# What Is The Purpose of Intelligence?



## Marauder06 (Mar 11, 2008)

Restarting this thread after the orginal one got off track.

A question was posed by one of our members- "what is the purpose of intelligence?"  Is it to drive ops?  To prevent surprise?  To support the commander?  Does the purpose of intel change or differ depending on the level (tactical, operational, strategic) at which the intelligence function resides?  Does one of the major "-INTs" (HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, etc.) matter more than another?

The challenge of this thead- take a position and support it.  Use your own reasoning, your own experience, your own thoughts, doctrine, history, whatever you want to use.  For purposes of this thread, there are no "wrong" answers.  

You don't have to have an intelligence  background to have an opinion.  Keep your answers consise, rational, unclassified, and above all, professional.


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## irnbndr (Mar 11, 2008)

The pourpose of intelligence:

Strategic: To provide policymakers and international consumers with products in order to enhance foriegn intelligence and shape international and domestic policies at home.

Operational:  To provide supporting intelligence consistant with strategic policies within a specified area of operation.

Tactical intelligence: To provide battlefield commanders with timely, objective and accurate information about their enemies and battlespace in order to acheive operational objectives.

Objectives of intelligence as a whole:  

1) Provide timely, accurate and relevant knowlege of the surrounding environment.

2) Assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence.


Question:  The senate Select Comittee on Intelligence (SSCI) often loses focus on how intelligence works. (Recent National Intelligence Estimates, for example)  How does one go about deciding the true effectiveness of intelligence at all three levels?  Easy if you are on of us.  If the mission is a success, intelligence was effective right?  But, what if you are on the SSCI and dealing with the subject at the policymaker level?  How then do you judge the effectiveness of an art that is hypothetical in nature in the first place?  How do you determine whether or not the intelligence produced is policy neutral or if, in fact, policy is driving operations rather than intelligence?


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## x SF med (Mar 11, 2008)

The purpose of Intelligence - to distill and analyze information into data useful to the strategic and/or tactical commands and units to keep our guys alive and make their guys dead, or disheartened.  (that's the short answer, I could go on, but I think I like this Reader's Digest version).


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 11, 2008)

> irnbndr;141132]Question:  The Senate Select Comittee on Intelligence (SSCI) often loses focus on how intelligence works. (Recent National Intelligence Estimates, for example)



*The SSCI reacts/doesn't react to all of the Info/Intel that is given to them. 

What often happens is that info/intel from one 'pet project' favorable to a  senior Senator is seen as more important than info/intel offered from a junior Senator, thus the Senior Senator's info/intel becomes more important and policy is then dictated from the more important [sic] data, even though the junior's was more up to date and correct. *



> How does one go about deciding the true effectiveness of intelligence at all three levels?
> 
> Easy if you are on of us.  If the mission is a success, intelligence was effective right?



*Sometimes not the case because we, as thinking on our feet SOF professionals, 'read' the intel and make our own assessments, arriving at and reacting on our own judgements. In other words, We fukn make those jackass Intel weenies look good, even though we had Shitty Intel.*



> But, what if you are on the SSCI and dealing with the subject at the policymaker level?  How then do you judge the effectiveness of an art that is hypothetical in nature in the first place?



*Refer to question and answer one. He who is in the Director seat makes the decisions, often based, by your own assessmnet, on a bad NIE.*



> How do you determine whether or not the intelligence produced is policy neutral or if, in fact, policy is driving operations rather than intelligence?



*That would be individual based IMO. Researching and knowing those on your side is often as important as knowing your enemies....*


:2c:


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## irnbndr (Mar 11, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> *The SSCI reacts/doesn't react to all of the Info/Intel that is given to them.
> 
> What often happens is that info/intel from one 'pet project' favorable to a  senior Senator is seen as more important than info/intel offered from a junior Senator, thus the Senior Senator's info/intel becomes more important and policy is then dictated from the more important [sic] data, even though the junior's was more up to date and correct. *



 Interesting thought.  Could this be why NIE's are so subjective with certain agencies (Replace Senator with analyst) while others such as the INR and DOE are not?  (in the case of the 2002 Iraq NIE)  And what is to say that the most recent Iran NIE is not guilty of the same influences?  Scary.

[/QUOTE]*Sometimes not the case because we, as thinking on our feet SOF professionals, 'read' the intel and make our own assessments, arriving at and reacting on our own judgements. In other words, We fukn make those jackass Intel weenies look good, even though we had Shitty Intel.*[/QUOTE]

 :eek: That's crazy talk!  Who says that?:eek: LMFAO

Good point... at the end of the- day, dusty, tired and dirty- we talk another game.

[/QUOTE]*That would be individual based IMO. Researching and knowing those on your side is often as important as knowing your enemies....*

Hmm... not sure I understand.  Maybe the beer, but that usually makes me smarter!

:2c: [/QUOTE]

What is it then?  If you are elected Senator and appointed Chairman of the SSCI, what gives you the warm and fuzzy that intel guys are doing thier job?  Keep in mind Miltary mission other than war (MMOTW).  Haiti in 1994-95 for example.  No real engagement, but billions of dollars spent. \

I don't know the answer to this. There must be some quantifying factor.

Haven't quite figured out the multi quote thing yet, my message is in your quote.


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 11, 2008)

I'll only answer one of these and then I'm bed bound. 

The 2002 NIE is still up in the air. 

Just because we haven't found WMD's yet, doesn't mean they're not there. 

After all, we just found 1,000,000 barrels of diesel (yes, 1 million) in an area that has supported thousands of troops for the last 5 years.

Mass graves are constantly found. Shit is buried over there that will be discovered decades/centuries from now. 

He had 10 years to dig a hole and hide everything. Others haven't spilled the beans and are waiting for us to leave so they can dig it out again.......IMO

How is it that you kill 100-200 people and bury them in one grave and no-one knows/saw a thing?? The same way you bury the 'big stuff' and kill everyone who knows.

:2c:


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## 275ANGER! (Mar 11, 2008)

IMO Intel is all hypothetical and until the end result of that Intel is known then the Intel cannot be quantified.

How does the “man” judge that the Intelligence community is doing its job? It is when the end result of the Intel has a “positive” or desired outcome.  We pour millions of dollars into exploiting and “researching” with uncertainty that we will be afforded something useful.  

We can also go back to policies before 9/11 that strained our battle field assets/ears to the ground/ HUMINT(rats) approach which makes Intelligence that much more effective/essential because it is there in real time... smacking you in the face... rather than relying on technology.  The ball was dropped when policy makers and bureaucrat's had the attitude “The Cold War is over”. 

I have always liked the HUMINT approach but even then that was like chasing ghost at times.  All the Intelligence platforms are essential, the more the better.    

Then again what do I know I was just a door kicker.


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## pardus (Mar 11, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> Just because we haven't found WMD's yet, doesn't mean they're not there.
> 
> After all, we just found 1,000,000 barrels of diesel (yes, 1 million) in an area that has supported thousands of troops for the last 5 years.



We have found very limited amounts of WMDs over there if my foggy brain recollects properly.

Interesting about the diesel...


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## Polar Bear (Mar 11, 2008)

Intelligence comes from the Latin verb "intellegere", which means "to understand". 

Class dismissed, Test this Friday


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## moobob (Mar 11, 2008)

As for which -INT is most important, I would say that MASINT is growing fast, and it's pretty amazing what you can find with it.

I think that HUMINT and SIGINT are at the forefront right now. SIGINT can lead to an instant target, but HUMINT, by it's nature, is a slow process. It's really like apples and oranges, but if I had to lose all and keep one, HUMINT would stay. It's the oldest form of them all.

Over reliance on IMINT has cost us dearly in other disciplines, but the new generation of UAVs has made it far more capable and relevant. It's far to easy to use deception measures against IMINT, unless it's live video.


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## Marauder06 (Mar 11, 2008)

Where are you going at Bragg?


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## car (Mar 11, 2008)

moobob said:


> As for which -INT is most important, I would say that MASINT is growing fast, and it's pretty amazing what you can find with it.
> 
> I think that HUMINT and SIGINT are at the forefront right now. SIGINT can lead to an instant target, but HUMINT, by it's nature, is a slow process. It's really like apples and oranges, but if I had to lose all and keep one, HUMINT would stay. It's the oldest form of them all.
> 
> Over reliance on IMINT has cost us dearly in other disciplines, but the new generation of UAVs has made it far more capable and relevant. It's far to easy to use deception measures against IMINT, unless it's live video.



SIGINT has always been at the forefront - said the SIGINTer -  but the fusion of all the INTs is where it's at. Getting rid of stove pipes and rice bowls (and any other catchword you can think of) is where we're going, and going successfully.


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## QC (Mar 11, 2008)

Any brand of INT finished product has to be accurate and timely.  There also is the question of bias within the finished product itself, which must be acknowledged, or at least understood. Good INT product will have no sales pitch or bias.


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## FNG_tracker (Mar 11, 2008)

Marauder06 said:


> Restarting this thread after the orginal one got off track.
> 
> A question was posed by one of our members- "what is the purpose of intelligence?"  Is it to drive ops?  To prevent surprise?  To support the commander?  Does the purpose of intel change or differ depending on the level (tactical, operational, strategic) at which the intelligence function resides?  Does one of the major "-INTs" (HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, OSINT, etc.) matter more than another?
> 
> ...



Wow..what a complicated question...as an Intel instructor for a few years now, i could give you the book defintion, but thats boring Army speak thats gaurenteed to put you to sleep in no time flat....

I will try an answer this in small groups..IMO Intel as a whole should provide the commander at what ever level the best picture of the battlefield/enemy he is facing. That being said it should drive operations to a degree, and if done correctly it should prevent suprise if you know the mindset, temperment and capabilites of the enemy you are facing. The more you know about him, the less you should be suprised about. The hardest part of intel is getting it to the warfighter in a timely fashion. Yesterdays news is just that...old news. I dont care how awesome of a powerpoint slide you put togther about the enemys strenth, and location yesterday, if he is still not there, whats the use. I have seen first hand how compartmentalized the intel community is, how much info hoarding is going on and how many assbags will delay the relase of intel so they can get credit for finding it in front of their boss...anyway..off my soap box now...

As fars as the most important INT out there, its really mission dependant. The best INT is the one you have at your disposal, and depending on what level you are at, you may not have access to all the INTS, or the time to check with all your collection platforms. I think all INTs are equally important, but they all need to put the best product they can because it may be the only thing the commander has to base his decision on.


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## car (Mar 11, 2008)

FNG_tracker said:


> The hardest part of intel is getting it to the warfighter in a timely fashion.



Been saying that for many moons. As a young 98C, I "found" ways to get info to the tactical commander that he didn't "have access" to. If you can't get info to the commander, what's the point? The community finally came around.

Then I gave a "class" to 18 series BNCOC and ANCOC about "what a SOT-A can do for you." Same thing - The "Green Door" no longer exists. It's combat information. Get it to the commander who can use it!

I think we're there now. The "enterprise" allows people at all levels to access (almost) all information/intel. :2c:


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## irnbndr (Mar 11, 2008)

FNG_tracker said:


> As fars as the most important INT out there, its really mission dependant. *The best INT is the one you have at your disposal, and depending on what level you are at, you may not have access to all the INTS, or the time to check with all your collection platforms.* I think all INTs are equally important, but they all need to put the best product they can because it may be the only thing the commander has to base his decision on.



Great answer...


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## moobob (Mar 12, 2008)

I'm supposed to goto the 82nd, not that I'm underhandedly trying to go elsewhere up until the moment I physically sign in or anything...



			
				irnbndr said:
			
		

> The duece.... sign a ranger contract, quick!


 Not to get off topic, but I did put in a packet and was denied at HRC because I quit SF selection, and the Ranger liaison doesn't want to waste money on me. Understandable (*cough* bad decision *cough*).

Now, I had ligament damage in my foot and was on crutches for a couple months immediately after I got back, but I was not med-dropped and am NTR. If I hadn't messed that up as a Specialist 4 months into my first duty station, I'm pretty sure I'd be on orders there right now. Lesson learned: Not only did I fail, but as far as assignment potential goes, I damaged my career. I'm otherwise being fast-tracked promotion-wise, for better or worse. I'm OK with going to the 82nd, but there are other places on Bragg I'd much rather go... Regardless, I am still planning to pursue SF when the right time and opportunity presents itself in the future.

My MOS is fairly new to the Rangers and there is a chronic NCO shortage in the field. The field is pretty small, and I don't know a SSG that knows what he's doing that would even consider going there (because of the typical type of dude in the job, and other opportunities out there). Plenty of Privates though, so they will eventually grow their own NCOs I guess.


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## varsity (Mar 12, 2008)

This thread has been hijacked but I have to put this out.



			
				moobob said:
			
		

> Not to get off topic, but I did put in a packet and was denied at HRC because I quit SF selection, and the Ranger liaison doesn't want to waste money on me. Understandable (*cough* bad decision *cough*).



Don't let that get you down.  I know plenty of guys who quit either BUDS or selection early on in there careers and then went back with more maturity and passion and made great assets to their units.  You can learn a lot in the 82nd and you WILL see combat.  Pay attention, learn from senior NCO's and you will be fine.  Remember, if you want something, the only thing holding you back is you.


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## JBS (Mar 12, 2008)

Intelligence, as I understand it is very simply:


What does a given organization (military, political, private) know about a particular subject?

The underlying data upon which all decisions are based is "intelligence".

Before a policymaker can can make a policy, before a military strategist can build his plans for attack or defense, there must be an absolute basic set of facts that will be considered.  This basic set of facts is the intelligence.


The finer the resolution, and the more detailed the intelligence gets, the less "knowable" something may be.  Eventually some details that cannot be directly confirmed must be extrapolated from other, secondary evidence.  For example, we might not be able to find a nuclear bomb built by an enemy force, but a nuclear detonation on a designated facility inside the enemy's border, is a good indicator that our enemy has a nuclear capability- even without a sample bomb to study.


Simply put, intelligence is what we know- to whatever degree a subject is actually knowable.


When you are talking politics or socio-economic data, intelligence may come from open sources.  For geo-spatial needs (maps, etc.) that might come from photographs of a given area.  Intelligence is a huge, multifaceted subject, each aspect of which could probably fill a whole library. 

How it is used depends on who you are, and how precise the intelligence estimate is, and what your agenda might be.


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## irnbndr (Mar 12, 2008)

JoeBlackSpade said:


> Intelligence, as I understand it is very simply:
> 
> 
> What does a given organization (military, political, private) know about a particular subject?
> ...



I disagree.
Some of what you say is true, yet, one of the types of intelligence is called estimative intelligence.  This is exactly what it sounds like.  Hypothetical information that is analyzed, classified and used as intelligence.  (this is why we call them National Intelligence Estimates instead of national intelligence facts)  The problem with this type of intel is that it is up to the analyst to describe to the policymaker- or whoever the consumer is- what is known or unknown and how the hypothesis was reached.


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## JBS (Mar 12, 2008)

> Just because we haven't found WMD's yet, doesn't mean they're not there.


 
I'm glad you mentioned that, Razor_Baghdad.



This is one of those tough subjects that I see discussed all over the internet, and people tend to lose rational thought processes when they mix facts with opinion or facts with emotion. It is one thing to criticize the current administration about not finding the LOCATION of WMD's. It is another thing entirely different to claim- even on major media outlets- that there are "no WMD's in Iraq". It is intellectually dishonest to make such claims, since we already know that there WERE WMD's in Iraq in the recent past (through observation of the Kurdish population) for example. There are reams of footage of them getting gassed, hours of firsthand interviews with survivors, and medical evaluations by impartial medical personnel, showing the effects of chemicals. 


*The actual use of WMD's pretty much confirms the possession of them.*

The question should never have been _"does {Saddam} have WMD's?"_, but rather _"where are the WMD's"._ 


He had them. He used them. They are definitely somewhere.

For once, I'd like to see the media cover this matter from the proper perspective, instead of sidetracking such an important security issue with sensational political jabs.



			
				irnbndr said:
			
		

> "...yet, one of the types of intelligence is called estimative intelligence...


 

Is that the same as (?):


"Eventually some details that cannot be directly confirmed must be extrapolated from other, secondary evidence. "


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## moobob (Mar 12, 2008)

JoeBlackSpade said:


> *
> The actual use of WMD's pretty much confirms the possession of them.*
> 
> The question should never have been _"does {Saddam} have WMD's?"_, but rather _"where are the WMD's"._
> ...



I recently heard the opinion from someone that Saddam probably didn't have WMDs, but wanted people to think he did. Now, the only cold hard facts I know are that he had them before, and he used them, and there is no evidence showing that he destroyed them. They may have been moved, hidden, whatever.

All I know is that when I ask the Magic 8-Ball whether or not WMDs were in Iraq when we invaded, it said yes. So, I'm pretty convinced. Just because we have an inability to figure out where they went, doesn't mean they weren't there. I won't even get into the relationship between politics and intelligence...


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## JBS (Mar 12, 2008)

From what I understand about the Hussein regime, it is also possible that some of his WMD's came from other, more stable nations, at a time when his regime was viewed as a stable, non-radical alternative to "other" regional influences.  In other words, there may even be receipts for some of those WMD's, in the filing cabinets of certain large, powerful nations.

I'll have to read up on this.  I wonder if there are any public statements readily available about sales of these weapons.


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## irnbndr (Mar 12, 2008)

Right, you did state that.  
I misread your post to say that intelligence is what we know.


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## irnbndr (Mar 12, 2008)

I hate the send button


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## irnbndr (Mar 13, 2008)

This is from a Marine Corps manual:  MCDP 2 Intelligence


Intelligence strives to build as complete a picture of both the
enemy and the area of operations as possible. Such a picture is
made up of a variety of factors—the concrete and measurable,
the intangible and subjective, the environmental and cultural,
the military and political—all of which must be assessed in order
to develop the knowledge needed to support the commander’s
decisionmaking. Building this complete picture
requires that we understand and apply the characteristics of
good intelligence. Our intelligence picture must be comprehensive;
it should combine relevant basic, current, and estimative
intelligence from all levels of intelligence. It must include estimates
of both capabilities and intentions. Finally, *developing
an understanding of the situation requires that we be able to
distinguish between signals and noise—that we avoid the pitfalls
of bias and preconception while interpreting collected information
as objectively as possible.*(Intelligence MCDP 2, 70)


...the sole criterion for good intelligence is whether it provides sufficient knowledge regarding the environment and an understanding of the enemy’s
capabilities, limitations, and intentions to effectively support the commander’s planning and decisionmaking. (Intelligence MCDP 2, 71)

I especially like to part about distnguishing between signals and noise and avoiding biased opinions and preconveived notions.  Objectivity is crucial.

On another note, Jarheads are actually smart!  Who'da thunk?


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## moobob (Mar 13, 2008)

I will second that. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) does EXCELLENT work. I use their products for all sorts of stuff.


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## Paddlefoot (Mar 13, 2008)

It's about finding your enemy (target) and more importantly, knowing him.

What drives him, what's his intent, what will disrupt his activites. Intel isn't just about information, it's about figuring out what to do with that info when it becomes available. That's the commander's job, and he can't just look at the info he's being given as the end all/be all. 

And bear in mind, sometimes even the best intel, stuff that is spot on and solid, might not keep everything from going to shit anyway.


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 14, 2008)

Paddlefoot said:


> And bear in mind, sometimes even the best intel, stuff that is spot on and solid, might not keep everything from going to shit anyway.



and that's where we come in.....and make 'em look good.....as if.... :confused::confused:

A lot of our teams have gone to using our own generated intel...whodathunkit? 

Ever wonder why? :doh::doh:


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## SgtUSMC8541 (Mar 14, 2008)

> *What Is The Purpose of Intelligence?*


 
To not take the fat chick home?


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## Swill (Mar 14, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> Ever wonder why? :doh::doh:



'Cuz Huachuca couldn't teach a whore how to fuck if their life depended on it.


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## JBS (Mar 14, 2008)

irnbndr said:
			
		

> On another note, Jarheads are actually smart! Who'da thunk?






Aww, shucks!  We's ne'er been one's fer book learnin' and such!;)





			
				Paddlefoot said:
			
		

> "What drives him, what's his intent, what will disrupt his activites."



Do intelligence analysts go on to decide what types of activities would disrupt an enemy's activities?  I would think perhaps this aspect of the chain-of-progression might be better decided by the recipient of the intelligence product.




			
				Paddlefoot said:
			
		

> Intel isn't just about information, it's about figuring out what to do with that info when it becomes available.



Same question.  At what point does the gathering of intelligence, the analysis of intelligence, and the rendering of conclusions end?  

Should intelligence be completely sterile, devoid of conclusions- leaving the client / customer to draw his own?  I'd guess there is a balance between objectivity and actually producing usable data, in a digestible format.


I ask this question since so much of intelligence work is apparently compartmentalized.  An analyst may not have access to other parts of the puzzle.  From where he sits, that elephant may appear to be a flat, leathery wall.  Another analyst- working via a different set of mediums- might see a tree trunk.  Since much of intelligence- especially as it relates to combat operations- is a living, breathing thing- and evolves by the second, I believe more of the "conclusions" should be left to the commander on the battlefield, and perhaps just a little bit more "raw".

Of course, as little as I know about this subject, I'm just speculating.


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## FNG_tracker (Mar 14, 2008)

Swill said:


> 'Cuz Huachuca couldn't teach a whore how to fuck if their life depended on it.




ouch.... 
I will admit we graduate our fair share of retards, and let students go that should not, but belive me its not the instructors here that want that. Its all about stats and QTB and crap like that. In the end, its the CDRs decsion if the student stays or goes. If they leave because of acdamic reasons, its a failure on their part and their OERs reflect that. I have fought that crap since i got here. I have seen soldiers go through the same course and test the same material 3 times and still get pushed through the system to keep up the commpany stats. The biggest issue here is the all the MI MOSs train sepeartely and dont share crap. They need to work togther here first before they get out to the big army and see how each MI job helps each other out.  the system here is definately broken. 

...


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## Swill (Mar 14, 2008)

FNG_tracker said:


> ouch....
> I will admit we graduate our fair share of retards, and let students go that should not, but belive me its not the instructors here that want that. Its all about stats and QTB and crap like that. In the end, its the CDRs decsion if the student stays or goes. If they leave because of acdamic reasons, its a failure on their part and their OERs reflect that. I have fought that crap since i got here. I have seen soldiers go through the same course and test the same material 3 times and still get pushed through the system to keep up the commpany stats. The biggest issue here is the all the MI MOSs train sepeartely and dont share crap. They need to work togther here first before they get out to the big army and see how each MI job helps each other out.  the system here is definately broken.
> 
> ...



PM Inbound.


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## car (Mar 14, 2008)

JoeBlackSpade said:


> At what point does the gathering of intelligence, the analysis of intelligence, and the rendering of conclusions end?



It's a cycle.


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## pardus (Mar 14, 2008)

car said:


> It's a cycle.



I see.... :cool:


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## car (Mar 14, 2008)

pardus762 said:


> I see.... :cool:



LMFAO!


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## JBS (Mar 14, 2008)

LOL!


It goes the other way in the Southern Hemisphere too!


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## RackMaster (Mar 14, 2008)

pardus762 said:


> I see.... :cool:





car said:


> LMFAO!



;)  I think that "cycle" is turning in the wrong direction though.


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## pardus (Mar 14, 2008)

Southern Hemisphere Intel! ;)


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## The91Bravo (Mar 14, 2008)

JoeBlackSpade said:


> LOL!
> 
> 
> It goes the other way in the Southern Hemisphere too!



Wait, you mean that BELOW the equator, when you flush, .... the shit comes up, instead of going down.... 

fuck that!
I'll stay here


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## Polar Bear (Mar 14, 2008)

*TEST*



Polar Bear said:


> Intelligence comes from the Latin verb "intellegere", which means "to understand".
> 
> Class dismissed, Test this Friday


 
Why is there always at least one burnt rice crispy in every box?


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 14, 2008)

car said:


> It's a cycle.



The entire DOD/DOS Intelligence cycle taught with one slide!!!!!!!

20 years of 'Death by Powerpoint' solved in 60 seconds!!!!!!

Priceless!!!!

Northern Hemisphere vs. Southern Hemisphere appear similar in disposition: :doh::doh:


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## JBS (Mar 14, 2008)

Polar Bear said:
			
		

> Why is there always at least one burnt rice crispy in every box?



We've got more than one burnt rice crispy in THIS box, LOL!


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## car (Mar 14, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> The entire DOD/DOS Intelligence cycle taught with one slide!!!!!!!
> 
> 20 years of 'Death by Powerpoint' solved in 60 seconds!!!!!!
> 
> ...



I think we've solved it! I'll this as the "way ahead" at the next CSM/SGM conference.


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 15, 2008)

car said:


> I think we've solved it! I'll this as the "way ahead" at the next CSM/SGM conference.



Can you say 'Impact Promotion to CSM'? for this innovative old approach to Intel?

No more Powerpoint! No more Powerpoint! No more Powerpoint! :doh::doh:

SGM uprising...Headlines read: 



> *'US Army announces armywide schools POI's cut by 1/3rd'*
> 
> The US Army announced today that it is moving away from the powerpoint presentation normally given in a classroom environment. Soldiers will now train outside where they're supposed to be anyway.



;)


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## Paddlefoot (Mar 16, 2008)

JoeBlackSpade said:


> Do intelligence analysts go on to decide what types of activities would disrupt an enemy's activities?  I would think perhaps this aspect of the chain-of-progression might be better decided by the recipient of the intelligence product.
> 
> Same question.  At what point does the gathering of intelligence, the analysis of intelligence, and the rendering of conclusions end?
> 
> ...



You're correct, in the Big Army, an analyst wouldn't have much say in operational planning, although every SF team has their own Intel NCO, as well as a supporting Intelligence unit. At the ODA level, I suppose there is equal amounts analysis and planning. Marauder and the BTDTs would know, but they're not tellin'. ;)

In other branches, it's not unheard of for an intel guy to get involved in operations, my congressional rep being a good example. He's technically part of Naval Intelligence, but has participated in operations aboard EA-6 Prowlers (back when there was such a thing). Another example of a guy that was involved as both an analyst and in operations would be Iceal Hambleton, who flew the BAT 21 mission in Vietnam. 

At any level, a good operations guy is probably a pretty good analyst, too.


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## irnbndr (Mar 16, 2008)

JoeBlackSpade said:


> Aww, shucks!  We's ne'er been one's fer book learnin' and such!;)
> 
> 
> 
> ...




Evaluation and interpretation is often done multiple times with the same information as it morphs from combat intelligence, or raw data, to usable intelligence. As raw data is collected, it must be evaluated for its intelligence value (What is it worth? What does it mean? Does it answer any of the question asked by the commander in his statement of essential elements of information?), the credibility of the source and accuracy. Upon determining the value, credibility and accuracy of the information it then must be interperated. The analyst, or reporting officer (RO) in some cases, should determine the significance and its ability to answer the commander’s EEI’s, arriving at conclusions which should be included in the report as analyst or RO comments. Without arriving at some sort of conclusion it is difficult to dtermine the value of the data.

FMFRP 12-16 (USMC) sites the book answer in evaluation and interpretation as asking the following questions: 
(1) Is it information of the enemy or of terrain not under our 
control? 
(2) Is it information needed immediately, and if so, by whom? 
(3) Is it information of future value? 
(4) Is it information of value to this unit, or to higher, subordinate? 
or neighboring units? 


These are good questions to ask yourself during the evaluation and interpretation processes. At the same time, information thought to be of no value can actually be a missing piece of the puzzle. RO’s should take great care not to get too involved in the evaluation process, rather they should collect data, give a base value conclusion and send it higher (G-2/J-2/S-2 ect.)  Just because it does not fit into these specific questions does not necessarily mean that it is not pertinent information. Generally it should be left up to the analyst to draw conclusions rather than the RO.


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## Paddlefoot (Mar 16, 2008)

irnbndr said:


> At the same time, information thought to be of no value can actually be a missing piece of the puzzle.



A VERY important point to keep in mind. It's nice to get one of those _Bingo!_ or _Eureka!_ moments, but most of the time the information is nothing until it can be collated and corroborated through some other source.

It ain't always about hitting one out of the park. That's one of the reasons those *just in time* interrogation scenarios bother me so much.


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## irnbndr (Mar 16, 2008)

Paddlefoot said:


> A VERY important point to keep in mind. It's nice to get one of those _Bingo!_ or _Eureka!_ moments, but most of the time the information is nothing until it can be collated and corroborated through some other source.
> 
> It ain't always about hitting one out of the park. That's one of the reasons those *just in time* interrogation scenarios bother me so much.



Agreed.  Intel is a long process, that is why it is so misunderstood by those that have only been exposed to immediate results in the military.


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## Pete031 (Mar 16, 2008)

To gain information
To define the enemy
To Gain and Maintain the Initiative.
To provide security 

:2c:


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## car (Mar 16, 2008)

Pete031 said:


> To gain information
> To define the enemy
> To Gain and Maintain the Initiative.
> To provide security
> ...



Nope. You forgot the main one to drive operations/give manuever commanders targets.


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## irnbndr (Mar 16, 2008)

car said:


> Nope. You forgot the main one to drive operations/give manuever commanders targets.



The term intelligence drives operations is a very broad and basic description of many different elements of *tactical* intellgence.  But intel is much, much more.

Te purpose of intelligence is to provide analysis in areas relevant to national
security;

give early warning of impending crises;

serve national and international crisis
management by helping to discern the
intentions of current or potential opponents;

inform national defence planning and
military operations;

protect secrets, both of their own sources
and activities, and those of other state
agencies; and

may act covertly to influence the outcome of
events in favour of national interests.

Much of this does not have anything to do with military operations.


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## Rabid Badger (Mar 16, 2008)

irnbndr said:


> The term intelligence drives operations is a very broad and basic description of many different elements of *tactical* intellgence.  But intel is much, much more.
> 
> Te purpose of intelligence is to provide analysis in areas relevant to national
> security;
> ...



This is Intel where I was going with earlier posts. 

You have that damn book open again....dontcha...

Here: :cool:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/mi/mi-fm.htm

;);)


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## Marauder06 (Mar 17, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> This is Intel where I was going with earlier posts.
> 
> You have that damn book open again....dontcha...
> 
> ...;);)



Yep, here it is in case anyone else wants to quote straight out of it too:

http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/bg_intelligence_services1.pdf


The way I read it though is that what was quoted is the purpose of intelligence _services_, which is different than the purpose of _intelligence_.


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## irnbndr (Mar 17, 2008)

Marauder06 said:


> Yep, here it is in case anyone else wants to quote straight out of it too:
> 
> http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/bg_intelligence_services1.pdf
> 
> ...



Yes, I quoted that.  I am guilty of plagiarism.  

No matter whether it is the definition of the purpose of intelligence or of intelligence services.  They are one in the same.  This is the mission of the intel services, to conduct intelligence. For what purpose?  To achieve the multiple missions of intelligence.

Intelligence drives operations... correct.  Yet, it is not limited to that alone.  Intelligence serves many purposes.

We as soldiers work so often at the tactical level that it is the only thing we see.


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## irnbndr (Mar 17, 2008)

This thread is excellent.  I have taken a ton away form it and will be better off in my course study because of it.  Thanks to all who are contributing.

I found this at the Center for Defense Information:

The overall purpose of intelligence is to provide policymakers the information they need to decide on the diplomatic, economic, and military actions needed to maintain national security. 

Intelligence has two primary challenges: determining the capabilities an opponent can muster and fathoming the intentions to employ those capabilities — the who, what, when, where, how, and how much. The latter are the hardest to determine, particularly when the opponent has little or no visible supporting infrastructure and support. 

http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/intelligence-role-pr.html


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## pardus (Mar 17, 2008)

Working out what the other fuck is doing it and how he is doing it, so you can fuck him up.  :2c:


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## car (Mar 17, 2008)

razor_baghdad said:


> *The SSCI reacts/doesn't react to all of the Info/Intel that is given to them.
> 
> What often happens is that info/intel from one 'pet project' favorable to a  senior Senator is seen as more important than info/intel offered from a junior Senator, thus the Senior Senator's info/intel becomes more important and policy is then dictated from the more important [sic] data, even though the junior's was more up to date and correct. *



Concur!



razor_baghdad said:


> We fukn make those jackass Intel weenies look good, even though we had Shitty Intel.[/B]



Never needed an operator to make _me_ look good..... ;)


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## rangerpsych (Mar 17, 2008)

where to aim the nukes :)


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## Marauder06 (May 21, 2009)

Bumping this thread to see if any of the new members with an intel background care to chime in.


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## Florida173 (May 22, 2009)

I'll take the chance to give a little insight that I have from my very limited experience.

The last three times I was deployed as an 11B I had no idea what intelligence was for me.  We did our patrols with no real rhyme or reason, at least none that I could see.  Current leadership though is pushing this idea of COIN to its fullest and a good unit can be very effective.  Allowing any soldier to be a collector and then arming the right -int(my opinion is HUMINT) with tools like Palace Guard and what not can push the reporting and disem exponentially.

SIGINT is incredible, but increasingly more ineffective in targetting on anyone other than the Tier 3 bad guys.  I've heard some good things from my friends in group using SIGINT based targetting.  Of course I am only really speaking of Iraq at this point.  I have no experience in Afghanistan.

This deployment to Iraq is now HUMINT led.  There is no targetting without a warrant.  Warrants are based off of my ability to find sources and sub sources that will provide me with the sworn statements and intelligence on the bad guys.  Warrant based targetting is frustrating, and especially frustrating when you are dealing with an incredibly corrupt government.

I've been pushed down to a company to provide direct support to a land owner.  My partner and I sit every night in a meeting with our Co. Intelligence Suport Team (11Bs that went to a school or a 35M), Targetting NCO, HUMINT (me), and the Commander.  We push the nonsense FRAGOs and other admin stuff through quickly, and then move on to what we are doing to make our battlespace better.  For instance:

1 - I have my meeting with a source that has knowledge of an RKG-3 attack on KBR convoy in our battle space.  I get a sworn statement and information about other people that may know about the bad guys.

2 - I get the information and write my DIIR

3 - I pass the information immediately off to targetting for him to develop a packet that will be sent up to higher once complete.

4 - during our nightly meetings, I brief on the intel and request that the COIST develop SIRs for patrols going out into specific sectors (photos, neighbors, floor plans, atmospherics, etc...) 

5 - Answered SIRs go back to me for further exploitation with source and targetting for packets, and maybe new SIRs.  Possible Palace Guard IIR sent up from patrolling element.

6 - Finally the Target packet, sworn statements, and published IIRs go through a process that eventually gets it to an Iraqi Judge.  Judge issues warrant.

7 - HUMINT trigger used for capture during a combined mission that is led by the Iraqi Army.

*Problems:*
The bad guys are learning how to use warrant based targetting against us.  
Takes time to devolop these targets and make it so the bad guys aren't on some kind of 14 day catch and release program like it use to be.
Takes days for IIRs to be published.
Coordination with Iraqi Army is sometimes clumsy.
Americans' lack of understanding on Iraqi and Arabic naming conventions.
Laziness of BN and higher personnel that just want to get to the gym and DFAC.


This seems like the best way to operate when at a company level.  Comany spoon feeds the complete targetting packet to higher to get the warrant.  The intelligence coming down is often times useless or misguided.  The intelligence coming lateral is sparce.

Just my thoughts and limited experience on how intelligence is driving the mission for me.


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## Marauder06 (Feb 22, 2010)

bump for the new folks


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## FireSpitter11 (Mar 23, 2010)

*My take on intel, as I am in the 02 field*

I, by choice lat moved into intel. Everyone can have their own opinion or take on what they think it is, and here is my professional take.

The purpose of intel is not only to understand and wait for the end state to see if a hypothetical guess comes true (because honestly that happens a lot based off of speculation and past events), but to:
1. Reduce the commanders uncertainty of the battlefield
2. Read between the lines of the unknown based on pattern and trend analysis
3. Reduce the threat of uncertainty to boots on ground through the use of all intel assets (OSINT,   MASINT, IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT)
4. Establish and Answer CCIR's and PIR's of a threat enviroment
5. Ultimately, purpose of intel is to inform commanders of risks and let them base op planning of of our findings.

We can debate the whole "intel drive ops / ops drives intel" until we are blue in the face, but face it without intel you walk blindly into a volatile situation and end state will not be pretty. Intel Drive Ops, Ops do not go with out intel.

Semper Fidelis.


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## slick (Jun 7, 2010)

The purpose of intelligence is a tough question to answer. Its purpose encompasses a vast majority of things. In my personal opinion it really depends on what your mission is, who you are providing intelligence products to and why the information is needed. Normally intelligence answers set questions established by commanders, and these can be changed at any point in time. Intelligence is a complicated beast and for one try and tame it is simply madness. In the intelligence community many things are left open due to the simple fact our missions, technology, capabilities and intent are changing constantly. Further, I don't feel there is a right or wrong answer to this question. Only good points that any intelligence professional should really consider when providing any type of support to anyone.

For the question of which -INT is the best. Ha, I see many professionals get locked into their own little worlds and forget that they need every bit to paint a complete picture. There is a reason to why there are different disciplines in intelligence. Each intelligence provides a key piece to the artwork. HUMINT brings the human element of what locals know about the enemy and the local populaces sentiment to coalition forces. SIGINT has a few sub disciplines, COMINT, ELINT, FISINT, and MASINT. Each of those SIGINT subcategory has to deal with some type of electronics or RF energy. IMINT is imagery intelligence information provided from pictures taken by cameras to satellites. As you break down each discipline you can start to see why each is important to the other and why each needs each other to paint the complete picture. To ignore one is to increase your chance to get someone killed on the battle space. To be an analyst is not only to be technically proficient, but to be creative and artistic. Intelligence is more or less an art. The best analyst are ones who are creative and who aren't afraid to make analytical leaps to help try to bridge gaps and understand information. Granted there are technical aspects to intelligence and people can take that slap it on a powerpoint, and yes it is true and its does provide somethings. But, they could provide so much more. This profession is an intimate one, you have to hate, love and understand your enemy. You have to know his insides and outs, where he eats, sleeps and works. If an analyst fails to realize this he is not only neglecting his duty, and he is failing the entire purpose of intelligence.

I have worked at division level for the Army in Afghanistan and at the agency. Each day I have ever gone into work I have never done the same thing. I have watched the purpose of intelligence change day to day. To put a stamp of the purpose of intelligence is to hinder its entire intent. I have seen the frustrations of operators because they feel they are being slighted on information and they start to gather this opinion that we are useless. A lot of time we are restricted due to classification issues. Most of the time these issues can be overcome by simply rewording and leaving out some information without destroying what is trying to be stated. But again this is why I say intelligence is more or less an art because you have to get creative with how you plan to disguise where the information came from in order to be able to push it down to lower levels.

I probably didn't answer any questions, but I felt like I should put in my two cents. Sorry if any of this was redundant; guess it just re-emphasizes how import somethings is. Feel free to lay waste.


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## _KJ_ (Jul 22, 2010)

Hey slick,

I am not in the intel field myself, too bloody thick but I do have a question.
IF you can answer it that is.

I see you have worked with/are working with the agency thus you may have alittle more insight then the ordinary Joes.
The "Iraq are about to buy plutonium from Egypt" report, how did that thing come to be?
Was it straight up a disinformation campaign on behalf of the opposition or was someone trying to paint a "picture/masterpiece" and the thing got away from him?

I am asking this trying not to look retarded, since I don´t have neither the experience you have or intel as my speciality.
I think there might be a lesson to be learned for all of us in there somewhere?


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## Grey (Aug 8, 2010)

Using the search tool I found this thread, though old I think its a good place to ask the question I have in mind. This thread helps me when it comes to why there is intelligence, but I am looking into the works of it. I guess im simply asking for the how not the why, more specifically im looking for any good books that would give good information on how the intelligence community works.  If this post is out of place or just plain stupid let me know and I will go back to shutting up and reading.


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## Robal2pl (Aug 29, 2010)

I was reading the thread , and I started thinking about one thing.

When it comes to police operations , or some COIN/LIC ones - does role of intelligence is the same? When the informations gathered must often be shown during the legal procedures and trial, does it limit scope and usefulness of various - INTs?

Robal2pl


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## JimMCpog (Aug 31, 2010)

Robal2pl said:


> I was reading the thread , and I started thinking about one thing.
> 
> When it comes to police operations , or some COIN/LIC ones - does role of intelligence is the same? When the informations gathered must often be shown during the legal procedures and trial, does it limit scope and usefulness of various - INTs?
> 
> Robal2pl


 
Bump, this is interesting and perhaps it could become it's own thread.

I'll say that I believe some of the collection efforts are the same. Don't police run source operations all the time? While wiretaps require warrants, don't FISA courts grant the warrants most of the time?

I don't know how it works in Poland, but information is often redacted from testimony that could reveal sources, methods and operatives. With that said, Italian prosecutors got enough information to indict and convict in absentia a handful of alleged CIA operatives and their agents.


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## car (Aug 31, 2010)

Let's be real careful here, guys, particulalary since most of you don't know what you're talking about.

I'm about to delete some posts.


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## Marauder06 (Sep 23, 2010)

OK, I've been thinking about this for a while, what about this as a definition of the purpose of intelligence (compiled from several different sources):

"The purpose of intelligence is to provide timely processed, contextualized, accurate, and predictive information in order to provide early warning, prevent surprise, and drive operational decisionmaking."

Thoughts?


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## AWP (Sep 23, 2010)

Wouldn't "provide early warning, prevent surprise..." be one and the same?


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## Teufel (Sep 23, 2010)

Marauder06 said:


> OK, I've been thinking about this for a while, what about this as a definition of the purpose of intelligence (compiled from several different sources):
> 
> "The purpose of intelligence is to provide timely processed, contextualized, accurate, and predictive information in order to provide early warning, prevent surprise, and drive operational decisionmaking."
> 
> Thoughts?


 
I think I would go with your definition but include something to the effect of: the purpose of intelligence is to reduce the commander's uncertainty and support his operational decision making.

I agree with Free that prevent early warning and prevent surprise are the same.


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## Florida173 (Sep 23, 2010)

Marauder06 said:


> OK, I've been thinking about this for a while, what about this as a definition of the purpose of intelligence (compiled from several different sources):
> 
> "The purpose of intelligence is to provide timely processed, contextualized, accurate, and predictive information in order to provide early warning, prevent surprise, and drive operational decisionmaking."
> 
> Thoughts?


 

LOL... are you saying intelligence drives operations?  that always seems to cause animosity between the 2 and 3 shops


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## AWP (Sep 24, 2010)

Florida173 said:


> LOL... are you saying intelligence drives operations?  that always seems to cause animosity between the 2 and 3 shops



Outside looking in, I can see rare cases where it should. "Hey guys, we have a report of an HVT/ MVT (or whatever) in village X." At that point the commander elects to launch a raid or not based on the validity of Intel's reporting. Otherwise, I see it as a necessary supporting arm for our maneuver elements. Ultimately in my Utopian world, the commander has the say, not his -2 or -3 shops.


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## car (Sep 24, 2010)

Although it's obvious, I'd add "...to (or "for") commanders." at the end of your statement. But, that being said, I think you've captured it.

Well done, Iron Major! 

Are we helping you write a paper........?



Florida173 said:


> LOL... are you saying intelligence drives operations?  that always seems to cause animosity between the 2 and 3 shops



It's true, no matter what the 3 thinks.  :)


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 24, 2010)

Early Warning is not necessarily the same as Prevent Surprise.

Early warning enables direct action, attack, or other actions and/or provides a trigger for decision at the time and place of our choosing.  Preventing surprise inhibits an adversary from having that advantage.

Concur with "support to operational decisionmaking" vice "driving".  

Consider:""The purpose of intelligence is to support decisionmaking with an accurate assessment of the operational environment derived from timely, contextualized, accurate, and predictive information. 
:2c:


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## Marauder06 (Sep 24, 2010)

Wow, excellent responses, thanks everyone.

Sadly, I am not writing a paper on this topic, this was genuine intellectual curiosity.  Although it would probably make an interesting one... :)

I omitted "commander" from the definition because I'm trying to make it applicable in both military and civilian contexts, although I agree that in a strictly military definition "commander" should be in there.

I chose "drive" operations deliberately.  I believe operations (including commanders) "direct" intelligence, and intelligence "drives" maneuver.  I think the choice of words that invoke "support"  do not capture the synergy between ops and intel that is necessary for optimum success.  Yes I recognize intel is a "combat support" function.  The commander and ops personnel direct intel ("I want to achieve this effect on the battlefield," "I want to know this about the enemy"), and intel drives operations by answering those questions and providing other information essential to mission success.

The above said, I really like SIGO's definition above, even with the "support" verbiage.  

edit:

thought about it during class today.  I think "enable" might be a better choice of words than "drive" or "assist," based on the the way intel is employed.  I also decided to phrase it in a task/purpose manner.  Reworded version:

 The purpose of intelligence is to acquire, process, and disseminate timely, accurate, predictive and contextualized assessments of the operational environment in order to provide early warning, prevent surprise, and enable operational decisonmaking.


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## Teufel (Sep 24, 2010)

I agree that intel should drive operations but often times this is not the case.  Operations will continue with or without intelligence.  How many times have members of this board been told to go patrol without any objective or conduct an attack without a good idea of what lies on the other side?


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 25, 2010)

"Enable" is less appropriate for the same reason "drive" is: it implies too much priority where that is not necessarily the case. Intel, while hugely important, is only one aspect of decisioning.  I would suggest that the JAG does as much to "drive" decisioning (or even "enable") via ROE interpretation as intel does.

Further, while "support" can imply both "enabling" and "driving", the reverse is not necessarily true. This is especially so if the scope of the definition of intel is expanded beyond a purely military context.


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 25, 2010)

> The purpose of intelligence is to acquire, process, and disseminate timely, accurate, predictive and contextualized assessments of the operational environment in order to provide early warning, prevent surprise, and enable operational decisonmaking.



The problem here is you have the "how" before you state the why (i.e. "the purpose").  Also, you use "Operational" twice and serves to limit your definitional scope and be redundant.

Reordering your words, consider:  *The purpose of intelligence is to enable decisonmaking by disseminating timely, accurate, predictive and contextualized assessments of the operational environment in order to provide early warning and/or prevent surprise.*


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 25, 2010)

_Finish to edit above (since the 15 min window expired)._ 

I would prefer: * "The purpose of intelligence is to support decisonmaking by disseminating timely, accurate, predictive and contextualized assessments of the operational environment in order to provide early warning and/or prevent surprise."*


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## Marauder06 (Sep 25, 2010)

I disagree slightly with regard to "enable" vs. "support."  If "enable" means "to provide with the means or opportunity," to make possible," or "to cause to operate," I think that it is a better choice of words.  "Support," while meaning "to promote the interests or cause of," or "to serve as the foundation for" is also a good word choice, I think "enable" is a better choice of words to reflect intel's function and purpose.


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 25, 2010)

If Intel were the sole function, I'd agree with your application of the "enable" definition.  But, that is not the case. And you know that.  

Also, since you want to expand scope beyond purely military purpose, enable implies a degree of control not as appropriate for non-military functions.


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## Manolito (Sep 25, 2010)

The one thing that intelligence did a long time ago was pass information between stove pipes. We had free fire zones that required no permission to light up. Often operators were in those areas and without intelligence information we would have had a lot more casualties of friendly fire. 
The thing we developed among ourselves were the day to day information that included new hide places. New traffic patterns. New engines on a certain area of the river. This information was never handed to us in briefings but was invaluable in the field. 
Tuefel hit the nail for my time anyway. We were often given the order patrol sector x we would ask anything new in the area and were often told we don't have any new intel on that area. 
I slept good when intel said we were going to get hit. When the local didn't set up the fruit stand outside the wire I didn't sleep. 
Remembering this was a long time ago.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 25, 2010)

I would apply some K.I.S.S. to your role definition.

JAB Example: Intel provides collected information and analyses in order to assist in the planning process.


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## Crusader74 (Sep 25, 2010)

"A product of collecting, evaluating, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information on an enemy and his area of operations of immediate or potential significance to ones own planning and operations..


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## SpitfireV (Sep 25, 2010)

I think you can't define the purpose of intelligence overall (encompassing all types, military, LE, Squirrelly, et al) because they're all so very different. Some of the collection techniques are similar (from my limited observation) but as to the actual purpose, they're all different. 

In saying that I came up with this rough purpose this morning: 

"The purpose of intelligence is to analyse information and disseminate it to those who might benefit from it." 

Thoughts?


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 25, 2010)

I would say it can be defined, but not with any depth. Hints my K.I.S.S. post earlier, instead of trying to jock it up to some “high speed statement”, take it down the most very basic purpose of Intel for all fields (LE, MIL, ect). When I read “drives ops or enables ops” I think yeah fucking right, it does none of a sort… Makes me think of that movie “Joe Dirt” where he is being interviewed and says his name is “Joe Dirteh” and the interviewer says “don’t try to church it up son, don’t you mean Joe Dirt”

I laughed my ass off when I read this from one of RB’s first posts, b/c it’s been pretty well the case with the conventional side of the house as well…



RB said:


> Sometimes not the case because we, as thinking on our feet SOF professionals, 'read' the intel and make our own assessments, arriving at and reacting on our own judgements. In other words, We fukn make those jackass Intel weenies look good, even though we had Shitty Intel.


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 26, 2010)

Irish said:


> "A product of collecting, evaluating, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information on an enemy and his area of operations of immediate or potential significance to ones own planning and operations..


 
This may "define" intelligence, but the question on the table is "for what reason do we have/use intelligence".


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## AWP (Sep 26, 2010)

LongTabSigO said:


> This may "define" intelligence, but the question on the table is "for what reason do we have/use intelligence".


 
To support the execution of the commander's intent.

Were I a commander, I'd rather have comm than intel, but I digress....


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## x SF med (Sep 26, 2010)

LongTabSigO said:


> This may "define" intelligence, but the question on the table is "for what reason do we have/use intelligence".


 
To keep soldiers alive by giving them insight into the objective.


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 26, 2010)

Freefalling said:


> To support the execution of the commander's intent.
> 
> Were I a commander, I'd rather have comm than intel, but I digress....


 
Well, if you're going to "there"...I thought it important to make the lesser functions feel important.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 26, 2010)

There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that Intel is a very important piece of the pie, but to what level is determined by the commander/soldier on the ground.

Comm’s, Intel, SR, Air Support and ground forces/support are all integrated pieces of the planning process. However you can drop several from that list and still conduct operations, or in many cases can be forced to conduct ops without those pieces in place in your planning. Which piece is more important than the other? Neither, it’s 100% mission dependent. I have been on missions without all of the above, comms fails, no Intel, SR was us, Air was too far out for any use and we were our own support. That is all too common and to what drove or enabled those missions was nothing more than a rag-tag platoon of Infantry getting shit done.

I guess my point is that all though I love good support such as Intel, Comms (everything I listed above); none of them drive/enable the operation. Now in some case they may be the mission, or a mission may come down b/c of their work. I just would not make it part of their defining role. They are a tool in the war fighter/leaders tool box to be utilized as needed. The same way everything else I listed is nothing more than a tool to be used when needed, if the tool breaks or won’t work then we find a way around it.


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## Marauder06 (Sep 26, 2010)

Don't remember if I posted this already or not- this is what the new (March 2010) version of FM 2-0 says about the purpose of intel:

_1-16. The purpose of intelligence is to provide commanders and staffs with timely, relevant, accurate,
predictive, and tailored intelligence about the enemy and other aspects of the AO. Intelligence supports the
planning, preparing, execution, and assessment of operations. The most important role of intelligence is to
drive operations by supporting the commander’s decisionmaking._

I think I like some of the suggestions I've read here better than what's in the FM.


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 27, 2010)

From Joint Pub 2-0:
The primary function of joint intelligence is to provide information and assessments to facilitate accomplishment of the mission. This function is supported by more-specific “purposes of joint intelligence” (described below) to guide the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) staff and those of supporting organizations:

Inform the commander
Identify, define, and nominate objectives
Support the planning and execution of operations
Counter adversary deception and surprise
Support friendly deception efforts
Assess the effects of operations


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## Polar Bear (Sep 27, 2010)

Polar Bear said:


> Intelligence comes from the Latin verb "intelligence", which means "to understand".
> 
> Class dismissed, Test this Friday


 
*an·a·lyze*/ˈanlˌīz/Verb
1. Examine methodically and in detail the constitution or structure of (something, esp. information), typically for purposes of explanation and interpretation.


*Analysis* is the process of breaking a complex topic or substance into smaller parts to gain a better understanding of it.


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## LongTabSigO (Sep 27, 2010)

Polar Bear said:


> *an·a·lyze*/ˈanlˌīz/Verb
> 1. Examine methodically and in detail the constitution or structure of (something, esp. information), typically for purposes of explanation and interpretation.
> 
> 
> *Analysis* is the process of breaking a complex topic or substance into smaller parts to gain a better understanding of it.


 
That's interesting. Not particularly on point with the question at hand, but an appreciated contribution.


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## pardus (Sep 27, 2010)

LongTabSigO said:


> That's interesting. Not particularly on point with the question at hand, but an appreciated contribution.


 
Thats a very diplomatic way of saying PB's a tard, well done


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## JBS (Oct 6, 2010)

In defining intelligence, I noticed a few posts where there was an attempt at trying to convey two things:


 the nature of action that friendly forces might take, based on information
the nature of action that enemy forces might take, based on information
For example this type of verbiage: 


> ...to facilitate accomplishment of the mission.


And here:


> Counter adversary deception and surprise
> Support friendly deception efforts


And here:





> To support the execution of the commander's intent.


In the FM's:





> _The most important role of intelligence is to drive operations _


In each of these cases, there is the overlapping theme, using synonymous terminology.  There is mention of surprise (as in, "we want to surprise the enemy whenever possible"), as well as preventing surprise against friendly forces.    From my perspective the one word that can apply almost universally to all these various themes is the one word that everyone in the chain of command can readily identify with.  It is the concept of *initiative*.  Warfighters want to establish, gain, sieze, and keep the initiative in every operation, every mission, every strategy.  And we want to actively prevent the enemy from ever gaining the initiative.   When friendlies have the initiative, then by definition the enemy does not have it.  Initiative is everything, since the force that is causing the other side to react is the force which has the initiative.  Intelligence can disclose so many different aspects of the enemy's disposition, but the end result (or the objective) is to give advantage to friendlies so that we can sieze the initiative, and deny the enemy the ability or opportunity to seize the initiative from us.  Whatever else happens- whatever tactics, covert means, SIGINT, HUMINT, and other sources, these are methods and avenues to the same destination, in my opinion: seizing and keeping the initiative.

So, coming from this perspective, I propose the following alternative verbiage:
*
"The primary function of intelligence is to provide information and  assessments to facilitate accomplishment of the mission, by aiding friendly forces to seize and actively maintain the initiative."*


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## Florida173 (Oct 6, 2010)

To turn NAIs into TAIs


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## LongTabSigO (Oct 6, 2010)

Let me know when we plan on discussing this at above the battalion level.


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## Florida173 (Oct 7, 2010)

LongTabSigO said:


> Let me know when we plan on discussing this at above the battalion level.


 

Sounds great, but I think it gets a bit more convoluted at the operational and strategic levels.  As in how the G/J2s out there are broken into different types of teams generally doing CT or PolMil stuff.  Most of the stuff is for situational awareness anyway because of the speed the intelligence goes down is no where near as quick as the collection assets at the Battalion level and below.


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## SpitfireV (Oct 7, 2010)

PolMil?


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## Florida173 (Oct 7, 2010)

SpitfireV said:


> PolMil?


 
Yeah... Think PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information systems), or even DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military and/or Economic)

PolMil is just Political and Military analysis at usually a Strategic or Operational level.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 7, 2010)

I don't think DIMEFIL is an effective model any longer.  I'm thinking about writing a paper about it.  Maybe a separate thread for that later.

I should have defined the parameters of the discussion better, it may be more useful to ask "what is the purpose of intelligence at the strategic level," and "what is the purpose of military intelligence" as two separate questions.


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## LongTabSigO (Oct 7, 2010)

Marauder06 said:


> I don't think DIMEFIL is an effective model any longer.  I'm thinking about writing a paper about it.  Maybe a separate thread for that later.
> 
> I should have defined the parameters of the discussion better, it may be more useful to ask "what is the purpose of intelligence at the strategic level," and "what is the purpose of military intelligence" as two separate questions.



(1) I find it interesting some seem to think that the presence or absence of systems/assets, or the level of command changes the nature of intelligence.  I'd submit that for any definition of "the purpose of intelligence" to be valid, it must apply at any level. 

(2) Please...do not make up a new acronym.  DIME/DIMEFIL/MIDLIFE really covers it.  For those who are not acquainted with these terms:  These are elements of national power, so I doubt you'll come up with another acronym that will materially enhance this concept.  

(3) Lets's stop throwing around acronyms/buzzwords.  We were doing way better when we were trying to capture the essence of this topic with tightly written prose.

(4) Also: "POLMIL" means political-military, but is not to be construed as only as, or primarily as, a form or manner of analysis.  "POLMIL" applies to any topic regarding political and military actors.


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## LongTabSigO (Oct 7, 2010)

JBS said:


> <snip>
> So, coming from this perspective, I propose the following alternative verbiage:
> *
> "The primary function of intelligence is to provide information and  assessments to facilitate accomplishment of the mission, by aiding friendly forces to seize and actively maintain the initiative."*



I do not see how this is any different from the JP 2-0 definition.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 7, 2010)

DIMEFIL does not accurately sum up the elements of organizational influence- it completely omits racial, ethic, and religious elements- clearly, these can be instruments of national power as much as any of the others.


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## JBS (Oct 8, 2010)

LongTabSigO said:


> I do not see how this is any different from the JP 2-0 definition.



The big difference was my addition of the mention of "*initiative*".   To define the purpose of intelligence in a way that can apply at any  level, a writer must grapple with just exactly how to nail down the  wording so that it encompasses a myriad of assets, while addressing them  in a very broad way.   Since _"facilitating the accomplishment of the mission"_  is something that every military unit is tasked with, the verbiage I  proposed is a way of narrowing down the scope and focus of what all  intelligence assets would / should concern themselves with by adding a  careful mention of this profound word.    In other words, it takes the  textbook definition, and places it on a war footing.   The original definition is vague.

To highlight my point, other military units _facilitate the accomplishment of the mission_,  but do not necessarily contribute to the commander or planner in a way  that affects the ability to seize (or hold or deny) initiative.   Supply  and logistics, for instance, would be one facet of (any level of) the  military which would be vital to any mission small or great, and yet  play only a limited role in the ability of (any level of) forces to  seize the initiative, hold it, or deny it from the enemy, other than  perhaps rudimentary interruptions or delays.   Batterys of LAAD might be  another example of military units/assets which, under certain  circumstances may be vital to a given mission, and yet not contribute to  the seizing of initiative (although they might certainly deny the enemy  the ability to sieze it).

The contribution of intelligence  assets, by comparison, can give a commander the ability to decide to act  or refrain from acting in such a way as to *force the enemy off balance*.   And with a steady stream of quality intelligence, the commander or  planner can then capitalize on earlier actions, and develop a[n  operational] tempo; this would be one in which enemy forces are given no  choice but to react to our activities.  Whichever side is causing the  other to react is the side which has the initiative, and therefore the  advantage.   A commander who can string together a sequence of these  cycles will control the AO.    At the highest levels of war planning,  commanders can exert a great deal of control on the outcome of  engagements when he can dictate the time, place, duration, and nature of  those engagements, as well as the selection of units to be employed  (i.e. placement of armor, prepositioning of other forces, etc.).  This  is my understanding of the concept of initiative, and I feel it deserves  a place of preeminence any time there is a mention of intelligence, and  especially when defining the very purpose of it.

Last of all,  I'll throw in a single high profile example of a well known mission that  demonstrates how intelligence can uniquely give a commander the initiative.  In my  view, it also illustrates how this instance involved action and  interaction from the squad level to the division level.  Without too  much detail, I remind you of the Desert Storm feint when CENTCOM  essentially sent a *SEAL* element/squad to place distraction devices and  explosives onshore, in a successful effort to deceive * 2 Iraqi Armor  Divisions* into believing that a Marine Amphibious Assault was underway.  From feeding disinformation to Iraqi forces, to movement of friendly forces offshore, to the Special Operations forces which carried out the mission, this was an instance where all the right pieces came together.    Knowing that Iraqi commanders were anxious about the possibility of an amphibious assault, knowing how they would likely react, and the using this information in order to force a reaction, CENTCOM was able to directly influence a huge force, paving the way for access elsewhere with little resistance. (For an interesting read on a little publicized aspect of this  particular feint, and how the mainstream media inadvertantly assisted US  forces,  http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA258285)


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## LongTabSigO (Oct 8, 2010)

Marauder06 said:


> DIMEFIL does not accurately sum up the elements of organizational influence- it completely omits racial, ethic, and religious elements- clearly, these can be instruments of national power as much as any of the others.


 
This bears its own thread, lest it hijack this one.  You're going to have to show me how the three elements you name rise to the level of elements of national/state power.  I look forward to that.



Color me dubious, but I do not see how you can leap from the recognized elements of national power to add factors that probably


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## LongTabSigO (Oct 8, 2010)

JBS typed:  





> The big difference was my addition of the mention of "initiative". To define the purpose of intelligence in a way that can apply at any level, a writer must grapple with just exactly how to nail down the wording so that it encompasses a myriad of assets, while addressing them in a very broad way. Since "facilitating the accomplishment of the mission" is something that every military unit is tasked with, the verbiage I proposed is a way of narrowing down the scope and focus of what all intelligence assets would / should concern themselves with by adding a careful mention of this profound word. In other words, it takes the textbook definition, and places it on a war footing. The original definition is vague.



The phases of operations are thus:
Shaping Phase 
Deterrence Phase
Seizing the Initiative Phase 
Dominance Phase 
Stabilization Phase 
Enabling Civil Authority Phase

As depicted, "seizing the initiative" is but one phase.  Including it in the definition we are debating would greatly compress the scope.  These other phases have different focuses.  The concept of "initiative" applies in vastly different ways in the "Shaping" or "Stabilization" phases as compared to the "Seize initiative" or "Dominance" phases. (Your examples trend toward these latter phases).  Could we include "initiative"?  Sure. But I'm not sure how it is additive to the existing, very thoroughly staffed and debated definition currently in doctrine.  Could I "live with it"? Sure.  

I'm purposely parsing here because this is a frustratingly difficult thing to codify.  Unless one has participated in doctrinal or joint task review, it is difficult to appreciate the degree of detail and nuance that these type of efforts require.  That said, I agree that doctrine is always the point of departure from which leaders train and lead their forces.  Nothing saying the ideas here could not be applied in specific cases.  

This is interesting.


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## Marauder06 (May 3, 2011)

I've been thinking about this thread some more, and based on what we discussed here and some of the research I did on my own I came up with this:

_The purpose of intelligence is to enable “decision advantage” by disseminating timely, accurate, predictive and contextualized assessments of the operational environment in order to provide early warning and prevent surprise, and to prevent the compromise of intelligence products and the sources and methods of collection._

This definition adds "decision advantage" and includes the CI aspect of intel that I think was kind of overlooked in earlier definitions.


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## Brill (May 11, 2011)

I think you need another conjunction in there somewhere.  :-"

I would argue that the prevention of "_the compromise of intelligence products and the sources and methods of collection" _is actually a security function (opsec, comsec, physec) more so than intel.


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## Marauder06 (May 11, 2011)

lindy said:


> I think you need another conjunction in there somewhere. :-"
> 
> I would argue that the prevention of "_the compromise of intelligence products and the sources and methods of collection" _is actually a security function (opsec, comsec, physec) more so than intel.



Opsec is an ops function, that's why it's "opsec" and not "intsec" ;) Intel has a role in opsec, but opsec is not an intel function.  Intel does, however, have CI, which is why I put the italicized portion in the definition.


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## Brill (May 12, 2011)

Marauder06 said:


> Opsec is an ops function, that's why it's "opsec" and not "intsec" ;) Intel has a role in opsec, but opsec is not an intel function. Intel does, however, have CI, which is why I put the italicized portion in the definition.



Damn Sir, have you been to 'gator school because I'm not sure what you just said but I think I'm ready to agree!  Maybe...perhaps...


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## Marauder06 (May 12, 2011)

'gator school is one of the only schools at Huachuca I didn't get to go to.  Well, of the ones I wanted to go to, anyway.

OPSEC really is an ops function, intel guys get saddled with it a lot because 1) ops guys don't want to do it, 2) it has "security" in it, so it MUST be an intel function, 3)the S3 has tasking authority, so even though it's not an intel function, "stfu and do it anyway, because I told you to."  ;)


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## x SF med (May 12, 2011)

Mara-
missing from your definition is ..._the fostering of surprise for operations by the fighting force for whom you are gathering the raw information which after analysis and synthesis becomes intelligence_....      I mean isn't good intelligence a force multiplier for the fighting force?  A good field platoon with excellent intel can become an excellent field platoon, possibly an overwhelming field platoon; and yet the corollary is also true as an excellent field platoon with shoddy intel may be rendered ineffective.

but, hey, I'm just the Troll, y'know?


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## Marauder06 (May 12, 2011)

x SF med said:


> Mara-
> missing from your definition is ..._the fostering of surprise for operations by the fighting force for whom you are gathering the raw information which after analysis and synthesis becomes intelligence_.... I mean isn't good intelligence a force multiplier for the fighting force? A good field platoon with excellent intel can become an excellent field platoon, possibly an overwhelming field platoon; and yet the corollary is also true as an excellent field platoon with shoddy intel may be rendered ineffective.
> 
> but, hey, I'm just the Troll, y'know?



I like it- but you don't think that would fall under "decision advantage?"


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## x SF med (May 12, 2011)

Marauder06 said:


> I like it- but you don't think that would fall under "decision advantage?"


 
Not really since decision advantage is part of command structure not the field operations  (execution) portion.  This is taking the highly honed reactive abilities of the fighters and adding steroids to the plan of attack through prescience - rather than reacting to a surprise right from an opponent they know the surprise right is an imminent conclusion and come under it with the left uppercut or coming at the opponent from an angle that renders the surprise right ineffective thus negating the presumed power of the opponent.   The decision advantage was in the planning - the operational advantage is in the execution.


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## Nasty (May 12, 2011)

x SF med said:


> Not really since decision advantage is part of command structure not the field operations (execution) portion. This is taking the highly honed reactive abilities of the fighters and adding steroids to the plan of attack through prescience - rather than reacting to a surprise right from an opponent they know the surprise right is an imminent conclusion and come under it with the left uppercut or coming at the opponent from an angle that renders the surprise right ineffective thus negating the presumed power of the opponent. The decision advantage was in the planning - the operational advantage is in the execution.



Damn Troll. I guess that I should have read that pre-Jim Beam. I'll take a look again tomorrow and then comment on your post.


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