# Special ops, CIA first in, last out of Afghanistan



## Marine0311 (Oct 16, 2011)

Special operations forces and the CIA are girding for the moment when Afghanistan’s security rests once again with them, working together with Afghan forces against the Taliban....

http://articles.boston.com/2011-10-...forces-special-operations-forces-cia-officers


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 16, 2011)

Thats the way it should be...


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## Marauder06 (Oct 16, 2011)

Interesting reading, lots of experience talking in that article (Mulholland, Sacolick, McChrystal).


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## Viper1 (Oct 16, 2011)

Good article.  McChrystal's comments were quite interesting when he mentioned DA being part of a "holistic approach".   Agree completely, yes DA has it's place.  Can't pass out soccer balls or build schools when you're getting shot at, as my CO likes to say.

I'm wondering about the pace of withdrawl over the next couple years.  Already some units are sending Soldiers back early and expecting commander's to do more with less.  If things get nasty, will there be a second surge and a lengthened timeline or will the burden be placed on SOF, CIA, and Afghans (along with conventional forces still in country) to hold the line for the 2014 date?


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## Rabid Badger (Oct 24, 2011)

Viper1 said:


> If things get nasty, will there be a second surge and a lengthened timeline or will the burden be placed on SOF, CIA, and Afghans *(along with conventional forces still in country)* to hold the line for the 2014 date?



Our (SOF) mistake in the first place came from turning over SOF missions to conventional forces, we took DA from Bagram to Baghdad. Bad mistake.

We had the T on the run in '01. We then ran the CF in with tanks and MOUT, basically withdrew SOF, and 10 years later we're starting over??

The burden was ours to begin with (SOF, CIA, and Afghans), but then everyone thought they could do 'our' job.

Wonderful.


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## DA SWO (Oct 24, 2011)

I believe we need to draw down until it becomes a SOF War again.  Conventional units OPCON'd to the CJSOTF Cdr.  I would steal from the SEALs and have the conventional unit train up with the SOF Unit/CJSOTF Staff prior to deployment.  I'd even go so far as to increase the deployments from 6 months to 9 months.


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## surgicalcric (Oct 24, 2011)

RB said:


> ...The burden was ours to begin with (SOF, CIA, and Afghans), but then everyone thought they could do 'our' job...



Well said.

However, I dont believe they (conventional commanders) actually thought - at that time - that they could do our job; they were afraid if they werent included, regardless of the job they would/could do, they would be left out of the war and they had to "get theirs" as well.



			
				SOWT said:
			
		

> I believe we need to draw down until it becomes a SOF War again. Conventional units OPCON'd to the CJSOTF Cdr...



Exactly...

Afghanistan is a perfect example of the type of conflict which should be controlled by SOF with CF sub to the CJSOTF or JFSOC-A CDR.  It will be a power struggle but one worth fighting...


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## RackMaster (Oct 24, 2011)

I think our withdrawal this year is a good example (except no where near the same scale).  Our conventional BG is gone and replaced by highly trained "conventional" training teams.  But we still have our SOF commitment (training and DA), which has evolved over the years as our assets have grown/changed but I don't see those guys coming home any time soon.


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## DA SWO (Oct 24, 2011)

surgicalcric said:


> Well said.
> 
> However, I dont believe they (conventional commanders) actually thought - at that time - that they could do our job; they were afraid if they werent included, regardless of the job they would/could do, they would be left out of the war and they had to "get theirs" as well.
> Afghanistan is a perfect example of the type of conflict which should be controlled by SOF with CF sub to the CJSOTF or JFSOC-A CDR. It will be a power struggle but one worth fighting...


 
Exactly, the Army seemed to be at a loss until ANACONDA, then they were all in.


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## Brill (Oct 24, 2011)

surgicalcric said:


> Afghanistan is a perfect example of the type of conflict which should be controlled by SOF with CF sub to the CJSOTF or JFSOC-A CDR. It will be a power struggle but one worth fighting...



Without reporters or open access by the press.  You know...like we do other places.


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## AWP (Oct 24, 2011)

Something that is either lost by the conventional side, or maybe they are too scared to admit it, is every SF Officer has completed the Infantry Career Captain's Course (or whatever they call it these days). I believe every ODA is supposed to train and lead an indig battalion which means SF O-3's are capable of doing the same job as a coventional O-5. Look at the number of 18A's that left SF for conventional assignments and eventually returned to the Regiment. It isn't like they pin on the crossed arrows and are suddenly incapable of leading conventional forces.

This war doesn't need a 4-star two or three 3-stars and a galaxy of other GOs to run it. Structure it like a division if need be, staffed with SF-qualified O's, and turn them loose.

The conventional forces would never go for it and would in fact fight it tooth and nail. They "won" Iraq after all, what could SF possibly teach them about war.....


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## Marauder06 (Oct 25, 2011)

I'm not sure I'm convinced. In seven tours of working in or alongside the CJSOTFs in Iraq and Afghanistan, I have yet to see one that I felt was capable of running the kinds of operations that are necessary to win a large-scale protracted conflict. It would take a major long-term restructuring of the way the CJSOTFs do business for them to be able to field a staff competent enough to run a major theater conflict- they're not set up to run those types of operations.

The CJSOTFs I saw (which admittedly wasn't every one, but it was a lot of them) all had the same general characteristics- spectacular success at the very bottom (ODAs) and very top (command group) but an extremely weak supporting cast in between, especially on the enabler side. CJSOTFs draw most of their manpower from SF Groups, which typically lack the kinds of depth and expertise in fields like logistics and intelligence that are essential in long-term conflicts. Where would you get the bodies to field that kind of expertise? Where do you get your fire support and your air? If the answer is, "put all the conventional units with that stuff under the CJSOTF," then maybe we need to re-flag the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 10th, 19th, and 20th as Divisions instead of Special Forces Groups, because that is what they would all start looking like.

More to follow, have to run.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 25, 2011)

I absolutely agree that Afghanistan should have remained a SOF war; I also agree that the placement of conventional forces in Afghanistan was probably the worst decision made. However, I always get a bit of a chuckle when I read this “put SF in charge of conventional forces stuff”. That will never happen and I think that brain power of thought would be better placed on something else. Where in the SF mission scope or force structure does it state that a SF Captain should be able to relieve conventional forces LTC from his battalion or that a SF SFC can tell a company commander “I need your troops but not you”. That is absolutely absurd in theory….

I respect you guys and think what you all do is pretty damn amazing, but things like this make me wonder what some of you are thinking? I mean really, some commander is just going turn over his forces to anyone else, much less someone who is not even associated with his organization? Did the northern alliance commanders just turn over their forces to SF ODA’s and say, yeah that’s fine, do what you will with them?

It’s one thing to want the use of a unit to support operations, it’s another thing to try and pick apart that unit and attempt to take command of it.


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## DA SWO (Oct 25, 2011)

JAB said:


> I absolutely agree that Afghanistan should have remained a SOF war; I also agree that the placement of conventional forces in Afghanistan was probably the worst decision made. However, I always get a bit of a chuckle when I read this “put SF in charge of conventional forces stuff”. That will never happen and I think that brain power of thought would be better placed on something else. Where in the SF mission scope or force structure does it state that a SF Captain should be able to relieve conventional forces LTC from his battalion or that a SF SFC can tell a company commander “I need your troops but not you”. That is absolutely absurd in theory….
> 
> I respect you guys and think what you all do is pretty damn amazing, but things like this make me wonder what some of you are thinking? I mean really, some commander is just going turn over his forces to anyone else, much less someone who is not even associated with his organization? Did the northern alliance commanders just turn over their forces to SF ODA’s and say, yeah that’s fine, do what you will with them?
> 
> It’s one thing to want the use of a unit to support operations, it’s another thing to try and pick apart that unit and attempt to take command of it.


I don't think anyone is saying SF walks over to the Bde TOC and says take a hike.  But that BN/CO Cdr will do what the OPORD says, and if that means chopping his forces to SF, so be it.  Putting those guys in the TOC as enablers makes sense to me.

How many CO/BN ops are happening as this is typed?  We keep saying we are in a COIN environment,but running the war as a large scale force on force.  SOF needs to be the supported command; if big Army isn't willing, then bring more Marines into the mix.


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## AWP (Oct 25, 2011)

SOWT said:


> I don't think anyone is saying SF walks over to the Bde TOC and says take a hike. But that BN/CO Cdr will do what the OPORD says, and if that means chopping his forces to SF, so be it. Putting those guys in the TOC as enablers makes sense to me.



That's a SOCCE, typically a B Team mission....or it was when I was in.

http://www.arl.army.mil/arlreports/1999/ARL-TN-136.pdf


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 25, 2011)

SOWT said:


> I don't think anyone is saying SF walks over to the Bde TOC and says take a hike. But that BN/CO Cdr will do what the OPORD says, and if that means chopping his forces to SF, so be it. Putting those guys in the TOC as enablers makes sense to me.
> 
> Sticking a guy in a TOC as an advisor is one thing, but that is not what I understood to be discussed in here. However, even having an “advisor” in the command staff does not change the command or how that command will deploy its forces in all cases. Giving SF support is not an issue, the issues are the fallow on result of that support and how it effects the unit (i.e. WIA/KIA's, use of resources/equipment, and most of all is soldiers losing dicipline & unit cohesion).
> 
> ...



I am not sure where you are going with this. Conventional forces are providing a security blanket and if you take that blanket away something needs to fill the void. It was my understanding that that would be Afghan forces and as they assumed operational responsibility, conventional forces would withdraw. That aspect could have been done by SOF in the beginning, but CF has been doing it for awhile now. Moving forward you have the sustainment of the Afghan forces, moving that over to SOF is probably the best option, but where do the CF come into play? Logistical support? Or is continuing to provide the national/infrastructure security support? Or is it both?

I see it as an issue of all in or all out, and I think it needs to be all out for conventional forces. I support the idea of having a contingency QRF to rapidly deploy as needed; I support conventional logistical support so that SOF can fulfill operational needs. But I disagree with maintaining BCT’s and BTN’s on the ground, conducting full spectrum operations under the direct control of a few ODA’s.

Even moving past the conventional forces in support issue, Americans are ready to call it good and pull out. The United States government wants to ensure the region stays pro western when we do pull out, but yet you have the Afghan government already stating that they will side with the Paki’s if the US goes to war with Pakistan. Sometimes it’s better to take things at face value, that region is not going to stop what they have done for thousands of years and adopt American ideology. The same shit with Iraq and all the other shit holes in the region. If anything is going to work in Afghanistan or anywhere else in that region, it’s going to be a very small foot print from SOF, and that small foot print isn’t so small when you bring conventional forces in the picture (regardless of how you utilize those conventional forces).


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## DA SWO (Oct 25, 2011)

Freefalling said:


> That's a SOCCE, typically a B Team mission....or it was when I was in.
> 
> http://www.arl.army.mil/arlreports/1999/ARL-TN-136.pdf


SOCCE was designed to support the conventional Cdr.

I am looking at a conventional BN Staff Augmenting the ODC/JSOTF Staff.


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## Rabid Badger (Oct 25, 2011)

JAB said:


> ~snip all~



I'm still wondering how it is that you are involved in an SOF discussion at all.

Everyone of your posts defends the conventional position and you were never in an SOF unit to begin or even end with.

We are not saying get rid of CF or even that SF should be in charge of conventional. SOF is a totally different mindset, SOF vs. conventional here is not the issue, the decisions that were made in the early days is the issue. WTF.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 25, 2011)

surgicalcric said:


> ... they were afraid if they weren't included, regardless of the job they would/could do, they would be left out of the war and they had to "get theirs" as well.
> 
> ...



That was me, about seven, eight years ago. I was certain I'd be the only kid on my block without a combat patch, because I was sure the war(s) would be over before I could get in the game.  It's funny what I thought was important when I was young.


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## AWP (Oct 25, 2011)

SOWT said:


> SOCCE was designed to support the conventional Cdr.
> 
> I am looking at a conventional BN Staff Augmenting the ODC/JSOTF Staff.



Looks like I got my chocolate in your peanut butter. My apologies for misunderstanding and swapping the roles  :)


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## goon175 (Oct 25, 2011)

> That was me, about seven, eight years ago. I was certain I'd be the only kid on my block without a combat patch, because I was sure the war(s) would be over before I could get in the game. It's funny what I thought was important when I was young.



It's funny you bring that up. I tried to get my parents to let me graduate H.S. a year early, I was convinced that if I didn't leave as soon as possible I was going to "miss the war". I also skipped hiking the Appalachian Trail before I went in as well. I was really big into backpacking and kayaking in high school, and completing the AT was gonna be my last big achievement before entering the military. I had it planned out down to the day, where my food drops were gonna be, water points, refit points, everything. Pretty much all I had to do was by the airline ticket out there. I still regret to this day not doing it, but hindsight is 20/20.


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## AWP (Oct 25, 2011)

To clarify my first post: I'm not suggesting that an ODA CDR take over an infantry BN. I used that as an example to show that 18A's are perfectly capable of running a conventional unit that is OPCON'ed to them. I wouldn't expect the 18A to be involved in all of the details of a conventional unit chopped to them, but they are capable of utlizing those conventional units. It isn't like you'd chop an infantry BN to a SigO running a CSSB. You COULD, but that SigO would be so lost about the capabilities of the infantry under his/ her command as to cause problems. You wouldn't have such a restriction with an SF/ infantry marriage.

On SF "divisions": Again, I wouldn't argue to make the Groups a division-sized asset. I'm talking about the CJSOTF and really the whole war if it were scaled back to such a level. What I meant was that there have to be SF qualified GO's out there who could run the war. A two-star former 18A and two one stars under him, at least the Ops commander should be a former 18A, and then your regional JSOTFs run by O-6's. All of the flavors of SOTF's right now are augmented like a porn star's boobs and at times are even spread across Groups. You have SF BNs forming the core of a SOTF (or a Group HHC for higher ecelons), but all have conventional augmentees attached to them for the deployment. I cut my teeth on the old school method of waging war, Mongolian Horde at the Fulda Gap scenarios, no computers and certainly no networked computers, message formats where a commander couldn't be verbose with orders and so ODAs were given a wide amount of latitude in how they operated, a small support to shooter ratio (less than 2:1), etc.

War has changed. It isn't that the old model can be thrown out, but it is now an option rather than the standard. Hmm....didn't they add a fifth SOF Truth to cover that?


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 25, 2011)

RB said:


> I'm still wondering how it is that you are involved in an SOF discussion at all.





RB said:


> The discussion is about SOF and CF and I’m giving my input from a CF point of view.
> 
> Everyone of your posts defends the conventional position and you were never in an SOF unit to begin or even end with.
> 
> ...




I never made that an issue, I was posting to the fact that CF will not be willing to turn over their commands to SOF and that it’s crazy to think they would, or should. I can't help the past (i.e. CF supposedly taking over SOF missions, etc), but looking towards the future I think SOF should take control of the war after the major CF withdraw. I gave my opinion on how CF should be utilized in the future after the major force withdraw (i.e. logistic support, QRF, etc), in that I see that is the best way SOF will gain support from CF without having CF vs SOF problems (again that I did not bring up in this thread)...


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## Rabid Badger (Oct 29, 2011)

Apologies out to JAB and didn't mean to ruffle Conventional feathers.

The war could've [IMHO] had a much different and faster outcome if we'd been allowed to do our jobs and been given more time.

RIP to all those who gave the ultimate sacrifice for our freedoms.


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## Ravensfan9090 (Oct 29, 2011)

You know, I am sure I could be very wrong about this. But when you change from SOF operating in Afghanistan...from what I remember it was one of the best executed operations ever. However, when you transfer over to conventional forces do the Afghan people start to think it's more of a total occupation when it really isn't?


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## Marauder06 (Oct 29, 2011)

Ravensfan9090 said:


> You know, I am sure I could be very wrong about this. But when you change from SOF operating in Afghanistan...from what I remember it was one of the best executed operations ever. However, when you transfer over to conventional forces do the Afghan people start to think it's more of a total occupation when it really isn't?



I think that's exactly what happened- the mission changed from "blowing up bad guys" to "nation building."  Nation building on the order of what was needed in Afghanistan is outside the capability of SOF.  Many other missions which probably would have had the same end result are inside SOF's mission set and capabilities.

With the benefit of hindsight, I think a lot of us would look back and say we would have been a lot better off with a SOF-centric, SF-led longterm, small scale operation in Afghanistan.   A big push to punish and attrit the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and then maybe getting further in bed with the Northern Alliance or whomever else we could buy off/partner with to ensure AQ couldn't come after us again.  Augmenting a CJSOTF with airpower and intel, and convincing them that they need a professionalized staff that includes highly competent enablers, could probably have gotten us to exactly the same point we will be in 2014 with a lot less cost in terms of bodies, money, and materiel.


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## Ravensfan9090 (Oct 29, 2011)

Marauder06 said:


> I think that's exactly what happened- the mission changed from "blowing up bad guys" to "nation building." Nation building on the order of what was needed in Afghanistan is outside the capability of SOF. Many other missions which probably would have had the same end result are inside SOF's mission set and capabilities.
> 
> With the benefit of hindsight, I think a lot of us would look back and say we would have been a lot better off with a SOF-centric, SF-led longterm, small scale operation in Afghanistan. A big push to punish and attrit the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and then maybe getting further in bed with the Northern Alliance or whomever else we could buy off/partner with to ensure AQ couldn't come after us again. Augmenting a CJSOTF with airpower and intel, and convincing them that they need a professionalized staff that includes highly competent enablers, could probably have gotten us to exactly the same point we will be in 2014 with a lot less cost in terms of bodies, money, and materiel.


 
I think you are right.  Then you have an issue of shifting priorities from Afghanistan over to Iraq.  Mind you, I am sure the guys in Afghanistan were doing their job right, but then you have the massive devotion of forces into invading Saddam Hussein.  Forcing democracy onto anther country seems un-democratic in itself.

What doesn't make sense to me is this idea of "spreading democracy."  It's the same thing as containing communism.  You can't do it unless the people there want it.  Sure SOF kicked the crap out of the Taliban 2001/2002 but now there seem's like a Vietnam-like situation where we tried to counter the Vietcong, but the south Vietnamese were for Ho Chi Minh from the start.  Korea was the only example where a specific population favored democracy in the south.


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## Brill (Oct 29, 2011)

goon175 said:


> It's funny you bring that up. I tried to get my parents to let me graduate H.S. a year early, I was convinced that if I didn't leave as soon as possible I was going to "miss the war". I also skipped hiking the Appalachian Trail before I went in as well. I was really big into backpacking and kayaking in high school, and completing the AT was gonna be my last big achievement before entering the military. I had it planned out down to the day, where my food drops were gonna be, water points, refit points, everything. Pretty much all I had to do was by the airline ticket out there. I still regret to this day not doing it, but hindsight is 20/20.



Dust off those plans man and let's hit that shit this year!  SP tryouts for our reality show takeover!!!


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## goon175 (Oct 29, 2011)

Ha, if only I could take more than one week of leave at a time!


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## TLDR20 (Oct 29, 2011)

I am going to put my two cents in here. There would have absolutely less bloodshed if it was a SOF war. True, however ray is because our prescence would have been felt in what 10% of the country. Why fight us when you can go a two day drive away and get left the fuck alone.


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## Brill (Oct 29, 2011)

cback0220 said:


> I am going to put my two cents in here. There would have absolutely less bloodshed if it was a SOF war. True, however ray is because our prescence would have been felt in what 10% of the country. Why fight us when you can go a two day drive away and get left the fuck alone.



Cback, I'm not a UW guy but an intel weenie so the doctrine is still new to me.

Curious how SOF would hold territory though?  Seems that combat advised HN forces COULD clear an area but once they withdraw/move on, insurgent factions would move back in. How could this be prevented without CF setting up COPs/FOBs and conducting presence patrols?

Seems to me the key to effect the battle field the HN locals must be brought in and BELIEVE their future is directly linked to US/HN.  It doesn't seem as if the local Afghans want us there but rather just want to be left alone to determine their own future.

Was the original mission to deny, disrupt, and destroy AQ's ability to use AF as a staging area or regime change in AF?


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## TLDR20 (Oct 29, 2011)

^what he said, SOF forces can NOT hold the kinda territory neccesary to keep the TB from gaining ground. It isn't possible. If every ODA in SF was there it wouldn't be possible. CF are necessary. Those FOBs allow for more freedom of operations for the locals and SF. I stayed out of this but if bravado is the reason we think this should be our war, we are wrong as two boys fucking in church on Sunday. I am all for the ability of twelve guys to go in and do terrific things. But those infantry privates buy that land and own it monopoly style.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 29, 2011)

That is a bit of a double edge sword, the more CF used to secure areas/zones, the more opportunity the opposing forces has to attack in smaller groups with the “long war” network type effectiveness. Limiting the CF foot print allows the opposing force to group in mass, and that opens the door to use a larger CF-QRF to go in destroy/disrupt it, and then pull out to allow HN forces to maintain the security. Even in Iraq, we saw and used this type of warfare with great effectiveness (i.e. Fallujah, Mosul, Najaf, etc).

Using a large contingency of CF-QRF to come in and kill/break shit but immediately turn it over to HN forces, keeps the foot print small and keeps that “occupation” feeling reduced. I think it would a lot more effective than taking ground and attempting to hold it, pissing of the HN population, giving OPFOR a diverse target selection, losing our soldiers, and spending retarded amounts of money to sustain it all.


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## Rabid Badger (Oct 29, 2011)

lindy said:


> Cback, I'm not a UW guy but an intel weenie so the doctrine is still new to me.
> 
> Curious how *SOF* would hold territory though?



We don't/didn't hold terrain.We show the local populace how to do it for themselves. *THAT* is a small part of the UW concept.

We had the trust of the local Imams/tribal leaders and were showing *THEM* how to hold terrain and showing *THEM* the importance of the will to fight for what *THEY* believed in, freedom from Taliban brutality, *THEN* we gave the Afghans nation building with bulldozers, tanks, and conventional Big Army. [Not Big Army's fault as BA doe what BA does]

It was at that point that we lost all trust we fought hard to develop.


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## TLDR20 (Oct 29, 2011)

RB said:


> We don't/didn't hold terrain.We show the local populace how to do it for themselves. *THAT* is a small part of the UW concept.
> 
> We had the trust of the local Imams/tribal leaders and were showing *THEM* how to hold terrain and showing *THEM* the importance of the will to fight for what *THEY* believed in, freedom from Taliban brutality, *THEN* we gave the Afghans nation building with bulldozers, tanks, and conventional Big Army. [Not Big Army's fault as BA doe what BA does]
> 
> It was at that point that we lost all trust we fought hard to develop.



I def agree with this. However now that we have gone that route we cannot go back. That is unfortunate but a fact.


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## Rabid Badger (Oct 29, 2011)

cback0220 said:


> I def agree with this. However now that we have gone that route we cannot go back. That is unfortunate but a fact.



and with that statement I believe it's CF's onion to peel to catch up to SOF in the operational environment.

"Shock and Awe" may work in some environments but the AO's that SA works in are situationally different.

Patience is the SOF virtue and CF, IMO needs to learn that lesson now that we're in the 21st century. The CF cold war mentality is dead.


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## TLDR20 (Oct 29, 2011)

RB said:


> and with that statement I believe it's CF's onion to peel to catch up to SOF in the operational environment.
> 
> "Shock and Awe" may work in some environments but the AO's that SA works in are situationally different.
> 
> Patience is the SOF virtue and CF, IMO needs to learn that lesson now that we're in the 21st century. The CF cold war mentality is dead.



Could not agree with you more.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 29, 2011)

I would say that in order for CF to develop that type of patience, they would have to shift away from the daily-monthly-quarterly data/statics in calculating progress and success and use an annual-biannual-5 year data/statics calculation system. One of the main problems with CF being inpatient is the statistical reports demanded by higher levels who want to “know where we are at”. Battalion and company commanders being required to continually show some form of progress statistically and when they are lacking in it, they attempt to make up for it in a hurry.

I would also say that deployment lengths would have to increase dramatically (probably around the 2 year mark) in order avoid the changes in leadership styles and mission focus. A CF unit showing good results within an A/O over a 2 year period is a sign of success and would hold the incoming unit leadership to maintaining or exceeding that performance. It would most likely cut down on the incoming unit trying to reinvent the wheel.

Finley I would say that in order to do away with the inpatience of CF, we would have to be clear with the US Gov and the American people that this type of war could take several decades to become successful and that commitment from both the people and Gov would need to be unwavering. Having a we have been there for 5 years now “what’s taking so long” mentality won’t work, and that is exactly what we currently have.

I do think the that Afghanistan can stand on its own with SOF, and without the use CF. But I also believe it would be at the cost of several more fine SOF soldiers lives, and me personally as one of the American people, I am not sure it is worth it in the long run.


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## DA SWO (Oct 29, 2011)

One of the problems (IMO) was going into Iraq before Afghanistan was finished.  Rummy didn't want a bigger Army, so we froze forces in Afghanistan, and they became priority 2.  I can't remember which Gen was in charge, but we essentially tied ourselves to the FOB/MOB and didn't wander about. This allowed the TB to move back in, change (slightly) their M.O. and the result is today's operating environment.

We should have finished Afghanistan.

I also think Iraq would have happened sooner if 9/11 attacks hadn't happened.


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## AWP (Oct 29, 2011)

Ravensfan9090 said:


> Then you have an issue of shifting priorities from Afghanistan over to Iraq. Mind you, I am sure the guys in Afghanistan were doing their job right,



Some were not, see below.



SOWT said:


> I can't remember which Gen was in charge, but we essentially tied ourselves to the FOB/MOB and didn't wander about. This allowed the TB to move back in, change (slightly) their M.O. and the result is today's operating environment.



Then Major General Eric T. Olson did that. 25th ID had Afghanistan, all of it, in 2004-2005. The division staff ran the war and one brigade held RC East while another held RC South. They had some OPCON'ed Guard units involved with them to be sure, but the bulk of conventional forces were 25th ID. I think they were making some progress until the wheels fell off in Iraq and the 25th ID BDE in country (The Stryker BDE if I recall) was taking a number of casualties. Olson didn't want families to see them losing men in two wars so he quietly put out an order restricting operations to within a few miles (I'm told no more than 10) from their FOBs/ COPs.

I'll say it again in case a few of you are shaking your heads: he deliberately restricted combat operations in Afghanistan IOT avoid casualties and bad press/ morale.

I'd heard rumblings that the 25th ID staff held a dim view of SF as a whole, I even heard a couple of captains blasting SF, but didn't see any widespread behavior; I also wasn't on the JOC floor or roaming the halls of their HQ. 3rd, 7th, and 1st Groups were in country during that time and they could maybe speak to that a little better than I.

The 173rd relieved the 25th ID in the spring of 2005. Some of their tales are epic. Huge trains of mules moving in broad daylight, 50+ bad guys meeting, stuff like that. The NCOs I spoke to didn't have any kind words to say about the 25th's "performance."

The guys on the ground were giving their all, but their leadership failed them and it failed us. Iraq being what it is and draining resources away from OEF-A, I don't see the 25th making a great deal of headway, but they could have at least held the status quo in country at the time. in 04-early 05, units were finding weapons caches left over from the Soviet/ Civil war eras. By the summer, they were uncovering small to modest-sized caches of new weapons and ammo.

The Taliban did a "Rope-a-Dope" on us.

We gave them this war, handed it to them on a platter.


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## goon175 (Oct 30, 2011)

> Everything Freefalling said



Holy shit. That is some eye-opening stuff.


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## AWP (Oct 30, 2011)

FWIW, I've contracted in Afghanistan since Aug. 2004 with a 20 month break from 06-08. The Olson story came to me from NCO's, Officers, and fellow contractors. The 173rd vignette is from soldiers and their JTACs.

Another blurb that some SF guys may know or have participated in. Summer of 05 or maybe 06 there was a firefight near Ghazni. An AC-130 went Winchester and was replaced by another AC-130. One or two flights of A-10's also expended all of their ordnance. There was something like 50+ KIA and no KIA Americans. An insurgency that is secure enough to have 50+ together for a meeting is hardly a weak organization operating in coalition-controlled areas.

We had a "good war" in '04. We needed more airlift, both FW and RW, MAYBE another squadron of A-10's, and that was it. ISR was probably thin, but our ground forces were good. SF was still SF and their commanders weren't balls deep in risk advoidance. Our footprints were small and we had the support of the people. PK wasn't involved and there weren't any civilian casualties to speak of. 04-05 was the turning point IMO. The 173rd was behind the power curve thanks to the 25th and we've played catch-up ever since.

Where is Olson now?
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=795


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## Brill (Oct 30, 2011)

Freefalling said:


> FWIW, I've contracted in Afghanistan since Aug. 2004 with a 20 month break from 06-08.



One Percent-er. 

Very interesting insight.  Be safe.


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## AWP (Oct 30, 2011)

lindy said:


> One Percent-er.
> 
> Very interesting insight. Be safe.



I've spent it all on hookers, blow, and orphan blood.


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## DA SWO (Oct 30, 2011)

Freefalling said:


> I've spent it all on hookers, blow, and orphan blood.


and tat's, don't forget tat's.


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## AWP (Oct 30, 2011)

SOWT said:


> and tat's, don't forget tat's.



BWAHAHAHA! My wife's the tattoo artist, so I guess the house payment counts?


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## DA SWO (Oct 30, 2011)

Freefalling said:


> BWAHAHAHA! My wife's the tattoo artist, so I guess the house payment counts?


She do piercings? 'cause I hear there is a ring in your nose so she can drag your ass around, LOL.


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## AWP (Oct 30, 2011)

SOWT said:


> She do piercings? 'cause I hear there is a ring in your nose so she can drag your ass around, LOL.



No, but I can't top that comment either, so I'll concede and return you to the thread.


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## Poccington (Oct 31, 2011)

As someone from outside the SOF world and with no direct experience of A'Stan, this thread has been a top read.


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## Scotth (Nov 1, 2011)

This thread has been a good read.


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## Rabid Badger (Nov 2, 2011)

Thanks for the ~likey~ scott.

Now if we could learn the fucking lessons from the last 10 years and not repeat the fucking mistakes for the next ten.


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## AWP (Nov 2, 2011)

RB said:


> Now if we could learn the fucking lessons from the last 10 years and not repeat the fucking mistakes for the next ten.



You have a better chance of collecting millions from a 419 scam.


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## Brill (Nov 3, 2011)

Freefalling said:


> You have a better chance of collecting millions from a 419 scam.



I have the grids for a bunch of gold hidden in the Libyan desert but I cannot get it out of the country.  If you deposit $10,000 into my account, I'll be able to dig the gold up, convert it to cash, then return your investment 10 fold.  All I need is the initial capital to get this going.


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## reed11b (Dec 22, 2011)

cback0220 said:


> I am going to put my two cents in here. There would have absolutely less bloodshed if it was a SOF war. True, however ray is because our prescence would have been felt in what 10% of the country. Why fight us when you can go a two day drive away and get left the fuck alone.


This is kind of along the lines of what I am thinking. IMHO, one of the failures in Afghanistan was failure to commet serious resources to it. Iraq is a small country and Afghanistan has never had but a fraction of the troops that it took to finnaly get the beginings of security in Iraq. Then again did we really "owe" Afghanistan a stable country and was that really the best way to get security over there. These are rhetorical questions, I don't intend to argue them at length.
Reed


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## surgicalcric (Dec 22, 2011)

reed11b said:


> ...IMHO, one of the failures in Afghanistan was failure to commet serious resources to it...


 
The trouble wasn't too few resources but too many of the wrong ones (read through the previous pages for more of the SF guys opinions on this issue.)

Comparing Iraq to Afghanistan, with respect to what each needs/needed for us to be successful, is intellectually lazy.



> These are rhetorical questions, I don't intend to argue them at length.


 
If you arent interested in discussing your opinion with others why post it to begin with?

This isnt a rhetorical question.[/quote][/quote]


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## reed11b (Dec 22, 2011)

surgicalcric said:


> The trouble wasn't too few resources but too many of the wrong ones (read through the previous pages for more of the SF guys opinions on this issue.)
> 
> Comparing Iraq to Afghanistan, with respect to what each needs/needed for us to be successful, is intellectually lazy.
> 
> ...


[/quote][/quote]
Technically I guess it wasn't a rhetorical question since I wasn't asking for dramatic effect. Trying to state that IF we were going to use CF we needed to commit enough to be effective. If you look at other COIN conflicts that used CF effectively they all used a MUCH higher ratio of soldier to citizen. The question about "owing" the Afghans a stable goverment was me acknowlging that perhaps the CF model of COIN was not what was in anyone's best interest and that I did not know eneogh to debate it either way. Not trying to be a jerk, sorry if it came off that way. 
Reed

Read what I mean and not what I type damn it!!


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## Rabid Badger (Dec 27, 2011)

> surgicalcric said: ↑
> The trouble wasn't too few resources but too many of the wrong ones (read through the previous pages for more of the SF guys opinions on this issue.)​


​

> reed11b said - Trying to state that IF we were going to use CF we needed to commit enough to be effective. If you look at other COIN conflicts that used CF effectively they all used a MUCH higher ratio of soldier to citizen. The question about "owing" the Afghans a stable goverment was me acknowlging that perhaps the *CF model of COIN was not what was in anyone's best interest* and that *I did not know eneogh to debate it either way*. *{yay, glad we finally got to the "over statement of the year"}*


Your answer lies in surgicalcric's initial statement. *"Too many CF/much higher ratio"* has been talked about ad-nauseum in this thread.



Review the SOF commitment in the first days of the Afghan conflict.

We had this war won in the initial stages, long before CF showed up for round 1 of "Shock and Awe". Baghdad was round II, FYI.


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## Loki (Jan 25, 2012)

The problem in my opinion has never been about money, resources, motivation and or good intentions. You must always have the carrot and the stick. I find this exchange very interesting and stressing. I was a CA asset and visited many villages and the people with regularity ( five to six days a week). Checking projects, assessments and developing relationships on the behalf of both SF and conventional forces in the AOR. In requesting support to secure and increase our foot print in some areas we were ignored. We shook hands with guys we knew were Taliban and or family of Taliban at meals and meetings. Passing out soccer balls, kites, food and building many things does require security. In some villages the Taliban would come right back in as soon as we departed. We had village teachers and leaders killed by insurgents shortly after our departure. Not everything involves hunting down bad guys and conducting DA. But when requested and assessed we couldn't get the right folks on target to eliminate threats to our civil populations. However it also requires synchronization of effort focusing on the desired end state and the total picture of the battle space. Many lost sight of this during my time there and command guidance directed us on frankly occasionally bait missions. As a four man CAT-A we spent allot of money, I say again allot of money (I was the team pay agent). We focused allot of energy and efforts to make life better develop sources and increase security for the locals. It wasn't sexy, glamorous or nor was it interesting to many. Hence the conventional forces wouldn't support the efforts we made many times. In the area and region I worked (Kandahar province) the insurgency was just beneath the surface. At times we were caught between the two (conventional and SF) and each with a different motive and objective. This same frustration was voiced by many of the USAID, OGA and many others with whom we interfaced. I and my team-mates and counter-parts were never happy with the conventional forces actions, intentions and methods in our area. The leadership and senior older guys in the SF community understood more clearly and embraced our efforts collectively. We departed and handed it over to the Canadians, who further refused good advice on approaches and strategy. I'm convinced as many of my friends are it cost them. I firmly believe this has always been an SF / SOF mission since it began. Yes a conventional force needs to be in place to supplement security (hold and maintain areas / regions) but not direct the entire battle space nor focus the efforts of the SF / SOF mission independently. I was in the Netherlands recently with a friend of mine who I worked with and advised on tribal matters, HA and cultural efforts. We spoke about this in depth and lament this greatly on many levels. He is now in Africa and working there with no intention of a return to A-stan. Does anyone believe men like Dostum and Sherzai will set back and do nothing? SF / SOF will be left holding the bag on this, they will as always do an excellent job despite everyone else.

Respectfully submitted


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