# Fixing Intel



## Marauder06 (Apr 11, 2012)

A guest speaker in one of my classes last week was one of the authors of "*Fixing Intel*."  I know many of you have read this document in the past, and like me many of you agree with some of the authors' findings and the remedies they offer.

One question I have for the board is, if you have read the document and especially if you have served in Afghanistan yourself, how much of the blame lies with intel and how much lies with commanders, and how much do you think of what was identified as problem areas are "fixable" at the intel level?  I tend to believe that the issue is not so much with intel as it is with commanders.  Intel guys focus on things like IEDs, because that's what is important to commanders.  If the command emphasis shifts to something else, the intel effort will (or should) follow.  Moreover, it's all fine and good to talk about community engagement and the big picture and the like, but all the community engagement in the world isn't going to happen if you can't get off the FOB because your trucks get blown up every day.

So, I still like "Fixing Intel" and I'm very glad it was written, but I'm beginning to think that it should have been called "Fixing Commanders," and I'm thinking about writing a follow-up paper to that effect over the summer.  I just wanted to see what you folks thought first.


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## Brill (Apr 12, 2012)

Concur! Intel processes work.


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## Salt USMC (Apr 12, 2012)

Agree with your "Fixing Commanders" comment, M6.  As much as we'd like dictate where our collection efforts focus, ultimately we are beholden to the CO and his PIRs.


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## Marauder06 (Apr 12, 2012)

When things calm down for me after this semester (and after I finish that case study I said would be done by Christmas :-/ ) I think I'll tackle this one.


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