# Great Paper on Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam



## Il Duce (Sep 24, 2015)

Highly recommend this article (really a book, it’s a long read): http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1269

I think the general strategic thoughts on Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan fall into two camps:


The wars were an unwinnable strategic mistake.  They should never have been initiated as failure was always inevitable


The wars were winnable but bad strategy, leadership, tactics, etc. caused us to lose those wars.  If the wars had been properly executed they could have been won.

I’ve always leaned toward the second argument.  Dr. Mason’s article is a powerful case for #1 – the wars were unwinnable from the start.

Despite his conclusions I still thought there were a number of valuable insights for proponents of view #2.  Specifically the recognition we were fighting a civil war and choosing sides.  The strategic implication to me is that you could have chosen the correct side – especially since in Iraq and Afghanistan their civil wars easily had more than just two sides.

I thought the first part of section I (security force ratios and failures of the ANSF) was not as strong as the other two.  While both were factual the significant differences in terrain and enemy capabilities made the comparisons less applicable than the other sections in my view.  I think you can find better arguments against the ANSF and GIROA in other articles.  However, the second half of part I (the historical summary) was one of the best I’ve seen – really places the Afghan conflict in the proper historical perspective in a fairly short period of text.  I don’t think I’ve seen it done better in another book.

Similarly, I thought the first part of section II relied too heavily on anecdotal evidence in the first part – but rebounded to be insightful and strategically cogent in later portions of the section.  The clear delineation of state-building and nation-building is a point I think is continuously absent from our COIN paradigms.  Similarly, I think the critical point that armies flow from states – not the other way around – puts our 3-24 nonsense in the failed ideas bin conclusively.  The year-by-year analysis of Afghanistan’s future should serve as a primer to anyone executing strategic intelligence assessments.

Part III I thought made an excellent case for national policy-makers but the advice was less clear-cut for the military.  While one would hope the military is not tasked to execute strategically unsound missions I don’t think that’s born out by experience.  I think the military needs to look very hard at our doctrine and capabilities for a solution to the inevitable problem of restoring order or at least diminishing threats in failed or semi-failed states.

If you don’t have the time to read the whole text – just read the foreword, end of part II (year by year prediction), and appendices.  This is a great read offering up some powerful points you need to address to have fully formed views on the war in Afghanistan.


----------



## Gunz (Sep 28, 2015)

I've read Section I and the first part of Section II and so far there's not much I can disagree with. His evaluation of ARVN Regional Force Infantry (dia phuong quan) is a bit more positive than mine would be, (having been embedded with both "good" and "bad" RF units); but overall he's spot on. And I thank God ARVN was not recruited--like the ANA--from such a factionally and tribally diverse population.

Civilian politicians, not soldiers, make policy. That's why a mission to avenge 9/11, destroy AQ and it's allies and kill Osama Bin Laden morphs into a nation-building venture. I believe that no matter how you train or equip them, a country of tribal bandits will remain a country of tribal bandits. 

He writes about _will. _The will to fight and die for a cause, the moral inspiration, the fanatical resolve and how it empowers our enemies. Fierce nationalism and Communist indoctrination fueled the Viet Cong and NVA; religious fanaticism and moral inspiration fuels both ISIS and the Taliban. That's the kind of stuff you just can't inject into your counterparts. 

And then there is my favorite expression with regard to most interventionary COIN operations: All your enemy has to do to win is wait for you to leave. I truly think that is the case with Afghanistan. Time is on the side of the guys who live there. They can afford to be patient. And as we have seen, these conflicts demand years and years of committment, the kind of investment in lives and resources that the American public is not willing to sanction.  

Entropy--as the author states--devolving into disarray. You gather the pieces together and try to form them into some semblance of organization and when you let go of the mold it flies apart into molecular particles. I fear that's the future of the ANA.

Thank you for posting this. I'll attempt to read the rest when I have more time.


----------



## Il Duce (Sep 28, 2015)

@Ocoka One - check out the end of part II, the year-by-year assessments of the next five years.  Each one is less than half a page so it's only 3-5 pages (with maps).  Really interesting framework to observe the news through if nothing else.


----------



## Grunt (Sep 28, 2015)

Very nice reading material. 

Thanks for the post!


----------



## Gunz (Sep 28, 2015)

Il Duce said:


> @Ocoka One - check out the end of part II, the year-by-year assessments of the next five years.  Each one is less than half a page so it's only 3-5 pages (with maps).  Really interesting framework to observe the news through if nothing else.


 
He's optimistic enough to predict a WW1-style stalement along that east-west line, *providing *US SF/SOF FACs return to work with the more reliable ANA units. So what I gather from this is he's predicting collapse is pretty much inevitable without the availability of US airpower. I've been on the sidelines looking in at what you guys have been up against since the Tora Bora days and I've got nothing but the greatest respect for terminal guidance and CAS as practiced by SF/SOF and our aircrews. But for how many years will the US commit SF/SOF and air assets? And if they're pulled out will we send them back in if the situation deteriorates enough, say in 2017 0r 18?

In 1972, during the Easter Offensive, NVA tanks began rolling up ARVN units in the northern provinces and might have gone all the way to Saigon had American Advisors and COVANs not been in the field calling in air strikes that stopped the offensive in its tracks. But despite heroic efforts and sacrifice then the end still came inevitably 3 years later. I'm a pessimist. I think, eventually, the TTP will get much of what it (and Pakistan?) wants and you guys will be watching the show on CNN wondering if it was worth the cost.


----------



## AWP (Sep 28, 2015)

Ocoka One said:


> He's optimistic enough to predict a WW1-style stalement along that east-west line, *providing *US SF/SOF FACs return to work with the more reliable ANA units. So what I gather from this is he's predicting collapse is pretty much inevitable without the availability of US airpower.



The country still has a dozen F-16's at Bagram plus who knows how many armed UAV's on top of whatever CCA (attack helos) is in country. Despite that the ANA is losing ground almost daily. Our 10,000 in country is a joke and some of us said as much when it was announced. 10k isn't enough to do much no matter how much effort they put out.


----------



## Gunz (Sep 29, 2015)

Il Duce said:


> The wars were an unwinnable strategic mistake.  They should never have been initiated as failure was always inevitable
> 
> 
> The wars were winnable but bad strategy, leadership, tactics, etc. caused us to lose those wars.  If the wars had been properly executed they could have been won.
> ...


 

There are so many variables. And I'm certainly not qualified to armchair OIF or OEF; but over the years I've given a lot of thought to the popular opinion held by many of my fellow VN vets, i.e., _We could've won if we'd been given the chance._

I'm not so sure. I think we would've had to invade the North. Five, six divisions at least, with amphibious hooks up the coast, then settle in to occupy the cities, towns and coastal enclaves while the enemy vanished into the jungles and mountains. And then...years and years of anti-guerrilla warfare and no end in sight, only we'd be trying to pacify twice the territory we originally had in the South.

Not to mention the credibility gap between the population and the GVN government, the corruption, the fighting spirit of the enemy and the lack of support on the US homefront.

So for Vietnam at least, I'd lean toward argument #2.


----------



## AWP (Sep 29, 2015)

I think Afghanistan could have been a win. I think Iraq had no chance.

The problem with a "win" is what do you define as a victory? One of my main gripes about OEF-A is that our goals and end state seemed to change. It was Calvinball with lives and money at stake. We should have said "Here's our goal" and then walked away once it was met. A bad strategy and changing goals guaranteed us a loss. The war was lost in 2002 and we wouldn't or couldn't accept that.


----------



## Florida173 (Sep 29, 2015)

Are we already giving a past tense on Afghanistan? We still have kinetic operations going on.


----------



## racing_kitty (Sep 29, 2015)

Florida173 said:


> Are we already giving a past tense on Afghanistan? We still have kinetic operations going on.


Do you see any leaders in place today that could at least lead starving wolves to meat? I'm gonna go with "No." 

Folks have been using past tense for Afghanistan since The Surge.


----------



## Gunz (Sep 29, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> I think Afghanistan could have been a win. I think Iraq had no chance.
> 
> _*The problem with a "win" is what do you define as a victory*?_ One of my main gripes about OEF-A is that our goals and end state seemed to change. It was Calvinball with lives and money at stake. We should have said "Here's our goal" and then walked away once it was met. A bad strategy and changing goals guaranteed us a loss. The war was lost in 2002 and we wouldn't or couldn't accept that.


 
That's the rub, isn't it? And it brings to mind another favorite (and overused, by me) expression: Victory in COIN is spelled S-T-A-L-E-M-A-T-E. @pardus has been good enough to point out to me in the past some notable exceptions, like the SAS in Oman in the 70's and a few others. But I think in most cases you take what you can get and call it whatever you want. And I couldn't agree more about goals.


----------



## AWP (Sep 29, 2015)

Ocoka One said:


> That's the rub, isn't it? And it brings to mind another favorite (and overused, by me) expression: Victory in COIN is spelled S-T-A-L-E-M-A-T-E.



I would disagree with that statement, but statistically you're probably right. You have Oman and Malaya as success stories (one could argue for Alexander in Bactria, Caesar in Gaul, and the Mongols at various locations), but those are little known in the West. I love the liberals and libertarians who say COIN isn't a valid strategy and then when you point them to the above they stutter and hem and haw before going back to their "point." The fact is COIN is valid, BUT (huge word in this case) the conditions to beat an insurgency are as much civil as military unless you can somehow kill your way out of the problem; possible, but statistically unlikely. It is an oversimplification, but you need a carrot and a stick. The "big three" in US history (Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq) had a big stick but a rotten carrot. By '66, '02, and '03 respectively those wars were "lost." We had a chance in Afghanistan to provide a good carrot, but not the other two cases.

You know the best part? We won't learn. We think we learned and we act like we won. We fall back on the "We were winning when I left" or "We won on the battlefield" whargarbl, but it doesn't matter. 500 yards passing in the Super Bowl can be negated with a weak defense or even a weak kicker. An "L" is an "L" on the scoreboard.


----------



## Gunz (Sep 29, 2015)

I agree COIN is valid, FF. But it's got to be done right. COIN is valid if everybody is on board, from the NCO in the field to the policy-makers in government. The committment has to be deep and the resources plentiful. Success has to be exploited. And it won't be if the high command regards what you're doing as a sideshow.


----------



## Il Duce (Sep 29, 2015)

Maybe some clarification of what is meant by COIN and COIN doctrine.  To me COIN is counterinsurgency - a type of combat, but COIN doctrine is FM 34-4 penned by GEN(R) Patreaus and team.  I don't subscribe to the idea COIN is impossible - but I definitely subscribe to the idea COIN doctrine developed for IZ and AF is fatally flawed and ineffective.


----------



## pardus (Sep 29, 2015)

The thing with COIN is that the Military effort MUST be 100% supported and mirrored by the political effort, in order for it to work.
That is what has lost the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan etc... The politicians started the war then spent most of their time and willpower undermining the Military effort. 
COIN is unwinnable in a scenario like that.


----------



## Brill (Sep 30, 2015)

Il Duce said:


> Maybe some clarification of what is meant by COIN and COIN doctrine.  To me COIN is counterinsurgency - a type of combat, but COIN doctrine is FM 34-4 penned by GEN(R) Patreaus and team.  I don't subscribe to the idea COIN is impossible - but I definitely subscribe to the idea COIN doctrine developed for IZ and AF is fatally flawed and ineffective.



Has the USG ever instituted a friendly foreign government via it's COIN doctrine?


----------



## Gunz (Sep 30, 2015)

lindy said:


> Has the USG ever instituted a friendly foreign government via it's COIN doctrine?


 
Crickets.

COIN won't get you there. Hearts and minds don't cut it. You gotta twist some arms and make a few deals with the Devil. See my thread on the Banana Wars. We facilitated "friendly" governments in Central America, on behalf of American sugar and fruit companies and Standard Oil; but I don't think COIN doctrine played a significant part.


----------



## Florida173 (Sep 30, 2015)

lindy said:


> Has the USG ever instituted a friendly foreign government via it's COIN doctrine?



Japan?


----------



## pardus (Sep 30, 2015)

Florida173 said:


> Japan?



What? 

In what way could WWII ever be misconstrued as an insurgency?


----------



## pardus (Sep 30, 2015)

Ocoka One said:


> Crickets.
> 
> COIN won't get you there. Hearts and minds don't cut it. You gotta twist some arms and make a few deals with the Devil. See my thread on the Banana Wars. We facilitated "friendly" governments in Central America, on behalf of American sugar and fruit companies and Standard Oil; but I don't think COIN doctrine played a significant part.



I disagree, unless of course you are singling the USA out on this post.

Malaya and Oman are again classic examples of successes of COIN doctrine.


----------



## Brill (Sep 30, 2015)

pardus said:


> Malaya and Oman are again classic examples of successes of COIN doctrine.



Both were UK sponsored, yes?


----------



## Florida173 (Sep 30, 2015)

pardus said:


> What?
> 
> In what way could WWII ever be misconstrued as an insurgency?



I had learned that Post war Japan had an active insurgency, but doing some basic research now it seems that there has been a reverse on that idea. 

There was of course the werewolves in Germany after the war, but that was apparently not all that significant.


----------



## Gunz (Oct 1, 2015)

pardus said:


> I disagree, unless of course you are singling the USA out on this post.
> 
> Malaya and Oman are again classic examples of successes of COIN doctrine.


 
USA only, Pardus, in response to Lindy's question.

Malaya and Oman stand out, but in terms of scale don't approach the massive operations in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. In Malaya we're talking about an estimated  8000-9000 insurgents; in Oman, less than 2000 rebels. And in neither case were the insurgencies backed by outside third parties. North Vietnam had two superpowers and the rest of the Iron Curtain countries backing it up and an army of more than a quarter million. I just think a small-scale conflict is easier to manage and contain and provides a more realistic environment for COIN.


----------



## Blizzard (Oct 6, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> The problem with a "win" is what do you define as a victory?


To me, this question gets to the heart of the issue.  How is one defining a "victory" or "loss"?

1.  Is it ousting the current regime and decimating their armed forces?  We did that...quickly and efficiently in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  If so, unquestionable win.

2.  Is it the nation building/COIN once the aforementioned is complete?  Well, that's another question.  The answer becomes complex and becomes a rather slippery slope... 

I'll quote from one of my past posts on a similar topic:

"From the _Air Force Officer's Guide_: "*The armed forces exist to serve the United States by providing the military wherewithal to deter war and, should that fail, to fight and conclude war to the advantage of the United States.* The armed forces do not exist for themselves, as a source of employment, as a market for American industry, or as a social welfare tool for social engineering."

Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogelman summed it up well, and his statement is applicable here, when he said, "The Air Force is not a social actions agency. *The Air Force exists to fight and win wars. That's our core expertise*; it is what allows us to be called professionals. We are entrusted with the security or our nation..."

"Air Force" can be substituted with "armed forces" in Fogelman's statement above."

Do we have an obligation to ensure a country we've waged war against is successful in our aftermath or is the simple removal of a regime and decimation of their existing military capability enough?  This is really a moral, ethical, and political question as opposed to a military one.  Is this what defines victory?  If so, who really owns the nation building process; DoS, some OGA, or the military?  My view is that ownership primarily lies with DoS.  This is their mission statement (contrast this with the bolded statements above):

"Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system."

However, the reality is this comes with it's own challenges, not the least being DoS's very political and changing nature and the line defining the military's role continues to blur more and more.   Isn't success or failure in this arena truly the result of subsequent diplomacy?

Retired Army Lt Gen and Former Ambassador Karl Eikenberry actually wrote an interesting read with some fair points (as well as a number with which I disagree) called "_The Limits of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan_".     In his conclusion he makes the statement, even if in passing, that, "..while making Afghanistan a better place to live is certainly a noble goal, it is not necessarily a vital U.S. national interest..."

Something to ponder.


----------



## AWP (Oct 6, 2015)

Blizzard said:


> Retired Army Lt Gen and Former Ambassador Karl Eikenberry



YMMV, but I personally discount anything uttered by that political hunk of stupid, especially where Afghanistan is concerned. He is pompous, arrogant, and out of touch with AFG despite his years of "service." He failed harder than Betamax.



Blizzard said:


> Do we have an obligation to ensure a country we've waged war against is successful in our aftermath or is the simple removal of a regime and decimation of their existing military capability enough?  This is really a moral, ethical, and political question as opposed to a military one.  Is this what defines victory?  If so, who really owns the nation building process; DoS, some OGA, or the military?  My view is that ownership primarily lies with DoS.  This is their mission statement (contrast this with the bolded statements above):



The military doesn't define the end state, it works towards that end state. The goals are defined by the President, his NSC, Congress, State, and whoever else is on the decision matrix. State doesn't carry that burden alone, it executes the civil side of both war and peace.

Even with goals set by the President or NSC, State and/ or the DoD can fail and render the other's contributions irrelevant. Given DoS and DoD's animosity towards one another (among a laundry list of contributing causes) we'll never successfully prosecute COIN on a large scale.

Also, Eikenberry is a tool.


----------



## Blizzard (Oct 6, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> YMMV, but I personally discount anything uttered by that political hunk of stupid, especially where Afghanistan is concerned. He is pompous, arrogant, and out of touch with AFG despite his years of "service." He failed harder than Betamax...
> 
> ...Also, Eikenberry is a tool.


LOL.  I understand and share your disdain.  Nonetheless...


----------



## Gunz (Oct 6, 2015)

The military can't make miracles happen. It can only try it's best to perform the tasks it's given, and sometimes it's given unrealistic tasks.



Freefalling said:


> ...we'll never successfully prosecute COIN on a large scale...


 
I think you're right. Large scale requires such a total committment, unwavering resolve, a harmony of purpose and the kind of resources I doubt we'd ever see.


----------

