# Do we really need MARSOC?



## Trip_Wire (Aug 12, 2008)

Stolen from another website: What is the consensus on this question? IMO using USMC people in SF roles, is a complete waste of time and money! :2c: 

*The MARSOC - Should the Leopard Change His Spots?*

The United States Marines are shock troops, originally used in support of naval actions. Boarding enemy ships at the height of a vicious eighteenth-century sea battle with the air full of flying lead and wooden splinters developed a magnificent breed of warrior, one capable of intensely focused action while in extreme peril. In the twentieth century, the Marines paid a very high price to become the force most associated with amphibious assault landings, delivering troops by sea to sweep an enemy from the beach in order to conduct a brutal land action. Marines are trained to strike the enemy a crushing blow – direct action in the highest and most explosive sense of the word. An aggressive, high-visibility force, our Marines are ready, willing and able to take the will of the United States around the world.

Marines get in as quickly as possible and get out as soon as they can bring the enemy to his knees or obliterate him. Marines then reorganize, reequip, and stand ready for the next crisis. Marines are not used to occupy or repatriate, and the winning of hearts and minds has not been part of their on-duty agenda. According to the current Commandant of the Marine Corps, "The Marines are an expeditionary force, not a sustainment force."

At the other end of the spectrum of warfare, the unconventional soldier of U. S. Army Special Forces is also possessed of extraordinary courage, superb combat skills, and the ability to unleash our country’s military might. In the main, however, the true unconventional soldiers – the Green Berets – operate by conducting long term, low-key operations designed to gain the support of the local population in an area of strategic interest to the United States. Unconventional soldiers have a holistic approach to their complex mission. Green Berets must acquire a cultural understanding of the local populace as well as have the ability to conduct psychological operations and to coordinate civil affairs, all underwritten by a superior capability in conventional small-unit combat tactics, techniques, and procedures. By recruiting, teaching, organizing and advising people in critical areas of the world how to protect themselves, Special Forces soldiers deny our enemies influence in an area that is in our vital national interests to secure. Some of these missions consume years and require the patient attention of unconventional warriors whose training and experience provide an excellent return in terms of economy of force and economy of resources.

In order to conduct successful missions of this nature, a certain mindset is required. Among other things, the entire chain of command must understand the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by Special Forces in the conduct of Indirect Action missions, which are very different than conventional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This capability is first developed while attending twelve months of schooling followed by serving three to five years in the SFODA, the basic operating unit of Special Forces, where the boots are on the ground. The Green Beret begins with the excellent Special Forces concepts and doctrine, developed over the course of fifty years, honed during the ten-year war in Viet Nam and in countless Joint and Combined Exercises and Training Missions (JCETs) around the world. Language training and area studies are important tools as the development of the matured and seasoned unconventional soldier evolves with time and experience. In addition, repeated service in the numbered Special Forces Groups is essential to train the chain of command to work with and to support the deployed unit in a way that allows maximum control to the men on the ground (within the parameters of the mission) in order that they can make decisions about what they need in the way of support and when they will need it. Repeated tours in the same area of operations develop valuable relationships between the Group and local leaders. Officers and NCOs need to practice this mindset, which can not be learned in the conduct of direct action missions, nor by merely reading about it. Although they talk the talk, officers and NCOs in conventional elite U.S. Army units such as the Rangers are not trained to conduct the indirect action missions which enable them to understand SF organizations or become adept in SF operational concepts.

Therefore, the notion that the USMC should organize a Marine Special Operations Command is difficult to understand. Yet it has happened, and the MARSOC now has its own website.

Apparently, the MARSOC will be under the operational control of USSOCOM. Will USSOCOM use these Marines to conduct direct action missions in support of Special Forces Unconventional Warfare operations? If so, they would be extremely capable in that mission.

Or are the Marines trying to stand up an organization capable of planning and conducting indirect action missions? If so, they are starting from scratch. Very little, if anything, in their two-hundred-year history will apply. Their website says they are conducting indirect action missions (Foreign Internal Defense) at the present time, but does their experience in these matters allow them to understand their vulnerabilities and shortfalls? The MARSOC may attempt indirect action missions, but the odds of success without the assistance of Special Forces are slim to none. They themselves admit to "a significant shortfall in the ability of an MSOC to be user-friendly" and have embarked on a "reorganization," according to the Questions and Answers page of the MARSOC website.

Their stated goal is to "establish the world-wide standard" in unconventional warfare and to "create a new warrior archetype." Perhaps they should stay in a Holiday Inn Express while working on that. LINK

The Marines did not decide to go in this direction themselves. They were directed to do this by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2005 with the cooperation of then-USSOCOM CG General Doug Brown. And – this is the amazing part – according to testimony before Congress by the USMC Commandant, they were given 1.6 billion dollars to produce between 1,200 and 2,400 Marines capable of conducting Unconventional Warfare.

That is 1,600 million dollars, folks. DOD and USSOCOM are giving the U. S. Marines 1.6B to set up a new command from scratch to learn and to teach operational TTPs dramatically different from the proven capability of the Marines. This new command will require years to establish, and will produce fewer than 2,500 additional unconventional warriors. This force will be less than one-sixth the planned size of the Green Berets, who already have the only demonstrated capability in our Armed Forces to perform unconventional warfare missions. This much smaller force is going to have a start-up cost of 1.6B, but the billions of dollars in the military budget that have been thrown at "Special Operations" over the last six years hint at the strong probability that the cost will escalate before the kinks are ironed out of MARSOC. In comparison, the Green Berets have never seen a billion-dollar budget, although they are the only force in our military inventory that can truthfully be described as warriors, teachers, trainers, advisors, and force multipliers. The 2007 SF budget was less than 120M to recruit and train about 950 new Green Berets. Why is the budget for a UW Marine more than five times the budget for a UW Green Beret?

Could the Marines have acquired the MARSOC mission as a cash-cow? 
Would they slide some of the 1.6B over to other targets? 
Does a Marine say “Oohrah?”

Could some of the MARSOC funds make up the 1.1B cut in the MV22 Osprey program in FY2007? Have the Marines and US Navy found a way to save the 19 MV22s that were on the Death List? There is an "Inside the Navy" column on Inside Defense.com entitled “Pentagon Cuts 1.1 Billion from Marine Corps’ Osprey Budget” which also dates from 2005. The article states, " . . . naval officials had planned to buy 14 MV-22s in FY-07, 19 in FY-08, 30 in FY-09, 35 in FY-10 and 38 in FY-11. Any reductions to MV-22 production numbers would be distributed over those five years." LINK

If the motivation of the USMC was to embrace the mission in order to get the money, the motivation of DOD and USSOCOM is more problematic. Why would they set up a competing force for the U. S. Army Special Forces, which has been conducting successful unconventional missions for fifty years? Why would they fund it at many, many times the funding received by U. S. Special Forces? There must be more here than meets the eye. Did no one suggest that money for Unconventional Warfare units might be better spent by beefing up U. S. Army Special Forces by restoring previously deactivated Special Forces Groups (6th SFGA, 8th SFGA, 11th SFGA and 12th SFGA)? Actually, under General Brown, USSOCOM did order a slight strengthening of Special Forces, then cut the budget. Do more with less, the Green Berets were told. These actions are strong signals that the contribution of U. S. Army Special Forces is not valued by DOD and that DOD is planning for the continued diminishment of the Green Berets. This devaluation of the smallest of the Army’s combat branches totally disregards the needs of our country and shows disrespect for the contributions of Green Berets throughout the years. It is reprehensible on the face of it. U. S. Army Special Forces is a unique part of our national defense capability, developed throughout fifty years of successful missions, paid for by Green Beret blood.

How does this project benefit USSOCOM? U. S. Army Special Forces are the largest unit in USSOCOM. Why would USSOCOM agree to divert part of their mission to the U. S. Marines? There must have been some really important returns for the money. Has USSOCOM given the Marines part of the SF mission rather than have them play a key role in JSOC, and compete directly with the Rangers and the 160th Special Ops Aviation Regiment for missions, assets, and promotion?

How will the MARSOC benefit the United States? It will be some time before the Marines have totally disciplined their aggressive tendencies, their quick trigger-fingers – those Lance Corporals, you know – but what they lack in subtlety, they make up for in stubbornness. When told to learn Unconventional Warfare, they will not quit. After having molded themselves into one sort of fighting force for more than two and a quarter centuries, why should they now try to modify their tried-and-true model into something so different? It is a stretch to imagine them involved in some of the remarkable but unsung actions in SF: quelling an outbreak of cholera in a village hundreds of miles from the nearest American base, for example. Did they think, when they were groaning their way through Parris Island, that they might be required to spend a week with liquid excrement running off their elbows while rehydrating dying babies and old people? No. When a Marine hears "cookout," does it evoke a memory of roast goat, even for a second? Probably not.

The real point is: why we would want to ask some of the Marines to reinvent themselves when we already have the ideal Unconventional Warfare force? The Marines are showing that by their imitation of the Green Berets. The new MSOT is modeled on the SFODA, with two more members (only no medics, certainly a lamentable omission, robbing them of one of the best entrees into their operational area). Is it a good idea to set up an artificial rivalry within our own military? Is this a time for duplication in the services, with every dollar in the military budget questioned, even threatened, by opponents of the effort in the Middle East? The old adage about not changing horses in midstream is particularly apt here.

How will the MARSOC benefit DOD? Now that General Petraeus has used the surge and some on-the-job training in Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency to turn operations in Iraq around, does anyone remember that General Schoomaker, then Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, said that our efforts there had "strained the Army to the breaking point?" Our years of muddling around in the Middle East after the successful beginnings in Iraq and in Afghanistan is likely, in part, to be the result of DOD’s refusal to allow input from senior officers with long years of Special Forces experience. Instead, they relied on the shock-and-awe leadership of conventional elite senior officers with perhaps one Special Forces tour at the company-grade level followed by decades of conventional elite service. This, in a confrontation that calls for leadership trained by long years of practice in indirect action missions in villages and neighborhoods.

DOD has established a record of failure to utilize Special Forces assets properly in the present conflict. Far from capitalizing on the initial 5th SFGA success in Afghanistan, DOD took BG Mulholland prematurely out of U. S. Army Special Forces Command instead of letting him continue with the mission. Subsequent American involvement in Afghanistan was turned over to conventional elite leaders, with a predictably degraded result and, as an incredible by-product, eliminating the DRB (Division Ready Brigade) of the 82nd Airborne Division. Equally egregious, the contribution of COL Charles Cleveland and elements of 10th SFGA to the initial actions in Iraq have received little acknowledgment. They tied up 12 Divisions of Iraqi Republican Guard in northern Iraq, while General Franks was making his drive to Baghdad. The Pentagon’s sad record of withholding recognition and reward for the contributions made by the Green Berets should give the Marines pause. Will the MARSOC receive the same treatment?

How will this project benefit the Marine Corps? That is hard to say. They have invested a lot of effort already. After another reorganization or so, the MARSOC’s UW mission could become sand in the gears of the USMC. They will have many adjustments to make. How will this project benefit the Marines who are a part of it? The MARSOC plan seems to be for Marines to serve three years in the MARSOC and then return to their regular Marine Corps units. After three years, an unconventional soldier is still an apprentice. Have the Marines selected their finest for the MARSOC? If so, are they now requiring them to have what will amount to a three-year career interruption?

Marines who have volunteered for U. S. Army Special Forces in the past made good Green Berets. As the MARSOC moves into the future, will Marines who like the new mission and excel at it be appreciated by the Corps, or will they find themselves, like the Green Berets in the Army, doing the impossible for the ungrateful?

Has the USMC asked for the alternate option of taking on the mission of the direct action Special Mission Units? Tailor-made for their talents, this would be a much more cost-effective pairing of men and mission as the Marines are already trained and equipped for missions of this kind. They have a robust command and control capability and arrangements around the world, and they have a delivery system enhanced by the M22-Ospreys and Navy amphibious ships called Landing Platform Helicopters (LPHs).

Provided nobody leaks it to the media, they can come from over the horizon and achieve total surprise. Now that is an unmatched capability for direct action. ** Shock! ** Oohrah! ** Semper Fi!

If we really intend to win the struggle against terrorist factions worldwide and, at the same time, be prepared to defend against other challenges that may emerge as the century progresses, indirect action missions should be left to the Quiet Professionals, the U. S. Army Special Forces.

De Oppresso Liber 
MG (Ret) James A. Guest 
U. S. Army Special Forces


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## DA SWO (Aug 12, 2008)

Let MARSOC do DA/SR type missions, and leave FID/UW to SF


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## Trip_Wire (Aug 12, 2008)

SOWT said:


> Let MARSOC do DA/SR type missions, and leave FID/UW to SF



IMO DA is a Great job for the Ranger BNs. I do agree; however, on the FID/UW missions.

Perhaps we should keep Strategic Reconnaissance as well. I think ODA's are better at this than most Marine units, because of the way they are trained and operate.

Keep the Marines doing what they do best! Breaking things and making head of the spear type frontal assaults!  :2c:


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## Boondocksaint375 (Aug 12, 2008)

IMO, I think that since SOCOM tasked MARSOC to develop a FID capacity, it was probably needed to supplement (not replace) an overwhelmed SFG.



> As a service component of USSOCOM, MARSOC is tasked by the Commander USSOCOM to train, organize, equip; and when directed by CDRUSSOCOM, deploy task organized, scaleable, and responsive U.S. Marine Corps special operations forces worldwide in support of combatant commanders and other agencies. MARSOC has been directed to conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Direct Action (DA), and Special Reconnaissance (SR). MARSOC has also been directed to develop a capability in Unconventional Warfare (UW), Counter Terrorism (CT), and Information Operations (IO). Commander, USSOCOM assigns MARSOC missions based on USSOCOM priorities. MARSOC units then deploy under USSOCOM Deployment Orders.


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## AWP (Aug 12, 2008)

Trip_Wire said:


> Perhaps we should keep Strategic Reconnaissance as well. I think ODA's are better at this than most Marine units, because of the way they are trained and operate.



Marine reconnaisance units have done well by the fleet for a number of years. Given the intel driven nature of this conflict extra bodies doing that mission won't hurt and the Marines certainly have a background in doing that.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Aug 12, 2008)

I think its a good idea, however I feel they should go through the SF pipe line... They hit SFAS, Q course, MOS, DLI and operat in the same fashion as a ODA assigned to a SFG...

The more the better:2c:


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## riptide (Aug 12, 2008)

You know i have thought about this issue myself. It doesnt make much sense to me personally. Green Berets have been conducting FID/UW since 1952, so well ya know. Personally i think that we should leave FID/UW to the Green Berets and MARSOC can have DA and SR


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## car (Aug 12, 2008)

Boondocksaint375 said:


> IMO, I think that since SOCOM tasked MARSOC to develop a FID capacity, it was probably needed to supplement (not replace) an overwhelmed SFG.



Agreed. Not my lane, but I think Boon's right. 

IMHO We've got too many missions for the guys we have available.


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## Trip_Wire (Aug 12, 2008)

Boondocksaint375 said:


> IMO, I think that since SOCOM tasked MARSOC to develop a FID capacity, it was probably needed to supplement (not replace) an overwhelmed SFG.



Who is 'we?' Are you talking about Rumsfield & Company? Or some of the more DA/Conventional minded Generals at SOCOM?

I would agree that our SF is overtaxed right now; however, I feel it is a mistake to turn this mission over to the USMC.

Keep in mind that it is the USMC's Generals that drug their feet on joining SOCOM for many years. They don't believe in elite units within the USMC, their idea to do the following "MARSOC plan seems to be for Marines to serve three years in the MARSOC and then return to their regular Marine Corps units."

Does that make a lot of sense to you? It sure doesn't to me; however, it is typical USMC thinking! Ever wonder why they did away with their Parachute Division or The Raiders in WWII? IMO the same mentality! :doh:

MARSOC's first action in the 'Stan, wasn't much to brag about either.

Why not just expand SF?  :2c:


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## 275ANGER! (Aug 12, 2008)

Trip_Wire said:


> "MARSOC plan seems to be for Marines to serve three years in the MARSOC and then return to their regular Marine Corps units."



Does it not sound familiar to you old man.  Regiment?

EDIT* Reference to Wickam/Sullivan Charters


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## Trip_Wire (Aug 12, 2008)

Freefalling said:


> Marine reconnaisance units have done well by the fleet for a number of years. Given the intel driven nature of this conflict extra bodies doing that mission won't hurt and the Marines certainly have a background in doing that.



Perhaps you missed the word Strategic Reconnaissance.

Typically Marine Recon units are not  tasked with that type of Reconnaissance, mission. ;)


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## Trip_Wire (Aug 12, 2008)

*The Multiple Definitions Of Unconventional Warfare?*

*Precluding Confusion - The Multiple Definitions Of Unconventional Warfare?
*
From Merriam-Webster - -
Definition ... a statement of the meaning of a word or word group ... Clarity, Distinctness
Confuse ... to make mentally unclear or uncertain ... Muddle, Befuddle, Addle, Fluster

How many definitions does it take to eliminate confusion? Who was confused? Who is confused now?

What did Colonel Aaron Banks, General Yarborough, General Kingston and General Lutz miss? What part of Unconventional Warfare did they and other Special Forces qualified personnel not comprehend?

January 2007, Definition of Unconventional Warfare (UW) as changed by US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) (Ft Bragg):

*****"Unconventional Warfare is operations conducted by, with, or through 
*****irregular forces, in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or 
*****conventional military operations."

October 2007, Definition of Unconventional Warfare (UW) as republished in the Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02):

*****"Unconventional warfare — A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations,
*****normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous
*****or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in
*****varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla
*****warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted
*****recovery. Also called UW. (JP 3-05)"

08/08/09, The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) (Tampa), Irregular Warfare "101" pamphlet, uses the DOD Dictionary Definition of Unconventional Warfare (as above).

Other US Army units and units from other Armed Services in USSOCOM have been assigned the UW Mission, which definition do they use? Do they have their own?

Does USASOC or USSOCOM have the capability to provide the force doctrine development support and promulgation that was provided by TRADOC prior to 1997?

Who benefits from the USASOC changes to the definition of UW?
Is it possible that some other service masqueraders are now able to strap-hang on the USASOC definition of UW, whereas they are not capable of performing the DOD and USSOCOM definition of UW?

Do the USASOC changes to the UW definition enable the assignment of the UW Mission to US Army units that are neither trained nor qualified to perform the UW mission as defined by DOD and USSOCOM?

What is the definition of "Graduate Level Unconventional Warfare"? Is it clarifying or confusing?

When individual units in USSOCOM write, teach and abide by their own different definitions of DOD and USSOCOM terminology, is confusion reduced or increased?

How did Congress define Unconventional Warfare when they recently directed USSOCOM to … "place greater emphasis on Unconventional Warfare techniques and missions"?


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## AWP (Aug 12, 2008)

Trip_Wire said:


> Perhaps you missed the word Strategic Reconnaissance.
> 
> Typically Marine Recon units are not  tasked with that type of Reconnaissance, mission. ;)




I believe Force Recon is. Regardless, I see no reason why they can't do SR. Besides, we don't have enough ODAs anyway, so it is all academic.

There's simply not enough ODAs to fight on two fronts at once AND rotate units in and out of theater. The Marines are here, might as use them well.


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## Trip_Wire (Aug 13, 2008)

275ANGER! said:


> Does it not sound familiar to you old man.  Regiment?
> 
> EDIT* Reference to Wickam/Sullivan Charters



Actually no, I'm not getting what your trying to say 'kid.'  

Take the SF Regiment though, what if we rotated 18xs through the ODAs every three years? IMO it takes in excess of three to train an individual, in all the needed skills to operate on an ODA and be worth a damn. Then you send him back to the conventional Army or Corps? Doesn't make any sense to me. (Especially XO's Team Sgts and Medics.) :doh:


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## Balls (Aug 13, 2008)

IMHO: 

- Marines are trained to break, destroy, obliterate, and kill. It's the mentality. (See MARSOC, Stan)

- Marines are relieving some of the pressure from overtaxed SF units in FID/UW missions. I believe that SF wrote the book and should lead that charge, but I don't see problem in MARSOC lending a hand where units are stretched thin. 

- Marines are very good at DA/SR. SF is very good at DA/SR. SEALs are very good at DA/SR. There's more than enough to go around. This is everyones "SEXY" role. 

- USMC is not flexible enough. They need to let loose of MARSOC if they are to be successful. Can't stress that enough. 

- Marines are trained to break, destroy, obliterate, and kill. It's the mentality. 
:2c:


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## 8'Duece (Aug 13, 2008)

Trip_Wire said:


> Actually no, I'm not getting what your trying to say 'kid.'
> 
> Take the SF Regiment though, what if we rotated 18xs through the ODAs every three years? IMO it takes in excess of three to train an individual, in all the needed skills to operate on an ODA and be worth a damn. Then you send him back to the conventional Army or Corps? Doesn't make any sense to me. (Especially XO's Team Sgts and Medics.) :doh:



Ouch!


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## Boondocksaint375 (Aug 13, 2008)

Trip_Wire said:


> Who is 'we?' Are you talking about Rumsfield & Company? Or some of the more DA/Conventional minded Generals at SOCOM?



You lost me here.... I don't think I said 'we' once :uhh:  If you mean the tasking, look at MARSOC's directive.  The Marine Corps didn't just decide they wanted to do FID, SOCOM specifically directed that they have that capability.


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## Rabid Badger (Aug 13, 2008)

Trip_Wire said:


> *The MARSOC - Should the Leopard Change His Spots?*
> 
> *According to the current Commandant of the Marine Corps, "The Marines are an expeditionary force, not a sustainment force."
> 
> ...



The 'misunderstanding' of the red ink statement above is quoteable in that *this mindset is what will doom MARSOC to failure.*

There can be no 'worldwide standard' in UW Ops. 

Every continent, every theater, every commander of an insurgency is different and must be dealt with differently. 

For the Marines to think, much less SAY, we want to standardize 'UW' is idiotic.

Shock troops should stay shock troops. QP's are cultivated. MARSOC could trim down the projected numbers to a more reasonable amount by selecting the best of the best soldiers that are able to 'flip the switch' when they need to. 

MARSOC hasn't shown this capability.

Gotta love General Guest. :cool:


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## demo18c (Aug 24, 2008)

Coming from a DA company in Group taking away DA/SR from SF bumps us out of alot of missions. Wont be that go to guy and lose some funding. Besides the guys behind the fence there isnt anyone better at our SPECIFIC mission set which makes DA look like cake.


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## Marauder06 (Aug 24, 2008)

*These actions are strong signals that the contribution of U. S. Army Special Forces is not valued by DOD and that DOD is planning for the continued diminishment of the Green Berets.*

Why do I hear so many people clamoring about DoD doing away with Special Forces?  Is that even a serious consideration at this point?  Didn't each Group recently get authorization for a whole other battalion?


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## hidesite (Aug 24, 2008)

Honestly, I think there should be a separate US Special Operations it's own branch.

They can identify those that are wired to be a QP and those that are wired for more of a DA role and then set everyone up for success...


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## Marauder06 (Aug 25, 2008)

I see MARSOC as a natural evolution for SOF, and I don't think it's a threat to SF's existence.  I don't understand that MARSOC-bashing that's been taking place over the last couple of months.  If blame is to be assessed and fingers pointed, shouldn't SOCOM be where the ire is directed, and not the Marines?

It makes sense to me to have a Marine SOF organization, and to apply this new capability against the SOF problem sets that we are having the most difficulty with at the moment, which in my opinion are FID and UW/surrogate ops.  Furthermore (again in my opinion), SF's legacy and future are secure within the US military- DoD validated that opinion by growing the Group MTOEs to reflect, among other things, two additional battalions (the GSB and an SF battalion per group- if I remember correctly).  There will always be a need for SF's core competencies, but the GWOT demonstrated they cannot be the "sole provider" for those competencies.  

If we accept the validity of the four SOF Truths:
- Humans are more important than Hardware.
- Quality is better than Quantity.
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.
- Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

Then the creation of MARSOC and it's adoption of missions closely associated with SF's legacy missions meets at least two of the four- "SOF cannot be mass produced," which is what you run the risk of doing by just "making more SF," and "competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur," which is what is happening now because SF does not have enough forces to meet the demand for SF's skill set.

As far as MARSOC sending it's SOF back into "big Corps" after a stint in MARSOC, isn't that what SF did back in the day, before they learned better and became their own branch?

Instead of resisting MARSOC, which at this point is an exercise in futility, SF should embrace MARSOC and offer to train their operators up; among other things, that would re-enforce SF's position at the top of the FID/UW hierarchy, allow SF to influence the training, build closer relations with their newest SOF partner, and keep an eye on what MARSOC was up to.  

For every general officer with SF experience who says that SF should remain the same, there is probably at least one who says it needs to evolve... MARSOC's not going away gentlemen, we can cast stones at them or we can embrace and enable them.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 25, 2008)

hidesite said:


> Honestly, I think there should be a separate US Special Operations it's own branch.
> 
> They can identify those that are wired to be a QP and those that are wired for more of a DA role and then set everyone up for success...



The costs in creating a "Sixth Service" are prohibitive.  The best situation is what USSOCOM currently has, which is as a Unified Command with Service-Like capabilities.

Beyond that, just about every Service (except the Marines) have at least enlisted special operators in their own branch/MOS/NEC...


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## Farang (Aug 25, 2008)

Marauder06 said:


> I see MARSOC as a natural evolution for SOF, and I don't think it's a threat to SF's existence.  I don't understand that MARSOC-bashing that's been taking place over the last couple of months.  If blame is to be assessed and fingers pointed, shouldn't SOCOM be where the ire is directed, and not the Marines?
> 
> It makes sense to me to have a Marine SOF organization, and to apply this new capability against the SOF problem sets that we are having the most difficulty with at the moment, which in my opinion are FID and UW/surrogate ops.  Furthermore (again in my opinion), SF's legacy and future are secure within the US military- DoD validated that opinion by growing the Group MTOEs to reflect, among other things, two additional battalions (the GSB and an SF battalion per group- if I remember correctly).  There will always be a need for SF's core competencies, but the GWOT demonstrated they cannot be the "sole provider" for those competencies.
> 
> ...


Well said!

Farang


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 25, 2008)

Marauder06 said:


> I see MARSOC as a natural evolution for SOF, and I don't think it's a threat to SF's existence.  I don't understand that MARSOC-bashing that's been taking place over the last couple of months.  If blame is to be assessed and fingers pointed, shouldn't SOCOM be where the ire is directed, and not the Marines?
> 
> It makes sense to me to have a Marine SOF organization, and to apply this new capability against the SOF problem sets that we are having the most difficulty with at the moment, which in my opinion are FID and UW/surrogate ops.  Furthermore (again in my opinion), SF's legacy and future are secure within the US military- DoD validated that opinion by growing the Group MTOEs to reflect, among other things, two additional battalions (the GSB and an SF battalion per group- if I remember correctly).  There will always be a need for SF's core competencies, but the GWOT demonstrated they cannot be the "sole provider" for those competencies.


Stipulate that i agree with every i didn't pull from Marauder's piece, cited above.

Here's where I believe Marauder incorrect as regards the finger pointing.  The Marines, as a Service, must yield endstrength to USSOCOM.  So, as much as they may want USMC to contribute, ultimately USSOCOM gets what it gets.

At issue are a couple of points here that, if ignored, make the case that Marines are only interested in "the cool stuff".  
(1)  No part of Marine Civil Affairs is moving to MARSOC, even though CA is a SOF mission and still falls under USSOCOM for Joint Proponency.  
(2) Unless the models have drastically changed from what I last saw, there is no cogent JSOTF capability in any MARSOC unit.  An SF Group can do it (now) only after significant augmentation, and despite the desires of at least two T-SOCs, an SF Battalion just doesn't have the manpower to pull it off.  

This goes to, what some call, "tooth-to-tail" ratio.  In both these cases, MARSOC either chose not to, just won't, man, train, and equip the full slew of SOF capabilities, even though the Service has it within their power to do so.  So, Army SOF gets stuck with 100% of the mission requirement, and now a new SOF Service Component to account for when organizing in either case.  MARSOC, as configured now, does not provide any relief.**

At a glance, it appears that the only missions USMC (and MARSOC) are interested in for MARSOC are DA/SR missions and FID (if, in fact, they are retaining that mission).  They don't appear interested in forming the larger deployed HQ's/C2 functions necessary to Plan, Direct, Monitor, and Assess at the operational level.  And they aren't moving any of their CA units (currently all in the USMC Reserves) to support SOF CA requirements.   

Given the highly touted, if grossly misnamed, "MEU-SOC" (about which they are quite fond), there's no reason why a budding MARSOC doesn't have this as a core capability.  

So, given that, why would MARSOC think there'd be no objection from Special Forces to their delving into UW?  From a roles and mission standpoint, there's plenty of unique, enabling capabilities a "MARSOC" could bring to the SOF milieu without also trying to take on the very complicated business of UW.

So, I can see the intellectual vice emotional, argument against MARSOC as it currently is, or at least one where the USMC is required to fork over a bit more manpower to provide true balance.  But the locus for a solution resides in Quantico...not Tampa.

**<NAVSPECWAR makes the same mistake.  I was in a brief recently where they "discovered" that their tooth-to-tail ratio is  Point 5 to one.  SF is about 7 to 1 by comparison.  NAVSPECWAR is making a play to borrow capabilities from Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to fill those gaps.  (Of course, these would be funded under Service (P-2) vice SOF (P-11) auspices.)>


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## AWP (Aug 25, 2008)

Great post, SigO. Everyone forgets the support slices.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 25, 2008)

Freefalling said:


> Great post, SigO. Everyone forgets the support slices.



Roger.  I didn't even get to the Comms or Log parts...  :)


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## RackMaster (Aug 25, 2008)

Freefalling said:


> Great post, SigO. Everyone forgets the support slices.





Simmerin' SigO said:


> Roger.  I didn't even get to the Comms or Log parts...  :)



Happens every where, doesn't matter where you're from. ;)

That was very insightful, I'd be very interested to hear the finer points on the Comms and Log situ.  I hope it's a learning curve that is being watched closely up here by those in charge of building our new "machine".


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 25, 2008)

gdamadg said:


> Happens every where, doesn't matter where you're from. ;)
> 
> That was very insightful, I'd be very interested to hear the finer points on the Comms and Log situ.  I hope it's a learning curve that is being watched closely up here by those in charge of building our new "machine".



Short answer:  Probably not.

Again, if i'm wrong on this, correct me.

But the Comms and Log formations in the org charts I saw were paltry and certainly did not enable an organization capable of operating as a JSOTF/Operatlonal Level deployed HQs.  

One comms Platoon for the whole command?  :doh:

Don't have the specifics on the Log side, but I doubt it could support a Battalion Landing Team, much less a robust HQs.

Tooth to tail....not a joke.


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## RackMaster (Aug 25, 2008)

Sounds like they don't want to learn from those that know....  

Thanks SigO. ;)


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## AWP (Aug 25, 2008)

I don't have a clue what MARSOC's support slices look like so I won't bash them. I can say that even an SF BN needs outside help, maybe that has changed a little though.

But SigO makes a great point about standing up a JSOTF. Right now only the Army can do it with organic assets. Other branches would need to beg and borrow pieces. Yes, the "J" is for "Joint" but you still need a core group of servicemembers to form that JSOTF unless you want to rely upon 11th hour augmentees. And if you strip SOF veterans from Unit X or Y then what happens when that unit deploys? You just robbed Peter to pay Paul. A vicious cycle has begun.

I would hope if we as a nation are truly serious about Joint SOF capabilities we would start to integrate members from other services into the TSOCs and assign them there. At least that would start to provide a pool of Joint manpower for your deployed JSOTFs.

Honestly, given the optempo of Army SF Groups/ BNs I'm surprised that the Army isn't asking for more assistance from the other services and trying to drive them to plus up their support/ HQ functions.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 26, 2008)

Freefalling said:


> I would hope if we as a nation are truly serious about Joint SOF capabilities we would start to integrate members from other services into the TSOCs and assign them there. At least that would start to provide a pool of Joint manpower for your deployed JSOTFs.
> 
> Honestly, given the optempo of Army SF Groups/ BNs I'm surprised that the Army isn't asking for more assistance from the other services and trying to drive them to plus up their support/ HQ functions.



This is why i'm surprised that, instead of bringing in a new full SF Group, they instead opted to add only battalions.

The help's been asked for.  I haven't seen a SEAL run JSOTF yet.  The 160th won't.  The jury's out on whether 75RR will.  Nothing heard from AFSOC. So, MARSOC, can you understand why there might be some angst on this question?


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## 0699 (Aug 26, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> One comms Platoon for the whole command?  :doh:



There is more than one comm platoon in MARSOC.  Each MSOB has their own and there's at least one more in the MSOSG.  Not that they can provide high-level support; as I understand it they are very similar in capability to other MC units.  The MSOSG also provides the log support for the rest of MARSOC.

Did SOCOM task MARSOC with providing a JSOTF capability?  Not being a smart ass, I honestly don't know.  But I would imagine MARSOC was set up with those capabilities they were tasked to provide.


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## Boondocksaint375 (Aug 26, 2008)

0699 said:


> But I would imagine MARSOC was set up with those capabilities they were tasked to provide.



Absolutely, and they were tasked by SOCOM to do it.  That just tells you from a higher up standpoint that MARSOC isn't just doing what it is doing for shits and giggles.


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## 0699 (Aug 26, 2008)

Boondocksaint375 said:


> Absolutely, and they were tasked by SOCOM to do it.  That just tells you from a higher up standpoint that MARSOC isn't just doing what it is doing for shits and giggles.



Okay, I'm confused.  Are you saying they were tasked to provide a JSOTF capability and didn't do so?


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## Boondocksaint375 (Aug 26, 2008)

0699 said:


> Okay, I'm confused.  Are you saying they were tasked to provide a JSOTF capability and didn't do so?




No, I'm saying they were specifically tasked by the special operations command gods, and weren't just sua sponte'ing it (I was agreeing with you).


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## 0699 (Aug 26, 2008)

Boondocksaint375 said:


> No, I'm saying they were specifically tasked by the special operations command gods, and weren't just sua sponte'ing it (I was agreeing with you).



See, that's why I was confused.  I'm not used to being agreed with...


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 26, 2008)

0699 said:


> There is more than one comm platoon in MARSOC.  Each MSOB has their own and there's at least one more in the MSOSG.  Not that they can provide high-level support; as I understand it they are very similar in capability to other MC units.  The MSOSG also provides the log support for the rest of MARSOC.
> 
> Did SOCOM task MARSOC with providing a JSOTF capability?  Not being a smart ass, I honestly don't know.  But I would imagine MARSOC was set up with those capabilities they were tasked to provide.



Not doubting you. I'd like to see what MARSOC says a Comm Platoon is capable of doing before saying whether what you say refutes or ratifies my point.

I fear we can't safely answer that question in the forum...


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## 0699 (Aug 26, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> Not doubting you. I'd like to see what MARSOC says a Comm Platoon is capable of doing before saying whether what you say refutes or ratifies my point.
> 
> I fear we can't safely answer that question in the forum...



I'm not trying to refute or ratify your point.  I'm pretty sure a comm platoon in MARSOC is not capable of the same things the 112th is capable of doing.

I'm just stating there is more than one comm platoon in MARSOC.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 26, 2008)

0699 said:


> I'm not trying to refute or ratify your point.  I'm pretty sure a comm platoon in MARSOC is not capable of the same things the 112th is capable of doing.
> 
> I'm just stating there is more than one comm platoon in MARSOC.



Not my intent, nor an apt comparison. The SF Groups and Battalions each have organic comms (i.e. not assigned to 112th) capable of supporting a TF headquarters.  If the comm platoon(s) also possess similar capabilities then it would appear to refute my point (and I'd be glad to defer).


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## AWP (Aug 26, 2008)

Simmerin' SigO said:


> Not my intent, nor an apt comparison. The SF Groups and Battalions each have organic comms (i.e. not assigned to 112th) capable of supporting a TF headquarters.



When did this happen? As late as '01 we were still pulling in assets from the 112th and augmentees from GSC just to do a JRTC rotation. Is this something the GWOT has changed? I'd hope so, I'm just curious about the timeline.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 26, 2008)

Freefalling said:


> When did this happen? As late as '01 we were still pulling in assets from the 112th and augmentees from GSC just to do a JRTC rotation. Is this something the GWOT has changed? I'd hope so, I'm just curious about the timeline.



Unless i'm misinformed...Groups and Battalions should now be fielding SDN Medium and Heavy

112th maystill be augmenting....but that's because Joint requirements are pretty robust


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## AWP (Aug 26, 2008)

Ah, gotcha. Thank you for the update. Jesus...our Army is evolving during the GWOT? Who woulda' thunk it? 

Thank you indulging me in the deviation to the thread. Back to the show.


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## Simmerin' SigO (Aug 26, 2008)

Freefalling said:


> Ah, gotcha. Thank you for the update. Jesus...our Army is evolving during the GWOT? Who woulda' thunk it?
> 
> Thank you indulging me in the deviation to the thread. Back to the show.



SOCOM is..can't speak for the whole Army or DOD.  (SOF is inherently joint, as you know).


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## Rando134 (Nov 9, 2008)

"How will the MARSOC benefit the United States? It will be some time before the Marines have totally disciplined their aggressive tendencies, their quick trigger-fingers – those Lance Corporals, you know – but what they lack in subtlety, they make up for in stubbornness."

This is a completely unprofessional statement. I can understand your arguement about expanding SF, and just letting marsoc do the DA/SR, but as a marine, we can accomplish whatever task is given. There is no reason to stereotype marines. I can go into the difference of a regular infantry marine, and a regular army grunt, but whats the point. When we send marines to ranger school, our attrition rate isnt nearly as high... but lets not get off track. I know awesome marines who aced marsoc assessment and selection, but didnt have the personality or qualities that make up the mission of FID and UW. We arent just throwing any marine into MARSOC.


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## lockNload (Nov 9, 2008)

Why are you capitalizing MARSOC, FID, and UW but not Marine :uhh:  That's hammered into every Marine's head.


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## surgicalcric (Nov 9, 2008)

lockNload said:


> ...That's hammered into every Marine's head.



How about you stay in your lane high-speed.

_______________
rao22:

The discussion isnt about comparing grunts to grunts or the number of Ranger School candidates the Marines send to RTB every year and how well the small handful stack up against the hundreds of others.  It is however about MARSOC and the things that need to change to bring them to where they want themselves to be as well as where SOCOM wants them to be.

Your statement, "as a Marine, we can accomplish whatever task is given, is precisely the type of thinking that is inhibiting MARSOC, at a couple levels, in their tasking.  

Despite popular belief not all Marines were created equal.  Until now those Marines who thought kinetic solutions werent always the best COA came to SF where its a thinking man's game.  There is plenty MARSOC can learn from SF, but they have to open not just their ears, but their minds to doing things differently than the Marine Corps conducts business...

Crip  


______________


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## Trip_Wire (Nov 9, 2008)

surgicalcric said:


> How about you stay in your lane high-speed.
> 
> _______________
> rao22:
> ...



Well stated! I agree 100%


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## Rando134 (Nov 9, 2008)

i agree with you 100% as well, but the point everyone is failing to realize is that they are doing business different than "mother marine corps."  look, im not trying to say one is better than the other, just got offended with the quote of "typical lance corporal with an itchy trigger finger", which isnt the case at all. why i brought up other shit, who knows. you guys have been doin the sf mission for quite some time, i highly doubt the marine corps is going to come in and not lend you their ears.


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## lockNload (Nov 10, 2008)

surgicalcric said:


> How about you stay in your lane high-speed.



While I am not in the military or a Marine, as someone that's gone off to Marine OCS and am familiar with Marine Corps customs, courtesies, and traditions I thought it was acceptable to bring up the issue of capitalizing Marine. I just updated that info in my profile. 

Now rao can't capitalize "I" or any word after a period   Sorry but lazy grammar is annoying and makes it harder to read.


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## P. Beck (Nov 10, 2008)

Don't know if we need them so much as they're fun to watch.

It's kinda/sorta like watching every other SOF unit's learning curve, just with one finger on the fast forward button because they're co-located with SF guys alot over here and have the benefit of cross-fertilization and lessons learned.

Right now they're kinda going through the same crap we went through back when.  For instance, no career management field. A guy makes E7 in MARSOC. Then they send him back to the fleet. Now he's supposed to be a platoon sergeant but personnel doesn't know what to do with him because they don't have any idea about equivalency, like that last year this guy was training and leading a platoon of hajjis in combat.  So he gets fucked over for career advancing positions and promotions 'cause now, as far as they're concerned, he's neither fish nor fowl nor good red meat.

This situation will not correct itself until MARSOC alumni get into positions of higher authority and that can take years.

But, like I said, if nothing else, they're fun to watch.


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## Hitman2/3 (Nov 10, 2008)

One of the biggest problems seems to be that some MARSOC unit leaders are trying to run their unit like a regular Marine unit, because "There are no special Marine's only Marines who do special jobs". Which of course is bullshit, but many of the leaders still believe it. So instead of focusing on the mission at hand you have leaders running around worrying about Marines having high and tights, uniform inspections, and field day. Never mind if that Marine can flawlessly perform his job. Its hard to believe but there are leaders who will put haircuts above job performance and knowledge.    

To this day it blows my mind how the Marine Corps will take a SNCO or officer, who doesn’t even have a combat MOS background and put him as the 1stSgt, SgtMaj, Plt Cmd, or Company Commander of a Recon unit, and at least in the past in charge of a MARSOC unit. 

Hell there are Officers who don't even go through BRC that are operating as Plt Cmd's, they don't even have the understanding of their Marines capabilities but they're expected to train them, and employ them. Oh but there quick to go to jump school, dive, or freefall. In the process taking a seat away from an 0321 who actually needs those schools, and for the most part no one corrects this.

Anyway, I think until the Marine Corps is ready to admit that not every Marine and/or unit is the same, there is no one size fits all solution, and being a SNCO or Officer does not make you an expert on all things Marine Corps MARSOC will have problems.


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## Rando134 (Nov 10, 2008)

hitman 2/3, you nailed it. very true. you see it at the time. i think its going to be a long time before marsoc takes off, but when it does, its going to be great, until then, we can just stand by.


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## surgicalcric (Nov 10, 2008)

rao22 said:


> hitman 2/3, you nailed it. very true. you see it at the time. i think its going to be a long time before marsoc takes off, but when it does, its going to be great, until then, we can just stand by.



rao22:

I am generally not the grammar police but you need to start using it properly.  Your written exchanges here and elsewhere speak volumes for who you are.  If you want people to take you seriously then take your self seriously and pay a lil more attention to detail.

Capitalizing where appropriate would be a great start.  ;)


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## 7point62 (Nov 10, 2008)

Everybody wanted a piece of the SOCOM pie during Rumsfeld's tenure. I get the feeling some of the service chiefs felt they might get left behind in the GWOT...hence the Navy's plans for a riverine naval infantry unit and the Marines push into special operations. 

For decades it's been axiomatic in the Corps that there was no need for an elite force within an elite force. That's why, sadly I think, the Raider & Parachute Battalions were absorbed into the MARDIVs after only a few years of operation. This step into MARSOC has been a big one.

It's also natural for people who have been in the business for years to be highly critical of any FNGs. Criticism is good. It will help MARSOC work out the bugs.  

Do we need MARSOC? I think we need all the shooters and killers we can get. And the more proficient they are, the more killing we can do.


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## Ajax (Nov 10, 2008)

7point62 said:


> Do we need MARSOC? I think we need all the shooters and killers we can get. And the more proficient they are, the more killing we can do.



If only that were the job.  You can teach any monkey to dominate a room and to pull a trigger.  The question is can you teach a Marine to teach that monkey?  Many valid points here.

I've had alot of quality experiences with Marine infantry and a couple disastrous and lethal ones.  I believe the success of MARSOC not only depends on how the Men's Department handles them, but also on the quality and mallaebility of the Marine placed in MARSOC.  So far, my sources in the field tell me they've got alot of learning to do on JCET's (or whatever the Marines are calling them), mostly for the reasons Hitman brought up.


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## 7point62 (Nov 10, 2008)

Do you think the Marines pushed too fast to get a unit under SOCOM? (Fear of getting left behind?) That was my thinking a few years ago when this thing started getting revved up. 

As far as high & tights and regimental bullsh*t taking precedent over skill and tradecraft, I agree. Old habits die hard. I did _not_ know that non-combat MOSs were being placed in command slots. That's pretty shocking to me.    

I understand it involves more than pulling a trigger. I still think its good to have as many highly-trained individuals as we can get...and I'm sorry to hear you've had bad and lethal experiences with Marine infantry.


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## Rando134 (Nov 10, 2008)

> I am generally not the grammar police but you need to using it properly



I believe that would be.... you need to START using it properly, not what you have above. Way to go.


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## surgicalcric (Nov 10, 2008)

rao22 said:


> I believe that would be.... you need to START using it properly, not what you have above. Way to go.



I will buy that one...good catch.  We are all prone to missing a word from time to time.  

Glad to see you caught onto the spirit of the post...

Crip


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## Boondocksaint375 (Nov 10, 2008)

7point62 said:


> Do you think the Marines pushed too fast to get a unit under SOCOM? (Fear of getting left behind?) That was my thinking a few years ago when this thing started getting revved up.



I think it took too long for them to get into SOCOM.  Think about what branches had already been under SOCOM ;).  Also to add, they already had SOF (i.e. FR).  However, SOCOM specifically altered their mission and gave them an FID portion.  So the Marine Corps really isn't to blame for anything.  I'm sure it'll work out for the best in the months/years to come.


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## 7point62 (Nov 10, 2008)

Ajax said:


> The question is can you teach a Marine to teach that monkey?




I reckon so since I've taught a few.


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