# In regards to my thesis..



## dknob (Sep 17, 2009)

Theres information in my thesis regarding publicized operations of the SOF community over the past 50 years. And I want to make sure I get everything right, so once in a while ill ask a question as it comes to me (cant do all at once).

For now, I'm trying to find out some more information on the Great Scud Hunt of '91. If Norman Schwarzkopf (idc much about his spelling) pretty much despised the SOF community and made sure that operators only served as his bodyguards, was it his choice to send Delta and SAS to do the job? Or did somebody else pressure him to do it?


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## Ravage (Sep 17, 2009)

Not sure about the SMU but I'm holding in my hands Crafords exelent book "SAS", in which he wrote that initially the SAS was supposed to be used - along with Delta - to try and free the international turists that were held in Baghdad as 'human shields'.
Only later (when the Izraelis were getting pissed of) were they utilised to hunt down SCUDS in the "SCUD Box". Think it was Sir Peter de la Billières idea - well he was the commander and chief of all British forces in the Gulf, and he was ex 22nd SAS.


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## AWP (Sep 17, 2009)

dknob said:


> Theres information in my thesis regarding publicized operations of the SOF community over the past 50 years. And I want to make sure I get everything right, so once in a while ill ask a question as it comes to me (cant do all at once).
> 
> For now, I'm trying to find out some more information on the Great Scud Hunt of '91. If Norman Schwarzkopf (idc much about his spelling) pretty much despised the SOF community and made sure that operators only served as his bodyguards, was it his choice to send Delta and SAS to do the job? Or did somebody else pressure him to do it?



Old Drunken (I mean, "Stormin'") Norman's book covers this in some detail from his view and I think Rick Atkinson's Crusade does as well. Bravo Two Zero and the book written by 22 SAS' Sergeant Major should have some background too.

Norman didn't care for SOF, period.


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## QC (Sep 17, 2009)

I think Sir Peter De La Billionaire convinced Swartzkopf of their usefulness.


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## Royal (Sep 17, 2009)

DLB (ex-DSF and CO 22, as has been pointed out) was the senior British officer in theatre (the senior coalition partner).

DLB no doubt pushed by Cedric Delves (then DSF) wanted 'his boys' to have a piece of the action. Beckwith did his stint at Hereford in the 60s when DLB was a young troop commander getting his first MC - so the Delta/SAS thing was personal with DLB. 

That meant that 22 SAS (and the shakies) were going in whether Schwartzkopf liked it or not - DLB merely finessed the mission (take out the Scuds and so keep Israel out of the war - and thus the Arab allies on side). 

Delta went in on their coattails. 

Everything was (by and large, B20 etc notwithstanding) a sucess and Schwartzkopf was big enough to eat his words. 

Here endeth the lesson


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## 7point62 (Sep 17, 2009)

Schwartzkopf gives most of the credit to Chuck Horner and downplays the work of SOF with regard to the Scud-hunt:

_We had already sent coalition special operations teams deep into Iraq
     to watch the roads and report sightings of mobile launchers. Those        missions
     were extremely dangerous _ [no shit, Sherlock, that's what we pay them for]
_...We'd also underestimated the severity of the weather in Iraq's mount-
     anous northwest. This was winter and it was alternately freezing and wet.
     One team _ [He's referring to an SAS unit] _ actually had two men die
     of exposure. _

And that's it, boys, thanks for your help. Don't let the doorknob get stuck in your ass on the way out...BTW Chuck Horner and the Air Force defeated the Scuds. 

(BTW, I've mentioned before, I was on the phone from Tampa with Netanyahu--who was in the Knesset at the time--and listening to Radio Israel when I heard the Scud warning in Tampa before the sirens went off in Tel Aviv...Netanyahu had to break off the call to don his gasmask.)


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## Royal (Sep 18, 2009)

7point62 said:


> _...We'd also underestimated the severity of the weather in Iraq's mountanous northwest. This was winter and it was alternately freezing and wet.
> 
> One team _ [He's referring to an SAS unit] _ actually had two men die
> of exposure. _



B20



7point62 said:


> BTW Chuck Horner and the Air Force defeated the Scuds.



In a way they did. Most that were destroyed were taken out by fast air - but most of that fast air was called by guys on the ground. The stats of exactly who did what are on the web, can't remember where though.


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## 7point62 (Sep 18, 2009)

Royal said:


> ...Most that were destroyed were taken out by fast air - but most of that fast air was called by guys on the ground...




Roger that. Schwartzkopf doesn't make much mention of that, maybe for OPSEC.


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## 7point62 (Sep 18, 2009)

dknob, this doesn't answer your question but it may have some relevance:


_Colonel Jesse Johnson, the wiry, tough commander of CENTCOM's Special Operations Forces had been fighting an uphill battle ever since he had arrived in Saudi Arabia in August. A colonel in a desert rapidly filling with generals, he was outranked, sometimes outflanked, and frequently overpowered in his efforts to establish Special Operations as a useful capability within CENTCOM headquarters. Because everyone was aware of General Schwartzkopf's dislike of Special Operations, Colonel Johnson knew there was essentially nothing he could do about it; effectively, he was an outcast...

...Schwartzkopf...was determined to keep the number of Special Operations troops as low as possible...and they'd only be given tasks that kept them on a short leash. _

from *Beyond Hell and Back: How America's Special Operations Forces Became the World's Greatest Fighting Unit* by Dwight Zimmerman and John Gresham.


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## Ravage (Sep 18, 2009)

Royal said:


> Most that were destroyed were taken out by fast air - but most of that fast air was called by guys on the ground. The stats of exactly who did what are on the web, can't remember where though.



Werent the Brits commended with a letter showin a A-10A for their work in taking out the SCUD threat ?
Btw, Durrant also write about finding SCUDS in "In the Company of Heroes".


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## Royal (Sep 18, 2009)

7point62 said:


> Roger that. Schwartzkopf doesn't make much mention of that, maybe for OPSEC.



At the time maybe.

Here's the list: 

Scud Kill Claims

Date Location Claims Weapons System/Unit

18 Jan W Iraq 2 Scuds, 2 damaged, 1 probable A-10A

23 Jan W Iraq 4 mobile Scuds Airstrike / JSOTF

28 Jan N/A 3 Scuds, 4 support vehicles F-15E

29 Jan W Iraq 2 Scud convoys F-15E / SAS

31 Jan N/A 2 Scud vehicles F-15E

02/03 Feb W Iraq 1 Scud MH-60 / JSOTF

03 Feb W Iraq 2 TELs F-15E / SAS

03 Feb N/A 2 Scud vehicles Airstrike

05 Feb W Iraq 2 TELs Airstrike / SAS

10 Feb N/A 1 Scud N/K

11 Feb KTO 4 mobile Scuds N/K

14 Feb N/A 2 Scud vehicles F-15E

15 Feb N/A 3 Scuds N/K

17 Feb N/A 5 Scuds N/K

18 Feb W Iraq 2 TELs, 7 stored missiles F-16 / SAS

19 Feb W Iraq 1 TEL F-15E / SAS

23 Feb N/A 6 Scuds N/K

23 Feb W Iraq 1 Scud A-7E

26 Feb W Iraq 24 Scuds A-10A / F/A-18C

Note: A total of 51 mobile Scud launchers were reported killed by USAF A-10A’s during the war. (Primary Source: Ripley, Tim, Scud Hunting: Counter-force Operations Against Theater Ballistic Missiles, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, 1998, pg. 23.)


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## AWP (Sep 18, 2009)

The actual number is:

zero.

http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/12/13/041213fa_fact


> Thus was victory declared in the Scud hunt—until hostilities ended and the Air Force appointed a team to determine the effectiveness of the air campaigns in Desert Storm. The actual number of definite Scud kills, the team said, was zero.



http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/counter.htm


> Throughout the Desert Storm air campaign, a total of 1,599 sorties [single flights by a single airplane] were assigned under the Air Tasking Order to counter-Scud operations, and a total of 1,459 strikes [launches of weapons against targets] were performed. These numbers pale in comparison with the total effort of the air campaign, in which 41,309 strikes were performed by 51,146 air-to-ground sorties [out of a total of 118,661 sorties of all types]. Thus operations against Scuds consumed only 1.3% of all sorties and 3.1% of air-to-ground sorties, while accounting for just 3.5% of strikes [all these numbers are derived from volume 5 of the Gulf War Air Power Survey]. The great Scud hunt did account for some 806 of the 2,202 air-to-ground sorties flown by the F-15E, but this was on account of the unique targeting radar carried by this aircraft. This system would otherwise have found little application against the remainder of Iraq's forces, which, unlike the mobile Scud launchers, remained largely immobilized throughout the air campaign.
> 
> Despite initial claims of successful destruction of mobile Scud launchers during the air campaign, it was subsequently determined that the destroyed vehicles were decoys, and that not a single actual mobile launcher was destroyed during the air campaign. This should not be interpreted as a measure of failure, but rather as a measure of success -- Iraqi missile teams were too preoccupied with eluding the air campaign to execute their primary mission of firing missiles.



I'm still looking for the official AF report to support the above, but I tend to believe the numbers listed.


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## dknob (Sep 18, 2009)

Thanks for all the good intel guys, definitely will be used.

I had no idea the scope of how worthless Schwarzkopf was.
I heard Franks was similar.. wanted conventional army in October of 2001 rather then SOF led campaign. Too bad Rumsfeld trumps Generals.


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## Royal (Sep 18, 2009)

You didn't have to deal with Clark :roll:


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## Ravage (Sep 18, 2009)

Royal said:


> 02/03 Feb W Iraq 1 Scud MH-60 / JSOTF



Think this one was Durrants kill. Cool infos Royal.


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## 7point62 (Sep 18, 2009)

dknob said:


> I had no idea the scope of how worthless Schwarzkopf was...





He viewed SOF like a snake in a box; keep the lid on tight or it would get out and maybe bite him in the ass. Seriously, he was concerned SOF would embarrass him. Maybe he dreaded some kind of Eagle Claw scenario.


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## Crusader74 (Sep 19, 2009)

7point62 said:


> He viewed SOF like a snake in a box; keep the lid on tight or it would get out and maybe bite him in the ass. Seriously, he was concerned SOF would embarrass him. Maybe he dreaded some kind of Eagle Claw scenario.



I think they proved him wrong..


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## 7point62 (Sep 21, 2009)

Irish said:


> I think they proved him wrong..




Indeed, and many times over by now. Probably sittin here in Tampa smackin his head. :doh:


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## 08steeda (Sep 21, 2009)

"The actual number is: zero."

Well I KNOW this is not true!  Regardless of what that report states. A Combat Photographer I know rather well was doing BDA and shot a lot of pic's at different sites! I have known this fellow for over 42 years now and looks a lot like me! ;)


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## AWP (Sep 21, 2009)

08steeda said:


> "The actual number is: zero."
> 
> Well I KNOW this is not true!  Regardless of what that report states. A Combat Photographer I know rather well was doing BDA and shot a lot of pic's at different sites! I have known this fellow for over 42 years now and looks a lot like me! ;)



Then call the US Air Force and tell them they are wrong. Everything points to dummy TELs, tanker trucks, etc. as being the cause for the originally posted numbers.

But that's the AF's conclusion, not mine.


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## 08steeda (Sep 21, 2009)

I also thought there was gun camera footage (that got out on the internet) from either an A-10 or a Tornado taking one out in the midst of a launch. I will see if I can find it. My memory could very well be failing me on that one but I will do some digging.

Plus my reference is all hearsay since the intel folks snagged up the film as soon as I used up a roll.  The shadow and got everything as soon as it came out of the camera.  

thinking about it now, I guess they could have been decoy's, especially since I am not sure I would have known the difference anyhow. Not sure how real the decoys looked. 

So what ever happened to all those missiles and launchers then if we never tagged them during the campaign? I personally find it hard to believe we did not get a single active launcher and missile. But that is just opinion.

I gotta believe with our Intel/Recon airborne and space based platforms even if we missed the missile we should have been able to see the launch/launcher almost immediately after lift-off. But I am just thinking out loud! I am by no means an expert!


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## AWP (Sep 21, 2009)

http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/gwaps.htm

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1408/MR1408.ch3.pdf



> ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SCUD HUNT
> In the immediate aftermath of the war, British and American political
> and military leaders announced that coalition operations had effectively
> neutralized the Scud threat. Senior U.S. SOF officers claimed
> ...


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## dknob (Oct 8, 2009)

Some new questions:
What were the names of the 3 Delta and 3 Nightstalkers that died in the first Gulf War. I had the picture saved of the USASOC memorial wall that had names and dates, but my PC crashed and now I cant find it online.


Second question: Sgt. 1st Class Robert K. McGee of 1st SFG
The only thing that I find is that he died in his hotel room, and that the causes are STILL under investigation 5 years later..
What can anybody tell me?


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