# Massive Cuts to Army Force Structure



## Marauder06 (Jun 25, 2013)

10+ brigades gone.  And this may be just the start.

http://www.stripes.com/army-cutting-combat-brigades-at-10-us-bases-1.227473#.Ucm1UtyyUFU.twitter



> WASHINGTON — The Army on Tuesday announced major force structure cuts that will drop the number of brigade combat teams from 45 to 33, saying further shrinkage of the federal defense budget would require even deeper cuts and further lessen the Army’s combat power.
> 
> The Army previously announced it would reduce its end-strength from its current level of 541,000 to 490,000 soldiers by 2017 under the $487 billion of spending reductions mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act, but until Tuesday had only announced it was cutting two brigades in Europe.
> 
> ...


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## AWP (Jun 25, 2013)

- How many of these are the 4th BCT added to each division due to Iraq?
- Only two INF BN's per BDE was the norm?
   -When did that change and
   - That brings it back to what it used to be: 3 manuever elements.
- Adding additional engineers? I guess RCT's and IED's have influenced our thinking. I hope we aren't fighting the last war with these changes....we're pretty good about that.
- It sounds like (my impression is), given the addition of 11 and 12 series to a BCT, that the support slices will take the largest hit. As a support guy and fobbit I'd like to say "ABOUT BLOODY TIME!" Problem: are those cuts realistic or is G-1 looking at contractors as the stop gap solution (going on over a decade now...some "temporary" fix)? There is too much dead weight hanging around bases like BAF and KAF and I'm sure Iraq had the same issue.

Now the issue is will the cuts be smart (dropping some of the turds we kept in due to Iraq)?


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## reed11b (Jun 25, 2013)

Notice no flag positions are on the chopping block. Says something about Army priorities.
Reed


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## Soldado (Jun 25, 2013)

You guys have too much soldiers while we do not have enough soldiers.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Jun 25, 2013)

Hell why not Afghanistan is almost over and we're not going to be fighting any drawn out wars anymore....right? 

Right!


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## DA SWO (Jun 25, 2013)

Does this bring the Army down to Pre 9/11 levels?


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## RetPara (Jul 2, 2013)

Welcome to the mid 70's and early 90's.....  again...


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## pardus (Jul 3, 2013)

I recently read in article in the Armt Times that had a break down of costs for both maintaining and deploying active duty troops vs reserve/guard troops.

Significant savings for using reserve/guard over active duty. Will be interesting to see the impact of that.


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## Marauder06 (Jul 3, 2013)

pardus said:


> I recently read in article in the Armt Times that had a break down of costs for both maintaining and deploying active duty troops vs reserve/guard troops.
> 
> Significant savings for using reserve/guard over active duty. Will be interesting to see the impact of that.



Significant savings of money during peacetime, the cost is bodies during the next war.


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## AWP (Jul 3, 2013)

pardus said:


> I recently read in article in the Armt Times that had a break down of costs for both maintaining and deploying active duty troops vs reserve/guard troops.
> 
> Significant savings for using reserve/guard over active duty. Will be interesting to see the impact of that.


 
Impact: none. The use of the Reserve Component is too political or else more Guard/ Reserve troops would have deployed over the last decade. You know I'm a Guard guy, so this isn't a slight on those who were deployed, but the reality is that same units barely did anything. FL has two with one deployment each and both weren't until 2008 or so.

We were always told that the Guard wouldn't be a replacement depot for the AD side, that we'd fight as a BN. At least one deployment of 3/20 didn't conform to this and they augmented 3rd Group

The use of the Reserve Component is very political. They weren't used in Vietnam for that reason alone and their use during the GWOT was limited.


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## reed11b (Jul 3, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> Impact: none. The use of the Reserve Component is too political or else more Guard/ Reserve troops would have deployed over the last decade. You know I'm a Guard guy, so this isn't a slight on those who were deployed, but the reality is that same units barely did anything. FL has two with one deployment each and both weren't until 2008 or so.
> 
> We were always told that the Guard wouldn't be a replacement depot for the AD side, that we'd fight as a BN. At least one deployment of 3/20 didn't conform to this and they augmented 3rd Group
> 
> The use of the Reserve Component is very political. They weren't used in Vietnam for that reason alone and their use during the GWOT was limited.


While this may be true for SOF components and later in the war, from '03 to at least '05 NG and reserve units were anywhere from 30-60% of the deployed total and NG combat arms unit had there own battlespace that they would be completely responsible for. By '08 they seemed to have lost this for the most part and were used as augments and for strictly force-pro roles. As much smack as we talk about the Guard, their numbers, success rate and casualty rate was equal or better then the active duty units during this early period, much to my surprise.
Reed


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## Marauder06 (Jul 3, 2013)

reed11b said:


> While this may be true for SOF components and later in the war, from '03 to at least '05 NG and reserve units were anywhere from 30-60% of the deployed total and NG combat arms unit had there own battlespace that they would be completely responsible for. By '08 they seemed to have lost this for the most part and were used as augments and for strictly force-pro roles. *As much smack as we talk about the Guard, their numbers, success rate and casualty rate was equal or better then the active duty units during this early period, much to my surprise.*
> Reed



I'm going to need to see some citations to support that statement, it doesn't jibe with what I saw on my seven deployments.  In each instance, National Guard units were far less capable than their direct active counterparts, SOF or conventional.  Some small Guard units were very good, but you don't win wars at the tactical level.

Also, low casualty figures are only an indicator that the unit was successful in not getting its troops killed or wounded, it doesn't necessarily mean that the unit contributed meaningfully to the overall war effort.  To win at the strategic level, you have to put your troops in harm's way.  And when that happens, the unit takes casualties.  If the goal is to not get people killed, then for example a National Guard division can take over for an active duty unit in... I don't know let's just say Mosul.  Then they button up in hard sites, do cursory patroling, and in general practice risk aversion.  There you go, lowest casualty figures of any rotation in that area before or since.  Meanwhile, their battlespace becomes infested with bad guys, making it even harder for the active duty unit that comes in to replace the National Guard one.  This may be one of the reasons why they were relegated to supporting roles later in the war.


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## pardus (Jul 3, 2013)

Marauder06 said:


> Significant savings of money during peacetime, the cost is bodies during the next war.



Politicians/DoD/(not fully ready to say Pentagon, but...), won't care about that until after the fact. Money is the issue here, and that's sadly the bottom line until surpassed by blood.

I keep thinking back to the US Military going to Southern Africa circa 1980 - 1983 to look at V hulled vehicles and deciding they didn't need them...

A numbers crunch on how many lives that would have saved in Iraq would be saddening/maddening...





Freefalling said:


> Impact: none. The use of the Reserve Component is too political or else more Guard/ Reserve troops would have deployed over the last decade. You know I'm a Guard guy, so this isn't a slight on those who were deployed, but the reality is that same units barely did anything. FL has two with one deployment each and both weren't until 2008 or so.
> 
> We were always told that the Guard wouldn't be a replacement depot for the AD side, that we'd fight as a BN. At least one deployment of 3/20 didn't conform to this and they augmented 3rd Group
> 
> The use of the Reserve Component is very political. They weren't used in Vietnam for that reason alone and their use during the GWOT was limited.



Not disputing you at all, but again, do you think this is going to be a factor when the talking heads look at the accounting papers and see how many billions of dollars they could save?


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## Ranger Psych (Jul 3, 2013)

The reserve component is very political because that's where you hide the senators kids so they don't have to deploy.


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## AWP (Jul 3, 2013)

pardus said:


> Not disputing you at all, but again, do you think this is going to be a factor when the talking heads look at the accounting papers and see how many billions of dollars they could save?


 
I do. In addition to Vietnam, Rumsfeld's stupid ass tightly controlled the activation of RC units. In part because he didn't believe a lot of troops were necessary for the Iraq invasion and in part because the activation of RC troops around Christmas 2002 would cause problems. Real or not, the political spector of activating RC soldiers is a concern in Washington.

I specifically omitted the Air Guard because they are probably the world's largest, most expensive individual augmentee program. I'm sure some squadrons deploy as a unit, but most parcel out their airmen on a volunteer status and the AD is left to backfill those positions which the AG cannot/ will not man.


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## pardus (Jul 3, 2013)

Roger. 
Whatever happens it's going to suck.

When I first read the paper on the RC cost savings, my mind immediately thought about the war of 1812...


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## x SF med (Jul 3, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> - How many of these are the 4th BCT added to each division due to Iraq?
> - Only two INF BN's per BDE was the norm?
> -When did that change and
> - That brings it back to what it used to be: 3 manuever elements.
> ...


 

and this is why the US is always accused of fighting the last war/conflict until we're 1/2 way through the latest one...  realignment based on where we were, not on what we expect to happen.

...and so it goes.


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## DA SWO (Jul 3, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> Impact: none. The use of the Reserve Component is too political or else more Guard/ Reserve troops would have deployed over the last decade. You know I'm a Guard guy, so this isn't a slight on those who were deployed, but the reality is that same units barely did anything. FL has two with one deployment each and both weren't until 2008 or so.
> 
> We were always told that the Guard wouldn't be a replacement depot for the AD side, that we'd fight as a BN. At least one deployment of 3/20 didn't conform to this and they augmented 3rd Group
> 
> The use of the Reserve Component is very political. They weren't used in Vietnam for that reason alone and their use during the GWOT was limited.



Not totally true.

ANG units rotated in/out of S. NV with F-102 providing Air Defense, and later on some support missions.
AF Reserve units flew cargo runs along with AD.
IN NG Ranger Co was activated, and did 12 months 'in the box"; IIRC a WV NG Artilllery unit also went in.

Reserve/NG wasn't used much and that it one of the (stated) reasons we went with the Total Force concept.

I can say Air Reserve and Guard units have been there early on in everything we've done since Vietnam.


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## AWP (Jul 3, 2013)

SOWT said:


> Reserve/NG wasn't used much and that it one of the (stated) reasons we went with the Total Force concept.
> 
> I can say Air Reserve and Guard units have been there early on in everything we've done since Vietnam.


 
You proved my point though I wasn't totally clear or correct. A handful of Guard units being sent to S. Vietnam can fly under the radar. Activating brigades changes the political dynamic. When you look at the number of forces deployed to S. Vietnam compared to the RC forces left in the states and those activated vs. those who weren't...the numbers aren't even close.

And yes, Air Guard units were involved early on...but not the entire unit. I know quite a few "units" which deployed, but they were more of a task force or ad hoc scenario than an entire squadron, group, or wing. Some of that is the nature of the AG mission, we can't expect the Air Defense Sectors to pack up and deploy (though some of their support slices have). I'm speaking mainly for the rest of the Air Guard: ATC and ACS squadrons, Combat Comm, even the -130 squadrons. You can't send all of your security forces because then you have to move airmen from other bases to cover the one left behind. So, some units can't deploy as a whole, and others simply don't. 180-day deployments and AG airmen are dividing that up into 30 days here, 90 days, 60 days...whatever. While that's the system, that's why I made the comment I did: they are mostly individual augmentees. 

Guard units used in Vietnam:
http://www.ngef.org/index.asp?bid=48

http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_State's_National_Guard_units_served_during_the_Vietnam_War

From the first link:


> The following units were not deployed to Vietnam; however, large numbers of Guardsmen were levied and sent as individual replacements to RVN:


 
That's not the way the Guard was designed. Whether we agree with it or not, the Guard isn't designed to form a pool of individual replacements.

Of course, then you have units like FL's 53rd Infantry BDE which had to strip qualified 11B's from other units (even secondary MOS') to meet required manning levels for at least one of its deployments.


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## reed11b (Jul 3, 2013)

Marauder06 said:


> Also, low casualty figures are only an indicator that the unit was successful in not getting its troops killed or wounded, it doesn't necessarily mean that the unit contributed meaningfully to the overall war effort.  To win at the strategic level, you have to put your troops in harm's way.  And when that happens, the unit takes casualties.  If the goal is to not get people killed, then for example a National Guard division can take over for an active duty unit in... I don't know let's just say Mosul.  Then they button up in hard sites, do cursory patroling, and in general practice risk aversion.  There you go, lowest casualty figures of any rotation in that area before or since.  Meanwhile, their battlespace becomes infested with bad guys, making it even harder for the active duty unit that comes in to replace the National Guard one.  This may be one of the reasons why they were relegated to supporting roles later in the war.



Are you going to tell me with a straight face after seven deployments that you did not see a large number of AD COC's state their mission as, or act as if their mission was "to bring everyone home"?
Reed


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## Ranger Psych (Jul 3, 2013)

Ranger's focus on bringing everyone home by killing all the enemy first. Doesn't always work out, but it sure as hell increases survivability more than trying to turtle up without indiscriminate artillery fire.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 3, 2013)

Marauder06 said:


> I'm going to need to see some citations to support that statement, it doesn't jibe with what I saw on my seven deployments.



No disrespect, but I would like to read any stats or supporting documentation that support your claim "that NG units were less effective or capable compared to their AD counterparts". As that opinion doesn't hold much water in my experience, not only on the deployment side but also on the training and unit validation side.

I have some unit specific info/data I will share next time I am on a PC vs my phone.


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## DA SWO (Jul 3, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> I do. In addition to Vietnam, Rumsfeld's stupid ass tightly controlled the activation of RC units. In part because he didn't believe a lot of troops were necessary for the Iraq invasion and in part because the activation of RC troops around Christmas 2002 would cause problems. Real or not, the political spector of activating RC soldiers is a concern in Washington.
> 
> I specifically omitted the Air Guard because they are probably the world's largest, most expensive individual augmentee program. I'm sure some squadrons deploy as a unit, but most parcel out their airmen on a volunteer status and the AD is left to backfill those positions which the AG cannot/ will not man.



PA ANG is the only COMMANDO SOLO unit around.  AFSOC has sent AD folks to augment them.



Freefalling said:


> You proved my point though I wasn't totally clear or correct. A handful of Guard units being sent to S. Vietnam can fly under the radar. Activating brigades changes the political dynamic. When you look at the number of forces deployed to S. Vietnam compared to the RC forces left in the states and those activated vs. those who weren't...the numbers aren't even close.
> 
> And yes, Air Guard units were involved early on...but not the entire unit. I know quite a few "units" which deployed, but they were more of a task force or ad hoc scenario than an entire squadron, group, or wing. Some of that is the nature of the AG mission, we can't expect the Air Defense Sectors to pack up and deploy (though some of their support slices have). I'm speaking mainly for the rest of the Air Guard: ATC and ACS squadrons, Combat Comm, even the -130 squadrons. You can't send all of your security forces because then you have to move airmen from other bases to cover the one left behind. So, some units can't deploy as a whole, and others simply don't. 180-day deployments and AG airmen are dividing that up into 30 days here, 90 days, 60 days...whatever. While that's the system, that's why I made the comment I did: they are mostly individual augmentees.
> 
> ...



Maybe the Guard needs to deploy as a Bde or lower TF.


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## SpongeBob*24 (Jul 3, 2013)

Reed......
The most casualty producing units WERE NOT NG or AR.....and you know that.

I won't go toe to toe on numbers and I won't disagree that NG and AR had a HUGE part in both wars..
My hat is off to both...

But come on really.....we all know who did what!!!


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## Marauder06 (Jul 3, 2013)

JAB said:


> No disrespect, but I would like to read any stats or supporting documentation that support your claim "that NG units were less effective or capable compared to their AD counterparts". As that opinion doesn't hold much water in my experience, not only on the deployment side but also on the training and unit validation side.
> 
> I have some unit specific info/data I will share next time I am on a PC vs my phone.



No disrespect taken- it's all good brother.    And I hope you don't think I'm deliberately seeking to disrespect the Guard, but I think what I said is both accurate and important for people to understand.   

I specified in my initial post that my comments were based on personal experience, I'm not going to spend any time looking up documentation to support my point of view- if such documentation even exists.  The Center for Army Lessons Learned might have some good, unclassified, and unbiased writeups that could support one side of this discussion or the another if someone wants to take the time to look for something more official. 

It should be intuitive though that all things being equal, an organization that does something full-time is going to be innately better that someone that does it part-time. If Guard units are just as effective as AD units in an apples-to-apples comparison, why do we even bother with AD in the first place?  Why not an all-voluteer, all-part-time force?  The answer is because there IS a difference.  A big one.  Again, I'm not bashing the Guard, they do their part and are an important component of the team.  But IMO anyone who thinks any size part-time Guard fivision is as capable as their direct counterpart on AD is deluding themselves.  Again, this doesn't mean they're "not capable," just "less capable."



reed11b said:


> Are you going to tell me with a straight face after seven deployments that you did not see a large number of AD COC's state their mission as, or act as if their mission was "to bring everyone home"?
> Reed



Officers with that degree of risk aversion typically didn't make it into the types of units I supported during the wars, so no, I didn't see it.  Ever.


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## reed11b (Jul 3, 2013)

Marauder06 said:


> It should be intuitive though that all things being equal, an organization that does something full-time is going to be innately better that someone that does it part-time. If Guard units are just as effective as AD units in an apples-to-apples comparison, why do we even bother with AD in the first place?  Why not an all-volunteer, all-part-time force?  The answer is because there IS a difference.  A big one.  Again, I'm not bashing the Guard, they do their part and are an important component of the team.  But IMO anyone who thinks any size part-time Guard fivision is as capable as their direct counterpart on AD is deluding themselves.  Again, this doesn't mean they're "not capable," just "less capable."


Not as direct as training time vs training time. Guard does have some strengths over AD. Unit cohesion, maturity, real world skills (especially the medics) and even on training, your average grunt has been in what 2 years? Your average Guard grunt has been in longer. There are clear weaknesses as well. On a whole, the physical fitness level of the NG is atrocious, technical skills take much longer to develop since we don't have new high tech equipment in peacetime, and there is a severe reduction in yearly training time. BUT, and I know you are old enough to remember this sir, peace time Army training in the conventional forces was not that intense. I spent a much greater time doing post beautification, change of command ceremonies, motor pool, mandatory paperwork, etc, then I ever did training and most of the training was still "hip pocket" training. And this was in an airborne unit, I can only imagine what day to day life in a conventional non-combat arms unit must have been like.





> Officers with that degree of risk aversion typically didn't make it into the types of units I supported during the wars, so no, I didn't see it.  Ever.


So you supported SOF units. Hardly a fair comparison for Guard units. 
Reed


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## pardus (Jul 3, 2013)

SOWT said:


> PA ANG is the only COMMANDO SOLO unit around.  AFSOC has sent AD folks to augment them.
> Maybe the Guard needs to deploy as a Bde or lower TF.



My BDE has deployed twice in the GWOT. Then piecemeal in at least one TF and a lot of individual augmentees.


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## Ranger Psych (Jul 4, 2013)

Reed, I'm going to start using your argument like a skeet range.

PULL!


reed11b said:


> Not as direct as training time vs training time.


So performing repeated and consistent training and testing isn't a gauge of unit readiness? Gee, wish I had known that so we could have blown off K22 every year and just drank beer instead

PULL!


reed11b said:


> Guard does have some strengths over AD. Unit cohesion, maturity, real world skills (especially the medics) and even on training, your average grunt has been in what 2 years? Your average Guard grunt has been in longer.


How so? Unit cohesion for a group of people that meet once a month and 2 weeks in the summer?

PULL!


reed11b said:


> maturity


Maturity when they recruit from the same stock as the regular army?

PULL!


reed11b said:


> real world skills (especially the medics)



Real world skills when recruiting from the same civilian stock and it's some college kid?  Not every NG medic (in fact very few in my experience) are actually even medics outside of the NG. Even if they're paramedics, they still have their scope they can work as with that unit and probably won't have the resources they do on an ambulance... and ACLS serves very little purpose in combat when penetrating or blast trauma are the flavor of the day.

PULL!


reed11b said:


> even on training, your average grunt has been in what 2 years? Your average Guard grunt has been in longer.



A Infantryman that's actually been training for 2 years versus an "infantryman" who's been training for 2 months (Because that's how much patrolling time you'll have with a weekend and 2 weeks in the summer)?  Really? You want to go there?  This is SPC SAW Gunner versus fresh out of OSUT PV1 FUCKIDUNNO. Reading a manual does not an expert make, you need time in the fucking woods ESPECIALLY for infantrymen.   Considering (and having seen the NG on training weekends and having NG friends) that the NG gets all the same paperwork, details, and other bullshit.... 2 years versus 2 months is a whole fucking PLANET of actually having trained and tested.


As a last shot: If national guard is so well trained and capable as you say...


Why was there a 1 year spoolup time of non-stop training and qualifications, etc, in order to deploy them... when the regular army just rolled the fuck out.

I rest my case.


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## reed11b (Jul 4, 2013)

Ranger Psych said:


> Reed, I'm going to start using your argument like a skeet range.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



(1) Unit cohesion for a group of people that have known each other for YEARS and believe it or not, talk to each other OUTSIDE of drill. (weird) 
(2) Not the same stock, lots of prior service, and for the most part older, an 18 year old Guardsman is fairly rare, while it was common on active duty
(3) Our experiences differ. Keep in mind you are comparing NG training to RANGER training. No NG unit is ever going to come close to that level of proficiency, but hardly any, if any, non-SOF  Active duty units will either.
(4) See (2) about large number of prior service, and some units do the stupid shit on drill weekends and some do not. I have been in 3 states and 5 units of the NG. Some were great, some not so much.
(5) Politics.

Look, I'm not saying the Guard is better or even as good as active duty, I'm saying that a straight "365 days of training compared to 36 days means were like 10x better" is not true, there are factors that make the Guard closer in capability to the active duty beyond just training days. Some of those things the active duty could do, and really improve themselves as well, such as recruiting a more mature base (college grads and early 20 year olds over high-school grads, allowing prior service that had been out for a short time to compete as recruiting numbers and not retention numbers, not PCSing everyone randomly every couple of years and allowing teams, squads and platoons a better chance to really gel as a unit. 
Reed


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## Ranger Psych (Jul 4, 2013)

I never said 10x better.  2 years of straight active duty with even a regular army training cycle (I spent 3 years in a Stryker Brigade, so I know what regular army's like) versus as I said a total of 1 MONTH a YEAR of training, with that month still having required stupidity that the rest of the military has to deal with? Not as well trained. 

One weekend a month of marksmanship or patrolling training isn't even maintenance level for those skills, let alone enough time to improve or actually prove proficient.

Having a whole lot of prior service doesn't count for anything... because TTP's and equipment change.. and without actual time to train?   

Your arguments aren't working. National guard specifically requires a huge workup before deploying. Regular army wether it's the 82nd or 101st or 75th or anybody else... is ready to go, NOW.  THAT is proof enough, everything else is simply addendums and asterisks as to why NG's behind the 8 ball.


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## AWP (Jul 4, 2013)

The Guard is designed around a 2-6 week train-up period with AD advisors before deploying. Even with the GWOT some units took longer and used their AT periods for an extra trip to JRTC/ NTC. The worst case is obviously the 48th BDE back in DS/ DS which never deployed.

If you can't take a Guard unit from the drill hall to the battlefield in 2 months' time, your leadership has seriously screwed you.

As to an earlier point made, and I'm not saying Guard units didn't do this, but I know of an entire AD brigade which went into casualty avoidance mode on the order of their CG and at least one aviation BN just a few years ago.

Comparing the Guard and AD is always a fruitless exercise because of the vast differences, even among identical units.


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## DA SWO (Jul 4, 2013)

Ranger Psych said:


> Reed, I'm going to start using your argument like a skeet range.
> 
> PULL!
> 
> ...


The regular Army as a whole did not just roll the fuck out.

NTC/JRTC rotations for units identified as next out so they were up to speed on current threats.

NG units took a year of drill time (vs 90 days pre-deployment time).
Were some units filled with shitbirds, yes.
Others did a great job, just like their active duty counterparts.


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## pardus (Jul 4, 2013)

Ranger Psych said:


> Maturity when they recruit from the same stock as the regular army?
> 
> Real world skills when recruiting from the same civilian stock and it's some college kid?  Not every NG medic (in fact very few in my experience) are actually even medics outside of the NG. Even if they're paramedics, they still have their scope they can work as with that unit and probably won't have the resources they do on an ambulance... and ACLS serves very little purpose in combat when penetrating or blast trauma are the flavor of the day.



NG does seem to be a little older when it comes to rank i.e. a NG E5 will on average be a little older than his AD counterpart. This is offset by his lack of training time as you have stated though IMO.

Yes NG has a lot better real world skills than AD. WTF does an AD guy who enlisted at 17-19 yr old know about the real world and working? What outside job experience skills does he bring? Not a lot.
That's like saying NG Infantry has the same training skills as AD 

Also as a NG medic, I will say NG medics are very well trained and have a lot of experience. I'd put my guys up against any conventional AD unit when it comes to medic skills.
Half of my medics are real world paramedics, nursing students (one senior ER nurse), a couple of NCOs who are ex AD medics with AD deployment time, a bunch of EMT-Bs that work as medics for FDNY, as well as other private companies and other FD's.
Once the guys have proven their skills/maturity to us senior medics and therefore the PA, our scope of practice is wider than civi medics get.

I'm not impressed with the NG at all, in fact it is a fucked up system in a lot of respects, but I'm also not impressed with conventional AD either. 
I see the same stupidity there, except done on a daily basis. Overall AD has better skills for sure, no way you can compare someone who trains for 20 days a year to someone who trains for 100-200 days (whatever the exact number is).
I hear and have seen plenty of cases of NG doing a better job than AD, I'm sure AD guys can say the same in reverse.


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## Ranger Psych (Jul 4, 2013)

This whole discussion actually completely supports my statements elsewhere about moving a large portion of CSS to the guard.  

I would rather have a truck driver that just traded his Kenworth for a HET, for just one MOS example.

Scope of practice for military medicine vs civilian... not touching that with a 10 foot pole, I know it all too well for fact.


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## Florida173 (Jul 4, 2013)

My experience with the Guard deploying at the tactical side is that it is often times unable to fulfill its mission with even 80% organic members to the the unit.  My last PAANG deployment had what seemed to be 40% or more from individual augmentees.  This was at the BDE and below level with most of the 11Bs having been inactive for a few years before being re-activated.  

I don't believe a maneuver element unit could ever be as good as their active duty counterparts with the lack of training.  Real world training is going to get you shit when you haven't done basic battle drills over and over with the same group of guys in your team/squad.  

On the other hand.. Hard to compare myself and some of the people I work with in the intel environment because of us doing real world intel work full time as contractors.. compared to a typical AD person that's likely spending time in this place I've heard about called the motorpool... even as an infantry guy at Bragg I never spent any time there..


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## pardus (Jul 4, 2013)

I'm sure AD trumps RC when it comes to combat arms type work (at least most of the time). I would be very curious to see the effectiveness of RC vs AD when it comes to CSS.


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## LimaOscarSierraTango (Jul 4, 2013)

Ranger Psych said:


> THAT is proof enough, everything else is simply addendums and asterisks as to why NG's behind the 8 ball.


 
I'm not going to agree or disagree with you or Reed.  I think everything depends on the State and the Unit (most California Units appear to be lazy compared to what I've heard in talking to people from other States).  I've been in NG Units that never did any major training, and then I spent time in 19th Group.  There is a HUGE difference between what goes on between the SOF side and the conventional side.  The SOF guys (ODA and ODB guys) were on it all the time.  Everyone was focused and always doing something.  On the conventional side, when we would hit the field, we would pop smoke.  Sometimes we would do some training, but not much IMO.  When it came to deploying, we were supposed to have a 2-month work up.  Well, an entire brigade showed up to the mob site and they had us go through the training in reverse (run, walk, crawl).  The First Army cadre (not a fan of them) learned a few things from us and told us it was unfortunate we were stuck there for two months because there was nothing they could do to prepare us more than we already were.

While overseas, the battalion we fell under gave us vehicles and missions from an AD unit that couldn't perform and stuck them at the gate.  We also had an AD unit laze an entire platoon convoying back from another FOB.  That laser was attached to an M2, which means he intentionally pointed his weapon at every vehicle in the convoy, during daylight hours. 

Do I believe the NG is "behind the 8 ball"?  In some areas, yes (mainly with combat arms).  But I also believe the AD guys are behind the 8 ball in some areas also that Reed pointed out (non-tactical skills, such as construction, building rapport with "different" people, and other "soft" skills).  It's an interesting conversation here with a lot of valid points/opinions/experiences from each side.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 4, 2013)

Standbys for one hell of a drawn the fuck out post, to address all of the weekend warrior vs day to day soldiering. 

Coming from someone who spent 10.75 year guard..... 9.5 of those were on title 10 AD orders. 

Until then ......everyone have a happy 4th of July! More to follow tomorrow


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## Marauder06 (Jul 4, 2013)

reed11b said:


> ...
> 
> 
> 
> ...




lol, well you asked me what I saw. 

This is the statement that I originally took issue with, and for which I still have yet to see any substantiation:

*



			As much smack as we talk about the Guard, their numbers, success rate and casualty rate was equal or better then the active duty units during this early period, much to my surprise.
		
Click to expand...

*
By what metrics, and by whose account?  

Might some small units (squads, ODAs) be better than some of their active components?  Perhaps.  But IMO and IME, the farther you go up the organizational chart, the more complicated things get and the harder it is for part-timers to match the effectiveness of their active components.   The main unit of employment was the brigade, right?  I would be astonished to read credible accounts of brigade size or larger units matching the effectiveness of their active components.  I don't think it happened- but I'm willing to be convinced otherwise if anyone wants to make the case.


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## pardus (Jul 5, 2013)

When I went through NTC, the training/support staff there repeatedly told us how they thought my NG BDE was awesome, when asked why, they kept telling us that the BDE from the 82nd that preceded us was ate up beyond belief. Anecdotal and taken with a pinch of salt but it happened.

My squad leader was telling a story tonight about a convoy led by an AD COL in Iraq, that he refused to allow into the fob when he was in charge of the gate as an E5.
The COL didn't have a convoy manifest, had no idea how many vehicles (civi tractor trailers) let alone how many people were on the convoy.
Interesting.

Personally I would tear the NG system down and rebuild it. Forget the weekend silliness, bring them in for *4* one week blocks a year, plus a large exercise. something like that. Or after basic/AIT cut them loose, no training at all until a deployment comes up then activate them 6 mths prior and train them up.
Ramble ramble...


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## LimaOscarSierraTango (Jul 5, 2013)

pardus said:


> Personally I would tear the NG system down and rebuild it. Forget the weekend silliness, bring them in for *4* one week blocks a year, plus a large exercise. something like that. Or after basic/AIT cut them loose, no training at all until a deployment comes up then activate them 6 mths prior and train them up.


 
I really liked how 19th had their drills set up (similar to what you are talking about).  2 drills a quarter (an admin weekend knocking out all the mandatory classes and paperwork, and a super drill that was usually a 4 or 5 day field drill) and a 1 month AT. 

I am not a fan of the no training option you mention.  Remember the Guard's primary mission is a State mission.  Some of the units actually train for their mission.  Not only that, if you don't have monthly training, imagine how many more fat bodies you'll be dealing with.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 5, 2013)

Okay, the idea that AD is better, more capable or more competent than NG because AD “does it full time” is not true at all IMHO. It may have been true before or at the very beginning of the war. However, over the last decade the NG has become a very capable force within the current force structure. The AD Army would not be able to go to war under our current deployment scheme without the NG. The AD Army knows they need a competent force to call on, and that is why the NG structure, training and equipment have grown so much over the past decade. Now this is geared towards conventional forces and not SOF. I lack any experience working with SOF units out side of supporting a few missions and some training aspects. Nothing of which is worth using as any form of judgment on the generalizations of capabilities between the AD or NG special ops forces. So any of you SOF guys reading this, please do not take this as my opinions about SOF or anything to do with SOF. I am speaking to the conventional side of the house….period.
Some of the issues:

Unit manning (strength/ under strength issues): is a big draw back of the NG, it primarily comes from the way the NG recruits and assigns new recruits. In the NG there is not a DEP, once you sign and swear, you are now assigned to a unit. That unit plugs you into the MTO-E and carries you as duty position filled. In other words some units would hand you a uniform and have you fall into a platoon before you ever got a ship date to BCT/AIT. In theory it is a good thing, the unit gets to prep you and make sure you are ready before you go to BCT/AIT. The other theory is that it screws up the manning rosters and shows units at strength or at deployable strength, when the unit is in fact not at strength and has several recruits who need to attend BCT/AIT before they can become a deployable asset. Another issue is broke dick 30 year E5/E6’s who hold slots trying to gain a better retirement. This is IMHO the most ate the fuck up problem in the NG, a non-deployable person holding a slot of rank, that keeps capable soldiers from being promoted and also reducing manning strength numbers when it comes time to SRP for deployment.

Training: The training NG receives is top notch, and IMHO better than most AD units get (most, not all). Over the course of the past decade, the NG was pretty damn smart. They took their returning soldiers, kept volunteers on title 10 orders to train up the next NG units to deploy. Basically each deploying unit got the most up to date, lessons learned, and TTPs. This has continued to grow into something that is just unbelievable to see. For me as someone who did the 6 month AD integration train up (sucked balls). To then come back and be one of the retuning vets training the new deploying units. To go back through a train up that had been broken down to a 52 day science and deploy, it was pure amazement. The two big events that brought me to the conclusion that NG training was better than AD was, 1) when I was tasked to go training and OC/T AD units as a NG trainer, and 2) when I got to see NG and AD training together in Kuwait and NG soldiers performances were far exceeding that of the AD soldiers. Up until 2010 (not sure if it is still happening or not) my NG/RC unit was providing designated marksman training for the 82nd Airborne Div….

Leadership: I think this is very complex and extremely hard for me to point out leadership down falls for the NG. Mainly because a lot of the problems stemming from leadership in NG are also effecting AD. I think the best way for me to break it down is by ranking:

JRNCO- I believe the NG has better E5-E6’s because they are normally older, more experienced, generally with prior service in AD or multiple deployments. They tend to bring tactical and technical proficiency than what I have seen from AD. Now this is not to discredit the AD E5/E6’s because I have met great ones in both branches, but with a generalization I have seen better junior leadership in the NG. Keep in mind, most E5/E6’s in the NG have 10-15 years experience vs the 3-9 years of AD.

SRNCO- the AD has much better senior NCO leadership IMHO. Most of the E7-E9’s I worked with in the NG were lost like a bastard on father’s day. Not all, but again with generalizations, AD has much better senior NCO’s.

JR Officers- my experience with O1-O3’s has been pretty much hit and miss. I would say that most of the PL’s were the same from AD or NG. Company CO’s was pretty much the same as well, however the best company commander I had was a AD O3, assigned to a NG company on deployment. I would say however in general the NG and AD junior officers are about even in leadership skill.

Field Grade- I’ve only had one good O5 btn commander, and that was on my first deployment. By far one of the best btn CO’s I have ever worked for. That said I would say that I have also had some run-ins with shitty O4’s on the AD side. I also have some prejudice against 3BCT 1st Cav from my first deployment. However, the Cav is hardly the unit to make a general comparison of AD. I would say that AD and NG are about even in field grade leadership; however, I think AD has better field grade officers in general.

Flag- I think both the AD and NG is ate up with stupid at this level and I don’t feel any of the star wearers on either side are worth the pay they were receiving. Excluding the very few, that tend to not make it above division command.

Capabilities: I think the NG is much better at peace keeping operations, disaster response and general security operations than their AD counterparts. I think AD has proven that they are exceptional at conducting force on force invasions, maneuver warfare and heavy armored conventional warfare. As for full spectrum warfare (COIN) I think both AD and NG conventional force suck equally at it.

My experience 1st Deployment (OIF 03-05 Full Spectrum Operations):

My battalion 1-153 INF (Light) was taken from our parent 39th Infantry Enhanced Brigade and attached to 3BCT 1st Cav. A battalion from the 3BCT was in return sent to the 39th. That’s a light NG battalion being assigned to an AD Mech Brigade, and a Mech AD battalion being assigned to a NG Light Brigade. It sounds pretty crazy and it was, but it worked out fairly well.

We (the NG battalion) started our training 6 months prior to deploying; our battalion trained under 3 BCT, following the AD training schedule. This was a total waste of time, we basically conducted all of our own training as a battalion, did not interact with 3BCT or any of the units we were supposed to work with. Imagine being a NG battalion on FT Hood, never training there, never interacting with other units there, and more or less being banished from the AD unit you were supposed to fall under. Think how difficult it is just to lay on a range when you did not have the post SOP’s, etc. Meanwhile when it came time for unit validation, our battalion validated on time and was the only unit in 3 BCT to do so (i.e. the other AD battalions had trouble validating, took longer time). Anyway, to keep this short we met all of our pre-deployment validations, did a JRTC rotation and had no issues.

As we got to our A/O in Baghdad, we started to conduct our right seat/left seat with an AD battalion from 1st Armored Div. These guys freaking hated us (NG has no business here, etc, etc). Our first tell-tell of how ate up of a unit we were replacing was a simple PCI/PCC. These AD soldier did not check their troops more than a head count, did not even have a patrol roster and our Btn CO basically refused to allow us to go out with these guys until they un-fucked themselves. That’s pretty sad, when you have a NG Btn commander telling an AD unit to get their shit right before you take his boys out on a patrol. Anyway we got through the BS and finely took over the sector. Once in place we had several issues sent up to 3BCT that were more or less turned down because the AD battalion we replaced did not do it that way. My platoon got hit with VBIED at a check point that was not hardened because of how AD did things. We took 1 KIA and 3 WIA, because the very ForcePro assessment/ recommendations we turned in 30 days prior was turned down by an AD brigade. Needless to say we (our battalion) started going around 3BCT to get things we needed, or when the AD vs NG problems put out soldiers in un-necessary jeopardy. Not the best thing to do, but about the only thing you can do when an AD brigade had no fucking clue.

Now the comparison of our NG Btn to our AD Btn counterparts during this deployment is not fair. Our Btn was better equipped due to our “enhanced brigade” status, our training was not the same and we tended to be hard charges due to the unique leadership we had in this specific Btn. Needless to say however, our Btn did perform much better than the other AD Btn’s assigned to 3BCT 1st Cav during that deployment. Some specifics:


> TF 1–153rd conducted over seventy raids, 8,280 patrols and 1,440 traffic control points during its deployment, resulting in 120 insurgents captured and numerous Rocket Propelled Greanades (RPGs), explosives, and weapons captured. The task force’s effectiveness was reflected in a captured arms dealer’s refusal to bring shipments of heavy weapons into Karradah for fear of capture in one of the many traffic control points established by the task force. The task force was also responsible for securing numerous high value assets (HVAs) located in its area of responsibility, including the Japanese, South Korean, Kuwait and Polish Embassies, Baghdad University, and the World Health Organization.
> In June 2004, the task force participated in a cordon and search operation which resulted in the discovery and disarming of a large improvised explosive device (IED) emplaced to kill the Japanese Charge d ‘Affairs, and the capture of the individuals responsible for its emplacement. In January 2005, the task force responded to a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI) headquarters. The attack resulted in thirteen dead and over fifty wounded Iraqi civilians. Company A and the task force Quick Reaction Force (QRF) cordoned the area against further attack and immediately began rendering aid to wounded Iraqis. The task force later assisted SCIRI as they conducted a force protection assessment and emplaced barriers to harden the facility. Mr. Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, the head of the party later thanked General Casey for the task force’s quick response and assistance. In total, the task force was attacked by twelve VBIEDs, twenty seven IEDs, forty seven indirect fire attacks, and fifty three attacks by small arms.
> C/1-153 IN also conducted numerous combat operations on Haifa Street in Zone 8S that resulted in the capture of 114 insurgents, and numerous RPGs, mortars, and explosives. The battalion also trained Company A, 302nd Battalion of the Iraqi National Guard to company proficiency. Company A, 302d later acquitted itself well in intense, sustained combat operations on Haifa Street. The task force also implemented over $5.6 million in community improvement projects and projects to restore essential services in Karradah. The money was spent to provide the greatest economic stimulus possible to the Karradah District and resulted in the creation of over 2,000 temporary jobs.
> TF 1-153 INF captured six division targets and contained or disrupted fifteen Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks in their sector. The battalion worked to suppress indirect fire attacks on the International Zone during the Transfer of Iraqi Sovereignty and weekly Iraqi National Congress meetings. The 1–153rd commander, LTC Kendall Penn also worked closely with the Karahda District Counsel to oversee over six million dollars of infrastructure and community improvement projects in the battalion's area of operations.


 
Not to damn shabby for a bunch of weekend warriors… We were the only NG Btn to be awarded the Presidential Maritoriues Unit Citation out of our Brigade. That’s not to say much, but being the bastard NG child of an AD BCT, it was at least something.

Some other little tid-bits, many of our guys to include myself were put in for several awards B Star with V and S Star, non of of them being approved except for our KIA’s. Meanwhile, many of the AD soldiers in other Btn’s received B & S Stars for actions not  as significant. AD commanders keeping less capabale NG soldiers in their place maybe? That’s another topic I am not going to get into, it is what it is…

I can go on and on and on, I’ve trained both NG and AD soldiers, I have served under both NG and AD units, I have gone through the ringer for my country as a National Guard Soldier and anyone who wants to call me less capable than or say my service was less effective than an AD soldier can kiss my ass.


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## Florida173 (Jul 5, 2013)

Anyone's opinions in here are just that.. Anecdotal at best.  YMMV


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## SpongeBob*24 (Jul 5, 2013)

I not gonna lie...this reminds me of people fighting over who took the fattest girl home from the bar last night.....:-"


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## pardus (Jul 5, 2013)

Florida173 said:


> Anyone's opinions in here are just that.. Anecdotal at best.  YMMV



Indeed, ask 100 people you'll get 100 opinons. Doesn't mean they aren't valid however...

Thats like telling someone who comes off a mission during the debrief that their statement is anecdotal at best.


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## pardus (Jul 5, 2013)

LimaOscarSierraTango said:


> I really liked how 19th had their drills set up (similar to what you are talking about).  2 drills a quarter (an admin weekend knocking out all the mandatory classes and paperwork, and a super drill that was usually a 4 or 5 day field drill) and a 1 month AT.
> 
> I am not a fan of the no training option you mention.  Remember the Guard's primary mission is a State mission.  Some of the units actually train for their mission.  Not only that, if you don't have monthly training, imagine how many more fat bodies you'll be dealing with.



I did not take into account the state mission...

As for the fat bodies, yeah I thought of that and dismissed it. 6 months on title 10, PT almost everyday, fail the PT test and you are off the deployment and get a General Discharge. RUN FATTY RUN!


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## LimaOscarSierraTango (Jul 5, 2013)

pardus said:


> I did not take into account the state mission...
> 
> As for the fat bodies, yeah I thought of that and dismissed it. 6 months on title 10, PT almost everyday, fail the PT test and you are off the deployment and get a General Discharge. RUN FATTY RUN!


 
Meh, it won't get all of the fat bodies off the deployment, and I would expect the ones that do get pulled off of it are the ones that are good at their job.  The real shitbirds will still find a way to stay on it.  IMO, all it will do is create a little safe haven for people that want the uniform but aren't willing to put in the work.

Unfortunately, politics has a nice was of causing hiccups in what could be a successful change.


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## ThunderHorse (Jul 8, 2013)

So should I be calling my Branch Manager...today?  I'm from 3/1 at Knox.


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## DA SWO (Jul 8, 2013)

ThunderHorse said:


> So should I be calling my Branch Manager...today?  I'm from 3/1 at Knox.


??

Guess I missed something.


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## ThunderHorse (Jul 8, 2013)

3/1 ID at Knox is one of the ten brigades now scheduled to deactivate which is two brigades from 1st ID so I don't think I'll be going to Ft Riley.


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## Marauder06 (Jul 8, 2013)

Deactivations typically take a good bit of time, so you may get there in time to do final maintenance and help roll up the unit colors... which will be decidedly


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## ThunderHorse (Jul 8, 2013)

I'm already there...so I'd like to be somewhere else, from what I understand deactivations are not fun.


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## Marauder06 (Jul 8, 2013)

The worst part might be knowing you're not going to deploy.  Is this your first duty station?


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## ThunderHorse (Jul 8, 2013)

Got here too late, 70% force cap and no open jobs kept me in the rear.  Didn't want to, but going to Ranger in September, get through there and I might get January and part of February on the other side.


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## DA SWO (Jul 8, 2013)

ThunderHorse said:


> Got here too late, 70% force cap and no open jobs kept me in the rear.  Didn't want to, but going to Ranger in September, get through there and I might get January and part of February on the other side.


Peacetime Army cometh, that Ranger Tab will go a long way.


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