# F3EAD



## slick (Feb 7, 2012)

So I was looking for some information regarding the process didn't find any papers on this site, unless I missed it somewhere. I did, however, find this link. It gives a pretty solid look at the process, in my opinion. Anyone notice it missing anything or can provide extra guidance?

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-“feeds”-the-sof-targeting-process


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## Marauder06 (Feb 7, 2012)

The author is a genius.  ;)

What specifically would you like to discuss?  There are several people on the site who have experience with F3EAD/F3EA, and they're on both sides of the debate as to whether or not it's a good idea.


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## DA SWO (Feb 7, 2012)

slick said:


> So I was looking for some information regarding the process didn't find any papers on this site, unless I missed it somewhere. I did, however, find this link. It gives a pretty solid look at the process, in my opinion. Anyone notice it missing anything or can provide extra guidance?
> 
> http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-“feeds”-the-sof-targeting-process


 

Why not use AKO to find the authors; then you could contact them.


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## CDG (Feb 7, 2012)

Marauder06 said:


> The author is a genius. ;)


 
I heard his NCOs wrote it for him.....


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## slick (Feb 8, 2012)

I don't have AKO and I don't think directly contacting an officer is the best of ideas for me, unless he's in my CoC.

Nothing to spark up a discussion as of now. The process is easy to understand and parts seem like common sense to me. Just making sure what I'm reading is valid and not leading me astray. I'm usually wary of when I read intel/ops fusion material because it can be very biased sometimes.


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## Brill (Feb 8, 2012)

Since you're at GAFB & I assume you're NOT a firefighter, rest assured you'll be very well versed in F3EAD at your next duty station.


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## Salt USMC (Feb 11, 2012)

Okay, here's something I've been wondering for a while:  Irrespective of collection methods/sources, how does the SOF targeting process differ from that of, say, a regular infantry battalion?


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## Brill (Feb 11, 2012)

Process is the process like football: some colleges have mores resources (human, technical, material) & better facilities but the game is exactly the same.


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## Marauder06 (Feb 11, 2012)

Deathy McDeath said:


> Okay, here's something I've been wondering for a while: Irrespective of collection methods/sources, how does the SOF targeting process differ from that of, say, a regular infantry battalion?


 
Different SOF elements use different targeting methodologies.  F3EA/F3EAD works very, very well in organizations that truly believe "intel drives operations" and "operations directs the intel effort."  SOF or not, in organizations without an effective ops/intel lashup, F3EAD (or any meaningful targeting methodology) is going to be less than fully effecting at anything other than the very basic tactical level.

Many people associated F3EAD with a certain element within SOF.  While the technique may have originated in that element, they are not the only ones who can use it effectively.  F3EAD isn't just a targeting methodology, it's an organizational culture.  When you can get ops and intel working that closely together, with effective leadership for C2 and a competent staff to support it, it can do great things.  And that's irrespective of the type of organization, the kinds of targeting, or the level of resourcing.


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## goon175 (Feb 16, 2012)

> how does the SOF targeting process differ from that of, say, a regular infantry battalion?


 
WAAAAY faster. And I think that is one of, if not the most important, keys to making F3EAD work well. If there is a week inbetween each step, then you would never produce the results that the system is capable of.


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## Marauder06 (Feb 18, 2012)

Speed is definitely a key characteristic of F3EAD.  But what really makes it work, and what is the key component, is the true fusion of intel and ops.  F3EAD will not work effectively in units that only pay lip service to "intel drives operations" and "operations directs intel."  That's why F3EAD is not only a targeting process, it's an organizational culture.  

Too many units out don't have intel as a priority; in those units intel is there to hand out maps, check arms rooms, and to be blamed when an operations doesn't go well.  In units where intel is a valued part of the team, commanders at all levels have high expectations of their intel professionals, and empower and enable those professionals to provide a high level of support to the operational mission.


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## Brill (Feb 18, 2012)

Marauder06 said:


> Too many units out don't have intel as a priority; in those units intel is there to hand out maps, check arms rooms, and to be blamed when an operations doesn't go well.



You shouldn't bash SF in the Guard like that. ;)


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## Marauder06 (Feb 18, 2012)

lindy said:


> You shouldn't bash SF in the Guard like that. ;)


 
lol

The units I really had in mind when I made that statement were my infantry battalion in the 101st and pretty much my whole experience in 2ID.

At the same time though, with the (lack of) quality of some intel types in some SF units, I don't blame SF guys for relegating some of their intel types to menial labor- because that's all they can be trusted with.


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## Salt USMC (Feb 19, 2012)

Your intel guys have to check the armory too?  Damn, we dont even have to do that in the corps!


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## Marauder06 (Feb 20, 2012)

:)  Yeah, physical security is a legit S2-type function, I don't think most intel guys mind doing it.  It's when that's ALL that the intel guys do (or when the ops guys try to stick us with managing OPSEC too) that it becomes a problem.


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## goon175 (Feb 20, 2012)

Isn't it just a once or twice a year inspection for S-2? I mean its not like they are going by every day and checking the sign in/out logs and key logs....


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## Marauder06 (Feb 20, 2012)

It depends on how bad the arms room are 

It's not the arms rooms checks are a pain in the ass- they're usually not- it's just that when that's all you call on your intel guys to do, it usually means they're underemployed.  Or the unit doesn't need/doesn't know how to employ intel.  OR, it means your intel guys really, really suck and you can't trust them to do anything else.  However it shakes out, there's a problem if all you have your intel guys doing is arms rooms checks and handing out maps.


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## interrogat (Feb 24, 2012)

Marauder06 said:


> It depends on how bad the arms room are


Sounds like you've witnessed a few OIPs-gone-bad.


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## M482012AN5 (Feb 25, 2012)

Did Smalls Wars Journal end up on Anon's hitlist? Server's down... pdf anyone?


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## tigerstr (Feb 25, 2012)

M482012AN5 said:


> Did Smalls Wars Journal end up on Anon's hitlist? Server's down... pdf anyone?


Link seems to be working now, but have it anyway...


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## Salt USMC (Feb 27, 2012)

Seems to be working now.  Still a good read!


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## x SF med (Mar 5, 2012)

Marauder06 said:


> The author is a genius. ;) ...


 
But he appears to have a great reliance on charts and not enough clip art, and it appears he may not have a very competent editing staff of qualified NCOs.

The article itself is well written, cogent and expains the enhancements necessary to the process to make the tactical/strategic intelligence collection and dissemination more efficient.


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## Marauder06 (Jun 22, 2012)

x SF med said:


> But he appears to have a great reliance on charts and not enough clip art, and it appears he may not have a very competent editing staff of qualified NCOs.
> 
> The article itself is well written, cogent and expains the enhancements necessary to the process to make the tactical/strategic intelligence collection and dissemination more efficient.


 
I have it on good authority that no NCOs were harmed in the writing of that article ;)


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## Etype (Jun 22, 2012)

Deathy McDeath said:


> Okay, here's something I've been wondering for a while: Irrespective of collection methods/sources, how does the SOF targeting process differ from that of, say, a regular infantry battalion?


Very old post to be replying to, but I'm going to try using simple Army language-

On the conventional side, especially when deploying as a BSO to A-stan/Iraq- the 5Ws of the mission are very generic. Everything that's learned in NCOES/career courses/staff schools is disregarded and "combat reconnaissance patrols", route clearance, and KLEs (with little direction or tactical importance) fill the void. The BSOs seem to lack intense focus, scatter their efforts, and dissolve effectiveness. I don't know how many times I'd just be BS'ing with squad leaders from the BSO about the happenings in the area and they'd have no idea as to what I was talking about in regards to key players, whats happening to the N-S-E-W of us, recent SIGACTs, etc. Hell, I know when I was in the 82nd I had no idea who the governor was, or the name of the local al Qaeda cell leader- I just knew that if I saw someone with an AK and no uniform that I was going to kill the hell out of him.

When SOF units go through their MDMP the facts and assumptions are scrutinized to the highest degree and great care is taken in developing CCIR. EEFI is then protected ruthlessly(look at the security at a SOTF or Ranger camp compared to a conventional BDE HQ, or an VSP compared to a COP). Missions are driven by PIR until enough of the holes have been filled for deliberate ops. When the DA missions do start really flowing, your intel section is still going to provide you with specific PIR to look for on that specific operation. There's also a large amount of cross talk between SOF units, both across task forces and multi-nationally.

So in closing- we don't do it differently, we just do it right.


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## goon175 (Jun 22, 2012)

I have to throw in this: we do have a slightly unfair advantage due to the assets given/available to us to develop targets that the CF doesn't have. Regardless, I agree with Etype in that we go about it in the most efficient and common sense way.


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## Marauder06 (Jun 23, 2012)

goon175 said:


> I have to throw in this: we do have a slightly unfair advantage due to the assets given/available to us to develop targets that the CF doesn't have. Regardless, I agree with Etype in that we go about it in the most efficient and common sense way.


 
Absolutely.  But part of it is what we do with those resources; "success breeds success."  In the squabbles for say ISR, I can envision a SOF commander saying, "This is what we've done with the four Reapers you have already given us" <throws up statistic of how many ops/how many kill or captures/results of those targets> "Now, this is what I could do if you give me two more, and that EP3 from III Corps that I've been asking you for months to throw my way" <different, even more impressive results shown>.


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## BravoOne (Jun 23, 2012)

slick said:


> So I was looking for some information regarding the process didn't find any papers on this site, unless I missed it somewhere. I did, however, find this link. It gives a pretty solid look at the process, in my opinion. Anyone notice it missing anything or can provide extra guidance?
> 
> http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-“feeds”-the-sof-targeting-process


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## Marauder06 (Jun 10, 2016)

Time to update this article, so it's time to resurrect this necro-post.

Anyone currently using F3EA/F3EAD and have a comment on this piece?


*Tier One Targeting: Special Operations and the F3EAD Process*




> Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD), pronounced “F-three-e-a-d” or “feed,” is a version of the targeting methodology utilized by the special operations forces (SOF) responsible for some of the most highly-publicized missions in support of overseas contingency operations. F3EAD is a system that allows SOF to anticipate and predict enemy operations, identify, locate, and target enemy forces, and to perform intelligence exploitation and analysis of captured enemy personnel and materiel.


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## Brill (Jun 10, 2016)

You pissed me off when you went down the "evidence" route. It's just for a feel good moment to convince the JAG that Abu Dipshi'ite is really the guy who I've been saying he is.

"How do you know it's him?"

"It's my fucking job and why you pay me."

When has ANYONE questioned the JAG about their calls?


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## Marauder06 (Jun 10, 2016)

Well, you can either go the "evidence" route, or you can see 100% of your detainees walk after your holding period has expired.

I never tried the "he's bad because I said he's bad" route and I would never accept it from my analysts or the operators that brought the bad guys in.  No evidence = he's out the door with a little money in his pocket for his time and trouble after our interrogators and analysts had a go at him.


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## Florida173 (Jun 10, 2016)

We recently developed a tool that helps expedite the "evidence" substantiation on targeting. Helps with what ever the current criteria is at the moment for diversity of INTs and quantity of reporting from each.


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## Brill (Jun 11, 2016)

Marauder06 said:


> Well, you can either go the "evidence" route, or you can see 100% of your detainees walk after your holding period has expired.
> 
> I never tried the "he's bad because I said he's bad" route and I would never accept it from my analysts or the operators that brought the bad guys in.  No evidence = he's out the door with a little money in his pocket for his time and trouble after our interrogators and analysts had a go at him.



I was coming from a SI perspective and alluding to the frustration that often happens when analysts are 100% sure Abu is The Abu because he's been "working" him for months but details are lost when sanitizing to SIPR-level.  I fully agree that single source derog could result in incorrect ID however we've lost the "destroy the network"  because JAG isn't a fan of digging deep.

You just described the problem: we've become a law enforcement organization, that doesn't understand that rehabilitating CT targets isn't effective.

I may be getting crotchety but we should be killing more and detaining less (not stop but less) but then since the US isn't involved in combat ops in Afghanistan or Iraq, I guess we should be detaining and charging suspects.  I can imagine @Etype on the stand testifying at The Hague!  Talk about a hostile witness!!!!

We've been doing this for 15 years now but AQ and IS are still effective insurgent forces. Kill more, talk less...UNLESS it's host nation taking all the credit.


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## Florida173 (Jun 11, 2016)

A lot has changed over there


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## Marauder06 (Jun 11, 2016)

lindy said:


> I was coming from a SI perspective and alluding to the frustration that often happens when analysts are 100% sure Abu is The Abu because he's been "working" him for months but details are lost when sanitizing to SIPR-level.  I fully agree that single source derog could result in incorrect ID however we've lost the "destroy the network"  because JAG isn't a fan of digging deep.
> 
> You just described the problem: we've become a law enforcement organization, that doesn't understand that rehabilitating CT targets isn't effective.
> 
> ...



There are different degrees of bad.  Especially in Afghanistan.  I'm pretty sure everyone that got brought into our facility was dirty in some way; after all, they were still alive.  But most of them weren't dirty enough for us to absorb the risk of sending them up to the big house.  In addition to the cost, the big prisons were Jihad U. for the people imprisoned there.  If they weren't muj'd up before they went in, and many of them weren't, they definitely were when they came out.

I'm all about detaining more and killing less.  Dead people tend to not talk as much.  We can't use corpses as HUMINT sources, or use them for operational messaging, or use them to spread mistrust within networks.  The worst of the worst / least cooperative bad guys tend to not allow themselves to be captured in the first place and end up KIA on the battlefield.  Just about everyone else we have a shot at doing something with, whether they're deliberately cooperative or not.

We are trying to establish rule of law in Afghanistan and Iraq so we can GTFO.  We can't do that with martial law and arbitrary, indefinite detentions.  It's got to go into the legal system at some point... unless we're just going to absorb the criminal justice system there as well.  I remember at least one of the JAGs on the tribunals at Bucca and Parwan was read on to TS, so we were able to lay out the classified evidence.

...and at the end of the day, if they're still bad when they get kicked loose, you can JDAM them later.

I don't think we ever turned over any detainees to be tried at The Hague, so Etype is safe for now ;)  And the 
Hague Invasion Act ensures none of us are going to be dragged in as defendants.


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## Etype (Jun 11, 2016)

Marauder06 said:


> I'm all about detaining more and killing less... ...The Hague, so Etype is safe for now ;)


I agree, and this is another place where a BOG count hurts us.  Detainee Ops are manpower intensive.

- The type of mission that would result in detainees vs. KIAs is higher risk, so it requires more manpower.
- Detainees need to be guarded at every phase of the operation.

Restrictive BOG counts usually result in these folks not making the list, or the unit simply not having enough personnel to accomplish the task.

As to testifying, I'm not saying anything in a courtroom. I'd go in there to testify against a j-walker and come out of there a suspect in a 1983 rape case (I've watched Law and Order), no talking to lawyers for me.



(...and I wasn't born until 1985.)


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