# New units to assume Special Forces mission



## Boondocksaint375 (Feb 29, 2008)

*New units to assume Special Forces mission*


By Kimberly Johnson - Staff writer
Posted : Friday Feb 29, 2008 13:39:12 EST
The Corps’ new conceptual, pre-emptive strike force will take on general-purpose advisory roles that are now tasked to Army Special Forces units, freeing up the elite fighters for other missions, according to a Marine official.
The plan to create Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, which Commandant Gen. James Conway signed off on the week of Jan. 28, is part of the service’s strategy for handling the “long war” beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and getting Marines back aboard ships.
The new SCMAGTF units will be considered “eyes forward” for the U.S. military, and will assist partner nations with military training and civil-military operations, according to a briefing document explaining the plan. They will be made up of ground, logistics and aviation combat elements, and will resemble a Marine Expeditionary Unit, but will work on land instead of the sea.
While the SCMAGTFs will take on general-purpose military advisory roles similar to those assumed by Special Forces, they will not be assuming special operations training missions, said Col. Robert Abbott, head of the plans section within the Plans, Policies and Operations division at Marine Corps headquarters.
Some aspects of the SCMAGTF training missions will be similar to those of special operations forces, such as the Army’s Green Berets and the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group. They will help advise foreign militaries, Abbott said in an e-mail, “but the advisory missions that are conducted by [special operations forces] generally tend to be more complex and reflecting capabilities that exceed the capacity of general-purpose forces to perform,” he said.
The Corps’ current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, have hamstrung the service from moving forward on the plan. The strategy will not likely be fully realized for at least five years, and is dependent upon a drawdown in Iraq, Abbott said by phone.
“Currently, nearly everything we have is committed toward the Central Command and the war in Iraq,” he said.
But it is the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — putting a strain on both general and special-purpose forces available to do such work — that have created the need for the SCMAGTFs, he said.
Creation of the new unit does not mean special operations forces aren’t able to handle the training missions, but instead indicates some can be handed off to general-purpose forces, Abbott said. In doing so, it gives the elite forces more operational flexibility for those missions that only they can perform, he said.
“The demand for forces coming from regional combatant commanders to conduct security-cooperation activities currently exceeds the forces available to support all the missions,” he said.

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2008/02/marine_scmagtf_022908/


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## phridum (Mar 1, 2008)

Oh goody! The Marines get to do what they were created to do again, and the other branches can go back to doing their job by themselves!

Nothing to put down on other branches, but every branch has a role and it just seems like management got in over their head with wars on two (well, between two and ten) fronts. I just remembered learning history and missions and organization in training and then quickly learned, "We don't do that stuff anymore."

Will almost make it a new Marine Corps as far as the guys that have gotten in within the last 6 years. I never even got the chance to go on a float. Who gets assigned to Camp Pendleton and doesn't see Australia or the Philippines? Sigh...


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## The91Bravo (Mar 1, 2008)

Boon,

excellent article....


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## irnbndr (Mar 1, 2008)

Irregular warfare is all the rage!  Not long ago SF was the bastard child of the military, now everyone wants some of the mission.  The 2006 Quarterly Defense Review is a good example of how higher command authorties are now subscribing to the methods formerly organic to SF exclusively.  
It is not a bad thing by any means.  My concern is that the inner workings of COIN, FID and UW (to name a few) will not receive enough attention.  Constant study of the art of irregular warfare is needed to truly be an effective player.  The entire team must be on board and have the critical thinking skills to truly be effective.  To simply train, lead and advise is not enough.
There are few soldiers as motivated as Marines in our military, therefor they would be the best alternative for the mission.  Nevertheless, careful consideration of each individual's ability to comprehend this vital role is paramount to the success of introducing them to this vital duty.


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## tigerstr (Mar 2, 2008)

*SC MAGTF details, MCTAG and the Long War concept*

The Marine Corps has developed a whole new concept for Irregular Warfare and “expeditionary” Security Cooperation capabilities. They are building TWO new formations to implement it and are giving a lot of emphasis on language-cultural training.

For anyone interested, the new operating concept for the Long War also called  “Send in The Marines” can be found here, at smallwarsjournal.com with lots of information about the SC MAGTF, the way they will be built and employed, the regions involved, plus the new *Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group *(MCTAG).

All this is in addition to the MARSOC  Marine Special Operations Advisory Group capabilities.

Interesting thing is, Regiments and Battalions slated for SC MAGTFs (three of them are planned which I imagine means 9 Bats rotating) will have a “*regional focus*” and lots of associated training, including standard language and culture training for E-5 and above.

Couple this with the small unit training/equipment associated with the “Distributed Operations” concept and it seems the Corps is currently aiming at capabilities that up to now (for the last three decades) where more or less exclusively in “SOF territory”.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 2, 2008)

I never intend to demean the Marine Corps, but a bit of intellectual honesty is necessary. The Marines do have a "small wars" pedigree.  But the fact is that, for the longest time, they wanted no real part of SOF. The Marines go where the money is.  They wouldn't be in SOF if there wasn't a perceived "future" in this type of operations.  Couple this with a world-class Public Relations machine, and you have a completely different story.

They had the opportunity to join the fray 20 yrs ago.  They refused.  So the hard work of building the mission set, professionalizing the force, updating the doctrine, developing the C2 infrastructure, etc was done by others.  Now they want "their share".  To be fair, the signs are that this new Marine SOC is doing things right to create an excellent force.  But they have the advantage of not having the costs associated with creating a cogent SOF capability and all of the benefits of 20 yrs of SOF experience.

By the way, the Marine FID units (I think they are currently called the MSOAGs) have done great things.  No argument.  But the MSOBs are just ranger units.  Nothing particularly unique.  MARSOC has no capability to operate JSOTFs in their current organizational model.  So, they don't have to do the hard part of SOF C2 at the operational level.  

If there's an updated command brief that refutes this, please send it along.


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 2, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> I never intend to demean the Marine Corps, but a bit of intellectual honesty is necessary. The Marines do have a "small wars" pedigree.  But the fact is that, for the longest time, they wanted no real part of SOF. The Marines go where the money is.  They wouldn't be in SOF if there wasn't a perceived "future" in this type of operations.  Couple this with a world-class Public Relations machine, and you have a completely different story.
> 
> They had the opportunity to join the fray 20 yrs ago.  They refused.  So the hard work of building the mission set, professionalizing the force, updating the doctrine, developing the C2 infrastructure, etc was done by others.  Now they want "their share".  To be fair, the signs are that this new Marine SOC is doing things right to create an excellent force.  But they have the advantage of not having the costs associated with creating a cogent SOF capability and all of the benefits of 20 yrs of SOF experience.
> 
> ...



Agree with the 'don't mean to demean'...that said.....This stands out:



> *They wouldn't be in SOF if there wasn't a perceived "future" in this type of operations.  Couple this with a world-class Public Relations machine, and you have a completely different story.*



And it only took them *8 years into the 21st Century *to figure that out....

*(Grabbing my kevlar umbrella and running for the bunker now while screaming 'But I love you guyz'!!!!)*

:confused::confused:;);)


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## tigerstr (Mar 2, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> But the fact is that, for the longest time, they wanted no real part of SOF. The Marines go where the money is.  They wouldn't be in SOF if there wasn't a perceived "future" in this type of operations....
> -------------------------
> .... But the MSOBs *are just ranger units*.  Nothing particularly unique.  MARSOC has no capability to operate JSOTFs in their current organizational model.  So, they don't have to do the hard part of SOF C2 at the operational level.
> 
> If there's an updated command brief that refutes this, please send it along.



Well, it can be argued that what USSOCOM (or the civilian leadership of DOD for that matter) wanted from the Marines in the first place, was added “capacity”, in terms of manpower that can be used for Special Operations, and not some kind of new unique capability.

Besides money (which always is a big factor for every Service worldwide), it can also be argued that Marines agreed to jump in the wagon, because they understood (in Afghanistan) that otherwise they would be excluded from proliferating SOF missions.

I am not sure they like much being in USSOCOM even now… It’s a matter of “Marine Culture” and the fact that they have a unique standing that makes them always very sensitive about the future “relevance” of the Corps

On the other hand comparing now Marine Special Operation Companies and Battalions to Ranger units, doesn’t seem right.

At first a MSOC was a combination of a DA/SR platoon (made up exclusively from Force Recon personnel, a closer comparison to SEALs than Rangers) and a security Platoon comprised of infantry MOSs with extra training, plus an enabler detachment of about 20 men) with Intel, Signal, EOD, Fire Control and other support capabilities. All in all, about 110-120 men.

This (the two different platoon combination) was a derivative of the Maritime Special Purpose Force, which was/is part of the MEU (SOC) concept. Somebody thought it could be a permanent “unit” concept in MARSOC, and probably was very wrong. 

But, MSOCs gave up already the Security Platoons and are  reorganizing in 14man Teams, (led by a Captain) plus the enabler detachment, for 80-90 men total . 
If you take a look at the way things are going, it seems MARSOC will be in the future, something like a “cross” between Special Forces and SEALs, regarding training and capabilities, probably closer to SF.

Right now a MSOC looks on paper much like a Naval Special Warfare Task Unit, but the Marines argue that they have much more experience/capabilities” with Intel, Sigint and other “high demand low density” elements needed for “task organizing” in SOF, than the Navy does.

This notwithstanding, Marines admitted having problems with the first MSOC deployed to Afghanistan, especially in combat service support and logistics. 

But first tries have their problems and I imagine there is no reason to assume that a MSOC will have trouble integrating in a JSOTF the way a NSWTU or other SOF unit does, after some inevitable glitches are taken care of. 

After all they do have a lot of experience in task organizing (MAGTFs etc)  

Regarding C2 and JSOTFs, what the Marines are saying is that MSOB staff (and higher echelons) can “battle roster” if it is needed to set-up a deployed HQ at higher levels. But not much is known about the way a MSOB (or MARSOC) staff is organized and if they have accumulated relevant experience. 

NO new open source Command Briefs available, as far as I know.


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 2, 2008)

> Originally posted by tigerstr: NO new open source Command Briefs available, as far as I know.



There could be a reason for this.....

:2c:


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## Hitman2/3 (Mar 2, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> But the MSOBs are just ranger units.  Nothing particularly unique.  MARSOC has no capability to operate JSOTFs in their current organizational model.



Don't know where you're getting your information from, but I don't believe I would compare the training, capabilities, or mission of an MSOB team to a Ranger unit. Just saying. :)


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 3, 2008)

Hitman2/3 said:


> Don't know where you're getting your information from, but I don't believe I would compare the training, capabilities, or mission of an MSOB team to a Ranger unit. Just saying. :)



notice the "small 'r' " for 'ranger unit'.   i specifically didn't say they were a Ranger Battalion or battalion-like.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 3, 2008)

tigerstr said:


> Right now a MSOC looks on paper much like a Naval Special Warfare Task Unit, but the Marines argue that they have much more experience/capabilities” with Intel, Sigint and other “high demand low density” elements needed for “task organizing” in SOF, than the Navy does.
> 
> This notwithstanding, Marines admitted having problems with the first MSOC deployed to Afghanistan, especially in combat service support and logistics.



I'd agree with the Marine position, insofar as they can reachback to get ground force multipliers that the Navy can't (at least not until Navy Expeditionary Combat Command is at full speed).  



> But first tries have their problems and I imagine there is no reason to assume that a MSOC will have trouble integrating in a JSOTF the way a NSWTU or other SOF unit does, after some inevitable glitches are taken care of.  After all they do have a lot of experience in task organizing (MAGTFs etc)



Integrating a Company into a JSOTF/SOTF as a component? I would agree.  Running a JSOTF?  Not happening in their current configuration.




> Regarding C2 and JSOTFs, what the Marines are saying is that MSOB staff (and higher echelons) can “battle roster” if it is needed to set-up a deployed HQ at higher levels. But not much is known about the way a MSOB (or MARSOC) staff is organized and if they have accumulated relevant experience.



No they can't.  SF Battalions struggle to do so and their experience level is huge.  JSOTF is a tough thing to do.  SF Groups can do it because they've adapted their force structure to support it.  No one else is even close.


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## Hitman2/3 (Mar 3, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> notice the "small 'r' " for 'ranger unit'.   i specifically didn't say they were a Ranger Battalion or battalion-like.



My mistake. Can you please explain what a ranger unit is?


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## tigerstr (Mar 3, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> No they can't.  SF Battalions struggle to do so and their experience level is huge.  JSOTF is a tough thing to do.  SF Groups can do it because they've adapted their force structure to support it.  No one else is even close.



Well, I can’t dispute this, but I have two rational questions

a) How are the Marines going to get the experience (the way SF did) if they don’t try and 

b) How do we know if they have adapted or are now adapting their force structure (at the MSOB level) to do that, or not?

Anyway, if you don’t mind an opinion, I think the whole idea that Marines are trying to duplicate or replace Special Forces, (admittedly some statements made by MC brass made an impression) is creating some sort of "SOF contest" to an extent that for me, an outsider, does not make much sense.

Considering the fact there is a war going on.

By the way, even the Marine Corps Times title, "New units to assume Special Forces mission" is very dubious (and a bit inflammatory for the SF community) since the details of the SC MAGTF concept specifically point out that it will NOT have SOF missions or train third nations SOF, but "some limited Special Operations capability”, in case it is needed.


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 3, 2008)

tigerstr said:


> Well, I can’t dispute this, but I have two rational questions
> 
> a) How are the Marines going to get the experience (the way SF did) if they don’t try and
> 
> ...



Me, personally, being an SOF GB and an 'insider' don't see it as a contest. I'm of the force muliplier variety in that working *IN CONJUCTION WITH *SOF, MARSOC will recruit more soldiers with the 'high speed' acronym 'SOF' attached to the recruiting drive.

a) How are the Marines going to get the experience (the way SF did) if they don’t try 

*[They are welcome to try, are trying, and are still in the developement stage]* 

b) How do we know if they have adapted or are now adapting their force structure (at the MSOB level) to do that, or not?

*[The recruitment drive is barely off the ground, not enough time for adapting anything, and they will adapt as the timing is necessary or the recruitment numbers are too low.]*

When are you gonna come on over, get your US citizenship, and join the SOF community?? The time is now, there is a war on, after all.....

:2c:


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## RackMaster (Mar 3, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> When are you gonna come on over, get your US citizenship, and join the SOF community?? The time is now, there is a war on, after all.....
> 
> :2c:




  Damn recruiters.  You didn't even take him out for drinks.  lol


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 3, 2008)

gdamadg said:


> Damn recruiters.  You didn't even take him out for drinks.  lol




Waiting for the invite to Greece.

Tiggy??

We need to start a new Greek SOF thread, methinks??

Tig, what's the Greek AF-SOF like?? ;);)


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## RackMaster (Mar 3, 2008)

Never worked with any Greek SOF guys but spent some time around the Hellenic Force in Kabul.  Nice guys, major language barrier; didn't learn much. ;)


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 3, 2008)

gdamadg said:


> Never worked with any Greek SOF guys but spent some time around the Hellenic Force in Kabul.  Nice guys, major language barrier; didn't learn much. ;)




Does Greece have an SOF?? Gonna have to research that one!!

How was the Hellenic force for training, soldiering?? ;)


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## RackMaster (Mar 3, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> Does Greece have an SOF?? Gonna have to research that one!!
> 
> How was the Hellenic force for training, soldiering?? ;)



:uhh:  I was more worried about there preoccupation to look at my guys than the girl that was on my team. :doh:  Other than that, they made great gate guards and can serve up a mean cup of Turkish coffee.


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 3, 2008)

The sheep were scared? in other words?? :eek::eek: ;);) 

Pard's gonna be jealous if we have another sheepshagger on board!!!!! ;);)


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## RackMaster (Mar 3, 2008)

Maybe they can team up and share the sheepshagging. :uhh:   Pardus shouldn't be jealous, I'm sure there's a difference between Greek sheep and Kiwi sheep.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Mar 3, 2008)

Marines do not attempt to copy anyone, they are well known for making their own. The fact that Marine SOF community actually has a budget now “is a great thing”. I watched a lot of friends, leave the USMC so they could get some where with a budget. Being that they are the newest branch in JSOC, and have evolved greatly to fill their new role, I think they can use a huge pat on the back. 

As for MARSOC replacing SF role in guerrilla warfare, SF will never be replaced. However, I see nothing wrong with the USMC having their own form of SF type units. Now that they have the means, and the ability to form (MCTAG) it’s a good thing and should be welcomed. 

As for MARSOC reinventing the wheel of Advisory and Training, “irregular warfare” is a fancy title to get a bigger budget. It’s a common practice in all branches of the military…
:2c:


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## Hitman2/3 (Mar 3, 2008)

Can anybody explain what a ranger unit is? :confused:


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

Hitman2/3 said:


> My mistake. Can you please explain what a ranger unit is?



My source for the following is Army FM 7-85, Ranger Unit Operations, dated 1987.  Although the FM talks about generally about a "Ranger Regiment" (as it is the basic doctrine for forming and employing 75th Ranger Regiment), the principles within the source document can easily be applied to any SOF Direct Action/Strategic Recon (DA/SR) force (like an MSOC).  Hope this helps both frame my point and advance the discussion.

Para 1-5  Employment Considerations
a. Ranger units are characterized by the quality, motivation, training, and individual skill of their members. This produces units with superb collective abilities, able to adapt well to changing, complex situations.

b. Ranger units can conduct either deliberate or quick-response operations.

(1) Deliberate operations rely on careful planning, reconnaissance and surveillance of the target area, deception, secrecy, thorough preparation and rehearsals, and violent execution. A deliberate operation aims to complete the mission even though the enemy may have heavy forces on or near the objective area. Deliberate operations allow for detailed planning, evaluation, rehearsal, and coordination before insertion. A deliberate operation is likely to succeed against targets that the enemy has protected in depth, that have strong natural defenses, or that need a detailed and long insertion process.

(2) Quick-response operations rely on the high level of training and readiness of the ranger regiment to execute a mission before the enemy can react. These operations are conducted when there is little time for long, detailed planning. They rely on set procedures set forth by the ranger regiment and its supporting elements. A quick-response operation aims to complete the mission before an enemy can react. This type of operation may be chosen due to the time-sensitive nature of the target, political or military goals, the time frame of other operations, or the increased chance of enemy detection.

(3) Whether an operation is to be deliberate or quick response is often a difficult and time-sensitive decision by a high-level command authority. Decision-makers must consider the enemy's strength in the area, his intentions, his ability either to reinforce or to alter the target area, and the consequences of success or failure of diplomatic or military initiatives in related areas. The ranger unit commander tries to use the existing time, manpower, and resources to complete a detailed and coordinated plan. He refines that plan up to the insertion into the objective area.

c. Ranger units train to operate in any environment or weather condition. They regularly perform operations during periods of limited visibility. Ranger units maintain a high state of physical fitness and often train in close quarters combatives. In addition to completing advanced marksmanship training with standard US weapons, each member of a ranger unit trains with many foreign weapons. Ranger units are trained to operate on urbanized terrain, becoming specialists in entry and clearing techniques and quick-fire methods, especially during periods of limited visibility.

d. Because ranger units have limited vehicles, logistics operations capability, indirect fire support, and heavy weapons systems, they are not designed for continuous operations. During all phases of operations and training, ranger units need responsive external support.

e. Ranger units are normally employed against targets and under conditions that need their unique skills. Although targeting priority is set by the overall commander, ranger units are not normally assigned missions that can be done by conventional aerial bombardment or by other units.

f. Ranger units are oriented toward offensive operations. They are not normally employed as a rear area protection force. Although the ranger regiment has a small reconnaissance unit, ranger units do not normally conduct long-range reconnaissance missions. The structure, communications, and training of the ranger unit do not prepare it for LRRP missions. Ranger units engaged in strike and special light infantry operations have a secondary mission to collect and report combat information.

g. Ranger units can be deployed worldwide when US military presence or participation with a host national military activity would serve US interests. This deployment shows a readiness to commit forces into a threatened area or proves US national resolve. After the deployment, other activities include staging operations, rehearsing combat operations, securing base areas for use and deployment of other forces, and so on that provide a clear signal of US intent. Ranger units are not trained or organized to provide mobile training teams (MTT) to train indigenous forces. The US Special Forces or other special operation forces are trained to conduct such security assistance operations.

h. Ranger units can serve as an example to a host country and provide limited military advice and training. They will normally be augmented with linguists and technicians to increase their abilities. The regiment would normally still function as a unit. Most of its assistance would be through short-term, high-impact, unit-oriented operations. They would not be long-term individual efforts associated with advisory-type activities.

i. Ranger units may be deployed to engage in combined training exercises with allies. This enhances US national image by demonstrating the outstanding abilities of the American ranger. These activities may include ranger, light infantry, airborne, air assault, or amphibious operations.

j. Ranger units use standard US nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) warning; detection; protection; and decontamination equipment and doctrine when operating on the integrated battlefield.


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## tigerstr (Mar 4, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> Although the ranger regiment has a small reconnaissance unit, ranger units do not normally conduct long-range reconnaissance missions. *The structure, communications, and training of the ranger unit do not prepare it for LRRP missions*.



Well,  I suppose this by itself, takes out the SR mission. 

Anyway, if there is a “ranger” unit with closer resemblance to Force Recon, (and DASR MSOCs) I presume it would be the new Ranger Recon Company.

Here is an extract:

“The RRC is a Reconnaissance unit organized to plan and conduct world-wide Reconnaissance and Direct Action Operations in support of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Simply put, RRC is our nation's experts in tactical and special Reconnaissance. The centerpiece of the RRC is our recce teams. Our recce teams consist of senior NCOs who are veterans of numerous combat deployments”.

Somebody put the whole recruiting letter (from AKO) on a forum, but I am not putting the link in case it would be considered an OPSEC breach.


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## Marauder06 (Mar 4, 2008)

That FM is from 1987, I'm thinking maybe doctrine has changed a little in the last 20 or so years ;)


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## Hitman2/3 (Mar 4, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> My source for the following is Army FM 7-85, Ranger Unit Operations, dated 1987.  Although the FM talks about generally about a "Ranger Regiment" (as it is the basic doctrine for forming and employing 75th Ranger Regiment), the principles within the source document can easily be applied to any SOF Direct Action/Strategic Recon (DA/SR) force (like an MSOC).  Hope this helps both frame my point and advance the discussion.
> 
> Para 1-5  Employment Considerations
> a. Ranger units are characterized by the quality, motivation, training, and individual skill of their members. This produces units with superb collective abilities, able to adapt well to changing, complex situations.
> ...




While I agree that MSOB displays all of these qualities, minus a few, their capabilities far exceed this definition. While I will not go in to detail due to OPSEC there are a few things that I can say. When speaking of SR and MSOB they are not talking about "strategic reconnaissance", which Battalion Recon as well as MSOB can perform, they are talking about special reconnaissance which as many of us know can involve a lot more than simply watching a target area. Also unlike this definition MSOB just like Force before it *can* perform long range reconnaissance. Although it doesn’t say it here I'm going to assume that a ranger unit *on the missions discribed above *operate in at least platoon size or close to it most of the time. MSOB on the other hand operates in much smaller numbers most of the time. Finally although they are experts in CQB MSOB does a lot more than just clear a house in an urban area.   

Like I said I'm not sure were you got your impression or info about MSOB from, but this definition doesn’t even completely describe modern day Battalion Recon, which is a few steps below MSOB in terms of capabilities and training, and many steps as far as funding and gear go. 

If anything, with the exception of often training with foreign weapons, not having indirect fire support, and needing external support,  I would say this definition describes a Marine Infantry Battalion. Not to offend the Army but don't confuse a "regular" Marine Infantry Battalion with a "regular" Army Infantry Battalion.  

Regardless of your intention to say that the Marine Corps is copying everybody else, or the Marine Corps goes where the money is, as if no other branch does the same is an insult. Everybody copies everybody when it comes to SOF, if somthing works and fits your needs why wouldn't you use it. Money wise the Marine Corps is the most cost effective branch in the DOD. To call MSOB nothing more than a ranger unit that is nothing special is also an insult. You have no idea how much training and sacrifices those guys have made to get this thing up and running, or how hard it was for some of them just to get into the unit, not to mention the day to day training. So I think it would be a good idea to refrain from giving an opinion that is based on partial information, until you have something more concrete than what I can only guess is scuttlebutt you've heard and an FM from the 80's. :2c:


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## tigerstr (Mar 4, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> Me, personally, being an SOF GB and an 'insider' don't see it as a contest. I'm of the force muliplier variety in that working *IN CONJUCTION WITH *SOF, MARSOC will recruit more soldiers with the 'high speed' acronym 'SOF' attached to the recruiting drive.
> 
> 
> When are you gonna come on over, get your US citizenship, and join the SOF community?? The time is now, there is a war on, after all.....



One reason I wrote about a “contest” can be found here 

http://www.veteransofspecialforces.org/Main/main.html 

and more specifically here 

http://www.veteransofspecialforces.org/Main/Editorials/recent_editorials.html

and here

http://www.veteransofspecialforces.org/Main/Editorials/recent_editorials.html#article_2

Maybe the word I used is not the most appropriate word, but there is undoubtedly some kind of serious animosity in the air.

I am referencing this source because the aforementioned organization is lead by widely respected senior SF veterans AND a lot of what they are saying makes sense.  

Am afraid it’s a bit late for me to come over, get the citizenship and enlist. But there are other ways to get involved, and support the effort, even from Greece.

Time for me to get a sheep before Pardus gets it. 

Seems like a tough fellah to mess around with.

PS:New thread about Greek Special Forces in the appropriate forum. Gdamadg beat me to it but I contributed a little.


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## Boondocksaint375 (Mar 4, 2008)

I think you are all confusing shit more than you need to.  That excerpt above was from a really old fm, not to mention it had nothing to do with RRD (now known as RRC).  The 75th Ranger Regiment doesn't spend time "reconning" shit, as they are a primarily a direct action force that is unlike the rest of the military units.  If you want to compare MSOB to something, it would more than likely be RRC.  Then again, until any of you have done both, I doubt you say much at all about each unit's capabilities.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

*1 of 3 for Hitman...*



Hitman2/3 said:


> Money wise the Marine Corps is the most cost effective branch in the DOD.



Someone- I think it was Harry Truman- said the Marines have the best propaganda operation in the world.

Who trains their pilots? The Navy
Who provides Marines with Medics and Chaplains? The Navy
Who facilitates most of the Marines' Tank/Heavy Armor training? The Army
Where do the Marines do a lot of their Motor-T and Engineer training? US Army Base Fort Leonard Wood.
Etc..

These things may have Marine Corps resources present, but are cents on the dollar compared to the costs the other Services provide.  It may be fiscally prudent to do things this way, but to then turn around and say "we're cheaper" is simply disingenuous. To their credit, the Marines do invest well in some things, and have great results (e.g. Infantry, marksmanship, etc).  And by being smaller, they have significantly less overhead, especially when a lot of that cost is sloughed off to other Services.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

*2 of 3*



> To call MSOB nothing more than a ranger unit that is nothing special is also an insult. You have no idea how much training and sacrifices those guys have made to get this thing up and running, or how hard it was for some of them just to get into the unit, not to mention the day to day training.



I never said a ranger unit is "nothing special".  In fact, I think I said that this is an excellent baseline for any SOF DA/SR type unit.  "SOF" is Special Operations Forces, in case you forgot.  So I think I have a conceptual understanding of how hard this is.  My 22 yrs of service in mostly SOF and Combat Arms units provides my actual understanding - I'll send my DD214 to the moderators for "vetting" my bonafides.  So spare me the crank-measuring contest.

If you want to be insulted, feel free - it's your right.  But you do that on your own - not by anything I've written here.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

*3 of 3*



> So I think it would be a good idea to refrain from giving an opinion that is based on partial information, until you have something more concrete than what I can only guess is scuttlebutt you've heard and an FM from the 80's. :2c:



Citing doctrine is not "scuttlebutt".  And since you've you spent more time  moaning about what I cited rather than refuting anything on point, it's fair to conclude that you missed the idea that it actually makes a strong case of (positive) comparison between a ranger type unit and an MSOC.  

I wish I could bring you a more current reference, but the fact is that it has never been updated.  It's been in draft at least twice that I know of, but for whatever reason, never went final.  So, what I've cited IS the definitive source, unless you've got something better.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

tigerstr said:


> Well, I can’t dispute this, but I have two rational questions
> 
> a) How are the Marines going to get the experience (the way SF did) if they don’t try and
> 
> b) How do we know if they have adapted or are now adapting their force structure (at the MSOB level) to do that, or not?



Operational-level command is not a battalion level task.  Too big/too many things going on.  So I don't think it's realistic or fair to expect an MSOB to run a JSOTF.  

It's tough to do with an O6-level Headquarters staff, and still requires significant joint augmentation.  The logistics and comms pieces alone are daunting juxtaposed against what the MARSOC is fielding.  Sure, they can get help in those areas and others, but how much outsourcing can you do before it's really just an ad-hoc organization?  In other words, if 6 out of 10 people are not yours, is it really your mission?  

Just a thought.

If it was easy, the Department of Homeland Security would be doing it....


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## Hitman2/3 (Mar 4, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> I never said a ranger unit is "nothing special".  In fact, I think I said that this is an excellent baseline for any SOF DA/SR type unit.  "SOF" is Special Operations Forces, in case you forgot.  So I think I have a conceptual understanding of how hard this is.  My 22 yrs of service in mostly SOF and Combat Arms units provides my actual understanding - I'll send my DD214 to the moderators for "vetting" my bonafides.  So spare me the crank-measuring contest.
> 
> If you want to be insulted, feel free - it's your right.  But you do that on your own - not by anything I've written here.



I never said you said a ranger unit was nothing special but I apologize because I did misquote you. 




Simmerin' SigO said:


> But the MSOBs are *just* ranger units.  *Nothing particularly unique*.




Also I never said anything about myself, and for that matter answerd your post in a respectful and logical way. So how you came to the conclusion that this is a "crank-measuring contest" I don't know. Unless you are refering to yourself when you brought up,



Simmerin' SigO said:


> 22 yrs of service in mostly SOF and Combat Arms units



Which is great, and I honestly commend you, but has little to do with this since we are speaking of a Marine units capabilites and more or less the Marine Corps in General which you appear to know quit a bit about. Now if we were speaking of an Army unit right on, but we're not. No one is questioning your abilites in your field or as a soldier. However, what I am questioning, quite fairly I believe, is your earlier statement.


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## Hitman2/3 (Mar 4, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> Citing doctrine is not "scuttlebutt".  And since you've you spent more time  moaning about what I cited rather than refuting anything on point, it's fair to conclude that you missed the idea that it actually makes a strong case of (positive) comparison between a ranger type unit and an MSOC.
> 
> I wish I could bring you a more current reference, but the fact is that it has never been updated.  It's been in draft at least twice that I know of, but for whatever reason, never went final.  So, what I've cited IS the definitive source, unless you've got something better.




Also on this point, you never cited anything. You made a comment that was not backed up by a source of any kind. And I, refuted your comment with one of my own. :)


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

Boondocksaint375 said:


> I think you are all confusing shit more than you need to.  That excerpt above was from a really old fm, not to mention it had nothing to do with RRD (now known as RRC).  The 75th Ranger Regiment doesn't spend time "reconning" shit, as they are a primarily a direct action force that is unlike the rest of the military units.  If you want to compare MSOB to something, it would more than likely be RRC.  Then again, until any of you have done both, I doubt you say much at all about each unit's capabilities.



If you have a more current reference, then cite it.  You don't have to do everything to be able to speak to things in a general sense (which is what a forum like this provides).  The whole "walk a mile in my moccassin" canard is bogus.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

Hitman2/3 said:


> Also on this point, you never cited anything. You made a comment that was not backed up by a source of any kind. And I, refuted your comment with one of my own. :)



Read post number 25 and then try this one again.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

Hitman2/3 said:


> Which is great, and I honestly commend you, but has little to do with this since we are speaking of a Marine units capabilites and more or less the Marine Corps in General which you appear to know quit a bit about. Now if we were speaking of an Army unit right on, but we're not. No one is questioning your abilites in your field or as a soldier. However, what I am questioning, quite fairly I believe, is your earlier statement.



This is not about me.  But it is important for you to understand that SOF is inherently joint, and as a result, my time there has opened my operational aperature considerably wider than a merely "Army" view.  

I think "purple", not "green".


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## Simmerin' SigO (Mar 4, 2008)

*Note to Moderators*

I think that, due in large part to my intransigence, this topic has drifted way off azimuth.

In view of keeping peace, it may be a good idea to let Hitman make his final points and then close this topic.  Since he's the operational guy, he should probably have the last word.

v/r
BJP


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## Hitman2/3 (Mar 4, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> Read post number 25 and then try this one again.



OK, you cited the part about a ranger unit, but you never cited the whole point of this debate and that is the one about MARSOC's capabilities, and the other comments you made about the Marine Corps.


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## tigerstr (Mar 4, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> If you have a more current reference, then cite it.  *You don't have to do everything to be able to speak to things in a general sense (which is what a forum like this provides).  *The whole "walk a mile in my moccassin" canard is bogus.



Yep, totally agree with you. But he is right about his assessment (RRC being comparable to MSOC and not any other Ranger or ranger unit). 

The way I see it, you are letting a mistake you made (comparing somekind of a generic  "ranger" unit, with a current MSOC) drag you around.


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## Hitman2/3 (Mar 4, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> I think that, due in large part to my intransigence, this topic has drifted way off azimuth.
> 
> In view of keeping peace, it may be a good idea to let Hitman make his final points and then close this topic.  Since he's the operational guy, he should probably have the last word.
> 
> ...



Dosen't really matter to me I was enjoying a good debate, but I agree its off topic.


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## Boot (Mar 14, 2008)

Boondocksaint375 said:


> *New units to assume Special Forces mission*
> 
> 
> By Kimberly Johnson - Staff writer
> ...



I think what no one is realizing or even aware of is Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG), and what their role is. An exert;

MCTAG's mission;  "Provide
conventional training and advisor support to Host Nation Security Forces
(HNSF) or to GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PARTNERING WITH HNSF (read: SC MAGTF)
IOT...."

Its not mentioned but I do know MCTAG's focus is FID/COIN. It was stressed to me that they ARE NOT SF. Now if someone can tell me the difference in the execution of advising or FID/COIN from a MSOAG or ODA TEAM, please let me know, I think there is probably not much difference. When I worked w/ MiTT's in Iraq, the best MiTT Team Leaders were SF Major's who elected to do MiTT's. One in particular who had spent 10 years w/ 5th and 7th Group, told me that being a MiTT Team Leader was the purest "SF" mission he has ever done. He had a good team, but since the were all big Army (except his 18E) they were ready to quit by the 10th month in Baghdad. My point is that FID/COIN isn't something limited to SF but certainly SF (Army ODA teams) have been doing this for the last 40 years, and they know a thing or two about it. I think FID/COIN can be executed by other forces who aren't SF types BUT as I witnessed first hand in Iraq, not every soldier/Marine is cut out for that sort of mission. What will be key for an organization such as MCTAG and SC MAGTF are the people entrusted w/ this mission. Quality over quantity and the training given to them. There is a good chapter in OP 19 (Ch 13) written by a couple of folks who outlined what FMTU selection should consist of. You could be an outstanding DA type but that doesn't mean you are cut out to be an adviser.
Sorry to ramble on.

SF

Edit; Article on MCTAG

News from Inside the Navy
provided by the InsideDefense NewsStand

Spelled out in ‘Long War’ concept

MARINES ENVISION ADVISERS FOR PARTNER NATIONS’ SECURITY ASSISTANCE

_______________________________________________

Date: February 25, 2008


A new Marine Corps force-employment concept calls for creating teams of Marine advisers who will help train and equip partner nations for “security assistance” efforts.


The service’s new “Long War” concept -- signed in December by Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway and released this month by the service -- calls for beefing up the nascent Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) that Conway commissioned last October.


This group of advisers was initially established to address “staffing and sourcing requirements” for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Long War concept states. However, that vision of the advisers’ group has expanded within the concept.


The 42-page concept document lays out plans for creating Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SC MAGTFs) -- units with expanded capabilities in the lower end of the expeditionary force spectrum that are task-organized for security cooperation in Africa, Southwest Asia and South America (Inside the Navy, Feb. 18).


The concept says the Marine advisers’ group’s purpose is to “source the Marine Corps’ advisory capability to support mission requirements that exceed those of SC MAGTFs.”


The advisers will provide training, education, advice, equipment and material to “select partner nation security forces,” it says.


“An embryonic capability now, [the Marine advisrrs’ group] will eventually grow to constitute a cadre of trained advisors organized into regional branches that deploy scalable teams of Marine advisors to partner nations,” the concept states.


The service sees the advisers helping to introduce Security Cooperation MAGTFs into theater and to develop relationships between the forces and partner nations.


The advisers, when not deployed, will train the Security Cooperation MAGTFs and other units conducting so-called “building partner capacity” activities, according to Marine Corps plans.


“Ultimately, the Marine advisors will provide a critical continuity for Marine efforts to engage across the shaping and deterrence phases of operations,” the Long War concept says.


The Marine Corps acknowledged the requirement for some kind of advisory battalion a few years ago, when officials thought the service would be drawing down its size, Col. Rob Abbott told ITN in an interview. Since then, the Marine Corps has learned it will not be decreasing in size and has kicked off a program to increase its active-component end strength to 202,000 by FY-11.


“So we realized that clearly in the new environment we’re going to need advisers,” Abbott, branch head of the plans section within the plans, policies and operations shop at Marine Corps headquarters, said Feb. 11 at the Pentagon.


“Exactly what that advisory capability is going to look like, we couldn’t tell you right now,” he added. “We think that will be largely determined by what the demand signal is coming from the combatant commanders.”


Abbott said he believes more will be known about the advisory capability in the next six to nine months.


The service is embarking on a period of detail analysis on the Long War concept, Abbott said Feb. 11.


“By early fall everybody should come back and say, ‘This is how we think we’re going to implement the Long War concept,’” he said. “And at that time we should put out some more detailed guidance.”


In the Marine Corps, security assistance is now executed through the Marine Corps’ Security Cooperation Education and Training Center and through Marine Corps Systems Command, via initiatives focused on foreign military sales and specialized training.


However, “recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to the recognition that a more robust SA [security assistance] capability is needed within the Marine Corps,” the Long War concept states. -- Emelie Rutherford


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## Hap4302 (Apr 15, 2008)

*Yup.*



razor_baghdad said:


> There could be a reason for this.....
> 
> :2c:



The reason is simple: version control. During our first couple of years, change was the status quo and we made a concerted effort to ensure briefs about what "might be" didn't end up on the street and outdated ten minutes later. That said, I'm wide open to direct questions from any member of the public, including, of course, but certainly not limited to civilian media. Drop me a line any time via our website link at www.marsoc.usmc.mil. The site looks better today than it did a year ago, but it's still pretty thin. All the same, stop by for a visit and ping me with whatever questions you may have.

My apologies to you and all that my visits here haven't been more frequent. I run a three-Marine public communications team (with a recently added videographer) and the pace of operations makes it a tad difficult to engage consistently at all points the way I would like to.

Semper Fidelis!
Maj. Cliff "Hap" Gilmore
MARSOC Public Affairs Officer


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## Simmerin' SigO (Apr 15, 2008)

Boot said:


> Its not mentioned but I do know MCTAG's focus is FID/COIN. It was stressed to me that they ARE NOT SF. Now if someone can tell me the difference in the execution of advising or FID/COIN from a MSOAG or ODA TEAM, please let me know, I think there is probably not much difference.



The difference is the difference between FID and UW (Unconventional Warfare).

Look it up. Do the research. Embrace the distinctions.

Once you discern the difference, you'll understand why what the MARSOF guys are doing is not the same as Special Forces.


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## Hap4302 (Apr 15, 2008)

*The Evolution of Warfare...*

Lots of solid discussion here. Made for a good read. And the debate over the difference between the newly forming MCTAG within the conventional force and the MSOAG within the special operations side is worth having. Received that very question via my organizational mailbox the other day and straight up there is no answer to that question within the current rhetorical rules that would make everyone happy.

My suggestion at this point is that folks start considering the historical evolution of warfare and that yesterday's "unconventional" tends to become today's conventional. Or, put another way, things that happen regularly tend not to be irregular.

Lots of talk here about who does what and how they do it better than this guy or the other guy. Funny thing about that line of debate is how easy it is to forget that nobody does anything somebody else can't do; Some of us just do things that nobody else can do right now. And that kind of thinking tends to restrict, well, thinking.

Plenty of demand for on-the-fly evolution in the years ahead. It should be interesting to see which organizations manage to keep up. For my part, I suspect some of us will get distracted by semantics.

-- Hap


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## tigerstr (Apr 16, 2008)

This level of arguments and thinking do raise the bar and add to a high quality forum.  Most people are a bit confused by the sudden change in MARSOCs "center of gravity" regarding missions and capabilities. Others are trying to figure out exactly how MARSOC fits alongside SF regarding mission profiles and capabilities.

This is not strictly a theoretical question, since an almost exact dublication of capabilities (having a "Marine SF" so to speak, as some people presume will happen) does raise eyebrows (specialy in parts of the SF community).

The main question they ask is "why reinvent the wheel" since the Special Warfare Center has a long history and could be the only training establishment for SF mission profiles (with a UW/FID/COIN focus).

For a big organisation like the USMC its only natural not to "give up" its troops to be trained by (a very special part indeed) of another -bigger-organisation, like the US Army.

Also it does not fit well with the "elite" fighting culture of the Corps.

On the other hand, many would argue that this would be the most cost-effective and results oriented solution. 

Difficult and complex issue to be sure.


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## surgicalcric (Apr 16, 2008)

Hap4302 said:


> ...yesterday's "unconventional" tends to become today's conventional. Or, put another way, things that happen regularly tend not to be irregular...



It doesn't matter how often an enemy engages in unconventional warfare it does not change that type of fighting to conventional or "regular" warfare.  Unconventional defines the type of warfare, not its regularity.  There are distinct differences between them.  This is not linear warfare and you cant solve the problems associated with conducting it by throwing bullets and bodies at it, you have to get inside it and that doesnt happen over night.  Conducting FID is one thing, UW isnt quite the same.

Do try to keep up... :)

Crip


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## Hitman2/3 (Apr 16, 2008)

surgicalcric said:


> It doesn't matter how often an enemy engages in unconventional warfare it does not change that type of fighting to conventional or "regular" warfare.  Unconventional defines the type of warfare, not its regularity.  There are distinct differences between them.  This is not linear warfare and you cant solve the problems associated with conducting it by throwing bullets and bodies at it, you have to get inside it and that doesnt happen over night.  Conducting FID is one thing, UW isnt quite the same.
> 
> Do try to keep up... :)
> 
> Crip



I think the Major was just saying how things change. Like 225 years ago conventional warfare was meeting at a predetermined place, standing up in file and marching towards each other shooting until the other side surrendered or was dead. It was considered (at least by mainstream) uncivilized, cowardly, and unconventional to take cover, "snipe", or ambush an opposing force. Now a days that’s the norm and we think nothing of it, but if we were to take our basic infantry tactics back to the 1700's, hell, they might just call us witches and try to burn our ass :). 

I now what your saying though. I think its about time the Marine Corps officially got into the game, but I sometimes worry about the gov pushing too fast and too hard for things to happen.  Like you said it won't happen over night.


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## Rabid Badger (Apr 17, 2008)

> Originally Posted by Hap4302
> ...yesterday's "unconventional" tends to become today's conventional. Or, put another way, things that happen regularly tend not to be irregular...





> Originally Posted by SurgC:
> It doesn't matter how often an enemy engages in unconventional warfare it does not change that type of fighting to conventional or "regular" warfare. Unconventional defines the type of warfare, not its regularity. There are distinct differences between them. This is not linear warfare and you cant solve the problems associated with conducting it by throwing bullets and bodies at it, you have to get inside it and that doesnt happen over night. Conducting FID is one thing, UW isnt quite the same.
> 
> Do try to keep up...
> ...



After reviewing Hap's earlier post, I kinda viewed this from our side of the fence. 

The more unconventional they've become, the more unconventional we've necessarily become. Or, better said, that we've finally *REALIZED* that *we have to fight fire with fire*, become a more unconventional military. Hap can jump in, but that's the whole reason behind the MARSOC intention (story/Draft)....fighting fire with fire.....

The FID portion of any countries defense is so that UW doesn't get to the OOB level. FID is Step 1. 

IMO you, Hap, and I are saying the same thing, just on different floors of the same building.

;):2c:


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## Boot (Apr 17, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> The difference is the difference between FID and UW (Unconventional Warfare).
> 
> Look it up. Do the research. Embrace the distinctions.
> 
> Once you discern the difference, you'll understand why what the MARSOF guys are doing is not the same as Special Forces.



Thank you, I know the difference and have done the research. Don't be a dick. 
FID and UW are different, they can also be intertwined. Reread my post. I'll get down to it, can you tell me the difference in how an advisor team "advises" and executes FID from one organization to another? I bet you can't. Never mentioned UW. FID has long been a province of Army SF, recent world events have changed things. Those aren't my words but the words of the SecDef. I think people have short memories; In 1966 Gen. "Brute" Krulak proposed his plan for winning in Vietnam. It called for extensive use of CAP platoons. Gen. Westmoreland fought him on this. Gen. Krulak briefed President Johnson (the CMC didn't have a seat on the JCS at the time) and President Johnson politely led him out of the office and favored Gen Westmoreland's plan of search and destroy. 
In 1940 the Marine Corps released the "Small Wars Manual", of which SF based their FID manual on. That was released based on lessons learned during the small dirty wars of peace such as the Banana Wars, Phillipene insurrection and a half dozen other places around the world. In those days SF didn't exist, fast forward to today and since that time and Vietnam SF came into being. FID/COIN and UW have been going on since warfare started, just because SF does it now doesn't mean no one else can. Read a book called "Rifleman Dodd". Then tell me that is conventional warfare.
Look it up, do the research.


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## Boondocksaint375 (Apr 17, 2008)

chill out folks.


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