# Boots on the ground: calling for dominant infantry



## Devildoc (Sep 30, 2016)

Retired general making some interesting observations about the need for more and better infantry:

Boots on the Ground: Why America Must Invest in Dominant Infantry Forces


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## Scubadew (Sep 30, 2016)

Meanwhile the Navy has our rates stripped.

Corpsman --> Medical Technician?

Fuck outta here.


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## Devildoc (Sep 30, 2016)

Scubadew said:


> Meanwhile the Navy has our rates stripped.
> 
> Corpsman --> Medical Technician?
> 
> Fuck outta here.



Sad I cannot 'like' and 'agree.'

Can you hear the cry on the battlefield?  "Medical technician UP!"  Makes me sick....


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## Marauder06 (Sep 30, 2016)

I'm not even going to read an article with that headline.  We have the most dominant, battle-tested infantry in the entire world.  The problem isn't with our infantry, or our military.  We don't win wars because of political ineptness.  That's what needs to be fixed.


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## Gunz (Sep 30, 2016)

I read it. He makes some good points about spending more money on acquisitions that can benefit the infantry as opposed to throwing billions at high tech stuff...but I think our Army and Marine infantry units today are better trained and more combat ready than at any other time in our nation's history. Enforced social engineering may change that in the future but that remains to be seen.


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## AWP (Sep 30, 2016)

"Better" means "more training" and training equals dollar bills. I wouldn't hold my breath on "better" infantry.


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## pardus (Sep 30, 2016)

Marauder06 said:


> We have the most dominant, battle-tested infantry in the entire world.



I would argue that for the first point, that is solely because of the technology behind it, and no to the second.


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## R.Caerbannog (Oct 1, 2016)

Scubadew said:


> Meanwhile the Navy has our rates stripped.
> 
> Corpsman --> Medical Technician?
> 
> Fuck outta here.





Devildoc said:


> Sad I cannot 'like' and 'agree.'
> 
> Can you hear the cry on the battlefield?  "Medical technician UP!"  Makes me sick....


Wait...what?


Ocoka One said:


> I read it. He makes some good points about spending more money on acquisitions that can benefit the infantry as opposed to throwing billions at high tech stuff...but I think our Army and Marine infantry units today are better trained and more combat ready than at any other time in our nation's history. Enforced social engineering may change that in the future but that remains to be seen.


Same here, I thought it was a good article.

It would be nice if the infantry did get a bigger piece of the funding pie. Having over strength Infantry units would be great, as injuries/normal wear and tear tend to diminish manpower. I also find it annoying that our enemy is better at utilizing available tech for their operations. The Infantry needs better lobbyists, because we are getting eaten alive by the Lockheed Martin loving POG's and the rest of their ilk. (I say this with love )


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## Etype (Oct 1, 2016)

I'm at a loss. Is the writer inferring that we don't have the best, most lethal infantry the world has ever known? I would argue that we do.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 1, 2016)

Our limitations with our war fighting capabilities is not with our infantry. We've got great infantry.  Our problems are with our enabling forces, post-conflict operations, and with the other instruments of national power not pulling their weight.


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## Brill (Oct 1, 2016)

Marauder06 said:


> Our problems are with our enabling forces, post-conflict operations, and with the other instruments of national power not pulling their weight.



Exactly!

Which government agency takes the lead in those post-conflict ops? It rhymes with hate.


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## Teufel (Oct 1, 2016)

I would agree that the U.S. infantry is amongst the finest in the world but I am not certain that we are "dominant".  Wars are won by people, not machines.  We tend to rely on technology too much, particularly our armored vehicles, and this can make our forces vulnerable when that equipment fails or the enemy finds a way to defeat it.  I have seen infantrymen humbled by a technologically disadvantaged adversary that understood how to use terrain to their advantage.  This is not something that is unique to the infantry; this has also occurred to our most elite special operations forces.

Here are some training and technology gaps that I think could be addressed to help improve the lethality and survivability of the infantryman.

1. We have over burdened our infantrymen with layers and layers of PPE that make it difficult to maneuver quickly under fire.  This problem is compounded in difficult terrain and weather conditions.  This is the first thing I would like to see addressed with a technological solution.  I would love to see industry come up with extremely light and flexible personal protective equipment.  A set of Large SAPI plates weighs around 6 pounds. Another 2 pounds for side SAPIs.  The USMC Modular Tactical Vest (which is ridiculously heavy) is 30 pounds.  The Scalable Plate Carrier is 25.  Add a 3 pound helmet to that mix and the average infantryman is walking around with 40 pounds of protective equipment without even factoring in the weight of ammunition and water.  A five pound PPE weight reduction would have a significant effect on mobility.  Could you imagine dropping 20 pounds?  I'm sure someone could figure this problem out if they were sufficiently motivated ($$$).

2. I would love to see lighter and more effective individual radios.  Imagine lightweight, encrypted, GPS enabled IPOD sized radio that would enable soldiers to communicate with each other and their HHQ, mark their position for battle tracking, and identify friend from foe when viewed through optics.  It can be extremely challenging to determine the location of all your subordinate and adjacent units when you are under heavy fire, particularly in an urban environment.  This delays the clearance of indirect and air delivered fires.  Imagine a future operating environment where every combatant has individual GPS enabled battle tracking that can feed into the theater command and control systems used by every level of command post as well as aviation and artillery assets.  Imagine if you could get a digital clearance of fires to back up human reporting on the ground.  It would be great if every squad leader, platoon commander and JTAC had a light weight digital battle tracking display on this sleeve or maybe a tablet that could display the location of friendlies overlaid on a map or grid reference graphic.  The latter may be a bridge too far because of present technology and cost but I bet apple could produce slick looking individual iBFT radios if they were motivated to do so ($$$$$$).

I understand that this could be a double edged sword if HHQ tried to jump on a team or squad net during a firefight.   I've seen this a lot as it is already unfortunately.

3. I could train infantryman to shoot, move, communicate and medicate like SOF if I had the right amount of qualified instructors, ammunition, equipment, and facilities.  There were huge gains in this department during the war but I have the feeling that infantry battalion budgets are going to get smaller than Rick Moranis in Honey I shrunk the Kids.  Infantrymen don't need to have SOF skills but they would gain a lot from having regimental training detachments with a robust cadre of SOF veterans to run them through standardized marksmanship, communications and medical packages.  I would also like to see higher quality professional military education at the E5/E6 and E7 ranks.  It would be great if you could link these PME courses together somehow so that a soldier gets a bachelors degree in small wars/security studies by the time he finishes his E8 PME.

4. I would increase the minimum GT score and physical fitness standards for the infantry.  The School of Infantry should look more like Ranger school than what it is now.


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## Brill (Oct 2, 2016)

@Teufel,  Looks like someone's researching a paper!


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## Teufel (Oct 2, 2016)

lindy said:


> @Teufel,  Looks like someone's researching a paper!



That's a good idea. I just wrapped up a paper on Hezbollah in South America


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## Brill (Oct 2, 2016)

Teufel said:


> That's a good idea. I just wrapped up a paper on Hezbollah in South America



If possible, I'd REALLY like to read that.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 2, 2016)

Teufel said:


> That's a good idea. I just wrapped up a paper on Hezbollah in South America


I know someone who will publish it... :)


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## yarles87 (Oct 3, 2016)

I usually just read this forum, but I'd like to tag on two points to Teuful which were significant problems in my short time as a USMC 0302 (Infantry Officer) from 2011-2016.

1. Retention. 
We were a overwhelmingly first enlistment company (and community as a whole). Squad leaders were almost entirely LCpl's or junior Cpl's. Sergeants did not exist, unless a first enlistment stud was able to pull a meritorious promotion. We only had one Sgt on his second enlistment in the company, and he'll be EASing next month. The retention rate for the battalion was abysmal, and the Squad Leader Development Program didn't seem to gain much traction. LCpl's and Cpl's can (and did) get it done, but nothing can make up for a seasoned Sergeant leading a squad. To make matters worse, if you are a junior enlisted and manage to get yourself a NJP, the chances of your re-enlistment package going through is slim to none. Hazing, tattoos, drinking, and fighting slim the ranks of those eligible to re-enlist, if they were so inclined. That shit was heart breaking to see, because I certainly did most or all of those things as a 18-22 year old. 

2. Deployment cycle and training priorities. 
Despite the slow down of GWOT deployments, the op tempo remained the same. Deploy for 7 months, 12 month train up, deploy for 7 months. A year may sound like a long time, but large scale exercises dictated the training cycle. As a anecdotal example, I was a Rifle Co. XO in one of the first iterations of the SPMAGTF to Iraq ISO OIR. We were granted 4-5 weeks of Company training time before being required to support a wide range of large scale exercises and certification exercises. This means you need to go from static live fire, to platoon level attacks (with a company attack perhaps squeezed in), in that 5 weeks. Mix in TCCC, comms, cross training on weapons systems, field craft, and various methods of patrolling and you can see the challenge which is presented. All of the other time was simply ate up. 

LSE's are poor training venues for infantrymen in a line company. Most of it is spent sweating your balls off in the back of a AAV, waiting for fires and assaulting a poorly constructed trench line with a single green ivan target. 

To make matters more challenging, new 03xx fresh out of SOI (which produces nothing close to a skilled infantryman) were sent to the BN throughout the duration of the work up. A BN doesn't become priority for manpower (new Marines and SNCO's) until D-180 from deployment date. More than likely, your team isn't established until 3 months out from deployment, at which point all small unit level training is finished due to those LSE/certification requirements

Hand held drones and Ipod sized radios are incredible tools, but until you are able to retain NCO talent and give them the time to train up their guys, the infantry will not be as good as it can be.


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## Ooh-Rah (Oct 3, 2016)

@yarles87 - You should get vetted and post more often.


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## Gunz (Oct 3, 2016)

Teufel said:


> I would agree that the U.S. infantry is amongst the finest in the world but I am not certain that we are "dominant".  Wars are won by people, not machines.  We tend to rely on technology too much, particularly our armored vehicles, and this can make our forces vulnerable when that equipment fails or the enemy finds a way to defeat it.  I have seen infantrymen humbled by a technologically disadvantaged adversary that understood how to use terrain to their advantage.  This is not something that is unique to the infantry; this has also occurred to our most elite special operations forces.
> 
> Here are some training and technology gaps that I think could be addressed to help improve the lethality and survivability of the infantryman.
> 
> ...





The skeptical old infantryman in me says that if they find a way to reduce the weight of one piece of gear, they'll come up with some other piece of mandatory gear that weighs even more. To balance out the Full-Load Waddle.


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## Gunz (Oct 3, 2016)

yarles87 said:


> "...To make matters more challenging, new 03xx fresh out of SOI (which produces nothing close to a skilled infantryman) were sent to the BN throughout the duration of the work up. A BN doesn't become priority for manpower (new Marines and SNCO's) until D-180 from deployment date. More than likely, your team isn't established until 3 months out from deployment, at which point all small unit level training is finished due to those LSE/certification requirements...



That is particularly unfortunate to hear because it suggests to me that little has changed in almost 50 years. I could probably fill half a page on the stuff we had to learn OJT _during_ deployment and even after joining our unit in the field.


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## Devildoc (Oct 3, 2016)

Teufel said:


> I would agree that the U.S. infantry is amongst the finest in the world but I am not certain that we are "dominant".  Wars are won by people, not machines.  We tend to rely on technology too much, particularly our armored vehicles, and this can make our forces vulnerable when that equipment fails or the enemy finds a way to defeat it.  I have seen infantrymen humbled by a technologically disadvantaged adversary that understood how to use terrain to their advantage.  This is not something that is unique to the infantry; this has also occurred to our most elite special operations forces.
> 
> Here are some training and technology gaps that I think could be addressed to help improve the lethality and survivability of the infantryman.
> 
> ...



Excellent post, and my insight.  RE: #1.  PPE and deuce gear (is it even still called that??):  Half the new stuff I got, didn't fit.  I had to cut, tape, and modify.  Or I chucked it into the closet and went to a surplus store.  But, yeah, the PPE made me feel like EOD.

RE: #2.  Radios?  I was a corpsman.  My stuff was heavy enough, then added batteries for comms.  Lighter, better would be nice.  I am not smart enough to say what would be better for the bigger picture.

RE: #3.  Quality training.  With people leaving and joining the platoon it was hard enough just to stay competent.  Add training, certifications, and exercises that @yarles87 mentioned, and "good" fundamental training just wasn't happening.

RE: #4.  Dudes were coming out of SOI in not SOI shape.  My window to see this was very narrow, and a long time ago, so I don't know if my perception is based on a specific timeframe or leadership influence, a sign of the times, or what.  When I was a reservist I had been assigned to branch clinic.  I hated branch clinic, so I traded to do med support at SOI.  I could not tell a qualitative difference in the level of fitness between SOI students and MCT students.


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## OpenSkies (Oct 3, 2016)

Teufel said:


> .  Imagine if you could get a digital clearance of fires to back up human reporting on the ground.  It would be great if every squad leader, platoon commander and JTAC had a light weight digital battle tracking display on this sleeve or maybe a tablet that could display the location of friendlies overlaid on a map or grid reference graphic.  The latter may be a bridge too far because of present technology and cost but I bet apple could produce slick looking individual iBFT radios if they were motivated to do so ($$$$$$).



I think that the battle tracking for JTACs could be a possibility and would be extremely useful. With new technologies like this: (Helmet Could Sync Imagery Between JTACs, Pilots - Kit Up!) coming out for JTACs helping them to more quickly and more accurately put ordnance on targets something like a tracker of all friendly units along with that would significantly boost a JTACs effectiveness.


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## Red Flag 1 (Oct 3, 2016)

MOD HAT ON:


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## yarles87 (Oct 3, 2016)

Done and Done. Apologies.


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## Red Flag 1 (Oct 3, 2016)

= .


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## TLDR20 (Oct 6, 2016)

OpenSkies said:


> I think that the battle tracking for JTACs could be a possibility and would be extremely useful. With new technologies like this: (Helmet Could Sync Imagery Between JTACs, Pilots - Kit Up!) coming out for JTACs helping them to more quickly and more accurately put ordnance on targets something like a tracker of all friendly units along with that would significantly boost a JTACs effectiveness.



You are out of your depth.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 6, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> The skeptical old infantryman in me says that if they find a way to reduce the weight of one piece of gear, they'll come up with some other piece of mandatory gear that weighs even more. To balance out the Full-Load Waddle.



I think that's borne out in the history of warfare.  "Oh, you made x lighter?  Great, here's some more y."


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## Il Duce (Oct 6, 2016)

But your rucksack is filled with 200lbs of LIGHTWEIGHT gear!


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## Teufel (Oct 7, 2016)

yarles87 said:


> 1. Retention.
> We were a overwhelmingly first enlistment company (and community as a whole). Squad leaders were almost entirely LCpl's or junior Cpl's. To make matters worse, if you are a junior enlisted and manage to get yourself a NJP, the chances of your re-enlistment package going through is slim to none.
> 
> 2. Deployment cycle and training priorities.
> ...



@yarles87, these are great points.  The Marine Corps infantry has been a largely first enlistment organization for a long time.  I deployed to Iraq with LCpl squad leaders in 2004.  Granted it took three or four years to pick up Corporal and combat sparks professional growth.  Additionally, the Marine Corps was shedding personnel during this time to meet our post GWOT manning limits.

It's very hard to combat the zero defect mentality when the Marine Corps is sharply reducing the number of re-enlistments available to young Marines.  I'm not saying it's right but it's important to understand why things happen if you want to change them.  There are a ton of guys who want to re-enlist and significantly less boat spaces for re-enlistment.  A board of SNCOs and officers will review the myriad packages to determine which Marines get to stay in service.  Most of these guys, if not all, have other jobs that they have to juggle or put on hold while they sit on this board.  They will not spend a lot of time reviewing any particular package and it's much easier to separate all the NJPs into the "nope" pile.  It isn't impossible to get these young war dogs promoted though.  http://havokjournal.com/culture/recon-marine-wasting-warrior-culture/  I got Frank retained and promoted with two DUIs as well as two other Marines.  All three Marines took Division CG waivers.  I had to expend a significant amount of golden bullets to make that happen but it was worth it.  I believe that it is an officer's responsibility to find problems in the "system" and do everything in their power to fix them.  This appear out of reach as a young platoon commander but becomes more feasible the longer you stay in.  Notice I didn't say it gets easier.  It never gets easier unfortunately. 

The deployment cycle is challenging.  The Marine Corps had to justify our numbers during the budget and manning cuts.  This is why the Marines went all in on crisis response.  This has second and third order effects on when Marines show up to a battalion.  I was a Recon Battalion operations officer during this time frame and I can tell you that this problem was one of the top priorities at the Division HQ.  I hope they have ironed this out by now.  They will fix it eventually. 

Good comments, thanks for sharing them.  You should post more.


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## yarles87 (Oct 7, 2016)

Teufel said:


> @yarles87, there are great points.  The Marine Corps infantry has been a largely first enlistment organization for a long time.  I deployed to Iraq with LCpl squad leaders in 2004.  Granted it took three or four years to pick up Corporal and combat sparks professional growth.  Additionally, the Marine Corps was shedding personnel during this time to meet our post GWOT manning limits.
> 
> It's very hard to combat the zero defect mentality when the Marine Corps is sharply reducing the number of re-enlistments available to young Marines.  I'm not saying it's right but it's important to understand why things happen if you want to change them.  There are a ton of guys who want to re-enlist and significantly less boat spaces for re-enlistment.  A board of SNCOs and officers will review the myriad packages to determine which Marines get to stay in service.  Most of these guys, if not all, have other jobs that they have to juggle or put on hold while they sit on this board.  They will not spend a lot of time reviewing any particular package and it's much easier to separate all the NJPs into the "nope" pile.  It isn't impossible to get these young war dogs promoted though.  http://havokjournal.com/culture/recon-marine-wasting-warrior-culture/  I got Frank retained and promoted with two DUIs as well as two other Marines.  All three Marines took Division CG waivers.  I had to expend a significant amount of golden bullets to make that happen but it was worth it.  I believe that it is an officer's responsibility to find problems in the "system" and do everything in their power to fix them.  This appear out of reach as a young platoon commander but becomes more feasible the longer you stay in.  Notice I didn't say it gets easier.  It never gets easier unfortunately.
> 
> ...



@Teufel Thanks for the reply, and much credit to you for getting Frank a chance to stay in the community. 

The issues you mentioned were certainly behind the curtain for me, and I fought as hard (along with my 1stSgt) as I knew how  to try to afford a few guys the opportunity to stay in. One case in particular, which led to a good Marine 0311 from rough beginnings getting administratively separated, affected me deeply and was a major factor in clicking "No" on the career designation button. Such is life, I guess.

Guys want to deploy, and it's not necessarily the op-tempo which was frustrating. It was the minimal amount of time allocated to conducting company training (i.e. focusing on basic skills to squad level). Like I said, no one is getting better below the company staff and fire support team during a large scale exercise. 

I'm glad these items are on the radar of division/MEF. When @Teufel tags on his stars and takes 1stMarDiv, I have no doubt things will change.


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## Teufel (Oct 7, 2016)

Il Duce said:


> But your rucksack is filled with 200lbs of LIGHTWEIGHT gear!



Let's be honest, the bulk of that weight is water, batteries and ammunition.  It's hard to reduce the weight of water and ammunition unfortunately.


yarles87 said:


> @Teufel
> 
> Guys want to deploy, and it's not necessarily the op-tempo which was frustrating. It was the minimal amount of time allocated to conducting company training (i.e. focusing on basic skills to squad level). Like I said, no one is getting better below the company staff and fire support team during a large scale exercise.



I saw brand new Marines BZO their weapons before assaulting Range 400.  That's far from ideal.  I know that the MEF and Division have overlaid their large scale exercises on top of each other to try to remedy that problem.


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## Gunz (Oct 7, 2016)

True. For us ammo was all you could carry and then some.  Nobody bitched about personal ammo load.

It's the other stuff. Don't get me started.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 7, 2016)

Only thing wrong with today's Infantry is the restrictive ROE and political hypocrisy that plegues the leadership on the military and civilian side. Training can always be better, lighter-faster-longer and more lethality is always talked about. The truth is, you cut American grunts loose, and they will fuck some shit up. Enemy forces, local bar, your sisters prom, etc.


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## Gunz (Oct 8, 2016)

Diamondback 2/2 said:


> Only thing wrong with today's Infantry is the restrictive ROE and political hypocrisy that plegues the leadership on the military and civilian side. Training can always be better, lighter-faster-longer and more lethality is always talked about. The truth is, you cut American grunts loose, and they will fuck some shit up. Enemy forces, local bar, your sisters prom, etc.



Your first point is anchored by 50 years of the same old shit, re ROE and politics.


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## Teufel (Oct 11, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> Your first point is anchored by 50 years of the same old shit, re ROE and politics.



I understand that ROE is a bitter topic for infantrymen.  It certainly was for me when I was a platoon commander.  Easing ROE in a counter insurgency can open up the way for easy victories at the tactical level victories and bitter failures at the operational and possibly strategic level.  

Political games can make it hard for the grunts on the ground to do their jobs successfully.  I don't think these were the biggest shortcoming I witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan though.  Our military was designed to defeat enemy conventional forces but was tasked with restoring security, rebuilding a broken state and developing governance.  The military should take the lead in the first task but I believe there are other organizations that are better suited for the others.  Unfortunately none of those organizations stepped up to the plate after the invasion of Iraq and the department of defense was left trying to figure out a task it was not prepared for or trained to assume.


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## Gunz (Oct 11, 2016)

Teufel said:


> I understand that ROE is a bitter topic for infantrymen.  It certainly was for me when I was a platoon commander.  Easing ROE in a counter insurgency can open up the way for easy victories at the tactical level victories and bitter failures at the operational and possibly strategic level.
> 
> Political games can make it hard for the grunts on the ground to do their jobs successfully.  I don't think these were the biggest shortcoming I witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan though.  Our military was designed to defeat enemy conventional forces but was tasked with restoring security, rebuilding a broken state and developing governance.  The military should take the lead in the first task but I believe there are other organizations that are better suited for the others.  Unfortunately none of those organizations stepped up to the plate after the invasion of Iraq and the department of defense was left trying to figure out a task it was not prepared for or trained to assume.




True. COIN at ground level requires a tactical sophistication and political finesse on the part young NCOs and officers who are out there at the sharp edge. And those are the guys who don't always have the authority to make decisions that, say, DoS or USAID reps can. But if the DoS or USAID guys stay in the Green Zones and never venture out, what's a platoon commander to do? All he can do is request, right? And as far as ROE, I agree with you, it _does_ makes a difference whether or not you kill the right people or the wrong people. It can come back and bite you in the ass hard. The Russians found that out in a big way in Afghanistan.

Even with all that, sir, I think ROE can be so restrictive as to be dangerous. I thought we had it bad back in my war, but it's nothing compared to that of our recent conflicts. As a spectator it seems to me that you guys have to call a JAG lawyer before you pull the trigger.


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## Teufel (Oct 11, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> True. COIN at ground level requires a tactical sophistication and political finesse on the part young NCOs and officers who are out there at the sharp edge. And those are the guys who don't always have the authority to make decisions that, say, DoS or USAID reps can. But if the DoS or USAID guys stay in the Green Zones and never venture out, what's a platoon commander to do? All he can do is request, right? And as far as ROE, I agree with you, it _does_ makes a difference whether or not you kill the right people or the wrong people. It can come back and bite you in the ass hard. The Russians found that out in a big way in Afghanistan.
> 
> Even with all that, sir, I think ROE can be so restrictive as to be dangerous. I thought we had it bad back in my war, but it's nothing compared to that of our recent conflicts. As a spectator it seems to me that you guys have to call a JAG lawyer before you pull the trigger.



Platoon commanders should not be building governance.  They should be improving the security situation.  I believe that company and battalion leadership had a role in this but for the most part this was a brigade and higher task in the GWOT.

I deployed numerous times to Iraq and Afghanistan between 2004 and 2011.  My Marines and I never encountered a situation where we were not allowed to eliminate a threat.  You demonstrate hostile act and hostile intent and you die.  Self defense is always paramount.  Granted, I understood the ROE, trained my Marines appropriately and backed them up when the time came.   I'm sure some other commanders did not approach things the same way I did.  As with most things in Afghanistan, experiences may vary.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 12, 2016)

18 year old hard dicks, who spent half a years worth of training to break and kill shit will never be able to meet the political and cultural requirements of COIN. I don't care how good the leaders are and how diciplined the unit is. Infantry is not a scalpel, it's the sledgehammer. If the leadership used Infantry for what it is meant for (find, fix, close with and destroy) and stopped trying to come up with secondary missions (be a beat cop in a police action),  shit would work alot better. Do you want your grunts hard charging killers, or do you want 18 year old kids making split second decisions that have possible strategic implications? 

Personally IMO, use that young grunt for the built up aggressive ass kicker he is, train him to break and kill and release his ass when it's needed. Leave the hearts and minds and handing out soccer balls for the guys on their second/third enlistment who volunteer and take on the training to be that warrior/diplomat.

That all said, it's gonna be a girl power world shortly enough, so why are we even debating a stronger more robust infantry any damn way.

$.02


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## Gunz (Oct 12, 2016)

Diamondback 2/2 said:


> 18 year old hard dicks, who spent half a years worth of training to break and kill shit will never be able to meet the political and cultural requirements of COIN. I don't care how good the leaders are and how diciplined the unit is. Infantry is not a scalpel, it's the sledgehammer. If the leadership used Infantry for what it is meant for (find, fix, close with and destroy) and stopped trying to come up with secondary missions (be a beat cop in a police action),  shit would work alot better. Do you want your grunts hard charging killers, or do you want 18 year old kids making split second decisions that have possible strategic implications?
> 
> Personally IMO, use that young grunt for the built up aggressive ass kicker he is, train him to break and kill and release his ass when it's needed. Leave the hearts and minds and handing out soccer balls for the guys on their second/third enlistment who volunteer and take on the training to be that warrior/diplomat.
> 
> ...




Bro, you are spot on. And this is why you don't take, say, a Battalion Landing Team of Marine infantry and try to turn them into Peacekeepers (as in Beirut), or make them put red wooden blocks into their magwells (as at III MAF in Danang), or give them nuanced secondary missions requiring specialized training and knowledge. Well said.


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## Devildoc (Oct 12, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> Bro, you are spot on. And this is why you don't take, say, a Battalion Landing Team of Marine infantry and try to turn them into Peacekeepers (as in Beirut), or make them put red wooden blocks into their magwells (as at III MAF in Danang), or give them nuanced secondary missions requiring specialized training and knowledge. Well said.



I know this is what we _want_ to see with infantry, but at least with the Marines, the handwriting has been on the wall regarding "the strategic corporal" and GEN. Krulak's three-block war.

It will be more and more kinetic and dynamic and less and less "normal" infantry tactics.


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## Gunz (Oct 12, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> I know this is what we _want_ to see with infantry, but at least with the Marines, the handwriting has been on the wall regarding "the strategic corporal" and GEN. Krulak's three-block war.
> 
> It will be more and more kinetic and dynamic and less and less "normal" infantry tactics.



Probably right, Doc. I doubt we'll ever do another division-sized frontal amphibious assault or a massed helo vertical envelopment or take a hill with frags and bayonets. Too bad, we were so good at it.


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## Devildoc (Oct 12, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> Probably right, Doc. I doubt we'll ever do another division-sized frontal amphibious assault or a massed helo vertical envelopment or take a hill with frags and bayonets. Too bad, we were so good at it.



I understand the frustration, and saw a junior Marine once yell out "I just wanna kill the fuck out of someone."  He was a grunt.  It was he was trained to do.  It is a very serious predicament...telling infantry to go do nuance and COIN, but not give them any substantive training.


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## Teufel (Oct 12, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> I understand the frustration, and saw a junior Marine once yell out "I just wanna kill the fuck out of someone."  He was a grunt.  It was he was trained to do.  It is a very serious predicament...telling infantry to go do nuance and COIN, but not give them any substantive training.



I've been to more than a couple Combined Arms Exercises (CAX)  in 29 Palms.   I saw a little bit of urban warfare added to the exercise when it was renamed Mohave Viper, then a lot more when it became Enhanced Mohave Viper (EMV).  Now Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) is evenly divided between conventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations.   Most units should also include COIN training in their progressive training plans.  I know that every infantry unit I served in during the GWOT did.


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## pardus (Oct 13, 2016)

Diamondback 2/2 said:


> 18 year old hard dicks, who spent half a years worth of training to break and kill shit will never be able to meet the political and cultural requirements of COIN. I don't care how good the leaders are and how diciplined the unit is. Infantry is not a scalpel, it's the sledgehammer. If the leadership used Infantry for what it is meant for (find, fix, close with and destroy) and stopped trying to come up with secondary missions (be a beat cop in a police action),  shit would work alot better. Do you want your grunts hard charging killers, or do you want 18 year old kids making split second decisions that have possible strategic implications?
> 
> Personally IMO, use that young grunt for the built up aggressive ass kicker he is, train him to break and kill and release his ass when it's needed. Leave the hearts and minds and handing out soccer balls for the guys on their second/third enlistment who volunteer and take on the training to be that warrior/diplomat.
> 
> ...



Totally disagree. Any halfwit monkey can climb out of a trench and charge a MG. You are in essence saying that US Infantry are too stupid to conduct COIN operations. COIN is and has been a vital Infantry role since at least the end of WWII. All units and personnel need is training on how to conduct themselves in a COIN operation. Just as you train to operate in a jungle/urban/desert/arctic environment, or offensive/defensive/recon role. 
You think recon/LRS/snipers aren't surgical? Come on mate.
The Brit Infantry did quite well in Northern Ireland on a COIN operation and managed to send those same Infanteers to the Falklands to sort out a numerically superior force with conventional tactics.
Don't sell the US Infantryman short. They just need to be trained properly. 



Teufel said:


> I've been to more than a couple Combined Arms Exercises (CAX)  in 29 Palms.   I saw a little bit of urban warfare added to the exercise when it was renamed Mohave Viper, then a lot more when it became Enhanced Mohave Viper (EMV).  Now Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) is evenly divided between conventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations.   Most units should also include COIN training in their progressive training plans.  I know that every infantry unit I served in during the GWOT did.



Just like this! 

Infantry must be adaptive/flexible as their role/situation in both war and civil missions are extremely varied. Train, adapt, overcome, Onward!


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 13, 2016)

pardus said:


> Totally disagree. Any halfwit monkey can climb out of a trench and charge a MG. You are in essence saying that US Infantry are too stupid to conduct COIN operations. COIN is and has been a vital Infantry role since at least the end of WWII. All units and personnel need is training on how to conduct themselves in a COIN operation. Just as you train to operate in a jungle/urban/desert/arctic environment, or offensive/defensive/recon role.
> You think recon/LRS/snipers aren't surgical? Come on mate.
> The Brit Infantry did quite well in Northern Ireland on a COIN operation and managed to send those same Infanteers to the Falklands to sort out a numerically superior force with conventional tactics.
> Don't sell the US Infantryman short. They just need to be trained properly.
> ...



I'm not saying Infantry cannot be flexible or that they cannot operate in a COIN battle space. What I am saying however, is that COIN is not the job for a 18 year old kid, who doesn't give two fucks for cultural norms, traditions and customs. That kid teaching all the younger LN kids to say cuss words and be disrespectfu, etc. Infantry is a young man's game, it's not those late 20's early 30's types who matured a bit and who can grasp a big picture. When I was 21-22, I sure as fuck didn't care. Just wanted to fuck shit up, joke and make the best out of a bullshit situation. 

As for Sniper teams and LRS, yeah they can be surgical, and are specifically trained and lead by senior leaders. You are not taking a squad of 18-19 year old PFC's fresh our of Sand Hill on a recon or assault that has strategic implementation. That is why Rangers have special training and incredible dicipline. If the average squad of Airplane gang fire pissers could do it, right, with the desired outcome, you wouldn't need Rangers or SOF. 

I love the Infantry,  best time of my life. But the reality is, you can't have a single tool works for all job's. The Infantry needs to be that sledgehammer, and SOF needs to be that scalpel. They may overlap in some areas, but they don't need to do each other's jobs.

I think the Falkland and Ireland operation are poor examples, when talking about the future operational environment being discussed. Falkland was a classic operations, assualt, seize, hold. Ireland was more of a police action/operation vs the COIN operations the likes seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. I'm sure you will disagree and throw out massive examples of how awesome COIN can be done by the average grunts, with super-duper training and special this and that. My point of disagreement is the current results of the last 15 years American grunts have been doing it and failing. 

My $.02, expand SOF to meet the future needs, and reserve Infantry for that sledgehammer-break shit-kill everything role.


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## Gunz (Oct 13, 2016)

pardus said:


> Totally disagree. Any halfwit monkey can climb out of a trench and charge a MG. You are in essence saying that US Infantry are too stupid to conduct COIN operations. COIN is and has been a vital Infantry role since at least the end of WWII. All units and personnel need is training on how to conduct themselves in a COIN operation. Just as you train to operate in a jungle/urban/desert/arctic environment, or offensive/defensive/recon role.
> You think recon/LRS/snipers aren't surgical? Come on mate.
> The Brit Infantry did quite well in Northern Ireland on a COIN operation and managed to send those same Infanteers to the Falklands to sort out a numerically superior force with conventional tactics.
> Don't sell the US Infantryman short. They just need to be trained properly.
> ...





I may have contradicted myself several times on this thread but COIN/FID was _exactly_ the mission of my unit--the 2nd Combined Action Group--in Vietnam. And we were all 0311s, 0331s etc and all volunteers. You needed good rifle range and GCT scores and you got COIN and Vietnamese language/culture induc at CAP School. History says we did pretty well. So @pardus is correct, although @Diamondback 2/2 makes some valid points:

COIN/FID on the part of 18 and 19 year-old Soldiers and Marines _can _work with the proper indoctrination,_ leadership in the field_ and backing up the chain. But patience is one of the keys to working with foreign counterparts, especially those from vastly different economic and cultural backgrounds. And not all young teenage American warriors have the maturity and patience to deal with it in spite of their training. Small disagreements, perceived slights, joking around at somebody's expense can grow, over time, into dangerous resentments and mistrust. With ARVN--and I believe also with the ANA and some Iraqi militias--there were even suspicions, or actual incidents, of individuals colluding with the enemy.


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## AWP (Oct 13, 2016)

I've watched PFC's and Spec 4's train/ mentor Afghans. Here's the thing, this "economy of force." We have x amount of SOF guys and y amount of Infantry types. Policy makers won't care about the felt on a guy's head, they see bodies. If they allocate some number of guys to a battlespace, they won't care if they are SF, Infantry, or mechanics (not the Jason Statham type), they will expect for peace and freedom to break out on command. You'll find more 11x/ 03xx on the battlefield than any other MOS because, and I hate to break this to some of you, our ground forces exist for those 11 series and 03 series to place a 19 YO with a machine gun on some geographic point.

We can argue about ideals and whatnot, but the reality is we've dumped O-5 and higher level responsibilities in an O-3's lap a gazillion times over in the last 15 years. Do we think that won't happen again? "Reaganomics at the bullet level" is our COIN strategy and nothing's changing. Might as well get used to teaching our E-3's how to work with others.


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## Devildoc (Oct 13, 2016)

Teufel said:


> I've been to more than a couple Combined Arms Exercises (CAX)  in 29 Palms.   I saw a little bit of urban warfare added to the exercise when it was renamed Mohave Viper, then a lot more when it became Enhanced Mohave Viper (EMV).  Now Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) is evenly divided between conventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations.   Most units should also include COIN training in their progressive training plans.  I know that every infantry unit I served in during the GWOT did.



Last time I was at CAX was....2000? It might have been 99.  I don't recall if there was training.  I don't remember what I had for breakfast this morning; there may have been (training), I just don't remember.  Given the 'strategic corporal' and 3-block war concept and the Marines' ownership in this, I am glad to see it has expanded like it has.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 13, 2016)

Just to add to the context of my post, offering clarity and honesty.  I am not a fan of the Untied States doctrine on COIN, and I am fully against how COIN has been conducted post 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan. If our grunts were specifically selected and trained to carry out COIN ops under the current and past strategies and methods,  it wouldn't change much IMHO.

That all said, I don't really have a dog in this fight anymore and I've had some heated debates on this subject in the past. So in an effort to not kick that dead horse again, or take this thread down an over traveled path. I will bow out of the discussion, and concede my views and opinions.... <~~~~that's fancy smancy talk for "fuck it, you win, I got better shit to think about":-":wall:


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## Gunz (Oct 13, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> ... *I don't recall...I don't remember*...*I just don't remember...*




Now you know what it's like to be my age. :-"


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## Gunz (Oct 13, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> I've watched PFC's and Spec 4's train/ mentor Afghans. Here's the thing, this "economy of force." We have x amount of SOF guys and y amount of Infantry types. Policy makers won't care about the felt on a guy's head, they see bodies. *If they allocate some number of guys to a battlespace, they won't care if they are SF, Infantry, or mechanics (not the Jason Statham type), they will expect for peace and freedom to break out on command. You'll find more 11x/ 03xx on the battlefield than any other MOS because, and I hate to break this to some of you, our ground forces exist for those 11 series and 03 series to place a 19 YO with a machine gun on some geographic point.*
> 
> We can argue about ideals and whatnot, but the reality is we've dumped O-5 and higher level responsibilities in an O-3's lap a gazillion times over in the last 15 years. Do we think that won't happen again? "Reaganomics at the bullet level" is our COIN strategy and nothing's changing. Might as well get used to teaching our E-3's how to work with others.



I'm quoting this because I'm quoting this.


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## Teufel (Oct 14, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> Last time I was at CAX was....2000? It might have been 99.  I don't recall if there was training.  I don't remember what I had for breakfast this morning; there may have been (training), I just don't remember.  Given the 'strategic corporal' and 3-block war concept and the Marines' ownership in this, I am glad to see it has expanded like it has.



I didn't realize you got out before the GWOT.  The Marine Corps did not have any COIN training at CAX.  The service ramped up COIN training significantly in 2004.  The Marine Corps hired Arabic speaking role players, ran Arabic language training and other training events.  They even set up a training facility with a Hollywood producer to run infantry squads through a simulated Iraqi village with role players and special effects.


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## Devildoc (Oct 14, 2016)

Teufel said:


> I didn't realize you got out before the GWOT.  The Marine Corps did not have any COIN training at CAX.  The service ramped up COIN training significantly in 2004.  The Marine Corps hired Arabic speaking role players, ran Arabic language training and other training events.  They even set up a training facility with a Hollywood producer to run infantry squads through a simulated Iraqi village with role players and special effects.



I was a corpsman through Dec 2003, then got my commission.  I had not been to CAX in a few years at that point.

I know Krulak had dropped hints about COIN several years prior and the writing was on the walls that the Corps was headed in that direction, and I am glad that it's being implemented.  When I left the 'green side' after I got my commission in 2003, GWOT was still newish, and a lot of the junior Marines were still very much "blood makes the grass grow."

ETA, I was in reserves at that point as well.  We weren't low-hanging fruit like our AD counterparts, and all "non-essential" ATs and ADSW orders were canceled/denied.


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