years would introduce an element of long-term financial planning and responsibility that simply isn’t possible now.

  From top to bottom, organizations and billets need to be scrutinized to see what benefit they actually provide.  Perhaps there are further, unorthodox cuts that can be made.  For example, I wonder how much money is spent on imprisoning Marines who have committed acts that the UCMJ criminalizes, but aren’t considered crimes in the civilian world.  For example, infractions of Articles 86-89, 90(except for the assault part), 91-92, 94, 115, 125, 133-134 deal mostly with disrespect or disobedience of one kind or another. If an inmate faces discharge upon completion of their sentence, what benefit does the Marine Corps derive from their incarceration?  How much could be saved by immediately discharging all prisoners who would not be criminals under civil code?


‘*Institutionalizing the Red Cell concept*’
  Finally sir, we come to the red cell, and the spectrum of its implementation, from strategically minded organizations to the mindset of a newly minted Marine.  For one, a separate organization assisting the higher-level red cells should be tasked with actively testing and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) - in theater, against our enemies.  On an operational level, this currently falls within the purview of the mission of the three Special Operations Training Groups.  Instructors from them should regularly be sent to accompany the units they have trained on deployment for short durations.  This would allow them to swiftly bring back and incorporate the latest in enemy TTP’s as well as any developments in our own.  On a strategic level, it would seem that this would fall somewhere between MCTAG and MCTOG.  An ideal organizational model for this would be the Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group.  Developments made or discovered by this group would be pushed to the SOTG’s, MCAGCC, and other relevant training agencies.  With this, the iterative cycle of TTP refinement could be greatly compressed. 

The sort of people that repeat words they don’t understand, enforce traditions when they clearly do not make sense in a new situation (and have no understanding of where the tradition came from in the first place), and take blind thoughtless action in the face of uncertainty will have great difficulty in transitioning from a conventional HIC action one day to a IW setting the next.  However, imbuing Marines with the capacity for loyal dissent and developing their critical thinking skills from the first training day will foster a cultural shift within the Corps.  If Marines at all levels start to truly embrace these practices (and not just pay lip service to them), we will experience a paradigm change that falls right into line with what is needed on the distributed battlefield of today and tomorrow to empower the small unit leader to effectively fight, and ultimately win, our wars.

  I wish you great success in your endeavors to reform, reshape, and revitalize our Corps.  May you never be bogged down by the nay-saying bureaucrats, and may your vision lead to a leaner, meaner, and more effective fighting machine.

Semper Fidelis,
Name Redacted
********************************************************


Needless to say, I never received a response.  But these are the sort of issues that plague our organizations.  As the war(s) wind down, these are only going to intensify.  Quality men are going to be pushed out, while the blue falcon politicians will remain and thrive.

Freefalling said: 





> Something else to think about: look at the "revolutionaries" listed in the article; they all top out at O-6. Go along to get along and you pin on stars.


  My own experience squares with this.  Of all of the best officers I met, true leaders of men, only one made it to O-6 (two others may yet).  Several topped out at O-5.  The Marine Corps actively and relentlessly pushes these men out.  For example: One of the gnarliest warrior-scholars the Recon community has ever produced, Fred Galvin basically had his career destroyed by bureaucrats.  If you don't know this story, check it out: http://www.wnd.com/2012/03/sacrifice-marines-for-the-greater-good/

I have lost hope that the military will correct these tendencies.  Amos, you took my innocence and broke my heart.  Shame on you.

-B&S


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## DA SWO (Apr 28, 2014)

Board and Seize said:


> This part of your post:
> 
> Freefalling said:   My own experience squares with this.  Of all of the best officers I met, true leaders of men, only one made it to O-6 (two others may yet).  Several topped out at O-5.  The Marine Corps actively and relentlessly pushes these men out.  For example: One of the gnarliest warrior-scholars the Recon community has ever produced, Fred Galvin basically had his career destroyed by bureaucrats.  If you don't know this story, check it out: http://www.wnd.com/2012/03/sacrifice-marines-for-the-greater-good/
> 
> ...



Mark Waple is the best there is.  

He doen't take cases that are unwinnable.


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## Board and Seize (Apr 28, 2014)

Fred survived the board of inquiry, and they even recommended that he immediately be promoted!

This does little however, to change the fact that there are far more Homiaks and Amoses than there are Galvins.  Those types cannot abide even the existence of a Galvin, since he destroys their credibility simply by living a counterexample.  Even with more junior officers, I see more that have the talent, ambition, and love of their men get out rather than play the ass-kissing politics needed to really thrive.

It is a sad state of affairs
-B&S


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## DA SWO (Apr 28, 2014)

Board and Seize said:


> Fred survived the board of inquiry, and they even recommended that he immediately be promoted!
> 
> This does little however, to change the fact that there are far more Homiaks and Amoses than there are Galvins.  Those types cannot abide even the existence of a Galvin, since he destroys their credibility simply by living a counterexample.  Even with more junior officers, I see more that have the talent, ambition, and love of their men get out rather than play the ass-kissing politics needed to really thrive.
> 
> ...


I see the same people in the civillian world too.


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## Teufel (Apr 28, 2014)

Board and Seize said:


> Fred survived the board of inquiry, and they even recommended that he immediately be promoted!
> 
> This does little however, to change the fact that there are far more Homiaks and Amoses than there are Galvins.  Those types cannot abide even the existence of a Galvin, since he destroys their credibility simply by living a counterexample.  Even with more junior officers, I see more that have the talent, ambition, and love of their men get out rather than play the ass-kissing politics needed to really thrive.
> 
> ...



Fred also was the center of the Task Force Violence:
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20080215/NEWS/802150317/The-story-8216-Task-Force-Violence-

He was the center of that PR disaster and you know the Marine Corps doesn't like bad PR.  He didn't come of that smelling like roses.

He also got into it with his boss in front of the whole COC while he was the S-3 at 3d Recon.  I have known Fast Freddy a long time and I love the guy but he dug his own grave.  There is a way to disagree with a boss and he didn't exactly go about it the right way.  Homiak was a total douche.


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## Board and Seize (Apr 29, 2014)

Teufel said:


> ...he dug his own grave.  There is a way to disagree with a boss and he didn't exactly go about it the right way...



I wasn't in that COC to read the body language, but from what I gather - you're right.  Fred is many things, but keeping the boss happy (especially if the boss is weak, or wrong) doesn't seem to be one of them.  To me though, the issue isn't his political failings, but the fact that we are even talking about his political failings.  The fact that there is such a thing as political failings in the career of a military officer.

I am no longer so naive as to imagine that we can have some pure organization untainted by human failings.  The Marine Corps is a huge organization.  It is a huge bureaucracy; there is no way around that, and it brings with it certain organizational incentives, impulses, and trends.  I think that we should fight to stymie those that take the organization away from its core warfighting mission.  Instead, it seems like most of our leadership, enlisted and officers (especially after a certain point) have embraced the bureaucratic aspects leading to a feedback loop known as the self-licking ice cream cone:

-General Officers whose well know motto is "It's not about the money.  It's ALL about the money."
-MEU CO's sitting in a room having a talk specifically about Marine Corps / MEU relevancy saying (about MEU - SOF integration) "F@ck those c@ocks@uckers! I don't need some guy coming on MY boat and telling me what to do with MY Marines."
-Or later (same conference as the above quote) something along the lines of (regarding a brief on a certain unit's VBSS capabilities) "I don't see what the big deal is.  Every one of my rifle companies can do the same thing."
-A Recon Bn BC and SMaj writing each other bronze stars for: "fearlessly traversing the battlespace".
-BC's inflating enemy KIA.  This guy was obviously more concerned with the metrics than he was with us.  Guys like him and Homiak were just using their unit (and men) to essentially pad their resumes and try to make a name for themselves.

-All of the above, and far more than is on the top of my head in the morning, are examples of what is systematically produced.  They are not aberrations, they are the rule.

Sir, guys like yourself and several (but not _that_ many) other officers I have known are the exceptions that prove the rule.  Men who have served under you, even for the briefest time, will remember you their entire lives.  You stand out because you are literally exceptional.  I don't know if it is something that is progressively stripped from most officers as they advance, or if it is selected against.  Most of the junior officers I worked with in the Recon community were solid guys.  Hopefully enough of you stick around (and learn politics better than some) to  actually make a change.

-B&S


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## Teufel (Apr 29, 2014)

Board and Seize said:


> I wasn't in that COC to read the body language, but from what I gather - you're right.  Fred is many things, but keeping the boss happy (especially if the boss is weak, or wrong) doesn't seem to be one of them.  To me though, the issue isn't his political failings, but the fact that we are even talking about his political failings.  The fact that there is such a thing as political failings in the career of a military officer.
> 
> I am no longer so naive as to imagine that we can have some pure organization untainted by human failings.  The Marine Corps is a huge organization.  It is a huge bureaucracy; there is no way around that, and it brings with it certain organizational incentives, impulses, and trends.  I think that we should fight to stymie those that take the organization away from its core warfighting mission.  Instead, it seems like most of our leadership, enlisted and officers (especially after a certain point) have embraced the bureaucratic aspects leading to a feedback loop known as the self-licking ice cream cone:
> 
> ...



I'm with you.  I don't disagree with any of your points.  I've also seen a MEU opso who didn't realize that we had Marines who could conducting HAHO/HALO operations.  Right before the MEU was going to insert a recon team via HALO.  During CERTEX.  It's a sad situation for sure.  Poor field grade officers and SNCOs create terrible working environments that push junior officers and NCOs out of the Marine Corps.  Which makes for more poor field grade officers and SNCOs.  It's a negative promotion cycle.  Add to that a terribly broken promotion system and you have a minor disaster on your hands.  We promote officers according to their time in service and unfortunately not their performance. 

Additionally, most recon/MARSOC officers don't want to become staff officers and hold on to leadership at the lowest levels as long as possible.  This is admirable but it makes it difficult to get promoted to a rank or position of influence where you are most needed.  I was a platoon commander for six or seven years but realized that I needed to get a company and eventually be the S-3.  Which I did.  I'm going to the pentagon next if I don't get hit for a Recruiting Station CO tour.  That's where I'm needed for the community, not in a platoon, at JSOC, OGA or outside the Marine Corps.  It's what keeps me in uniform and helps me suffer through some difficult command climates and frustrating Marine Corps work environments.  That's just me though.  I feel the need to pay my men back for all the mentorship and knowledge they gave to me as a young Force Recon platoon commander.


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## Ranger Psych (Apr 29, 2014)

Teufel said:


> I've also seen a MEU opso who didn't realize that we had Marines who could conducting HAHO/HALO operations.



While disappointing given the circumstances....Let's be honest to the truth and the Corps. It's not like a MEU like has some sort of a unit list as to what comprises it and their inherent capabilities or anything. Granted, if it did it'd be a flip book full of pictures with shit at the bottom like "G is for Gunny" or "R is for Recon"... Couple it with the fact that there's like what... 20 guys who are even airborne qualified in the Marines anyway?  Ya'll ain't exactly known for your airfield seizures or anything, at least not unless Rangers have already been there...  

All jesting aside, hearing you say that honestly blows my mind.


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## Teufel (Apr 29, 2014)

Ranger Psych said:


> While disappointing given the circumstances....Let's be honest to the truth and the Corps. It's not like a MEU like has some sort of a unit list as to what comprises it and their inherent capabilities or anything. Granted, if it did it'd be a flip book full of pictures with shit at the bottom like "G is for Gunny" or "R is for Recon"... Couple it with the fact that there's like what... 20 guys who are even airborne qualified in the Marines anyway?  Ya'll ain't exactly known for your airfield seizures or anything, at least not unless Rangers have already been there...
> 
> All jesting aside, hearing you say that honestly blows my mind.


The sad thing is that there is a MEU SOP and a two week course on rapid response planning that covers all the capabilities of the MEU that every officer and SNCO has to attend.


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## Teufel (Apr 29, 2014)

Ranger Psych said:


> While disappointing given the circumstances....Let's be honest to the truth and the Corps. It's not like a MEU like has some sort of a unit list as to what comprises it and their inherent capabilities or anything. Granted, if it did it'd be a flip book full of pictures with shit at the bottom like "G is for Gunny" or "R is for Recon"... Couple it with the fact that there's like what... 20 guys who are even airborne qualified in the Marines anyway?  Ya'll ain't exactly known for your airfield seizures or anything, at least not unless Rangers have already been there...
> 
> All jesting aside, hearing you say that honestly blows my mind.



I forgot, the MEU OPSO actually said that the only guys in the DOD who do freefall are SF and SEALs.  We had to show him our rigs to convince him that not only were Marines going to insert into the MEU Certification Exercise via HALO, they had been training up to it for over a year.


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## Ranger Psych (Apr 29, 2014)

So, my flippant flip book jest was actually somewhat on the money? 

It's not surprising. Most services don't know what capabilities their inherent units actually have, let alone in joint capacity.


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## Board and Seize (Apr 29, 2014)

As Teufel pointed out, there is a course that MEU staff officers attend as a part of their pre-deployment training.  And then there are the two books of the MEU bible, the MEU PTP order and the MEU Order (I don't remember the MCO numbers off the top of my head).  The MEU PTP order actually goes into ass-bleeding detail on the training requirements and capabilities of various subordinate units, including the Force Platoon.  It spells out to the team how many people have what skill sets and what their prerequisite courses are.

For an OpsO to make that claim is nothing but blind, unrepentant ignorance.  Sadly, too many people at the MEU level of leadership take an anti-SOF/Recon attitude as a point of pride.  Many of them remember when Conway killed the MSPF for supposedly being the tail that wagged the dog.

Teufel hit the nail on the head:


Teufel said:


> Poor field grade officers and SNCOs create terrible working environments that push junior officers and NCOs out of the Marine Corps.  Which makes for more poor field grade officers and SNCOs.  It's a negative promotion cycle.



The younger generation that is just starting to hit mid-senior leadership is really the only hope for a cure.  Unfortunately, they (like I) continue to drop out rather than push past the BS at a cyclic rate.  Hopefully we have enough like Teufel who will stick it out until they are senior enough to effect organizational-level cultural change.


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## Teufel (Apr 29, 2014)

Board and Seize said:


> As Teufel pointed out, there is a course that MEU staff officers attend as a part of their pre-deployment training.  And then there are the two books of the MEU bible, the MEU PTP order and the MEU Order (I don't remember the MCO numbers off the top of my head).  The MEU PTP order actually goes into ass-bleeding detail on the training requirements and capabilities of various subordinate units, including the Force Platoon.  It spells out to the team how many people have what skill sets and what their prerequisite courses are.
> 
> For an OpsO to make that claim is nothing but blind, unrepentant ignorance.  Sadly, too many people at the MEU level of leadership take an anti-SOF/Recon attitude as a point of pride.  Many of them remember when Conway killed the MSPF for supposedly being the tail that wagged the dog.
> 
> ...



This was pre MARSOC too so he really had no excuse.


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## Gunz (Jul 26, 2014)

Just my general view: The higher you go the fewer the slots and the more ass-kissers you meet. The survivability of your integrity would often depend, one would think, on the integrity of those directly above you.  If the Commander-in-Chief wants sycophants, sycophants he will get...and that sets the tone for the games played all the way down the ladder. Men of honor and integrity don't often thrive in that kind of atmosphere.  In a perfect world the people at the very top have to encourage boldness and vision, promote on merit, recognize brilliance and audacity, be generous enough to put the good of the service above their own ambitions.

When does _that _ever happen?


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## surgicalcric (Jul 26, 2014)

Board and Seize said:


> ...Fred is many things, but keeping the boss happy (especially if the boss is weak, or wrong) doesn't seem to be one of them....
> 
> -B&S



Good for him.  If there weren't so many pussies in CoC (NCO and O alike) disagreeing with them wouldn't be the career killer it is.

Yes men are favored over real leaders and career advancement ahead of the mission and men...


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## Gunz (Jul 26, 2014)

Ranger Psych said:


> ... Couple it with the fact that there's like what... 20 guys who are even airborne qualified in the Marines anyway?...


 

Bad mistake me coming on here during Happy Hour...


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## Gunz (Jul 26, 2014)

Teufel said:


> I forgot, the MEU OPSO actually said that the only guys in the DOD who do freefall are SF and SEALs.  We had to show him our rigs to convince him that not only were Marines going to insert into the MEU Certification Exercise via HALO, they had been training up to it for over a year.


 

Why would an MEU OPSO not take the time to learn about the capabilities of the various elements/weapons/units within the Special Operations capable MEU? Wouldn't it be his job to know these things?


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## Teufel (Aug 4, 2014)

Ocoka One said:


> Why would an MEU OPSO not take the time to learn about the capabilities of the various elements/weapons/units within the Special Operations capable MEU? Wouldn't it be his job to know these things?


 
Beats the hell out of me?


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## LogDog0402 (Aug 5, 2014)

Ocoka One said:


> Why would an MEU OPSO not take the time to learn about the capabilities of the various elements/weapons/units within the Special Operations capable MEU? Wouldn't it be his job to know these things?


 
There you go spouting off common sense.  I had a team leader try to get rid of our HUMINT guy because the two agendas didn't jive.  I also think that the dear Major didn't understand what HUMINT could offer to our advisor team.  I tried explaining it to him but WTF do I know, I had only spent the previous year working with HUMINT on a different advisor assignment.


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## Gunz (Aug 6, 2014)

LogDog0402 said:


> There you go spouting off common sense.  I had a team leader try to get rid of our HUMINT guy because the two agendas didn't jive.  I also think that the dear Major didn't understand what HUMINT could offer to our advisor team.  I tried explaining it to him but WTF do I know, I had only spent the previous year working with HUMINT on a different advisor assignment.


 
Yeah, what was I thinking? I was on the verge of giving the officer corps far more credit than civilian corporate management. My faith in the core values of the military--honor, courage, committment-- is such that I'm not quite ready to abandon it to such a drastic comparison, but there's much in common between the two.


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