# Special Ops wearing down Taliban



## Ravage (Dec 18, 2010)

http://www.thespectrum.com/article/20101217/OPINION/12170355

"The  shift has started to take effect," said General James Cartwright, in  that understated Pentagonese that obscures what's actually happening.   Cartwright, currently vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, addressed  reporters last week on the fight in Afghanistan.



"(Our)  counterinsurgency strategy is balanced by a counterterrorism strategy,"  he said. "Now we need to reduce (Taliban) lines of communication and  reduce that flow," he said. "Counterinsurgency is starting to shift to  have an element of counterterrorism larger than we thought (we'd) need."
He's  referring to the stepped-up tempo of Special Operations Forces in  Afghanistan, which includes Special Forces, Delta, Navy SEALs, Rangers,  the British SAS and other elite units. For whatever reason, the results  of SOF "counterterrorism" efforts have been getting quite a bit of media  play lately. For example, coalition officials recently disclosed to the  Long War Journal that from June to December 2010, SOF troops executed  about 7,100 raids. In those operations, more than 4,100 Taliban fighters  were captured and more than 2,000 killed. More than 600 of those were  insurgent leaders, those leading Taliban cells and coordinating attacks.  In a similar release, officials told a reporter for Brit newspaper The  Sun that 3,200 Taliban had been taken out in just 90 days, with 387  being leaders.
Assuming these numbers are relatively accurate, some back-of-the-napkin calculations reveal the following stats:

¥  Crank it up.  Those 7,100 missions in six months works out to more than  1,100 a month and almost 40 raids a night. That's a lot of door  kicking. But also, think of all the supporting efforts that go into  that. That level of activity represents a ton of helicopter, logistics,  comms and intel support.

¥  Roll 'em up.  The 180-day and 90-day tallies of Taliban captured or  killed in the above sources averages to between 33 and 35 insurgents  removed from the battlefield each day. Yes, of those captured, some are  released through the sieve of Afghanistan's judicial system, but many of  them stay for awhile, leave the insurgency or give up important intel.


¥  Put 'em down. Of course dead insurgents don't come back. Two thousand  Taliban fighters killed in 180 days is about 11 per day. Sure, others  take their place, but attrition exacts its toll on an insurgent force.  Experience suffers. Morale decreases. Desertions increase.



¥  Wear 'em out. The figures above translate into three to five Taliban  leaders killed or captured daily. The big target of the SOF raids is the  mid-level Taliban leadership. As we found out in Iraq, when you keep  taking out the middle layers, an insurgent/terrorist organization breaks  down. Another recent general officer statement is telling. "Every 24  hours on average we're killing three to five mid-level (Taliban)  leaders," said General John Nicholson. "It's lowered the average age of  enemy leadership because they're getting killed so quickly. It's  severely disrupting their command and control."
One  more detail. These numbers only reflect the reported results of Special  Ops missions. Add in what conventional U.S. Army, Marine, coalition and  Afghan units are doing and you start to see the kind of pressure being  put on the Taliban.
Tad Trueblood has more than 20 years experience in the U.S. Air Force and national security community. He lives in Santa Clara.


One  more detail. These numbers only reflect the reported results of Special  Ops missions. Add in what conventional U.S. Army, Marine, coalition and  Afghan units are doing and you start to see the kind of pressure being  put on the Taliban.
Tad Trueblood has more than 20 years experience in the U.S. Air Force and national security community. He lives in Santa Clara.


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## TLDR20 (Dec 18, 2010)

Good Post.


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## SpitfireV (Dec 18, 2010)

I was reading an article in Newsweek I think it was, they were talking about how the Talib are experiencing PTSD and it's difficult to treat them.

Oh no.


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## AWP (Dec 18, 2010)

SpitfireV said:


> I was reading an article in Newsweek I think it was, they were talking about how the Talib are experiencing PTSD and it's difficult to treat them.
> 
> Oh no.



Apply 62 or 149 grain FMJ once daily.


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## pardus (Dec 19, 2010)

> Put 'em down. Of course dead insurgents don't come back. Two thousand   Taliban fighters killed in 180 days is about 11 per day. Sure, others   take their place, but attrition exacts its toll on an insurgent force.   Experience suffers. Morale decreases. Desertions increase.



Although this seems fine, remember that those 2,000 have parents and brothers and cousins and uncles and nephews which equates to about 50 new enemies per insurgent killed (pulled that number out of my arse but its probably not far off).

Killing bad guys is good, turning them is excellent, remember that.


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## Marauder06 (Dec 19, 2010)

Nine years into the war and we're still killing the enemy in those kinds of numbers.  Either our math is off or their ability to reconstitute forces is astonishing.  I tend to believe the latter is true.

Until and unless we're able to root out the sanctuaries for the Taliban, AQ, and HQN inside Pakistan, this war will never be over on our terms.


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## surgicalcric (Dec 20, 2010)

ASSHAT who wrote the article said:
			
		

> ...Put 'em down. Of course dead insurgents don't come back. Two thousand   Taliban fighters killed in 180 days is about 11 per day. Sure, others   take their place, but attrition exacts its toll on an insurgent force.   Experience suffers. Morale decreases. Desertions increase.



Very poor metric in COIN.

Again attrition will not win this war.  They can and have been replacing their numbers at a higher rate than we can kill them.



			
				M06 said:
			
		

> ...Either our math is off or their ability to reconstitute forces is astonishing.



The math is right Sir.

Its the ability of people to understand how insurgent warfare works that is the issue.  ;)

Crip


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## x SF med (Dec 20, 2010)

The difficulty in an insurgent war is the fact that it's like killing a hydra, or stopping a Zombie invasion - to kill a hydra, one must cauterize each stump, to stop a zombie invasion, each zombie has to be killed and the infection has to be stopped.


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## Scotth (Dec 20, 2010)

surgicalcric said:


> Its the ability of people to understand how insurgent warfare works that is the issue. ;)
> 
> Crip



I'm reminded about the movie We were Soldiers.  If you have the DVD and check out the extra scenes they have a scene were the Ltc Moore is being debriefed by McNamara and Westmoreland.  They were so happy about the body count they thought they could win the war through attrition.  Moore just sat there with the understanding that our leadership had no idea of who we were fighting.


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## Marauder06 (Dec 20, 2010)

surgicalcric said:


> The math is right Sir.
> 
> Its the ability of people to understand how insurgent warfare works that is the issue.  ;)
> 
> Crip



Yes, that is a problem sometimes ;)


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## surgicalcric (Dec 20, 2010)

Scotth said:


> ...They were so happy about the body count they thought they could win the war through attrition.  Moore just sat there with the understanding that our leadership had no idea of who we were fighting.



That reminds me about a conversation between Col Harry Summers and his North Vietnamese counterpart in 1975...

Summers said, "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." Tu replied,  in a phrase that perfectly captured the American misunderstanding of the  Vietnam War, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."


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## lockNload (Dec 20, 2010)

pardus said:


> Although this seems fine, remember that those 2,000 have parents and brothers and cousins and uncles and nephews which equates to about 50 new enemies per insurgent killed (pulled that number out of my arse but its probably not far off).



While it may be factually true that the Taliban can replace fighters at a high rate, I've always had a problem with statements like that. If that type of reasoning was true then wars would never end. One could argue that we killed so many Germans and Japanese in WWII that their children would hate us and keep fighting us but that war obviously ended, like so many others. Not only that but in less than 50 years both countries have become allies of ours and there is not a sentiment of hate towards each other among the populace.


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## JJ sloan (Dec 20, 2010)

pardus said:


> Although this seems fine, remember that those 2,000 have parents and brothers and cousins and uncles and nephews which equates to about 50 new enemies per insurgent killed (pulled that number out of my arse but its probably not far off).
> 
> Killing bad guys is good, turning them is excellent, remember that.



Fart noises...

This is what alot of people do not understand about COIN.  In this fight, we don't really need to give a shit about the families and friends of insurgents.  They are already against us, it is not an issue.
What we need to care about is the populace in the areas that are being used as safehavens for shit heads.  The Afghan populace needs to see us (along with Afghan Partner Units) crushing the enemy and driving them away from their villages.  The Afghan people will never trust anyone other than the Taliban if we do not legitimize the security forces and the aid of the U.S. Government.  This is how COIN works.  Provide saftey, security and legitimacy for the populace.  In order to do this we must utilize a strong counterterrorism strategy, which is what our commanders are doing presently.  Killing is very much a part of COIN and must continue until the Afghan people have confidence enough not to support the Taliban out of neccessity.

As for the original report, those numbers are grossly overstated.  Success is clear in recent months, but this report is ridiculous.


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## Marauder06 (Dec 20, 2010)

lockNload said:


> While it may be factually true that the Taliban can replace fighters at a high rate, I've always had a problem with statements like that. If that type of reasoning was true then wars would never end. One could argue that we killed so many Germans and Japanese in WWII that their children would hate us and keep fighting us but that war obviously ended, like so many others. Not only that but in less than 50 years both countries have become allies of ours and there is not a sentiment of hate towards each other among the populace.




I think the reason we won those wars- and haven't won one against a country of reasonable size since- is that both countries were utterly crushed.  They were subjected to years of brutal warfare that specifically targeted citizens, and more importantly they had no safe sanctuary where we could not or would not attack them.  The people for the most part were fatigued by fighting that brutal and real to them, not the sterilized version of warfare that some would have us wage now.  This is an observation only and not advocacy for WWII-style tactics.

The war in Afghanistan would look much different if our enemies didn't have sanctuary in Pakistan.


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## SpitfireV (Dec 20, 2010)

One thing to consider is that the Germans and Japanese didn't have a similar concept to Pashtunwali, where they would avenge any death in the family.


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## pardus (Dec 20, 2010)

Dude if you're trying to say I don't know COIN you are way off the mark my friend.

You either misinterpreted my post or took it as _my statement_ on COIN, please don't make that mistake.



JJ sloan said:


> Fart noises...
> 
> This is what alot of people do not understand about COIN.  In this fight, we don't really need to give a shit about the families and friends of insurgents.  They are already against us, it is not an issue.
> What we need to care about is the populace in the areas that are being used as safehavens for shit heads.  The Afghan populace needs to see us (along with Afghan Partner Units) crushing the enemy and driving them away from their villages.  The Afghan people will never trust anyone other than the Taliban if we do not legitimize the security forces and the aid of the U.S. Government.  This is how COIN works.  Provide saftey, security and legitimacy for the populace.  In order to do this we must utilize a strong counterterrorism strategy, which is what our commanders are doing presently.  Killing is very much a part of COIN and must continue until the Afghan people have confidence enough not to support the Taliban out of neccessity.
> ...


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## JJ sloan (Dec 21, 2010)

pardus said:


> Dude if you're trying to say I don't know COIN you are way off the mark my friend.
> 
> You either misinterpreted my post or took it as _my statement_ on COIN, please don't make that mistake.



I have read many of your thoughts on COIN and most are on point (in my humble opinion).  This thought, on the other hand, is not. I sent you PM, but since you decided to post on the open thread, I thought I would reciprocate.  No hard feelings.


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## pardus (Dec 21, 2010)

No hard feelings at all.

This is not my thought, it is one of the tenets of COIN.
I have read FM 3-24 and didn't see it mentioned there which I find curious.
Even a cursory look into past COIN campaigns will show you ample evidence of this.

I will point you to the campaign in Dhofar in the 70's and the bush war in Rhodesia.

Your other points about securing the populace and separating them from the insurgents is of course correct, as is killing the enemy but that does not disregard what I stated earlier.

Intelligence is more valuable than a good body count and the best intelligence comes from the horses mouth.




JJ sloan said:


> I have read many of your thoughts on COIN and most are on point (in my humble opinion).  This thought, on the other hand, is not. I sent you PM, but since you decided to post on the open thread, I thought I would reciprocate.  No hard feelings.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Dec 21, 2010)

I am glad to read bad guys are getting killed, the rest of this thread makes me want to kick a puppy.


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## Etype (Dec 21, 2010)

Marauder06 said:


> Until and unless we're able to root out the sanctuaries for the Taliban, AQ, and HQN inside Pakistan, this war will never be over on our terms.


We're fighting (on a much lower, less dangerous scale) our father's war all over again. This genreartion's own Vietnam complete with safe havens, rules of engagements, and Jane Fondas.


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## surgicalcric (Dec 21, 2010)

lockNload said:


> ... If that type of reasoning was true then wars would never end...



Today we are engaged in a conflict (not limited to Afghanistan) fighting a variety of people for a variety of reasons which transcends nations and persons and as such is much more complicated that wars against nation states.

It is a gross oversimplification to compare WW-II -and the enemies faced then- to the enemy faced today.  I wish it was that simple...



ETA: clarity in my post


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## Etype (Dec 21, 2010)

There are more people at work in Afghanistan than just the Taliban, and Iraq was even worse.  There's a laundry list of players and an even longer list of motivations.  To say 'Taliban' and 'ideologoical' to describe the enemies in Afghanistan is like saying 'germs' and 'common cold' to explaining the enemies of health.


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## JJ sloan (Dec 22, 2010)

pardus said:


> No hard feelings at all.
> 
> This is not my thought, it is one of the tenets of COIN.
> I have read FM 3-24 and didn't see it mentioned there which I find curious.
> ...



Noted.
I read an article about adusting the trigger on my Remington 700 last week.  I am now a gunsmith.
I didn't fight in Dhofar or Rhodesia.  I have ample experience in Afghanistan.
On your final point I agree.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Dec 22, 2010)

JJ sloan said:


> I didn't fight in Dhofar or Rhodesia. I have ample experience in Afghanistan.



I think this is one of the major issues here, experience. The bush wars, Viet Nam and many many other wars are completely different from the current war. Nobody will disagree with Iraq being different than Afghanistan, but yet everyone brings up all of these wars when discussing COIN in Afghanistan. Everyone seems to be an expert and everyone seems to know the right strategy, but the only people who could possibly know are the people boots on ground doing the damn thing.

Its no secret as to how I feel about COIN and it use in Afghanistan, but what I have come to terms with (with a few kicks in the ass from you guys doing the damn thing) is that my personal opinion meaning absolutely nothing. I lack the experience in Afghanistan and there for I am nothing more than cheer leader on the side lines screaming defense when you have the ball in your hand. ;)

As for the purpose of this thread, I glad to read that you guys are killing the enemy of our nation and doing it well. Keep up the good work gentlemen, your countrymen are proud of you…


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## pardus (Dec 22, 2010)

JJ sloan said:


> Noted.
> I read an article about adusting the trigger on my Remington 700 last week.  I am now a gunsmith.
> I didn't fight in Dhofar or Rhodesia.  I have ample experience in Afghanistan.
> On your final point I agree.



You seem to be hinting in a few of your posts that I'm an arm chair warrior when it comes to COIN.
I spent 6 years in the New Zealand Infantry, training in COIN, my instructors included several Vietnam Vets and in one case in NZ a Rhodesian vet.
I then spent a year in Africa learning from Rhodesian SOF vets, I'm still involved with some of those people, some of which are helping to re write the way the US Military is going to conduct itself in the future.

So whatever your experience is in COIN (which I'm sure is extensive) don't make the mistake of thinking your club is the only one in town playing this game.



JAB said:


> I think this is one of the major issues here, experience. The bush wars, Viet Nam and many many other wars are completely different from the current war. Nobody will disagree with Iraq being different than Afghanistan, but yet everyone brings up all of these wars when discussing COIN in Afghanistan.



Because if you knew about COIN you'd realize that it is a doctrine, A doctrine that can be applied in any location regardless of terrain.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Dec 22, 2010)

Whatever you say Pardus. :cool:


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## Etype (Dec 22, 2010)

We should just mass produce AWD like they mass produce SF to help all the conventional guys fight the asymmetric fight.
Done deal, we win, who wants lunch?


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## surgicalcric (Dec 22, 2010)

JAB said:


> I think this is one of the major issues here, experience. The bush wars, Viet Nam and many many other wars are completely different from the current war. Nobody will disagree with Iraq being different than Afghanistan, but yet everyone brings up all of these wars when discussing COIN in Afghanistan. Everyone seems to be an expert and everyone seems to know the right strategy, but the only people who could possibly know are the people boots on ground doing the damn thing…



Iraq is different but the fundamentals still apply to both.

Furthermore, if we were discussing COIN as it applies to Iraq -which I am more than happy to do- we would be citing Viet Nam, Rhodesian bush wars, the insurgency in Indonesia and East Timor, Colombia, El Salvador, etc as doctrine as well.

JAB...I will leave you with a quote from an insurgency in Malaya circa 1952:

_The shooting side of this business is only 25 percent of the trouble; the other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us.  The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people. -General Sir Gerald Templar_

_
_


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Dec 22, 2010)

Crip, I respect your view on this and I am not attempting to have the COIN argument again. You guys have the training, experience and knowledge. I am nothing more than a dumb grunt that spent 10 years playing the big Army game and who is looking forward to putting it behind me. My post was an attempt at a complement to you and the many other SOF types who have been doing the killing. Nothing more and nothing less, I appreciate the work you men are doing and wish you all the best and god's speed in doing it.


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## Manolito (Dec 22, 2010)

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2909.pdf
I have no experience in COIN nor in Iraq or AStan. I am fascinated in your thoughts that the other wars are not like AStan or Iraq. I wouldn't even think of arguing the point. What I do believe is we would make a mistake to not thoroughly understand history before undertaking a war strategy.
I pray every night that you are right and this is not a second Viet Nam with the exact ending we had then.
History tells me to try and push a 20th century doctrine on a people that can't read or write is an energetic undertaking.
2011 holds a lot of unpaid bills for the US and it will take a great deal of resolve for the American liberal to stay the course.
Respectfully,
Bill


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## AWP (Dec 22, 2010)

I guess I'm not smart, because all of this focus on doctrine has me confused. Our doctrine is irrelevant if we're sending the wrong guys and gals out to execute it. Aerospace engineers can tell me a plane's going to fly, but if I put a forklift driver in the cockpit things are going to be ugly.

As a whole, our military doesn't "get it" and all of the doctrine in the world won't make up for the wrong people in the wrong positions, poor leadership, and little to no education.


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## surgicalcric (Dec 23, 2010)

Freefalling said:


> ...As a whole, our military doesn't "get it" and all of the doctrine in the world won't make up for the wrong people in the wrong positions, poor leadership, and little to no education.



Exactly.

Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare-Hy Rothstein is excellent reading for those interested in why things are the way they are. He puts words to those things people have known for a while but couldnt put their finger on it.


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## TheSiatonist (Dec 23, 2010)

Freefalling said:


> As a whole, our military doesn't "get it" and all of the doctrine in the world won't make up for the wrong people in the wrong positions, poor leadership, and little to no education.



Aw fuck. Can't you guys nominate the right people for leadership positions or something?  

Personally, I think this problem exists in ALL armed forces and I can only wish for the day when all this politicking would stop so you guys have the right people running the war.

This is just my 0.02.


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## AWP (Dec 23, 2010)

TheSiatonist said:


> Aw fuck. Can't you guys nominate the right people for leadership positions or something?
> 
> Personally, I think this problem exists in ALL armed forces and I can only wish for the day when all this politicking would stop so you guys have the right people running the war.
> 
> This is just my 0.02.



Regarding positions: You cannot send Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Infantry, and Armor LT's and CPT's off with minimal training and expect them to be an effective "tip of the spear" in COIN.


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## DA SWO (Dec 23, 2010)

Freefalling said:


> I guess I'm not smart, because all of this focus on doctrine has me confused. Our doctrine is irrelevant if we're sending the wrong guys and gals out to execute it. Aerospace engineers can tell me a plane's going to fly, but if I put a forklift driver in the cockpit things are going to be ugly.
> 
> As a whole, our military doesn't "get it" and all of the doctrine in the world won't make up for the wrong people in the wrong positions, poor leadership, and little to no education.



Leadership gets it; they don't want to believe it, so they ignore it.

Last thing these tank driving, fighter piloting, boat drivers want is a bunch of uncooth, semi-sophisticated SOF guys in charge of anything.
Yes, I am serious.  Guys are more concerned with N Korea then the taliban/AQ-yet we are engaging the latter on a daily basis.


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## Marauder06 (Dec 23, 2010)

> Guys are more concerned with N Korea then the taliban/AQ




That might be because AQ doesn't have nukes* and isn't backed by China ;)






*yet


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## TheSiatonist (Dec 23, 2010)

Marauder06 said:


> *yet



Now there's a scary thought.


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## surgicalcric (Dec 23, 2010)

SOWT said:


> Leadership gets it; they don't want to believe it, so they ignore it...



I disagree slightly here.  Leadership gets that their role (large footprints and commands) would be minimized if those who do "get it" were to have the lead.  They ignore us because it doesn't fit the mold they are comfortable with, attrition warfare.

This can be seen clearly through the events shortly after 9.11 when the CinC and SoD asked for a plan to attack and destroy AQ and the TB.  The senior leadership wanted nothing to do with a UW concept because it didn't put "enough" of them on the ground.  The plan to use SF was a CIA plan that the Chiefs of Staff laughed at but had nothing to counter it.  If memory serves me according to the plans put forth by the the Chiefs of Staff it would take a couple months to get troops on the ground because of their not being CSAR elements etc in theater and the CIA plan was to have their guys and 5th Group on the ground in a matter of days-to-weeks.


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## x SF med (Dec 23, 2010)

We seem to be missing the fact that region currently called Afghanistan has been the crux of tribal/internicene warfare for about thousands of years.   Russia, France, England, Turkey, The Mongols, even Alexander could not subdue the area for any period of time.  The Kush is steeped in the practical knowledge of conducting an insurgency - be it local, tribal, regional or larger...

How do we  teach the majority of our soldiers and leaders the myriad tribal/clan mindsets, how do we place them into the situation so that they understand the constantly switching dynamic in the low level political dealings that lead to the larger shapeshifiting politics of the region - allegiances chane - almost on a daily basis - and these allegiances change based on things as basic as the Maslow heirarchy of needs - shelter, food, clothing, protection....  We are trying to introduce Western thought into a region that needs people sent in that understand the thinking currently (albeit, in our view medieval) in control of the region.

A Low Intensity Conflict / UW/FID Mission should be the base for COIN in Afghanistan - it will take years/ decades...  there is no quick fix, no immediate change, no magic pill to erase thousands of years of self protection in the form of clan/tribal politics and warfare that is now fueled by outside groups who look, speak, act and believe very similarly to the indigineous people.

Technology may not always win over the will of the people - these guys are fighting for their homes, and are being supported by people more similar to them than us, maybe we need to focus on getting inside, and starting some change there, instead of from the outside.   Not to say the internal and external forces driving the 'jihad' should be ignored, but a two pronged attack could be more effective.

Sorry - but even to me this sounds like a basic lecture of the political significance of the capabilities of US Army Special Forces.

I'll shut up now.


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## x SF med (Dec 23, 2010)

Hey, Crip....  we overlapped a little in our posts - timing and points...  imagine that...


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## surgicalcric (Dec 23, 2010)

x SF med said:


> Hey, Crip....  we overlapped a little in our posts - timing and points...  imagine that...



Imagine that indeed...


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## x SF med (Dec 23, 2010)

surgicalcric said:


> Imagine that indeed...



I wonder if has anything to do with the Camp MacKall Finishing School?  Ya think?


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## TLDR20 (Dec 25, 2010)

Or both of your unwavering dedication to the love of man meat!


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## Ravage (Dec 25, 2010)

JJ sloan said:


> Fart noises...
> This is what alot of people do not understand about COIN.  In this fight, we don't really need to give a shit about the families and friends of insurgents.  They are already against us, it is not an issue.
> What we need to care about is the populace in the areas that are being used as safehavens for shit heads.  The Afghan populace needs to see us (along with Afghan Partner Units) crushing the enemy and driving them away from their villages.  The Afghan people will never trust anyone other than the Taliban if we do not legitimize the security forces and the aid of the U.S. Government.  This is how COIN works.  Provide saftey, security and legitimacy for the populace.  In order to do this we must utilize a strong counterterrorism strategy, which is what our commanders are doing presently.  Killing is very much a part of COIN and must continue until the Afghan people have confidence enough not to support the Taliban out of neccessity.
> As for the original report, those numbers are grossly overstated.  Success is clear in recent months, but this report is ridiculous.


So what about all those voices I hear about 'you can't kill your way out of an insurgency" ? Or should I understand that killing the bad guys is part of winning the hearts and minds ?
I remember reading on another board that a SFer wrote that "its not a door-kickers war".....

Btw, every time I log in here I learn something new - thank You :)


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## JJ sloan (Dec 25, 2010)

Ravage said:


> So what about all those voices I hear about 'you can't kill your way out of an insurgency" ? Or should I understand that killing the bad guys is part of winning the hearts and minds ?
> I remember reading on another board that a SFer wrote that "its not a door-kickers war".....
> 
> Btw, every time I log in here I learn something new - thank You :)



It is not a door "kicker's war".  I am not saying that we should focus on killing at all.  I am saying that it is a neccessary evil and that we should not be afraid of destroying senior leadership in order to degrade networks and provide examples of success for locals wo crave security.  Senior Taliban leadership and AQ turds have already made insurgents out of their family members.  There is nothing that we can do about that.  That is the point that started this side bar conversation, which has spun a bit out of control in my opinion.

Listen, backpacks and handshakes don't work on fuckheads... bottomline.  They need to die.  We cannot just keep recycling these assholes through the prisons, catch and release style, and expect to make any progress.  Things haved changed dramatically since McChrystal was canned.  Assholes are dying and being rolled up at an alarming rate, certainly not at the rate that was initially posted in this thread, but quite a few.  This commander is the author of the COIN manual that everyone loves to quote on this site.  He is directing the deaths of commanders and networks and pressing the kinetic fight.  Hmmmmmm..... I wonder why.  At the same time, he is managing an effective non-kinetic effort, which is the other side of COIN.  Somewhere we got off track, this COIN business is not about _not killing_.  That is absurd.  It is about choosing your targets more carefully and killing those that would cause great harm to the enemy's capabilities and morale and sparing the bottom feeders who are fighting only for money and security (those we can turn).  I think what Pardus was discussing was intelligence value, which I cannot agree with more.  Rolling these jugheads up and getting information is great and has led to alot of successful follow-on missions.  Nevertheless, if they have been rolled up three times before and gave up jack and shit, then fuck 'em.  Hollow out their brain housing group.

I have never changed my position.  Counterterrorism (CT) is an integral part of conducting counterinsurgency warfare.  No where have you ever heard me say that we should not use our CT forces for what they are intended for.  Others may have preached that but not I, my friend.  I am all for degrading metworks through high ordinance.


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## Ravage (Dec 25, 2010)

Roger that. Don't know if I've 'got it', but thank You for the clarification.


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## pardus (Dec 25, 2010)

Good post JJ.

I want to clarify also, that I was not advocating not killing, fighting and killing is an essential part of COIN. Like JJ said, it just needs to be done carefully.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Dec 25, 2010)

What sends me into a down spiral about all of this is that everything is being wrapped up under the COIN doctrine. CT, FID, CA/PSY is all part of COIN (everyone keeps saying), but yet they are all different doctrines that require different rules and policies to be effective. I fully agree with what JJ posted, but the way I am reading this is not as just a COIN doctrine/strategy but as multiple “different” operations, doctrines and strategies being used. Why I am so caught up about this, is b/c most commanders cannot tell the difference between these different doctrines/strategies and once they are told the ROE is this, they take it full retard. Instead of being fluid in their doctrine and strategy, observing the enemy and the threat. Instead they say “we are doing this men” and leave your ass in the wind, and this is not a tactical or even operational level issue. It’s an issue at the highest levels…

I have always stood by the fact that in Iraq (in my A/O) we were not fighting an insurgency. We were attempting to control a civil war and conducting counterterrorism (at a much dumber level) going after IED makers, taking out HVT’s and deny and disrupt patrols. We then shifted roles to more of a FID mission, while helping CA/PSY people do their thing all while listening to this “insurgency stuff” being jammed down our throats when there were no insurgents in our A/O. We had scared Iraqi’s, pissed off Shia Muslims and foreign fighters. The Shia Muslims were engaged in a civil war with the Sunni Muslims where the middle of the road Iraqis were caught in the middle of civil war and terrorism. The foreign fighters were attempting to gain support and raise an insurgency, but the Iraqis did not want that either and in most cases were terrorized into keeping quiet. Mean while we had HVT’s that were either Iraqi (former regime) or foreign fighters and a few IED makers for hire.

The issue I found in Iraq was not the issue of an insurgency, but the issue of a terrorized population due to a lack of any government protection. That being caused by our own stupidity of disbanding the entire Iraqi military and police, leaving the door wide open for anyone to come into these communities and terrorize them, kidnap families and force people to participate in attack against coalition forces. I found that our stupidity in not bringing the Shia Muslims to the table sooner, led us into being attacked by Shia militias thus bringing a civil war into full swing, coupled with our inability to pick a winner in that civil war. Most of all I found that a massive majority of the problems we faced in Iraq was purely due to our stupidity to engaging the Iraqi population and providing the things we promised them we would. But that was IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN is a different animal in my not so experience opinion.

Afghanistan has an insurgency (Taliban) and they are in full swing; however the TB were at one time the government of Afghanistan. So in a basic since, by attacking and uprooting the TB we created that insurgency. Al Qaeda is not an insurgency in my opinion; they are an Islamic (Jihadist) terrorist network that is raging a terror campaign against all non-Muslims. So in effect you have two different enemies in Afghanistan (1) a former Afghan government attempting to retake control through UW (an insurgency) (2) a terrorist network aligning its self with the TB and Paki’s (and many many more) to launch attacks against non-Muslims.

Now my big issue about the COIN strategy for all of Afghanistan is that the population is being engaged by the TB (their former government) in an effort to maintain some control of governance. While at the same time there is an enemy (the one that started this war) Al Qaeda that needs to be attacked, killed and destroyed. I am in full agreement that blowing up villages and killing Afghanis is a bad thing for the future of Afghanistan. However I am of the opinion that it is a big mistake to not go after the true enemy, b/c we are bogged down in this COIN, nation building, hearts and minds stuff. The American people cannot afford to rebuild every Muslim country into pro western ideology, the American people do not have the patients for the “long war” and they are too foolish to maintain the friendship that may be established through these long wars.

Mean while we are still countering terrorism attacks all over the world on a daily bases, yet we have not gotten to the root of the problem through global policing or global COIN. Maybe COIN is not going to do it, maybe it’s time to kill their children’s, children’s children and remove the disease from this earth for good. Afghanistan should be a front line for our war on terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, but that is not a war that should be fought through making them friend s and attempting to win them over, it should be a war of annihilation of these jihadists.


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## pardus (Dec 25, 2010)

Actually JAB Al Qaeda is the ideal adversary to use COIN against, because they are foreigners, it would be much easier to separate them from the Afghans.
They are not a group one would put major effort into trying to turn because they have little value (outside of short term intel about their comrades/base etc...) when it comes to the local Afghans.

Whereas the Taliban though much harder (maybe impossible) to seperate from the locals as they are possibly related to them for example, have far greater value alive than AQ because they are part of the tribe/family and therefore have greater influence in getting others on our side.

COIN is slow but has been proven to work.
Local dynamics are vital to it's employment, we must be smart.

Genocidal war would probably work but I don't want to kill women and children nor do most people I'd wager.


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## AWP (Dec 26, 2010)

I'm going to think/ debate out loud here:

JAB makes an interesting point in his first paragraph. Is COIN a true multi-disciplined (Full spectrum?) approach or has the Army maybe tried to make it one doctrine instead of something more fluid and situationally dependent? Have we "dumbed down" COIN to make it something our servicemembers can understrand with little training and did we go a bridge too far with that approach? Quantum physics isn't for everyone and perhaps COIN isn't as well despite a new FM......

----

One thing I don't believe anyone wants to think about is that we REALLY need to get a handle on COIN. The next war could be a massive armored battle or it could be more of what we've had for the last 9 years. When OEF and OIF are behind us we still need that knowledge and moreover, we need to learn from it. Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia/ Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq....throw in the "lesser" conflicts like El Sal, Colombia, a good portion of Africa and I think we can see that these skill sets need to be permanent AND that our leadership in suits and uniforms needs to POP their head out of a certain cavity and learn from history.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Dec 26, 2010)

I think that people are too wrapped up around “COIN” to think straight on this. Doctrine is not the real issue here IMHO, PID'ing our enemy is. We have an enemy, that enemy is global (not just Iraq/Afghan) they want to kill and terrorize our women and children. Our response is to rebuild shit hole nations and win over the populations?

The Taliban is not who attacked us on 9-11, they were the dumb shits that allowed Al Qaeda to build a base in Afghanistan. Why are we focused on the TB and rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq, when Al Qaeda is right across the border? Why are we not attacking AQ on a global scale, meaning find them and kill them?


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## pardus (Dec 26, 2010)

JAB, answer your own questions, why do we try and build nations? Why do we not invade/raid every country on earth where Al Qaeda have elements?
Think about it, it's a no brainer.





JAB said:


> I think that people are too wrapped up around “COIN” to think straight on this. Doctrine is not the real issue here IMHO, PID'ing our enemy is. We have an enemy, that enemy is global (not just Iraq/Afghan) they want to kill and terrorize our women and children. Our response is to rebuild shit hole nations and win over the populations?
> 
> The Taliban is not who attacked us on 9-11, they were the dumb shits that allowed Al Qaeda to build a base in Afghanistan. Why are we focused on the TB and rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq, when Al Qaeda is right across the border? Why are we not attacking AQ on a global scale, meaning find them and kill them?


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Dec 26, 2010)

pardus said:


> JAB, answer your own questions, why do we try and build nations? Why do we not invade/raid every country on earth where Al Qaeda have elements?
> Think about it, it's a no brainer.



I don’t think you truly understand what I am talking about.

The Taliban want to defeat the “Invaders” where Al Qaeda wants to kill the “infidel”. The TB is attempting to fight an unconventional war to kick us out of Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda is a global threat attacking/planning to attack every non-believer in every country. Al Qaeda is everywhere, they are “global” they are a network of jihadist using terrorism to fight a genocidal war against all non-believers. How do we fight AQ? We do it through global intelligence, FID (training other countries to fight them/ share intelligence) and we do it through locating and capturing or killing them. That is not counterinsurgency that is Intel, FID and counterterrorism.


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## SpitfireV (Dec 26, 2010)

I would agree with JAB on this occasion, for what that's worth. The Taliban, as themselves, aren't a threat per say to anyone outside of Afghanistan. They were providing a safe haven, this is true, but Al Qaeda were moved out of Sudan we should remember without a lot of force, just pressure. Perhaps the Pakistani government could have been convinced to put pressure on the Taliban to expel AQ, I don't know.


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## pardus (Dec 26, 2010)

JAB said:


> I don’t think you truly understand what I am talking about.
> 
> The Taliban want to defeat the “Invaders” where Al Qaeda wants to kill the “infidel”. The TB is attempting to fight an unconventional war to kick us out of Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda is a global threat attacking/planning to attack every non-believer in every country. Al Qaeda is everywhere, they are “global” they are a network of jihadist using terrorism to fight a genocidal war against all non-believers. How do we fight AQ? We do it through global intelligence, FID (training other countries to fight them/ share intelligence) and we do it through locating and capturing or killing them. That is not counterinsurgency that is Intel, FID and counterterrorism.



I get _this_ post and agree 100%

AQ should be declared an illegal organization, an organization that membership of earns you a mandatory death penalty.

I would like to see acts of terror and being a terrorist as crimes that have a mandatory death penalty.
Then buried with their ass facing mecca and a strip of bacon in their mouth.


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## SpitfireV (Dec 26, 2010)

AQ is already an illegal organisation in most countries.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Dec 26, 2010)

SpitfireV said:


> I would agree with JAB on this occasion, for what that's worth. The Taliban, as themselves, aren't a threat per say to anyone outside of Afghanistan. They were providing a safe haven, this is true, but Al Qaeda were moved out of Sudan we should remember without a lot of force, just pressure. Perhaps the Pakistani government could have been convinced to put pressure on the Taliban to expel AQ, I don't know.



I don’t believe that the TB would have expelled AQ, however the aftermath of removing the TB and hunting down AQ is where I think we got twisted. We continue to put too much effort into pro western ideology in the reconstruction of countries we conduct operations in. Instead I feel we should allow the natural process of civil differences to work themselves out. Meaning we should have not played nation building through selecting leaders and empowering people to take control of the government of Afghanistan and Iraq. We should not have pushed democratic beliefs on these people; we should have let them conduct their own process of building their countries and used CA/PSY to establish a pro western society in whatever government they chose to have. If and only when we have been asked for our help, we should offer FID through a very small foot print (SF) to allow a non-US involvement look to the general population.

If we remove our selves (westerns) from the picture on the ground and put a pure host nation picture, we in effect remove the insurgencies that we are creating. Yes there will probably be some form of rebellion or civil war process, but that is a natural part of a nation developing itself. We can see that through our own national history. We fought the Brits to gain independence and build the United States, we had more fighting over small bullshit, and we had a civil war due to differences within our own governance. The confederate states lost b/c of one major influence; the British stopped buying confederate cotton. Thus causing the Confederate states to lose the financial resources it needed to beat the United States; a very small foot print by the British decided our nations future.


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