# Zero Returns to the Skies over Japan



## AWP (Jan 28, 2016)

The first Japanese owned Zero flew in Japan recently. Given their rarity, this is very cool.

A6M Zero Flies Over Japan



> Earlier today, legendary Reno Air Racing pilot, Skip Holm flew a restored Mitsubishi A6M Zero over Japan. Although it is not the first former WWII-era Japanese aircraft to do so in the intervening seventy odd years since the end of the war, it is the first time a Japanese-owned example has gone aloft in that period, and this may have set a major new precedent in Japanese aviation policy. It should be noted that a couple of American-owned examples have made brief flying tours of Japan; most notably the former Planes of Fame Museum of Flying’s A6M Zero back in 1978 and again in 1995.


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## BuckysBadger24 (Jan 28, 2016)

I've always wondered how much longer Japan could have continued the air war had they used their pilots more in the U.S. model of sending experienced pilots home to train new recruits, instead of sending them up until they were pretty much killed.  Obviously they could have never turned the tide, as they simply couldn't match the U.S. in replacing lost ships, but how more effective could they have remained with a healthy mix of experience and better trained recruits?  Agreed, it's very interesting to see a Japanese owned Zero flying over Japan again.  I can only imagine the thoughts and memories this would bring up in the mind's of veterans on both sides.


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## AWP (Jan 28, 2016)

BuckysBadger24 said:


> I've always wondered how much longer Japan could have continued the air war had they used their pilots more in the U.S. model of sending experienced pilots home to train new recruits, instead of sending them up until they were pretty much killed.  Obviously they could have never turned the tide, as they simply couldn't match the U.S. in replacing lost ships, but how more effective could they have remained with a healthy mix of experience and better trained recruits?  Agreed, it's very interesting to see a Japanese owned Zero flying over Japan again.  I can only imagine the thoughts and memories this would bring up in the mind's of veterans on both sides.



I don't think it would have mattered. They could maybe delay the end until '46, but once our sub program (particularly the torpedo issue) started rolling (the IJN also had lackluster ASW capabilities) their raw material imports couldn't support the war. _Shattered Sword_ (I have a review in the Books section) and Hastings' _Retribution_ (or _Nemesis_ in the UK) both laid out Japan's bleak and ultimately futile case. I think the US built more fleet carriers in 1943 than Japan built before and during the war combined. We fielded roughly 100 carriers of all types during the war with good, but not great pilots. The Japanese intake system was meant for quality, not quantity, while the US system wanted masses of "good enough" aviators. I vaguely recall something about one class of Japanese naval aviators had 6 graduates and in the US it was dozens and dozens more per class.

I think late '42/ '43 would have mattered the most under your scenario. We'd have killed them off and placed far more men in the air than they could in 1944. Once the Essex class showed up, Japan was doomed.


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## Gunz (Jan 28, 2016)

They were doomed. No matter what.

I see your point @BuckysBadger24 but given the spirit of _Bushido_ experienced combat pilots would've cut their own guts out rather than go back to the rear to be instructors. That would have been low duty to a samurai.


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## BuckysBadger24 (Jan 28, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> They were doomed. No matter what.
> 
> Pathetic really, when you look at their arrogance, their tactical inflexibility, the constant deception between Army, Navy, government, Emperor and populace. It's to their credit, I think, their amazing fortitude, that they lasted as long as they did. Because in the end, bravery and a willingness to die was all that was keeping them going.
> 
> ...



But does a delay, possibly until '46 as @Freefalling mentioned, also delay the dropping of said A-Bombs.  Truman was under quite a bit of scrutiny and pressure when it came to dropping the bombs as it was.  If they get delayed those months, I wonder if the invasion of Japan gets put back into the forefront, as Truman loses more and more support on the issue.  Obviously there isn't a doubt that the Allies were going to win, invasion of the mainland or not.  But the cost in lives as well as Japan effectively not existing as a country or race, and the Soviet Union already pushing hard into China, our influence as it stood after the war would have to be called in to question.  The Soviet's get that much more of a foothold in China who loses much, if not all, of its bargaining chips against the USSR, and the U.S. is pretty much left with only Australia as a key ally in the South Pacific, and little in the way of a valuable foothold in the region.


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## AWP (Jan 28, 2016)

BuckysBadger24 said:


> But does a delay, possibly until '46 as @Freefalling mentioned, also delay the dropping of said A-Bombs.  Truman was under quite a bit of scrutiny and pressure when it came to dropping the bombs as it was.  If they get delayed those months, I wonder if the invasion of Japan gets put back into the forefront, as Truman loses more and more support on the issue.



An invasion was always at the forefront. When the bombs came along with gave us a Plan B, but had they failed we'd have still invaded. A delay slowing our progress across the Pacific merely delays the invasion and without Saipan/ Tinian dropping the bomb becomes a moot point. The Soviet bastards didn't declare until Aug 8, two days after Hiroshima. If we're delayed I question if the Soviets jump in at all. Stalin was profoundly bitter at our "delay" in invading Europe. FDR kept saying we could invade in 42, then 43, and finally we went in 44 partially at Stalin's urging. Our war in the Med. (necessary, but almost its own thread) pissed off Stalin because he saw us doing very little while his country was bled dry. I think a delay keeps him out of the war with Japan. His paranoia and loss of life in the "Eastern" Front would have kept him at home

Where it gets interesting is Lemay and some Navy brass thought Japan would surrender that winter. The subs and B-29 mining campaign (another story) strangled the Home Islands. The potential for starvation that winter was very high. I doubt Japan would surrender, but stranger things have happened.


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## Devildoc (Jan 28, 2016)

King and Lemay advocated quarantine and starving the Japanese.  Some projections took Japan out to the late 40s before they would have surrendered because of quarantine.  The chiefs got on board with the bomb, King begrudgingly, and hedged their bets that if the Japanese saw the power of the bomb and thought we had many such bombs, they would surrender.

We tried to get the USSR into the war in the Pacific to take the heat off us earlier, but as pointed out, they were very cool to that idea until August.  Their list of demands for participating was quite high, partially as referenced above Uncle Joe was pissed because we did not provide a second front in Europe to get Germany off his back when we said we would.  The Med was really England's deal, pushed very heavily by Churchill, et al., whom we tried very much to dissuade and get re-engaged back in Europe (specifically, southern France).


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## BuckysBadger24 (Jan 28, 2016)

I guess the way I was looking at it is with the the rest of the Allies putting their full might into Japan, a great opportunity opens for the Soviets to roll in to China under the pretense of clearing out any remaining Japanese forces still in country.  The Chinese were hardly in a position to successfully stop them, and the Red Army, even after their campaigns against the Germans on the Eastern European front, was at a solid strength, with strong manufacturing capabilities.  It would appear to be a golden opportunity to tighten a noose on China's neck, while simultaneously eliminating American influence in that part of the world, as we slug it out on the Japanese mainland for an untold amount of time.  I don't know that Stalin would have had any qualms about sacrificing as many Red Army soldiers as was deemed necessary to get that upper hand on Soviet influence throughout the rest of the world.

Of course, the "conventional" firebombing of Japan, mixed with Japan's actually ability to still make effective war at that point, as well as the possibility that Truman still drops the bombs whether a delay affects U.S. invasions on the last of the island chains or not, is a lot of ifs.  The more we talk about it, of course, the more Japanese pilots having a serious delay on the war to that extent seems harder to believe, but the problem certainly wasn't in their aircraft.  The Zero is a pretty solid testament to that.


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## BuckysBadger24 (Jan 28, 2016)

I think the Med. was more important that Stalin realized, or wanted to realize, at the time.  Hitler is pretty much the only thing slowing Rommel from running into all the Middle Eastern oil Germany would need.  Hitler was simply obsessed with destroying the Soviet's, the Romanian oil fields were a great excuse to begin doing it.  Rommel was steam rolling the Allies in the Med. and North Africa.  Had he been allowed to continue, Germany would be one hell of a manufacturing problem.  But as Ff said, this is all information for a separate discussion.  Discussion of one almost always leads into another.


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## AWP (Jan 28, 2016)

BuckysBadger24 said:


> the problem certainly wasn't in their aircraft.  The Zero is a pretty solid testament to that.



Yes and no. The speed, maneuverability, and range performance over US aircraft was partially because of Bushido. They built an offensive aircraft without self-sealing tanks or armor. Additionally their 20mm wing cannon were limited in ammunition. They could do more in a fight if they controlled the fight. US aircraft from start to finish, even to this day, could take a beating while dishing out impressive amounts of damage. Look at most nations during WWII, they either used 30-ish caliber rounds or 20-30mm. The US used the Ma Deuce in everything and lots of it. By '43 all of our frontline fighters had 6 .50 cals with the P-47 sporting 4. Hell, we had B-25 gunships with a theoretical 14 forward firing .50 cals (most used less) with A-20, B-26, and PV-1/2 variants carrying 5-8 in the nose alone.

The Zero was a very capable fighter, but once we discovered how to beat it the Japanese never recovered. By then her best pilots were dead and their training system as you've pointed out simply sucked.


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## BuckysBadger24 (Jan 28, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> Yes and no. The speed, maneuverability, and range performance over US aircraft was partially because of Bushido. They built an offensive aircraft without self-sealing tanks or armor. Additionally their 20mm wing cannon were limited in ammunition. They could do more in a fight if they controlled the fight. US aircraft from start to finish, even to this day, could take a beating while dishing out impressive amounts of damage. Look at most nations during WWII, they either used 30-ish caliber rounds or 20-30mm. The US used the Ma Deuce in everything and lots of it. By '43 all of our frontline fighters had 6 .50 cals with the P-47 sporting 4. Hell, we had B-25 gunships with a theoretical 14 forward firing .50 cals (most used less) with A-20, B-26, and PV-1/2 variants carrying 5-8 in the nose alone.
> 
> The Zero was a very capable fighter, but once we discovered how to beat it the Japanese never recovered. By then her best pilots were dead and their training system as you've pointed out simply sucked.



Hard to argue that.  "Stick as much firepower in it as possible" was certainly one of America's unparalled advantages over every Axis country during the war.  Looking at your points, I suppose my earlier wondering about what effects the war being delayed would have had, would have had more ground if I started at the Battle of Midway, instead of Japanese pilots later in the war.  Had they finished off our carriers, when they still had a relative upper hand, maybe a delay until at least '46 would have been more likely, irregardless of what Japan changed in the training and deployment of its pilots.  I'm just going round and round now though.


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## Gunz (Jan 28, 2016)

BuckysBadger24 said:


> But does a delay, possibly until '46 as @Freefalling mentioned, also delay the dropping of said A-Bombs.  Truman was under quite a bit of scrutiny and pressure when it came to dropping the bombs as it was.  If they get delayed those months, I wonder if the invasion of Japan gets put back into the forefront, as Truman loses more and more support on the issue.  Obviously there isn't a doubt that the Allies were going to win, invasion of the mainland or not.  But the cost in lives as well as Japan effectively not existing as a country or race, and the Soviet Union already pushing hard into China, our influence as it stood after the war would have to be called in to question.  The Soviet's get that much more of a foothold in China who loses much, if not all, of its bargaining chips against the USSR, and the U.S. is pretty much left with only Australia as a key ally in the South Pacific, and little in the way of a valuable foothold in the region.



I don't think Truman would ever have delayed using the bomb. Why would he? Once we had it and knew it would work there was no reason to not use it. Objections to using the bomb were few because of the intense secrecy surrounding it.


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## AWP (Jan 28, 2016)

Saipan made us seriously consider using the bomb. Okinawa almost guaranteed we'd use it. Once we saw them fighting to the end, to include civilians and their participation and suicides, we were all but forced to use them.


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## Devildoc (Jan 29, 2016)

BuckysBadger24 said:


> I think the Med. was more important that Stalin realized, or wanted to realize, at the time.  Hitler is pretty much the only thing slowing Rommel from running into all the Middle Eastern oil Germany would need.  Hitler was simply obsessed with destroying the Soviet's, the Romanian oil fields were a great excuse to begin doing it.  Rommel was steam rolling the Allies in the Med. and North Africa.  Had he been allowed to continue, Germany would be one hell of a manufacturing problem.  But as Ff said, this is all information for a separate discussion.  Discussion of one almost always leads into another.



Stalin wanted the second front in Europe, not the Med.  He made that pretty clear.  FDR promised him we would do it but the Brits dragged their feet, partially because the Limeys had a hard-on for Italy and the Balkans.  Ike and the US believed that the Med was a British thing because of their desire to "reimperialize" some of the Baltic states and a burning desire t chase the Germans into the Alps.  Ike nixed that idea, seeing a Nazi guerrilla war fought in the Alps over many years.

Contrary to popular history, the US and Britain really did not have a very cohesive strategy and were often at odds about goals and objectives.


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## Devildoc (Jan 29, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> I don't think Truman would ever have delayed using the bomb. Why would he? Once we had it and knew it would work there was no reason to not use it. Objections to using the bomb were few because of the intense secrecy surrounding it.



Once Truman was briefed in about the bomb he went all-in.  Most of the chiefs supported it; King did not but concede that it could end the war faster than the quarantine-and-starvation route.  Sec of War Stimson was really hesitant as well as he could see the problems of eventual nuclear proliferation.


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## Gunz (Jan 29, 2016)

Truman got a kick out of hinting to Stalin at Potsdam that we had "a powerful new weapon." That was right after he got the word that the tests were successful. I bet Harry would've liked dropping a few Stalin's way.


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## Devildoc (Jan 29, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> Truman got a kick out of hinting to Stalin at Potsdam that we had "a powerful new weapon." That was right after he got the word that the tests were successful. I bet Harry would've liked dropping a few Stalin's way.



Yup.  FDR had a pretty cordial relationship with Stalin, believing that like with everyone else in the US, he could get Stalin to do anything once they established a friendship and common ground.  That was part of FDR's blindsides is that he thought he was always more charming than he was and that his charm would always prevail.

Truman on the other hand, was really skeptical of the Russians and really saw them for what they were.  He did not trust Uncle Jo any further than he could throw him.


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## AWP (Jan 29, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> Stalin wanted the second front in Europe, not the Med.  He made that pretty clear.  FDR promised him we would do it but the Brits dragged their feet, partially because the Limeys had a hard-on for Italy and the Balkans.  Ike and the US believed that the Med was a British thing because of their desire to "reimperialize" some of the Baltic states and a burning desire t chase the Germans into the Alps.  Ike nixed that idea, seeing a Nazi guerrilla war fought in the Alps over many years.
> 
> Contrary to popular history, the US and Britain really did not have a very cohesive strategy and were often at odds about goals and objectives.



The Brits still relied heavily on India as a source of income so keeping the Suez out of German hands was a big deal for them. The US thought it could invade France in '42 and believed the UK wanted us in the Med to prop up the British Empire. As we learned so painfully in N. Africa, our military wasn't even close to prepared for an invasion of Europe in '42 or '43, so the Med helped us learned combined arms and joint operations. Even late in the war Churchill pushed for an invasion of the Baltics, but I think that was driven by the desire to keep Eastern Europe out of Stalin's hands. FDR was dying and still enamored with Stalin, so Stalin took advantage of him at Yalta. FDR made some key mistakes, but his views on Stalin were the worst.


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## Devildoc (Jan 29, 2016)

FF, very cogent post.  The more I read about the British leadership in WWII, the less impressed I am.  They most definitely wanted things their way, and usually at our expense.

Ike referred to the North African and Med campaigns as good practice for the invasion of Europe and really solidified his leadership structure, which I really think minimized loss of life in Europe (i.e., sacking his friend in the N African campaign, protecting Patton, rearranging staff). 

Yeah, Stalin really railroaded FDR, I wonder how much was FDR's guilt in not opening the second front earlier.  Stalin really played on that.  Also FDR never believed the intel about the Russian involvement in the Katyn massacre, refusing to believe they would be involved.  And once word of Soviet atrocities leaked out with regard to Eastern Germany, he just looked away.


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## BuckysBadger24 (Jan 29, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> Yeah, Stalin really railroaded FDR, I wonder how much was FDR's guilt in not opening the second front earlier.  Stalin really played on that.  Also FDR never believed the intel about the Russian involvement in the Katyn massacre, refusing to believe they would be involved.  And once word of Soviet atrocities leaked out with regard to Eastern Germany, he just looked away.



I hate to say it this way, but really though, why wouldn't FDR look the other way?  I don't agree with FDR not questioning the Soviets when these massacres came to light, but I can also see how inter ally fighting could become a liability when they were that close to the finish line in FDR's mind.  Not to mention Germany is just coming off the largest counterattack in the war in the Bulge, when they were thought all but defeated, and the Allies by that point were uncovering concentration and death camps all over Eastern Europe and Germany.  I think the last thing the American populace wanted to hear about at that time was how their supposed "ally" was slaughtering Germans in Eastern Europe.   The same Germans who, as was coming to light, were slaughtering pretty much every non-German east of Berlin.

As was previously said by you all, FDR's concessions at Yalta were probably enhanced by his liking of Stalin, and Stalin laying the guilt on thick about the second front.  But even if the U.S. wanted to do nothing more, was it even realistic for the Western Allies to open a European front until at least mid to late '43?  Had we just sat still and built up forces and materiel' during '42, maybe an invasion at the beginning of '43 would have been possible.  But how much would the country stand for that inaction, let alone a struggling England, who quite frankly would have most likely been leveled off without U.S. support?  I think helping the British in the Med. and North Africa helped appease them, as well as helped the U.S. in getting their feet wet in fighting the Wehrmacht as @Devildoc said, which in the beginning was pretty much a disaster.  It also allowed the U.S. to say "hey, we're killing Germans" to the Soviets, whether it was on the shores of Europe or not.  I think that in itself is better than saying "hey, we're working on the European invasion, it takes time", while the Soviets are fighting for their literal survival.  An immediate invasion of Western Europe immediately in '42, if it was even possible, probably ends in unmitigated disaster.  Quite frankly, I don't think Stalin was listening to that argument at Yalta, even if FDR actually wanted to push the case.  Stalin was always going to push the literal slaughter of his country by Germany until Stalingrad turned the tables, as the ace up his sleeve, to get what he wanted and would simply lie about the rest (Poland comes to mind).


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## Devildoc (Jan 29, 2016)

FDR was gripped by a few factors.  One, and the most glaring, he was a politician, and one across the pond.  He just didn't have skin in the game as did Britain, which was the temporary home to Polish government in exile (and it was Britain who really raised holy hell about Katyn and other atrocities and really argued against the pro-Soviet government that was eventually put in place).  Second, FDR believed the concessions he got from Stalin outweighed the negatives.  Third, he really thought that Stalin and Co. would really come around to the US way of thinking eventually.

Of course, at Yalta Stalin called for a "free and independent" Poland, and we all knows what that means to the Soviets.  Churchill knew, too, but Roosevelt just didn't care.  It just wasn't in the US geopolitical sphere.

It is true that FDR was all about image, and to him the image of him, Churchill, and Stalin being in accordance was very important, although often not the reality.

Stalin could not have cared less about the allies in the Med/North Africa.  He wanted one thing and one thing only: the second front in Europe.  At least that's what I got from the reading I have done.  I think he knew the Germans could send divisions from France to the Med without diverting too much from their eastern front; a front in France WOULD require Germany to divert troops from the Russian front, and that's what he wanted.

I doubt the allies could have opened a second front on France's west coast very early, but there was a lot of support that we could have opened up a second front on the coast of Mediterranean France earlier than we did.  Part of the problem was that the US was pushing for a faster entry in Europe (because that's what FDR promised to Stalin) but felt that the British-driven desire to put a crapload of troops in Italy prevented them from using the divisions necessary in Europe.  That said, Marshall did concede that an earlier attack in France may have required more manpower than the US had.

As for the American citizens, it seems that more were interested (up until June 1944) in the Pacific than what was going in Europe.  The Pacific was another factor that shelved the early France invasion: King was loathe to send any more ships and landing craft to the ETO than he absolutely needed to.  Of course, that torqued Marshall, but Churchill didn't mind.  He DID mind ANY change of focus from the ETO to the Pacific, which was an issue with King.

As for Stalin in Yalta, I think it is true that he wasn't listening to anyone's particular arguments.  Stalin wanted what Stalin wanted, and he was going to get his way (although now we know he didn't get all of the concessions he wanted). 

Truman was mightily pissed at what Stalin wanted from the Yalta conference, and he had many conversations with his chiefs about prosecuting the war in the Pacific without their help, and just writing them off.

Man, I love talking about this stuff.


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## BuckysBadger24 (Jan 29, 2016)

I agree, I don't think there's any argument that Stalin only cared about what was important to the USSR (and more importantly, what was important to Stalin).  

But without Germany becoming seriously occupied by Western forces with U.S. bolstered support in the Med., I question whether forces would have had to be diverted from the East in any significant number.  Without Operation TORCH, Germany is fighting a very reeling England, led by a very timid Montgomery.  Germany could have diverted a large amount of troops from Italy and even more from the Afrika Korps if they needed too, as England is simply on their own.  MAYBE short of Patton, Rommel was easily the cream of the war when it came to maneuver warfare.  He still led impressive victories against the Allies up until supplies began running short, including replacing lost tanks, half-tracks, etc.  Without the U.S. bringing in forces, I see no reason why Rommel doesn't continue his victories in the region, even with divisions being moved to Normandy to face what would be a mainly U.S. force, with nowhere near the amount of men, materiel, and experience it would come to have in '44, and with no bulk of forces being kept at the Pas-de-Calais to prepare for what Hitler was sure was the true invasion by a then not well known Patton.  Hell, Rommel may have even been willing to sit tight for a while until Germany decided the invasion of Europe.  Germany would bring all forces in Normandy to bear on the invasion, because most likely any feint wouldn't be considered as seriously, as the U.S. wasn't in much of a position to pull off such a successful one.  I have to think that that invasion would fail, and Stalin loses a lot more men than he did.  Not to mention, while the Allies probably still would have eventually won the war, the U.S. pretty much loses all face in the end.

Ha its funny how, just like during the war, the conversation started on the Pacific, and the interest and conversation quickly moved to the ETO isn't it?


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## Gunz (Jan 29, 2016)

Churchill had a hard-on for what he called the "soft underbelly" of Europe, going in through Italy (and later the Balkans, which, thankfully, never happened.) And he convinced FDR to sign off on the mainland Italy campaign; and IIRC, Marshall and the other chiefs thought it was a bad idea. In any case Italy turned into a meat-grinder, Salerno, Anzio, Monte Cassino, etc. Churchill had this fixation with the Med going back to the first World War, and lost his job as First Lord of the Admiralty because of his part in the engineering of the Gallipoli disaster. But he was also brilliant in so many ways and had a great deal of influence on FDR. And that had to rattle King.

During the Guadalcanal Campaign in late '42, which comprised the land battle and a number of incredibly ferocious naval surface actions, there was serious concern as to the outcome...so much so that eventually FDR told the Chiefs to give Nimitz what he needed to finish the job, even if they had to rob from the upcoming TORCH. (See how I shifted this back to the Pacific?)

(BTW, just as a personal note, my Daddy was an Army Engineer and went into the ETO during the DRAGOON operation in Southern France. He built Bailey Bridges all the way to Austria.)


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## AWP (Jan 29, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> During the Guadalcanal Campaign in late '42, which comprised the land battle and a number of incredibly ferocious naval surface actions, there was serious concern as to the outcome...so much so that eventually FDR told the Chiefs to give Nimitz what he needed to finish the job, even if they had to rob from the upcoming TORCH. (See how I shifted this back to the Pacific?)



Midway didn't break the back of IJN aviation as much as the Guadalcanal/ Solomons campaign. She lost more pilots there than at Midway. The two greatest losses to come out of Midway were carriers (duh, I know) and skilled maintainers. A/C maintainers suffered disproportionately to pilots. The Solomons was a meat grinder and the Navy took more casualties than the Marines. That isn't to minimize the Marines' sacrifices, but most people don't know how many sailors we lost.


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## Gunz (Jan 29, 2016)

I'm reading for probably the 8th time, _The Battle for Guadalcanal_ by Samuel Griffith, (a book published when I was in 4th grade), and the best account of the entire campaign I've ever read, and he gives equal treatment to the naval engagements. Horrific losses in ships and sailors, as you say, and so much so that the American public couldn't be told, for fear of the demoralizing effect it would have.

(BTW, the author, Brig Gen Griffith was the XO of the 1st Raider Battalion under Red Mike Edson and took over command of the Raiders when Edson was made CO of 5th Marines.)


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## AWP (Jan 29, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> I'm reading for probably the 8th time, _The Battle for Guadalcanal_ by Samuel Griffith, (a book published when I was in 4th grade), and the best account of the entire campaign I've ever read, and he gives equal treatment to the naval engagements. Horrific losses in ships and sailors, as you say, and so much so that the American public couldn't be told, for fear of the demoralizing effect it would have.
> 
> (BTW, the author, Brig Gen Griffith was the XO of the 1st Raider Battalion under Red Mike Edson and took over command of the Raiders when Edson was made CO of 5th Marines.)



Book Review: Neptune's Inferno

Excellent book on the naval campaign around Guadalcanal. I highly recommend the author's work.


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## pardus (Jan 30, 2016)

BuckysBadger24 said:


> I agree, I don't think there's any argument that Stalin only cared about what was important to the USSR (and more importantly, what was important to Stalin).
> 
> Like every other Allied leader.
> 
> ...


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## AWP (Jan 30, 2016)

Okay, @Red Flag 1 why the disagree for my Zero/ firepower post?

Regarding @pardus post above:

There's no denying the US played a secondary role in N. Africa. One major contribution though was aiding the Commonwealth at a time when Her navies were stretched thin and providing an anvil for Monty's hammer. The RN et. al. had their hands full with the Med, India, and the Atlantic convoys. Our entrance into the war, but in the Med especially helped lock down that "pond." The Commonwealth was hurting, but still very capable, and the US in late '42 helped to slow the bleeding.

Monty....I'm anti-Monty but for some different reasons. He was kind of the proto-Colin Powell as far as decisive force, but he really made his bones in N. Africa. He was the right guy for that time, but I think he found himself overmatched in Normandy. Some of that was his approach (which some view as "timidity" but he harbored his resources which can be understandable), but in '44 he was also hampered but dwindling manpower reserves. The Commonwealth, especially the UK, was reaching the end of its rope in '44. Still immensely capable, but running out of men. Years of war had bled them dry and that's no one's fault, that's just war. He DID tie down large amounts of German armor, but that was a mixture of truth and post-war spin. He tied it down because he or his army could take Caen. A tough nut to crack, but tying down the armor was a by product of being stalled. The US bogged down in the hedgerows and Monty kept the Germans from massing their forces in front of the Americans, but that was an accidental benefit in a bad time. He was a polarizing character and his supporters vocal and rabid at times. He was the right guy in Africa and maybe not the best choice for Normandy, BUT he was a national hero so his position in France was a foregone conclusion. His Market Garden idea was a folly then and history isn't kind in that regard, nor should it be....but Market Garden is another discussion.

I really think the key to N. Africa was Malta and to a lesser extent Gibraltar. The former was an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the right place and the latter an armed bottleneck which prevented the Germans from reinforcing the theater. Their U-boats were a disaster in the Med.

As for manpower or the mainly US force, I think you're dead wrong. I won't list the numbers, but the US had more divisions on D-Day and later more in Europe. Again, not a fault of the Commonwealth because a conflict like WWII guarantees a finite amount of manpower. The CW was being bled dry and even the US had to take measure like ending the ASTP program. We had "deeper pockets" from start to finish, but that wasn't felt until '44. That's just a function of resources, not heart.

HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Supreme Command (ETO) [Appendix E]


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## Red Flag 1 (Jan 30, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> Okay, @Red Flag 1 why the disagree for my Zero/ firepower post?
> 
> Regarding @pardus post above:
> 
> ...



The "disagree" came up because my fingers are too big for my I-Pad sometimes. It was meant as a chechmark "agree", in particular with the loss of good veteran combat pilots, to not only fly and fight; but to train newer pilots. My apologies for not having caught it in my "Read, check agree" and move on. I don't recall ever hitting disagree without explaining why I disagreed. My apologies, amigo.


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## Gunz (Jan 30, 2016)

Red Flag 1 said:


> The "disagree" came up because my fingers are too big for my I-Pad sometimes. It was meant as a chechmark "agree", in particular with the loss of good veteran combat pilots, to not only fly and fight; but to train newer pilots. My apologies for not having caught it in my "Read, check agree" and move on. I don't recall ever hitting disagree without explaining why I disagreed. My apologies, amigo.










 :-"


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## Gunz (Feb 1, 2016)

The Japanese had a fighter that could match anything the US had in the air late in the war. It was the Nakajima KI-84. It didn't go into production until late '43. From the account I'm reading it had a faster rate of climb, better agility, could fight at 30,000 feet, had self-sealing tanks and four 20mm guns. But...because of raw materials shortages and declining numbers of experienced pilots "...it's true potential could not be realized..."

Still, 3500 were manufactured.


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## pardus (Feb 3, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> Okay, @Red Flag 1 why the disagree for my Zero/ firepower post?
> 
> Regarding @pardus post above:
> 
> ...



The US was the final straw on Hitler's back, no doubt at all. The US ships were a huge factor in the winning of the war. The numbers of Victory ships along with constantly improving anti U-Boat measures saved the UK, no doubt.
Churchill himself stated that his greatest fear (or words to that effect) was the U-Boat threat, it very nearly brought the UK to it's knees.
Malta, yes absolutely was a vital lynch pin in saving the Med from Axis victory. There is a very interesting book ( I don't recall the name off the top of my head) out that I read years ago regarding a US made oil tanker that had the living shit bombed out of it trying to get to Malta, this tanker's fate was also the fate of Malta itself, so desperate the situation was.



As for D-Day... 





> "Commonwealth personnel, nearly all British and Canadian, outnumbered the Americans on D-day. Of the 156,000 men landed in France on 6 June, 73,000 were American, and 83,000 were British and Canadian, while the Commonwealth naval contingent was twice that of the Americans."


 BBC


> On D-Day, the Allies landed around 156,000 troops in Normandy. The American forces landed numbered 73,000: 23,250 on Utah Beach, 34,250 on Omaha Beach, and 15,500 airborne troops. In the British and Canadian sector, 83,115 troops were landed (61,715 of them British): 24,970 on Gold Beach, 21,400 on Juno Beach, 28,845 on Sword Beach, and 7900 airborne troops.



D-Day Museum and Overlord Embroidery

Also there can be no denying that it was mainly the Brits and Canadians who took on the brunt of the fighting in Normandy and wore down the German forces.  
That is no slam whatsoever on the American forces. 
http://www.ddaymuseum.co.uk/d-day/d...f-normandy-your-questions-answered#whichtroop


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## BuckysBadger24 (Feb 4, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> The Japanese had a fighter that could match anything the US had in the air late in the war. It was the Nakajima KI-84. It didn't go into production until late '43. From the account I'm reading it had a faster rate of climb, better agility, could fight at 30,000 feet, had self-sealing tanks and four 20mm guns. But...because of raw materials shortages and declining numbers of experienced pilots "...it's true potential could not be realized..."
> 
> Still, 3500 were manufactured.



Thanks for the post, had no idea they were even closer to an aircraft of that caliber, let alone producing them.  Too late to be any factor, but had they been able to get them into motion, could have caused stupid headaches.  

Learn something new every time I log in to this site.  As @Devildoc said, I love talking and reading about this stuff.


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## AWP (Feb 4, 2016)

pardus said:


> Churchill himself stated that his greatest fear (or words to that effect) was the U-Boat threat, it very nearly brought the UK to it's knees.
> 
> As for D-Day...  BBC
> 
> ...



U-Boats: Short answer's "no." The UK didn't suffer as much as the narrative portrays. Clay Blair spent a lot of time covering the reasons why/ why not. Churchill made that statement but given what is known his reason(s) for it aren't understood. WWI is a different story and maybe the worry or perception was there regarding WWII, but the Germans were never even close to knocking out the UK via U-Boats.

Overlord/ Normandy: You win this round. Curses, foiled again!


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## Devildoc (Feb 5, 2016)

RE: FDR, Stalin, and Yalta, I read this today:

Roosevelt’s Failure at Yalta


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## Red Flag 1 (Feb 5, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> RE: FDR, Stalin, and Yalta, I read this today:
> 
> Roosevelt’s Failure at Yalta




Another great read is," FDR's Last Year" by Jim Bishop. FDR was physically not a well man at Yalta. The attending Docs were very worried about FDR even surviving the trip, let alone the whole Yalta interface. Much was done for the POTUS by aides and other informed minds. Just looking at the photos of FDR at Yalta are very revealing. FDR's big worry was keeping Stalin and Churchill apart. Churchill did not like or trust Stalin at all. If you can find a copy of Jim Bishop's book, it will give you a better idea of what FDR was up against, just getting through the day.


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## Devildoc (Feb 6, 2016)

Red Flag 1 said:


> Another great read is," FDR's Last Year" by Jim Bishop. FDR was physically not a well man at Yalta. The attending Docs were very worried about FDR even surviving the trip, let alone the whole Yalta interface. Much was done for the POTUS by aides and other informed minds. Just looking at the photos of FDR at Yalta are very revealing. FDR's big worry was keeping Stalin and Churchill apart. Churchill did not like or trust Stalin at all. If you can find a copy of Jim Bishop's book, it will give you a better idea of what FDR was up against, just getting through the day.



And Yalta was dank, had bedbugs, communal bathrooms.  It was not set up for success, except for the Russians.  Not only did Churchill and Stalin not like one another, FDR played each off the other.


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## pardus (Feb 8, 2016)

FDR's foolish and naive stance with Stalin was a major cause of the Cold War, and cost millions of lives as a result. I don't have a lot of respect for him at this point.


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