# How to Fix the Army



## Marauder06 (Nov 28, 2011)

I found a couple of "How to Fix the Army" articles in Foreign Policy that I thought might generate some interesting conversation.  Here's the first in the series:



http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/16/how_to_fix_the_army_in_66_easy_steps_i

Philosophy

CSA position needs to be Commandant-like, commanding the Army, not just directing the Army staff, assigning Generals or formulating the Army budget. Army structure should empower him to do so.
Don't be afraid to admit mistakes, acknowledge that the institution made a mistake and then fix it, even if it means going back to the way something was in the past or even getting a black eye.
Do not, I say again, do not, have a regulation/policy/or law that you are unwilling or reluctant to enforce; examples, enforcement of the height/weight program, or the prohibition of cell phone use in moving autos. To do less is to violate the first principle of leadership and makes a mockery of the institution. Enforce unilaterally, not out of convenience. Perfect example is the inability to enforce the Army height/weight standards in order to maintain force structure manning for deployments. Cynics develop over things like that.
Eliminate NCO business or NCO time as an institutional mantra. It becomes Army business or all our business, focused on one solution and focus.
Do nothing in the Army that does not build soldiers' and officers' confidence in themselves and their units.


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## 0699 (Nov 28, 2011)

Marauder06 said:


> I found a couple of "How to Fix the Army" articles in Foreign Policy that I thought might generate some interesting conversation. Here's the first in the series:
> 
> 
> 
> ...


 

A lot of good ideas here.  To focus on what I've bolded; I'd agree with that statement, but let NCOs solve problems at their level that can be solved there.  The OIC/CO doesn't need to solve every problem.

I was a big fan of the Force Preservation Program at Camp Lejeune in the 06-08 time frame (not sure if they still do it).  Effectively, for Marines identified as high-risk while off duty like Marines with DUIs and such, the CO (formally, in an authorization letter) delegated the authority to his NCOs to restrict privlidges such as going off-base, after-hours liberty, and wearing of civilian clothes.  Put the authority to make decisions at the level they belong.


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## TLDR20 (Nov 28, 2011)

Last time I checked our "broken" army is fighting two wars, while effectively maintaining a global presence and deterrent. Seems to be working. I don't like the title as it implies something is seriously broken!


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## goon175 (Nov 28, 2011)

It is not broke, but there are many areas that can be improved on. Maintaining the current standards and enforcing them would be a great start - Ht/Wt, APFT, malingering, etc.

Also, I believe if we make BCT a challenge again instead of an easy check the block that it has turned into, it will do a lot for overall confidence and morale.

We also need to retain and promote those who are constantly striving to be the best (whatever there job or duty position may be), and kick those to the side who are just along for the ride.

If we want to make the Army more expeditionary, than why do we not expand the amount of Airborne units we have? That is the most rapidly deployable expeditionary force in the military. I would be in favor of one brigade per Division being airborne and rapidly deployable, along with being Jumpmaster qualified for promotion to Sr. NCO ranks regardless of MOS.


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## AWP (Nov 28, 2011)

goon175 said:


> If we want to make the Army more expeditionary, than why do we not expand the amount of Airborne units we have? That is the most rapidly deployable expeditionary force in the military. I would be in favor of one brigade per Division being airborne and rapidly deployable, along with being Jumpmaster qualified for promotion to Sr. NCO ranks regardless of MOS.


 
Airlift is the killer.


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## DA SWO (Nov 28, 2011)

goon175 said:


> It is not broke, but there are many areas that can be improved on. Maintaining the current standards and enforcing them would be a great start - Ht/Wt, APFT, malingering, etc.
> 
> Also, I believe if we make BCT a challenge again instead of an easy check the block that it has turned into, it will do a lot for overall confidence and morale.
> 
> ...


 
Do a better job "standardizing units".
82nd and 101st should each have two Airborne Bde's and 2 AASLT BDE's.  The Airborne DRB could alternate between Bragg and Campbell.
Do away with "Mech" and just go with a Heavy (Armor) Division.
Eliminate the numbered Corps Hq or Division Hq (I would vote on killing the Corps Hq)  Send additional bodies to the Theater /Numbered Army (or eliminate the numbered Armies to retain the Corps Flag, but one layer has to go).

I like a Chief of Army Operations.
Eliminate FORSCOM/TRADOC as four star commands, Hq DA/Chief of Training (3-star) can be the TRADOC Commander. FORSCOM just goes away or becomes HQ DA/G3.

Merge OSD/Joint Staff and eliminate 50% of the positions.

Eliminate the Army Reserve AGR program.  Transfer the positions to the Active Army and make Full-Time Support to Reserve Units a PCS Assignment (think ROTC/Recruiting/etc).


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## DA SWO (Nov 28, 2011)

Freefalling said:


> Airlift is the killer.


Not when compared to rapidly moving a Striker/Armor unit.


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## TLDR20 (Nov 28, 2011)

SOWT said:


> Not when compared to rapidly moving a Striker/Armor unit.



Airlift is the killer either way. You have to have the assets to keep all those soldiers airborne q'd. Shit us a waste of money.


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## goon175 (Nov 28, 2011)

I am under no illusion that it would ever actually happen, but if there were a will, there would surely be a way. If we are gonna gouge our man power, we might as well make the soldiers left more capable and able to deploy more diversely and quickly.


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## digrar (Nov 28, 2011)

Been near on a decade since your last jump? Where as choppers are dropping people off every day.


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## DA SWO (Nov 28, 2011)

cback0220 said:


> Airlift is the killer either way. You have to have the assets to keep all those soldiers airborne q'd. Shit us a waste of money.


Not really, you could use C-27's for the local stuff.  Company level, and an occasional Bn drop.  The expense comes from the AF demanding a 2 hour low-level prior to the drop.  

Really no different then keeping ODA's qualified, which would be easier if we did it in a C-27 or CASA vice a MC-130.


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## Brill (Nov 28, 2011)

cback0220 said:


> Airlift is the killer either way. You have to have the assets to keep all those soldiers airborne q'd. Shit us a waste of money.


 
You'll see how many times your air gets canx'd in the Guard.  I've been out of jump school almost 6 months now and my ONLY jump with the unit was during AT.  Still waiting for air.


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## 0699 (Nov 28, 2011)

SOWT said:


> Not when compared to rapidly moving a Striker/Armor unit.


 
That's the advantage of the MEU.  A few days sailing and we can land a reinforced battalion, including armor, helos, CAS, artillery, and CSS.  And we can maintain them for 15 DOS while ashore.

Or we can just sit off the coast and intimidate the hell out of them.


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## Marauder06 (Nov 28, 2011)

It was 12 years between my fifth jump (jump school) and sixth jump (5th Group).

I think airmobile is a much better investment than airborne.


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## Brill (Nov 28, 2011)

Marauder06 said:


> Philosophy
> 
> CSA position needs to be Commandant-like, commanding the Army, not just directing the Army staff, assigning Generals or formulating the Army budget. Army structure should empower him to do so.
> Don't be afraid to admit mistakes, acknowledge that the institution made a mistake and then fix it, even if it means going back to the way something was in the past or even getting a black eye.
> ...


 
Ahem...tap, tap, tap...Is this thing on?

What the hell is all this corporate touchy feely crap? Admit mistakes? I need a freakin' Army policy for that? How about enabling big boys to use their skills to kill an enemy that is killing us? Anywhere, anytime, anyhow! Take the gloves off both on the battlefield and in Garrison. If you're a shitbag, I should be able to tell you you're a shitbag, provide some counseling on how to unshitcock yourself and rejoin the team. OR I should be able to send you away so I can fill your spot with another meat eater.

If we have shitbags in the Army...IT'S THE INDIVDUAL'S FAULT THE ARE A SHITBAG!!!

Regulations not willing to enforce? Who gives a damn? How about giving me a weapon system or lethal capability and order me to use restraint? Either you want me to close with and destory the enemy (or enable others to teach how to do it) or you don't. Which is it?

Regarding the NCO business...well, let me say this: if Pardus' NCO's were enabled to use their business or time effectively, we'd have a happy and successful combat medic in the Guard. We ain't perfect but I'd rather be led by a NCO rather than a freakin' commitee.

If you need personal confidence go see Dr. Phil and get out of my Army.  Successful achievement of difficult goals, both personal and team, instills confidence.  I wonder if the amputees who are still on AD and in the Guard need a confidence boost?
Let a NCO lead like a NCO should and if we screw the pooch, let us fix it.


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## TLDR20 (Nov 28, 2011)

SOWT said:


> Not really, you could use C-27's for the local stuff.  Company level, and an occasional Bn drop.  The expense comes from the AF demanding a 2 hour low-level prior to the drop.
> 
> Really no different then keeping ODA's qualified, which would be easier if we did it in a C-27 or CASA vice a MC-130.



Sorry to offend you buddy but how long have you been out? C-27's? I have never even seen one. Keeping an ODA legit qualified is hard enough... I think you may be slightly out of touch with how hard it is to actually stay airborne qualified for an individual, no less an entire new brigade.


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## DA SWO (Nov 29, 2011)

cback0220 said:


> Sorry to offend you buddy but how long have you been out? C-27's? I have never even seen one. Keeping an ODA legit qualified is hard enough... I think you may be slightly out of touch with how hard it is to actually stay airborne qualified for an individual, no less an entire new brigade.


They are a new airframe coming into the Guard.  Md and OH have them. OH is in the box now.  
I kept 36 people qualified (to include HALO) if I can do it, others should be able to do it.
Airlift has been stretched keeping 4 priority one operations going, Libya is ending, Iraq is ending, PACOM requirements are reducing. Afghanistan will be the biggest user until after 2014 when Pres Obama pulls out of there too.  
Reduced requirements should also free up Guard Helo assets, I understand the budget will suck, but people should be able to make it happen.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Nov 29, 2011)

I am LMFAO’ing a bit in this thread.

I kind of agree with the new SMA, that the key is in the discipline and training of our force. The primary thing this Army (RA, RC, NG) lacks right now is discipline and well trained leaders. If we are going to make changes, I would start there and then after we reestablish discipline and better leadership schooling, look at the force structure and how they work.

I think killing Mech would be an awful idea, Tanks cannot clear buildings by their selves. You need a dismountable force to accompany the armor. During the invasion of Iraq both DS1 and OIF was an Armor and dismount force war, the assault on Fallujah Iraq in 2004 was an Armor and dismount force. Without the dismounts the tanks get taking out with mines, anti armor and most of all lack the capability to actually secure the ground.

Airborne has its place, I think the current system of a rapid deployment division is an awesome idea. If another Granada or Panama kicks off, having a rapid deployment division that Air drop in is a good thing. I would agree with giving 101’st a BCT of Airborne, and I would even agree with doing a Stryker style BCT in every division.

The things we need to keep in mind, is that even though we have been fighting low intensity conflicts a lot this past decade. We could end up doing a big maneuver war at the drop of the hat. Having the ability to say “I am sending two mech divisions from the south, and dropping a Airborne BCT and or Div in the north” is a good capability.

My quick list of things to fix/change:

Basic Training extended to 6 months and actually prepares the soldier to show up and be integrated into the force. No more pvts showing up not wanting to get at parade rest, no more Pvts not being able to qual with an M4, no more “I can’t put my gear together”, falling out of runs, etc. Train the SOB’s before you send them to me…

NCOES, longer harder and with strict selection process. No more pinning the rank before the school, you go to school, you get selected to become the next rank after finishing the school and you pin as you return to the unit. NCO’s should meet and exceed all standards…period…. Do not pass go, do not collect $200.

Career risk adverse Officers and SrNCO get the boot, if you fail to lead because you are incompetent and afraid of getting in trouble “fuck you, you are done”. Sr Raters need to be taught how to look for this type of leadership (doing nothing is better than doing the wrong thing) and mark it down on NCOER/OER.  That is our number one issue with good retention and soldier being killed, battles not being won, etc.

Standards need to be raised to the highest of levels, you don’t make it past PVT/2LT until you are 100% meeting those high standards. Being a professional soldier means knowing your job “completely”. We do not need mediocracy within the ranks of the world’s greatest Army and if we are going to have it, it needs to be kept at the lowest levels. And those standards of training are should not be taught on-fucking-line (fucking sat through the ACT program brief today ) that is where I disagree with the SMA, that shit is stupid.

Anyway the longer story of this being kept short, cut the bullshit and enforce the discipline, raise the standards, train the soldiers completely and only promote the best. That is how you fix this Army and ensure it remains the best Army in the world…


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## DA SWO (Nov 29, 2011)

JAB said:


> I am LMFAO’ing a bit in this thread.
> 
> 
> I* think killing Mech would be an awful idea*, Tanks cannot clear buildings by their selves. You need a dismountable force to accompany the armor. During the invasion of Iraq both DS1 and OIF was an Armor and dismount force war, the assault on Fallujah Iraq in 2004 was an Armor and dismount force. Without the dismounts the tanks get taking out with mines, anti armor and most of all lack the capability to actually secure the ground.
> ...


 
You can put Bradley's/Strikers with an Armored Division.

What is the difference (Tank/APC wise) between an Armor Division and a Mech Division?


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Nov 29, 2011)

SOWT said:


> You can put Bradley's/Strikers with an Armored Division.
> 
> What is the difference (Tank/APC wise) between an Armor Division and a Mech Division?


 
Mech is Armored, no real difference really.  Stryker's are nice and fast, but the Bradley offeres alot more capability in protecting the ground forces, and sustained fire support.


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## Marauder06 (Nov 29, 2011)

Second part in the series:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/post...de_4_star_slots_and_end_the_regimental_system

Institutional

Downgrade all Army general-level commands to LTG commands. CSA and VCSA would be only 4-star generals in the Army. Army Generals serving in COCOMs could be 4-star. Doing so would help empower the CSA as the commander of the Army. The Army is roughly 60 percent the size it was in the Cold War, but with near-same institutional structure and greater rank structure. If there is concern that 3-star corps commanders could not work for 3-star major commanders, it worked well in WWII. There just needs to be a pecking order of 3-star generals. They will know and they will understand and being the professionals they are they will work together. This would greatly assist in streamlining the Army structure. For every star there is a needed staff of military and civilians to provide staff work. This reduction would greatly streamline the Army and would make it more efficient, taking out layers of bureaucracy.
Downgrade existing Army special staff billets from LTG to MG, example Dir Army budget to MG, etc. Leave principle Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 to G8 alone. Other services may have to do same in order for Army to compete in the Pentagon.
Now that the National Guard Bureau has a 4 star seat on the JCS, insist that the NG replace "U.S. Army" on the uniform with "Guardsman." They are now close to the 6th service. As such, reduce or eliminate Title 10 support to the NG. All NG budgetary and personnel issues should be Title 32.
Refer to Soldiers by rank and not pay grade, not all Sergeants are Sergeants; PV1/2 are Privates, SSGs are Staff Sergeant, MSGs are Master Sergeant, etc, and LTCs are Lt Colonel and Colonel (06) are Colonel. Refer to no one as a pay grade. It is disrespectful to do so. No professional wants to be called by or referred to as a pay grade.
Expedite soldier valorous awards so that heroism is recognized rapidly. Over three years to award a MoH is absolutely ridiculous, especially in this information age with fast moving communications. Sgt. Basilone, WWII USMC, along with three others, received his MoH 7 months after his action while still serving in the area of operations and they had no internet. The latest USMC award of the MoH took two years to approve. Even that is too long. If it is the veracity of the action that they are concerned about, I think history will tell you that war stories get more questionable with age. Go with the witness statements at the time of the action, not months later. They will be more accurate.
Assess the necessity for the manning of the Acquisition Corps (AC) with senior officers as is currently staffed. May be wrong here but the AC seems terribly top heavy. This must be a product of industry only wanting to deal with GOs or senior officers, otherwise lower level officers could easily accomplish the task. Do all those contracting GOs count in the AC and what do contracting commands command?
Acquisition Corps (AC) officers should not be the requirements generators for developing systems. A tanker should develop a new tank rather than an AC officer who wears Infantry brass from a long ago experience. An AC officer wearing MI brass should not be the principle developer for Infantry weapons systems. There are many, many examples of how this should not be done. Knowledge and hands-on experience are the key ingredient in developing new materiel, not knowledge of programmatics. Build in the programmatic experts into the system but not at the requirements generation level.
What does the regimental system do for our Army? Either give it a function or eliminate it. It means little to most Soldiers. Only value I see is to give some old General, Colonel or Sergeant Major some honorary position in his waning time.
Since 75th Ranger Regiment is not an Infantry Regiment do not allow Infantry personnel in that organization to declare 75th Infantry as a regimental affiliation. But, if we eliminate the Regimental system from a personnel perspective, don't have to worry about this. This may only be applicable to officers as most enlisted men in 75th Ranger Regiment stay in that organization until they are very senior.
Re-instill drill and ceremonies so that units can at least have confidence in unit abilities to conduct a pass in review at ceremonies. Oh, and when supervised properly, it is a tremendous discipline builder and junior NCO developer, but most officers don't know that. It is a great way to instill confidence in NCOs and discipline in Soldiers. A lost trade I think . . . unfortunately, and still needed.
Settle on a uniform set and let it alone. There are great frustrations in the Army the last several years over this. In particular, the combat uniform has seen 4 versions in 10 years and they still can't get it right. The dress uniform is a real joke, especially the Class B uniform. Even the GOs gripe about it. 2 CSAs agocould have stopped it but he did not. His predecessor made so many horrific decisions about everything, especially uniforms, that the Army has been unstable ever since. I guess the bottom line on uniforms is there are no standards. Think CSA Dempsey was on his way to fix all those items but he was there only a very short time. He would have fixed it.


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## Brill (Nov 29, 2011)

> Now that the National Guard Bureau has a 4 star seat on the JCS, insist that the NG replace "U.S. Army" on the uniform with "Guardsman." They are now close to the 6th service. As such, reduce or eliminate Title 10 support to the NG. All NG budgetary and personnel issues should be Title 32.


 
WHAT
THE
PHUK
?


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## DA SWO (Nov 29, 2011)

JAB said:


> Mech is Armored, no real difference really. Stryker's are nice and fast, but the Bradley offeres alot more capability in protecting the ground forces, and sustained fire support.


That's why I said do away with Mech and just make them Armored Divisions.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Nov 29, 2011)

SOWT said:


> That's why I said do away with Mech and just make them Armored Divisions.


 

I guess, Mech is Armor; the divisions are no different as far as I am aware of. I thought you meant get rid of Mech Infantry (i.e. Bradley or APC), and that was why I responded the way I did. The term “Mech” is normally used to describe armor mounted Infantry or Cav scouts (i.e. you ask what kind of infantry unit were you in? I would say I was Mechanized “Mech” Infantry in 1st Cav, etc). I don't see why they could not do away with the term "Mech" though, I am sure a few former paratroopers assigned to 1st Cav would appreciate it. lol It's like filth rolling off their tung when they state "Mech" lmao.


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## DA SWO (Nov 30, 2011)

Responses in the article.
1st-Why is this in Foreign Policy, that's like AUSA printing a paper on making the State Department relevant.
2-What is his backgrouns vis-a-vis the Army?





Marauder06 said:


> Second part in the series:
> 
> http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/post...de_4_star_slots_and_end_the_regimental_system
> 
> ...


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## DA SWO (Nov 30, 2011)

Ouch!
AFA E-mail this morning said the Guard was getting a seat at the JCS Table.  Bad move by NGB, avoidable had DA and DAF treated the Guard?reserve as full players.


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## reed11b (Nov 30, 2011)

While there are some good points in this article, and several not so good ones, my main disappointment is that he fails to acknowledge the BIG challenges the Army has. Those challenges are Personnel system, Readiness, Training and Acquisition. The Army’s failures on these issues stem from a WWII manning philosophy and a belief that it is actually even possible to be both 100% deployable and 100% trained. There are several others who have approached these issues in writing far better than I ever could, but basically, when you constantly have new personnel ETSing, or off at individual schools and you bring in new equipment piecemeal, a unit never gets far beyond rehashing basic skills.
 I really like the idea of bigger brigades working on a rotational readiness plan. X months on train up. During this time personnel are locked into the unit (unit should be over strength) and promotions are merit and ability based. In other words the team leader at the beginning of the train up may be a rifleman by the end of it, if he is not capable of doing the job.  Same for officers. This is followed by X months of on alert/deployment. Again personnel are locked in. The rotation ends with X months of rest/refit. This is the time when new personnel can be brought in, current member can elect to leave for advancement opportunities or for perceived better work environments, individuals go to schools, etc. This will allow units to be far better at their mission tasks and provide a much better work environment for soldiers and soldier families.
I like longer initial training and I like more UNIT training and less individual training. I know the theory is train the trainer, but how many of you have served in units were somebody has been offered schools as a reward, and they never bring much of that skill set back to the unit? And offering airborne school to a new private in a NG mechanized unit as a licky-chewie is beyond retarded and a waste of training. money, period.
Acquisition changes are better addressed by folks smarter than me.
Reed
P.S. If the above bloggers comment on the NG were to ever come to reality, the rumbling noise you would hear would be the mass exodus of the NG. Also, perhaps he fails to realize that the Army reserve has NO combat units.


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