# Report: US Unable to Fight Two Simultaneous Wars



## AWP (Feb 25, 2015)

First, the above conclusion is a huge "Duh" to anyone who saw our performances in Iraq and Afghanistan. We lacked the troops, logistics, and support needed for two in the same region. Two wars in different areas would be...."painful."

Second, I don't know how much stock I 'd put in the rest of the report, but it makes for interesting reading and thought.

Lots of quotes and figures available at the links below.

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/201...-fight-2-wars-at-same-time/?intcmp=latestnews

http://news.usni.org/2015/02/24/new...-s-navy-and-marine-corps-strength-as-marginal

http://www.heritage.org/research/re...es-first-annual-index-of-us-military-strength


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## DA SWO (Feb 25, 2015)

The Flag Ranks were lying through their teeth during the Clinton Administration when they claimed we could fight and win two near-simultaneous wars (Iraq and Korea), we've cut forces since then, so why would the results change?


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## reed11b (Feb 25, 2015)

but, but, networks and technology and ....
Reed


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## 0699 (Feb 25, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> First, the above conclusion is a huge "Duh" to anyone who saw our performances in Iraq and Afghanistan.


 
Not only are we unable to "fight" two simultaneous wars, evidence shows that we are currently unable to "win" either one of them. 

IMO "fighting" and "winning" are two different things.  I would rather be able to "win" one war at a time than "fight" two wars simultaneously. :wall:


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## policemedic (Feb 25, 2015)

And that raises the question of how do you define winning?

In my view any plan that predicated winning on long term stability in either country--but especially Afghanistan--without heavy USG presence and commitment had to have been conceived during a drunken orgy whilst anally copulating with meth whores.


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## AWP (Feb 25, 2015)

policemedic said:


> ..had to have been conceived during a drunken orgy whilst anally copulating with meth whores.


 
So much for my retirement plan. Guess I'll grow a garden instead.


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## SpitfireV (Feb 25, 2015)

policemedic said:


> And that raises the question of how do you define winning?



That should be done before the commitment of forces.


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## Brill (Feb 25, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> First, the above conclusion is a huge "Duh" to anyone who saw our performances in Iraq and Afghanistan. We lacked the...political will to commit to total war.



Fixed it for ya.


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## 0699 (Feb 26, 2015)

policemedic said:


> And that raises the question of *how do you define winning*?


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## Gunz (Feb 27, 2015)

policemedic said:


> And that raises the question of how do you define winning?
> 
> In my view any plan that predicated winning on long term stability in either country--but especially Afghanistan--without heavy USG presence and commitment had to have been conceived during a drunken orgy whilst anally copulating with meth whores.


 
I'm guilty of overusing this definition, but it's been extemely useful: Victory in COIN is spelled S-T-A-L-E-M-A-T-E. And one could add INDEFINATE COMMITMENT in money, resources and lives. The best you can hope for is that when you leave the counterparts you trained and equipped and the government you propped up will not make a complete hash of things...but we all know how that goes. Usually all the enemy has to do to win is wait for you to leave. The Persian Gulf War was such a conventional warrior's bonanza it raised too many lingering expectations.

We'll never be able to fight a two-theater war without the draft. And the prospect of the draft coming back, with a nation full of me-firsters, is a fantasy.


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## pardus (Feb 27, 2015)

Ocoka One said:


> I'm guilty of overusing this definition, but it's been extemely useful: *Victory in COIN is spelled S-T-A-L-E-M-A-T-E. And one could add INDEFINATE COMMITMENT in money, resources and lives. *The best you can hope for is that when you leave the counterparts you trained and equipped and the government you propped up will not make a complete hash of things...but we all know how that goes. Usually all the enemy has to do to win is wait for you to leave. The Persian Gulf War was such a conventional warrior's bonanza it raised too many lingering expectations.
> 
> We'll never be able to fight a two-theater war without the draft. And the prospect of the draft coming back, with a nation full of me-firsters, is a fantasy.



Not so my friend. Check this out 
*SAS: Secret War- Operation Storm in the Middle East*


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## Gunz (Feb 28, 2015)

Thanks, Pardus, for pointing that out. It's beautiful when it works and I should have put a qualifying adjective in there...but I tend to view the Dhofar thing as more the exception than the rule. As successful as it was, still it lasted 16 years and involved a pretty small insurgent force.

It's probably personal bias, but I'm in the "eating soup with a fork" camp when it comes to COIN. I'd argue that counter-insurgencies can be successful but success may require constant vigilance and aggressive maintenance for many years. You could cite Sri Lanka as another "win"...but that one lasted 26 years. IMV there'd be more success stories if those conducting COIN ops were given what they needed for as long as they needed to maintain constant pressure. It's about defeating them, but defeating them is often about outlasting them.


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## pardus (Feb 28, 2015)

Ocoka One said:


> Thanks, Pardus, for pointing that out. It's beautiful when it works and I should have put a qualifying adjective in there...but I tend to view the Dhofar thing as more the exception than the rule. As successful as it was, still it lasted 16 years and involved a pretty small insurgent force.
> 
> It's probably personal bias, but I'm in the "eating soup with a fork" camp when it comes to COIN. I'd argue that counter-insurgencies can be successful but success may require constant vigilance and aggressive maintenance for many years. You could cite Sri Lanka as another example of a successful counter-insurgency...but that one lasted 26 years. IMV there'd be more success stories if those conducting COIN ops were given what they needed for as long as they needed to maintain constant pressure and outlast the insurgency.



COIN takes a long time, there's no dispute about that as far as I'm concerned. The Malayan Emergency for example took 12 years to sort out.
But that's irrelevant, it takes what it takes. That is only an issue when it comes to the public, which are a bunch of impatient pricks, they bitch and moan, the only way to shorten a war is to concede which is no option as far as I'm concerned.


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## Gunz (Feb 28, 2015)

pardus said:


> COIN takes a long time, there's no dispute about that as far as I'm concerned. The Malayan Emergency for example took 12 years to sort out.
> But that's irrelevant, it takes what it takes. That is only an issue when it comes to the public, which are a bunch of impatient pricks, they bitch and moan, the only way to shorten a war is to concede which is no option as far as I'm concerned.


 

Totally agree. And I'll definately look into the SAS's actions in Oman.


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## pardus (Feb 28, 2015)

Ocoka One said:


> Totally agree. And I'll definately look into the SAS's actions in Oman.



It's a great read. One reason why it was so successful was that it was kept secret from the public. Something that's nigh impossible in the USA.


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## AWP (Feb 28, 2015)

RAND did a study years ago about COIN campaigns. The average length, win or lose, was 13 years. COIN/ FID works, but it usually fails because the political will isn't there. Cases like El Sal, Oman, and Malaya occur off the public's radar (and before the Internet) and failures are rarely in stealth mode.

COIN/ FID are valuable and achievable, but impractical  and unwinnable unless they are secret. At best you can only commit small forces the US public won't care about because of the numbers and lack of media coverage. That means conventional forces MUST keep their grubby paws off of those efforts.

Curiously, all of the above sounds like what the Army's Special Forces used to do.


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## Mac_NZ (Feb 28, 2015)

A good war film is one in around 58 minutes and I think the general public feels it should be that way in real life.  Shock and awe and all that.


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## Betenhauser (Mar 1, 2015)

0699 said:


> View attachment 12665



This is what is best in life.


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## x SF med (Mar 1, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> ...
> Curiously, all of the above sounds like what the Army's Special Forces used to do.



And should still be doing, but it's not sexy and eye catching and money grabbing and reportable...  which are exactly the reasons I joined SF and was involved in COIN/FID/AT among other things in the 80's when the general public had forgotten about SF, except for Rambo movies.

Something about the quiet part of "Quiet Professional".


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## Gunz (Mar 1, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> RAND did a study years ago about COIN campaigns. The average length, win or lose, was 13 years. COIN/ FID works, but it usually fails because the political will isn't there. Cases like El Sal, Oman, and Malaya occur off the public's radar (and before the Internet) and failures are rarely in stealth mode.
> 
> COIN/ FID are valuable and achievable, but impractical  and unwinnable unless they are secret. At best you can only commit small forces the US public won't care about because of the numbers and lack of media coverage. *That means conventional forces MUST keep their grubby paws off of those efforts.*
> 
> Curiously, all of the above sounds like what the Army's Special Forces used to do.


 

The powers-that-be see COIN/FID working successfully at the hands of the professionals, i.e. Special Forces--and then get the Larry Lightbulb idea that they can convert conventional forces into that same role with a 3-week training ramp-up.  Suddenly you've got 20-something junior NCO rifle company squadleaders thrust into situations that require tactical sophistication, political finesse, cultural sensitivity, extreme patience, etc, etc. :wall:


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## Gunz (Mar 1, 2015)

pardus said:


> It's a great read. One reason why it was so successful was that it was kept secret from the public. Something that's nigh impossible in the USA.


 
You know me, I'll order it on your rec and get back to you on it. When I think of SAS I think CT/DA, not so much COIN/FID/UW.


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## DA SWO (Mar 1, 2015)

Freefalling said:


> RAND did a study years ago about COIN campaigns. The average length, win or lose, was 13 years. COIN/ FID works, but it usually fails because the political will isn't there. Cases like El Sal, Oman, and Malaya occur off the public's radar (and before the Internet) and failures are rarely in stealth mode.
> 
> COIN/ FID are valuable and achievable, but impractical  and unwinnable unless they are secret. At best you can only commit small forces the US public won't care about because of the numbers and lack of media coverage. That means conventional forces MUST keep their grubby paws off of those efforts.
> 
> Curiously, all of the above sounds like what the Army's Special Forces used to do.


Until big Army gets butt hurt over Bronze Stars and Combat Patches; then Big Army has to play, and by play, I mean be in charge.


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