# Linda Robinson: One Hundred Victories



## AWP (Nov 3, 2013)

I've skimmed the first 6 chapters. Despite my obvious hate for her and the Bowden's/ Logan's/ Naylor's of the world who interview a bunch of guys and are now SME's as it relates to Special Operations...

If the book is to be believed, and I don't doubt the narrative, we lacked a comprehensive policy WRT to SOF in Afghanistan, even making changes or creating policy as late as 2010. She quoted one AD Group commander who admitted, in so many words, that he didn't consider El Salvador a model until 2009 or so. "I never gave it any thought" or words to that effect. I was left with the view that our SF BN and Group commander's were....myopic in their worldview. Maybe that stemmed from a lack of an overall plan, much less a SOF plan, and the war being run by 2 and 3 star conventional commanders, but the SF Officers interviewed in the book came across as two-dimensional at best.

There is a chapter devoted to the border raid which killed a number of Pakistani soldiers. I need to read it in detail but the short version remains: they brought it on themselves.

I found it curious she spent her time with 3rd and 7th Groups. Knowing that 3rd had tours in 2010-2011 which left 20th group sandwiched betwen their deployments, she never addresses 20th Group's time in country in those first 6 chapters. For someone who is trying to discuss big picture items, omitting 6 months' of work and another unit's contributions seems sloppy or disingenuous.

Being reminded of our lack of vision pissed me off enough that I put it down and picked up the Jennifer Saunders autobio. I'll return to it eventually, but I didn't know if anyone has read it or not.


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## Centermass (Nov 5, 2013)

Just thinking about how things evolved in country Free, seems the longer it went on, the more big military got involved, the more difficult it became, maybe for more than I'm seeing (Such as AQ, TB establishing new bases of opn, regrouping, rearming, refitting etc) but my collective thoughts tell me the big bad war machine polluted much of the success had there.   

I wasn't aware there was a book out by Robinson regarding this. Interesting.


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## DA SWO (Nov 5, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> I've skimmed the first 6 chapters. Despite my obvious hate for her and the Bowden's/ Logan's/ Naylor's of the world who interview a bunch of guys and are now SME's as it relates to Special Operations...
> 
> If the book is to be believed, and I don't doubt the narrative, we lacked a comprehensive policy WRT to SOF in Afghanistan, even making changes or creating policy as late as 2010. She quoted one AD Group commander who admitted, in so many words, that he didn't consider El Salvador a model until 2009 or so. "I never gave it any thought" or words to that effect. I was left with the view that our SF BN and Group commander's were....myopic in their worldview. Maybe that stemmed from a lack of an overall plan, much less a SOF plan, and the war being run by 2 and 3 star conventional commanders, but the SF Officers interviewed in the book came across as two-dimensional at best.
> 
> ...


El Sal ended in what 92?

Overshadowed by Desert Storm, then Bosnia and Kosovo (which essentially used the Desert Storm model).  

IIRC, the goal was to have guys stay in the same group for their entire SF career, which limits the cross-flow of information.

I have to wonder if the El sal model came up when the administration started limiting war funding?


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## AWP (Nov 5, 2013)

Centermass said:


> Just thinking about how things evolved in country Free, seems the longer it went on, the more big military got involved, the more difficult it became, maybe for more than I'm seeing (Such as AQ, TB establishing new bases of opn, regrouping, rearming, refitting etc) but my collective thoughts tell me the big bad war machine polluted much of the success had there.
> 
> I wasn't aware there was a book out by Robinson regarding this. Interesting.


 
Personally, I think the war was lost back in 2002 when Big Army began taking over. While we had many opportunities to reverse course, Big Army running this show would ultimately doom it.



SOWT said:


> El Sal ended in what 92?
> 
> Overshadowed by Desert Storm, then Bosnia and Kosovo (which essentially used the Desert Storm model).
> 
> ...


 
One of the guys quoted was from 7th Group.

If you didn't know much of the story the book wouldn't be that bad. If you apply common sense and even a fundamental knowledge of SF across it....there are a lot of WTF moments in the first 6 chapters. The book doesn't condemn leadership, but I can't see how anyone with a basic grasp of military science wouldn't lose their minds upon reading it.

LOL...one of the best quotes, and I need to find the author, was about the placement of camps here. Pointing to a map and the terrain features vs. camp placement: If you proposed this back at Benning, you'd be fired.


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## TLDR20 (Nov 5, 2013)

SOWT said:


> El Sal ended in what 92?
> 
> 
> IIRC, the goal was to have guys stay in the same group for their entire SF career, which limits the cross-flow of information.



If you mean NCOs staying in one group yes. Officers? No way. Almost all my officers from 0-4 up were from other groups


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## DA SWO (Nov 5, 2013)

Freefalling said:


> Personally, I think the war was lost back in 2002 when Big Army began taking over. While we had many opportunities to reverse course, Big Army running this show would ultimately doom it.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


I was gonna try and defend my points but can't.

I new ODA Cdr hitting 7th SFG in 92 would have been 15 yr Major on 9-11-2001.  Same Captains would have been Bn Cdrs when 7th SFG started deploying for OEF-A.  A few of those CPT's would have been Col's in 09 when the light bulb came on.

Funny (in a sad way) how guys who were training in Colombia couldn't take the same mindset into Afghanistan.


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## TLDR20 (Nov 5, 2013)

SOWT said:


> I was gonna try and defend my points but can't.
> 
> I new ODA Cdr hitting 7th SFG in 92 would have been 15 yr Major on 9-11-2001.  Same Captains would have been Bn Cdrs when 7th SFG started deploying for OEF-A.  A few of those CPT's would have been Col's in 09 when the light bulb came on.
> 
> Funny (in a sad way) how guys who were training in Colombia couldn't take the same mindset into Afghanistan.



I think you are out of your element here man. Most of those officers would not be in 7th group anymore. My last two Bn commanders were from 1st group. And group commanders come from all over as well, my last company SGM came from 3rd.


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## DA SWO (Nov 5, 2013)

cback0220 said:


> I think you are out of your element here man. Most of those officers would not be in 7th group anymore. My last two Bn commanders were from 1st group. And group commanders come from all over as well, my last company SGM came from 3rd.



Your right, but those guys (who are now in 1,3,5,10)should have remembered something from their time at 7th Group, no?

Or how about 1st Groups guys doing OEF-P?  wouldn't some of those TTP's be applicable?

Or how about some of the SGM/CSM's? Couldn't they have brought up their time down south, or in the PI?  

For some reason everyone decided all previous stuff wouldn't work, so we re-invent the wheel every 12 months a-la Vietnam.

I am reading an e-book by one of the Last Bde Cdrs in Iraq, he states the Army was fighting a short war until 09, when they suddenly shifted to a longer strategy, why?

When is the last time we had a short war?  and by short, I mean all troops came home within 6 months of hostilities ending.

Phase IV (post conflict) still seems to elude us.


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