# Rethinking COIN. We need something new.



## 7point62 (Sep 5, 2009)

I used to think successful COIN warfare was possible, provided it was done right. But now, after putting a lot of thought into it, I'm not so sure.

I'm guessing--I don't have any _real_ numbers--that you're kind of fucked from the get-go. I'm figuring maybe a 20-25% chance of a successful outcome _provided_ it's done right, and--here's the rub--_provided_ you have 15-20 years to dedicate to the prosecution of the war.

For us Westerners, our people just don't have the patience or the interest to wage a long-term COIN war. They didn't 40 years ago and they sure as shit don't now.  

Obviously, some of the elements of COIN doctrine make sense. Like don't piss off the locals. If they don't like you they're going to tell your enemy where your ambush site is. They're not going to be so forthcoming about the location of that IED. If they _do_ come to like you, you stand to gain some valuable intel from them. But you are always going to be the Outlander. Always.

And let's face it. We know and they know that we are not going to be there forever. In fact, in today's world, 8-9 years is about the maximum commitment we are going to see, if that. And they are not going to embrace Americanism or Westernism. It's not going to happen.

I think COIN doctrine needs a major overhaul. Take what makes sense and discard the rest. 

Any thoughts?


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## AssadUSMC (Sep 5, 2009)

Since we know this country will NOT do true COIN, we need to do a full-scale deconstruction of the enemy.  Of course this will not happen either, for in the words of Gen. Petraeus, "We will not carpet bomb."

Either we are in a war or we're not.  I don't recall someone issuing us rules.  Oh yeah, that's right, the court of (foreign) public opinion decided for us...


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## AWP (Sep 5, 2009)

7point62 said:


> I'm guessing--I don't have any _real_ numbers--that you're kind of fucked from the get-go. I'm figuring maybe a 20-25% chance of a successful outcome _provided_ it's done right, and--here's the rub--_provided_ you have 15-20 years to dedicate to the prosecution of the war.



RAND did a study on this, some 160+ pages worth. I'll try to find a link, but of the ~100 insurgencies since the end of WWII a successful COIN campaign took an average of 14 years.


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## DA SWO (Sep 5, 2009)

I can think of two that worked.  Brits in Malaysia, and US in El Salvador.  Takes time and money, we set ourselves up for defeat by moving the effort from A-stan to Iraq too quick.


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## JJ sloan (Sep 5, 2009)

Word.
COIN works just fine.  All we need are commanders who understand the operation... not just vomitting information that they read in the recently published manual.
COIN is not a buzz word, a fad or something that should be used for promotion opportunities.  Leave this operation to the guys who have been doing it for decades rather than try to put joe snuffy in the position to do the job, or train an entirely new SOF contingent for this purpose.  Absurd.
Backpacks and smiles are not doctrinal components of COIN.


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## AWP (Sep 5, 2009)

The RAND study for anyone interested:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595/


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## arizonaguide (Sep 6, 2009)

Three questions to ponder:
1.) what is the capability and "local credibility" of friendly indiginous forces in A-stan?
Pretty much limited to small unit tactics under ONE decision maker, correct? No real "NCO's" in their organization right? Just one "leader" and a bunch of "followers" that need constant decision making "guidance" from that senior leader. No "middle management", I understand. Is that correct? How many actually can READ a map, develop a mission, react and improvise on the fly, etc? 

2.) what is the (local) credibility of the Government/infrastructure to govern?
To my understanding the President's brother is who again? I also understand that they are "waiting to see if we have the stomach to stay"...and until then, don't want to piss off the Taliban...indicating that they know the current GOVT Structure is NOT enough to protect them if we leave. (THIS seems like the MAIN issue to tackle).

3.) Do we really expect to turn Cousin against cousin...tribe against tribe?
If so, how do we do this? Live amongst them and become a member of their tribe?
Know all of them as well as their Mailman does? (shit, like they have a mailman!?).
How do we know who's enemy and not, except by HUMINT that is sketchy and used to settle tribal and family disputes...and not 100% to stop OUR chosen "enemy".  Are we living (or ready to live) amongst them 100% for the "duration"? To protect them like "family"?


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## 7point62 (Sep 6, 2009)

Invisible J said:


> Current COIN doctrine works - sort of.
> 
> When it's left to units that are manned, trained and equipped for it, and when it is applied _before_ a low intensity conflict blossoms into open warfare, great gains can be made.
> 
> ...




Terrific post. 

But we seem to have the historical inability to limit our adventures to just COIN and leave the professionals alone. The tanks always roll in...the 18-year old PFC's, God Bless them ;), are not only allowed within a hundred miles of the effort, but get a 3-week work-up in COIN and then go out and hide a frag in some old lady's Burkha for laughs.

What I'm saying is, it's almost unrealistic for us to contemplate the successful prosecution and _completion_ of any COIN effort because COIN always seems to get relegated to side show status (except for a few exceptions as SOWT points out) and we and our allies lack the patience.

And then there's the national character of the people who's hearts and minds you are trying to win. They have to be receptive enough, there has to be enough motivation to make them want to side with foreigners against their own countrymen or people who share their culture. People in Afghan cities remember the repression of the Taliban. That's motivation. But the cities are just dots on the map.


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## 7point62 (Sep 6, 2009)

AssadUSMC said:


> Since we know this country will NOT do true COIN, we need to do a full-scale deconstruction of the enemy.  Of course this will not happen either, for in the words of Gen. Petraeus, "We will not carpet bomb."
> 
> Either we are in a war or we're not.  I don't recall someone issuing us rules.  Oh yeah, that's right, the court of (foreign) public opinion decided for us...





Y'know, I'm thinking of a new doctrine along those same lines: KOE/GTFO= Kill Our Enemies and Get the Fuck Out.

That was the original mission in A-Stan. Kill Osama and as many of his AQ motherfuckers as we could, kill anybody who stood in our way and get the fuck out. Now it seems we're trying to re-make the country into something it's never going to be.

I think the only COIN effort our government could ever seriously prosecute would be against an insurgency in our own country...


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## Manolito (Sep 6, 2009)

If you are interested Gen. Tommy Franks said the same thing in his book. I will command troops and win the war. I will retire before we occupy the country. We should leave at the end of the war.


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## AWP (Sep 6, 2009)

Franks is a clown and is/ was part of the problem here.


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## archade (Sep 6, 2009)

My € .02


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## AssadUSMC (Sep 6, 2009)

7point62 said:


> Y'know, I'm thinking of a new doctrine along those same lines: KOE/GTFO= Kill Our Enemies and Get the Fuck Out.
> 
> That was the original mission in A-Stan. Kill Osama and as many of his AQ motherfuckers as we could, kill anybody who stood in our way and get the fuck out. Now it seems we're trying to re-make the country into something it's never going to be.
> 
> I think the only COIN effort our government could ever seriously prosecute would be against an insurgency in our own country...



THIS is the key.  Nation-building is a fine endeavor, but one best left to those to whom the country belongs...  We are polishing the turd that is Afghanistan to a fine sheen, but alas, it's still a turd.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 6, 2009)

Okay I waited until I was sober to post here  that way I can be clear in my statements.

I don’t think there should be a COIN book on the conventional side, it serves no purpose. I feel that it is the SF/ CA/ PSYOP role and their expertise. They my have read/ wrote and use parts of the book, but they have a far better understanding of what needs to take place in a COIN operation, then what is actually being said in the book it self.

I can give a support unit a FM 7-8 and even give them some follow on training from some HSLD Infantry soldiers, however that unit and that units command will never perform to an infantry units ability or knowledge level. They will not fully understand and they will fail to apply the proper tactics to the conceived threat. It takes a 18+ year 1SG to keep a Company commander inline and focused on what’s right, it takes a 12+ year PSG to keep a Platoon leader inline and focused. So on and so on, experience and understanding goes farther when apply a tactic, b/c a tactic is ineffective when applied the wrong way.

I don’t think that COIN is effective and fail to see where it has been a true success. However I do believe that in order for it to be a success it most be conducted by the right people, with the right knowledge and experience in COIN.

From this Infantryman’s view point and knowledge/ experience the only way to defeat insurgency is to kill every last insurgent and every person who help those insurgents. If that means leaving a population in shambles, so be it. I will come back 20 years later and do it again (job security  ).


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## arizonaguide (Sep 6, 2009)

Yup, I still like 7point's KOE/GTFO doctrine.

I look forward to the input into the new FM-3-24-1, Kill Our Enemies and Get the Fuck Out field manual! :) I'm guessing it could be covered in about 19 pages.
Save the gov't a bunch of money (hell, just on Field Manual paper alone). ;)


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## JJ sloan (Sep 6, 2009)

Alot is definately lost in OPSEC.  
COIN will work in this theatre, there is no doubt.  It will require a shift in thinking which I believe is underway.  Pakistan is definately a large part of the success of COIN in Afghanistan; I believe that the current leadership knows this and is making the neccessary corrections.
To "kill our enemy and get the fuck out" has never been a part of our doctrine and seems a bit absurd.  The area must be stabilized and if that means we stay there for an undetermined amount of time (eg. Germany, Japan, Korea, Panama, the Philippines) then so be it.  
I think in order for this tactic to work at the operational level, NATO needs to be relieved and special operations needs to take control at the tactical level.  This does not mean remove conventional forces, it means to establish (revive) tactical areas of responsibility where SF companies are the "battlespace owners".  USCENTCOM remains the operational commander, just as it was in the beginning.  
There is nothing wrong with COIN as a tactic, but it has to be understood by all who are charged with executing the task.  And those who _are_ charged with the task must be left to accomplish it with some autonomy.  There is no one size fits all solution for COIN, each commander must decide what will work in his AOR.  That is where we are going so wrong.
:2c:


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 6, 2009)

I agree with most of what you wrote accept this:



JJ sloan said:


> To "kill our enemy and get the fuck out" has never been a part of our doctrine and seems a bit absurd.



It’s untested by the US Military (accept for a few operations), however very well proven to work by the IDF. I think it’s absurd to think that the entire Middle Eastern region is going to be stabilized and eliminate the threat of future attacks on the United States and Allies. Such as Iran, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. We cannot afford to spend the money and time to rebuild (the retarded terrorist from those areas) views of the world and their religious devotion. However we can kill them disrupt them enough to render them ineffective and make them a low level threat. 

And this:



JJ sloan said:


> This does not mean remove conventional forces, it means to establish (revive) tactical areas of responsibility where SF companies are the "battlespace owners".



As long as a conventional force and leadership are maintained that does not share the views of SOF in the theater of operations, you will continue to have stupid ineffective policies and continued mishaps. SF/ CA/ PSYOP is trained to view the conflict different and act according to your training. Conventional and DA type units are trained to view warfare in a different way and that does not fall in lines with the SF/ CA/ PSYOP views. As necessary as you and your training are, is the same way my training and I am necessary. I agree that Afghanistan is a SOF war, but disagree with keeping conventional forces (other then support and a BCT size QRF) on ground or with a leadership influance.


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## JJ sloan (Sep 6, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> > I agree with most of what you wrote accept this:
> >
> >
> >
> ...


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 6, 2009)

JJ sloan;320706][quote=J.A.B. said:


> Noted.  I would submit to you that the ideology ("the retarded terrorist views") of our enemy is their center of gravity.  This center of gravity aids extremists in their ability to leverage the populace for recruitment. At the same time, this center of gravity is their critical vulnerability.  If we can stop the recruitment we can snuff out the insurgency.  Therefore, we have to strike at the ideology by using unconventional means.  One of the unconventional means is simply proving to the people that we will not leave until their government is able to provide security and a better way of life.  That should only take another twenty years or so, but it can be done.  Conversly, I don't believe it will be done with democracy... I believe that the Afghans will have to create a viable Islamic Republic.  But to kill and retreat is not going to make this possible, it will only enflame the base from which to recruit.  Therefor, this tactic of "KOE/GTFO" will never achieve the endstate of mitigating the threat, or as you said "make them a low level threat."
> 
> 
> And this:
> ...



Okay so it’s a moot point, as I said in my 1st post there is a different view’s on fighting a conflict and you are trained one way to deal with a conflict. I am trained a different way to deal with it. I agree that Afghanistan is your war, but if am getting involved it needs to be for KOE/GTFO reason.

As for keep me there to pull security and be used hard and put up wet, that is truly absurd! :uhh: What about using the Afghans? I thought that was your guys other specialty FID? I think that’s what gets the American’s in a bind when supporting UW operations. They don’t want young 18 year olds dieing for the Afghan’s security. Let the Afghans die for their security and our kids will die for ours…


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## JJ sloan (Sep 6, 2009)

J.A.B.;320712][quote=JJ sloan said:


> Let the Afghans die for their security and our kids will die for ours…



They are brother.... both sides.


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## DA SWO (Sep 6, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> I agree that Afghanistan is a SOF war, but disagree with keeping conventional forces (other then support and a BCT size QRF) on ground or with a leadership influance.



Two comments here.  I made a comment in another thread about sending the majority of the conventional forces home.  Let me explain that comment here:The Conventional Forces are needed, conventional commanders are not needed and should stay at home.  SFODB Commanded by a Major could have a conventional company (or companies) commanded by Captains under his control (OPCON/ADCON, the whole ball of wax).  Bn,Bde,Div Staffs could augment the CJSOTF; but the Commanders stay home.  

The conventional units act as a force multiplier, FOB security, blocking force etc.  Furthermore, the conventional companies would chop 90 days prior so they could learn SOP's etc.  FID, only we are training Americans.


Kill them all and go home was tried once, El Salvador, didn't turn out real good. Aid dried up once the war was over, a shatterred economy resulted in runaway crime and assisted MS-13 in ways we never envisioned. The crime, criminals, and gangs emigrated to the US.  The costs to the taxpayer are greater then it would have been if we had converted mil aid to economic aid.

COIN is a long term mission, and post conflict ops are a long term mission.  Americans think everything should be fixed in four year os less, and that is the problem.


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## JJ sloan (Sep 6, 2009)

SOWT said:


> Two comments here.  I made a comment in another thread about sending the majority of the conventional forces home.  Let me explain that comment here:The Conventional Forces are needed, conventional commanders are not needed and should stay at home.  SFODB Commanded by a Major could have a conventional company (or companies) commanded by Captains under his control (OPCON/ADCON, the whole ball of wax).  Bn,Bde,Div Staffs could augment the CJSOTF; but the Commanders stay home.
> 
> The conventional units act as a force multiplier, FOB security, blocking force etc.  Furthermore, the conventional companies would chop 90 days prior so they could learn SOP's etc.  FID, only we are training Americans.
> 
> ...



Word.
That is what I was trying to say.  I am not as eloquent I guess.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 6, 2009)

SOWT said:


> Two comments here.  I made a comment in another thread about sending the majority of the conventional forces home.  Let me explain that comment here:The Conventional Forces are needed, conventional commanders are not needed and should stay at home.  SFODB Commanded by a Major could have a conventional company (or companies) commanded by Captains under his control (OPCON/ADCON, the whole ball of wax).  Bn,Bde,Div Staffs could augment the CJSOTF; but the Commanders stay home.
> 
> The conventional units act as a force multiplier, FOB security, blocking force etc.  Furthermore, the conventional companies would chop 90 days prior so they could learn SOP's etc.  FID, only we are training Americans.
> 
> ...



Maybe so, but WW1, WW2 and Desert Storm were not COIN missions and were victories. Viet Nam was a COIN mission and ultimately became a loss.

The only COIN mission successfully fought by the United States that I can see was the Civil War and that was done through brutality and kill them all tactics used by the conventional “Union” The same tactics used by some of the British troops to slow down some of the UW/ insurgency tactics used by the American Revolutionary Army primarily the militias.

My point is that everyone is saying it works and conventional doesn’t, however the proof is in the pudding. Thinking outside the box is great, but I think a lot of what being said here is unrealistic on all sides. Americans are going broke; Americans are worried and tired of seeing Joe Snuffy die, Americans want results and have yet to get them OIF or OEF…:2c:


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## 7point62 (Sep 7, 2009)

SOWT said:


> COIN is a long term mission, and post conflict ops are a long term mission.  Americans think everything should be fixed in four year os less, and that is the problem.




My point exactly.

Look, I _know_ COIN can work. I've seen it work. But merely working doesn't cut it if it's not given time to _succeed._ And that's the crux. 

Policy is made by politicians. Politicians live and die by the vote. The amount of precious time you are alotted to conduct successful COIN operations is determined, not by the Pentagon, but by public opinion.

I left my counterparts standing on a rice paddy dike with their dicks in their hands because public opinion made me and my bros climb on a 46 one day and fly off, leaving the job half finished.

If anything, the public has become even more impatient since then and the national tolerance for casualties is a fraction of what it once was...combine all that with the fact that you have a CINC who was elected in part by Peace Democrats who are going to demand quick results...and I'd say if you're in Afghanistan you better expedite COIN while the gettins good because if it's dragged out too long the mission's going to get pulled out from under you.


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## AssadUSMC (Sep 7, 2009)

The El Salvador example doesn't work with Afghanistan.  El Salvador was and is a viable country.  Afghanistan is a gigantic dirt pile with one export: Opium.  The fact that the Taliban (and apparently half the population) want it to go back to the 8th century only compounds the issue.  

I made the original post that evolved into KOE/GTFO, but that was not the intention.  My point there was that we either need to be FULLY committed (i.e. no limitation on use of forces in any part of the battlespace - incl. Pakistan, no limitation on types of weapons used - incl. carpet bombing, FAEs, etc.), or we need to leave.  That country will NOT embrace American-style democracy.  It will NEVER be a republic.  Many of us have served there - you guys know those people understand two things:  tribe and violence.  That's it.

The really distressing factor on top of all of this is that we now have a "leader" who has NO military experience, NO management experience, and a complete need for positive world opinion.  :doh:


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## surgicalcric (Sep 7, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> ...As for keep me there to pull security and be used hard and put up wet, that is truly absurd! :uhh: What about using the Afghans? I thought that was your guys other specialty FID? I think that’s what gets the American’s in a bind when supporting UW operations. They don’t want young 18 year olds dieing for the Afghan’s security. Let the Afghans die for their security and our kids will die for ours…



What is absurd is you, a conventionally minded soldier by your own admission, attempting to tell the unconventionally minded soldier(s) what our job is or what it is that we do.  FID and UW are two sides of the same coin (no pun intended) at different times in the continuum of war.  

Now that that is out of the way.  Since conventional commanders saw the writing on the wall (when a couple handfuls of SF soldiers conquered an entire country without their heavy handed approach to warfare) it has been SF supporting a conventional commanders intent in this war.  A war quite frankly they havent a clue how to fight so instead they take a "kill them all" mentality which has filtered down to Joe.  It is the exact opposite of the way it should be in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the security of the Afghan people is directly linked to the security of America.  As long as AQ and the Taliban have a safe haven to spread their vile hatred, recruit the weak minded, and train them Americans will continue to die where they do so is of little importance.



> WW1, WW2 and Desert Storm were not COIN missions and were victories...



Apples and Oranges...

Those were conventional wars, fought against an enemy who wore uniforms, who fought with conventional methods...  Vietnam was lost before we got started good.  It was lost on the streets here in America, not in the jungles of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.  It was lost because America didnt have the stomach for war, the same is true today...



> My point is that everyone is saying it works and conventional doesn’t, however the proof is in the pudding. Thinking outside the box is great, but I think a lot of what being said here is unrealistic on all sides. Americans are going broke; Americans are worried and tired of seeing Joe Snuffy die, Americans want results and have yet to get them OIF or OEF



Noone said conventional doesnt work.  It has its place.  The trouble is the conventional commanders dont seem to know what they dont know.  And regardless of how many times they are told so they dont seem to want to accept the fact that tanks and infantry divisions cant do it all...

JAB:  I see where you are trying to go, but you are woefully out of your depth in this discussion.  Your heavy-handed approach to this is what has gotten us to where we are today in OEF...  In all honesty you need to do a little more reading on COIN and a lot less posting  

Crip


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## Rabid Badger (Sep 7, 2009)

All...

Great discussions about 'Shock and Awe / Conventional' VS COIN....let's keep it that way.

I'm enjoying reading the different opines.

;)


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## arizonaguide (Sep 7, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> Thinking outside the box is great, but I think a lot of what being said here is unrealistic on all sides. Americans are going broke; Americans are worried and tired of seeing Joe Snuffy die, Americans want results and have yet to get them OIF or OEF…


But, a lotta truth in THAT statement. :2c: cuz the news tells me we're "losing" now.
Is this war being "squared away" now, or NOT?


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## 7point62 (Sep 7, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> ...Americans are going broke; Americans are worried and tired of seeing Joe Snuffy die, Americans want results...



"People get sick and tired of a moment of silence at the ballgame. They just want to be told it's over."  Russell Crowe, _Body of Lies_


And there you have it, my friends. _The_ problem with warmaking, unconventional or otherwise: the fucking civilian public. The fickle masses. If it were up to me, SF and SOF would have all the support/money they need to run the show, all the backing they want and 20 years to do it. But it'll never happen.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 7, 2009)

surgicalcric said:


> What is absurd is you, a conventionally minded soldier by your own admission, attempting to tell the unconventionally minded soldier(s) what our job is or what it is that we do.  FID and UW are two sides of the same coin (no pun intended) at different times in the continuum of war.
> 
> I agree and I was not telling anyone what his or her job is, I was saying that I thought that FID was a mission of SF. At least it listed as one, I have not the smallest clue as to how you guys operate or think. However I know that a few ODA’s and a few other SOF personal fought A-stan in the beginning, and the masses coming from Afghani’s. Was it not? So why is it that now you need a bunch of conventional to pull security for you and hold blocking positions?
> 
> ...



I don't need an SF tab to understand how COIN works, I have read on the subject for many years, as well as spending a portion of my college party years conducting COIN/ FID operations and simply disagree that conventional forces play a role in COIN and or FID. I am going to post my opinions on it b/c it does matter to me and I have seen its effects, regardless how you view my opinions.  I have no problem being the peanut gallery! 

Keep your eye on the prize Crip ;)


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 7, 2009)

Invisible J said:


> Not what conventional forces do?
> 
> As an infantryman in the Marine Corps I participated in all of the roles that SOWT outlined in his post in support of Army and Navy SOF. To say that we were there "because SOF didn't want to do it" is disingenuous.



Well it was not in my job description, just b/c we both have been used in that role doesn’t make it right. If my mission is to pull security or be a water boy, I will do it b/c that’s what I am told to do. However that is not what my purpose in warfare is and not what I am training to do.


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## surgicalcric (Sep 7, 2009)

*Oh hell no you didnt........*

I know you are not preaching to me, or any other .mil guy here, about losing friends and fellow soldiers and the anger that runs thru ones veins wanting revenge...  Please tell me you are not up on a soapbox as if the Infantry as a whole, or you specifically, has the market cornered on losses.  I for one will not put up with your self-righteous BS.  

As for not trusting the Afghani's, there are quite a few of them who have laid their lives on the line and died, for their countries freedom from terrorists, along side us, many times saving American's lives.  Dont begin to marginalize their commitment to make a blanket statement in hopes that it will help substantiate your opinion on the place of the infantry on COIN operations. Talk about disingenuous.....

There is a place for the infantry in COIN, doing the same job they were trained to do, destroying things and killing people.  Its who makes the decisions about who and where that needs to change...

I never stated you needed an SF tab to understand COIN.  It isn't requisite; but an open mind is.  

Crip


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 7, 2009)

*I am not attacking you, so why do you want to attack me?*



surgicalcric said:


> I know you are not preaching to me, or any other .mil guy here, about losing friends and fellow soldiers and the anger that runs thru ones veins wanting revenge...  Please tell me you are not up on a soapbox as if the Infantry as a whole, or you specifically, has the market cornered on losses.  I for one will not put up with your self-righteous BS.
> 
> Reread what I wrote!
> 
> ...



I am open minded, just not to the use of failed tactics at the cost of more US service members lives.


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## Trip_Wire (Sep 7, 2009)

7point62 said:


> "People get sick and tired of a moment of silence at the ballgame. They just want to be told it's over."  Russell Crowe, _Body of Lies_
> 
> 
> And there you have it, my friends. _The_ problem with warmaking, unconventional or otherwise: the fucking civilian public. The fickle masses. If it were up to me, SF and SOF would have all the support/money they need to run the show, all the backing they want and 20 years to do it. But it'll never happen.



I'm afraid you are correct! :doh:

The same people who continue to support this administration will pressure this administration to pull the 'Troops' out of A 'Stan before the mission is accomplished just like we did in Vietnam!

Unlike Vietnam, this will be a larger disaster leaving, support as well as a base and mission training area for every Muslim terrorist group in the world, just like it was before we went there! :eek:


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## JJ sloan (Sep 7, 2009)

Trip_Wire said:


> I'm afraid you are correct! :doh:
> 
> The same people who continue to support this administration will pressure this administration to pull the 'Troops' out of A 'Stan before the mission is accomplished just like we did in Vietnam!
> 
> Unlike Vietnam, this will be a larger disaster leaving, support as well as a base and mission training area for every Muslim terrorist group in the world, *just like it was before we went there!* :eek:



The difference will be that they will have a much larger pool of people to recruit from since we left them hanging.


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## surgicalcric (Sep 7, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> ... I am tired of people using soldier in the wrong way for the wrong things?...



You mean like conventionally minded leaders attempting to fight an unconventional war with conventional methods?  That instead of allowing the SME's on UW/COIN to control the tempo and objectives to meet the demands of the battlefield, a bi-product of which would be maximizing the conventional soldiers capabilities in inflicting casualties upon the enemy as deemed appropriate.



> ...I disagree that we should fall under and ODA’s or SF Companies leadership...



And why is that, just curious?  



> I strongly disagree with the use of US forces to provide security for the Afghan people.



I never said you should be providing them security.  That is what the ANP/ANA is for.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 7, 2009)

surgicalcric said:


> You mean like conventionally minded leaders attempting to fight an unconventional war with conventional methods?  That instead of allowing the SME's on UW/COIN to control the tempo and objectives to meet the demands of the battlefield, a bi-product of which would be maximizing the conventional soldiers capabilities in inflicting casualties upon the enemy as deemed appropriate.



If it worked that way it would be a good thing and I would see it as a effective tool. However it’s still not likely to happen…



surgicalcric said:


> And why is that, just curious?



I do not think any unit company level or above should have their command level replaced/ or chomped down by another command. Removing a units leadership to replaced by HSLD SF’ers sounds cool, but actually destroys the unit as a whole in the long run. After that unit leaves and becomes a unit under their leadership again, they have to go through a total rebuild and that just sucks. Now having a platoon or a section, is not as big of a deal, but a company, battalion or brigade is a totally different issue.

Maybe a good solution would be to expand SF’s support units to include a few companies of combat arms types? But to just use a unit and chump the command is just not good for that unit.



surgicalcric said:


> I never said you should be providing them security.  That is what the ANP/ANA is for.



I guess I missunderstood. What security would coventional forces be conducting in Afghanistan then? FOB security?


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## surgicalcric (Sep 7, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> If it worked that way it would be a good thing and I would see it as a effective tool. However it’s still not likely to happen…



So then again, the problem isnt COIN.  



> I do not think any unit company level or above should have their command level replaced/ or chomped down by another command. Removing a units leadership to replaced by HSLD SF’ers sounds cool, but actually destroys the unit as a whole in the long run. After that unit leaves and becomes a unit under their leadership again, they have to go through a total rebuild and that just sucks. Now having a platoon or a section, is not as big of a deal, but a company, battalion or brigade is a totally different issue.



If its the removal of a unit from its parent unit then your argument against it happening should stand regardless of the level: BN, BDE, company, platoon, etc...  However I am specifically talking about a platoon with the ODA or BN/BDE within the JSOTF to be OPCON where needed.  Some teams may need them while others may not; its mission driven.  As a matter-of-fact I know of several instances where infantry platoons were OPCON/ADCON to an ODA here and there...  It didnt seem to affect them when they returned CONUS (Yes I am still in contact with a couple of them), with the exception of losing a couple company commanders (PL's then) and enlisted to SFAS. The soldiers the command got back had a better understanding of COIN/UW than before, got more training across a wide range of disciplines, and enjoyed their rotations more believing they were doing something more than walking up and down ridge lines on a mvmt-to-ambush.  



> Maybe a good solution would be to expand SF’s support units to include a few companies of combat arms types? But to just use a unit and chump the command is just not good for that unit.



We dont regularly find ourselves needing a platoon's worth of infantry guys sitting around when we are busy doing one of our other missions.  It just so happens that we could utilize them in Afghanistan from time to time...



> What security would conventional forces be conducting in Afghanistan then? FOB security?



Personally I wouldnt be on a FOB if I had my choice in the matter. I would be out in a safe house doing what it is that SF soldiers are suppose to do.  And I would have the 11B/C's with me pulling security / comms watch on the house just like my guys do, training and going out on missions with us. 

Then again if I had my way I wouldnt ride around in a damn RG31/33 either...

Crip


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 7, 2009)

Okay so we are talking about small platoon level units attached with an ODA pulling security and assisting in operations? Then yes I agree with you.

If we are talking about BCT’s being sent out to help patrol areas and perform with in the COIN doctrine I do not see it as a good thing.

My personal thoughts is that unless you can cut the US forces on ground down to very small numbers and do it fast, the public will push for a with draw. If all you guys need is a platoon per an ODA, why is there so many damn conventional forces on the ground? Why are they planning to plus up 20-40K more?


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## surgicalcric (Sep 7, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> ...If all you guys need is a platoon per an ODA, why is there so many damn conventional forces on the ground? Why are they planning to plus up 20-40K more?



I never said all that is needed across the country is a BN/BDE.  I was simply stating that in the context given earlier a platoon/+ of infantry guys could be beneficial in some instances, not all.

There is still alot of breaking shit that needs to be done.  We are too busy teaching and mentoring to do everything...  I dont have all the answers, in fact I have more questions than answers.  But I am getting ever closer to knowing what I dont know...  ;)

Crip


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 7, 2009)

surgicalcric said:


> I never said all that is needed across the country is a BN/BDE.  I was simply stating that in the context given earlier a platoon/+ of infantry guys could be beneficial in some instances, not all.
> 
> There is still alot of breaking shit that needs to be done.  We are too busy teaching and mentoring to do everything...  I dont have all the answers just ones to the questions I know of...  ;)
> 
> Crip



Right on, well I will STFU about it and see you guys in the stan next year. :doh:;)


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## TheSiatonist (Sep 7, 2009)

Interesting discussion, everyone.



archade said:


> My € .02



I'd like to share my .02, as well, just in case any one of you guys have not read this, yet.

Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes

... and a follow-on:

Shaping the Future of Counterinsurgency Warfare: A Strategic Approach

Thanks.


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## surgicalcric (Sep 7, 2009)

Sand Man said:


> Interesting discussion, everyone.
> 
> 
> 
> I'd like to share my .02, as well, just in case any one of you guys have not read this, yet...



That is someone else's .02...


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## JJ sloan (Sep 7, 2009)

Sand Man said:


> Interesting discussion, everyone.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Interesting... but what are your thoughts?  Don't be scared.


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## Florida173 (Sep 7, 2009)

taking HUMINT from higher echelons and putting them down for direct support at the company level would help a lot.  Also the newer concept of creating a position for a 35F or a COIST (Company Intel Support Team) creates a atmosphere of purpose for patrols going out.  Allowing the COIST members to work for the S2 and the Humint team to be workign for the S2X would allow for a focus of requirements in most AOs.  

That is what we did in Iraq on this deployment that I just came home from, and it worked very well.  My being HUMINT now and former infantry I was able to click with the grunts and put into simple words what I needed.  I worked side by side the COIST and when they got something that I wasn't there for, I'd just send the answers to requirements up via PG.

In a area like Iraq that idea is almost essential with the warrant based targetting.


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## DA SWO (Sep 7, 2009)

J.A.B. said:


> Okay so we are talking about small platoon level units attached with an ODA pulling security and assisting in operations? Then yes I agree with you.
> 
> My personal thoughts is that unless you can cut the US forces on ground down to very small numbers and do it fast, the public will push for a with draw. If all you guys need is a platoon per an ODA, why is there so many damn conventional forces on the ground? Why are they planning to plus up 20-40K more?



Yes.
FWIW- 10th Mtn (2/22 Inf) and the 101st both chopped units to the CJSOTF at the Start of OEF.  FOB security was the initial mission (after the Bosnia side trip).  Then worked into other ops, it was a good relationship, and the SOF guys did not abuse the conventional units (it's usually the other way around).

Question for the masses.  What was the first dicked up operation in OEF, who ran it, and was it a SOF or Conventional Op?


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## AWP (Sep 7, 2009)

I have no idea if we've done it since 9/11, but prior to that it wasn't uncommon in training scenarios (read: JRTC) to chop out several ODAs under the umbrella of a SOCCE to an infantry BDE.

As a minor aside, given that an ODA can train up to a BN of indigs.....I think it could effectively manage a PLT/ CO of allied infantry if the need arose.

Somedays you use a ratchet or a nutdriver for the same task. Maybe you only had the ratchet, maybe the space was too confined for a ratchet, but having multiple tools is not necessarily a bad thing.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 7, 2009)

SOWT said:


> Yes.
> FWIW- 10th Mtn (2/22 Inf) and the 101st both chopped units to the CJSOTF at the Start of OEF.  FOB security was the initial mission (after the Bosnia side trip).  Then worked into other ops, it was a good relationship, and the SOF guys did not abuse the conventional units (it's usually the other way around).
> 
> Question for the masses.  What was the first dicked up operation in OEF, who ran it, and was it a SOF or Conventional Op?



I was not there, but according to the recorded accounts:



> Nov 16 2001 – Tora Bora.
> U.S. bombs mountain stronghold of al Qaeda. Afghan allies fight on ground. Some three-dozen U.S. special operators guide strikes. Arabs escape into Pakistan.
> 
> Nov 25 2001- First U.S. Death to Enemy Action.
> ...



Also as for personal information from a buddy in the 101st who was there the first conventional forces boots on ground were US Marines from the 15th MEU and built and manned Camp Rhino in Kandahar and were relived in place by the 101st.


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## arizonaguide (Sep 8, 2009)

*Questions from back home...*

So, what is the status of the Gov't now, after the election?
Is there really a National Government/infrastructure that the population trusts to "protect" them from the return of the Taliban so we can leave? Are they predicted to be friendly to American interests (for real) when we leave, or just "biding their time"? Realisticly, are we currently just spinning our wheels with the culture? Have we made much progress (or loss) in the last year?


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## 7point62 (Sep 8, 2009)

Let me just sidestep in here and say this is a great discourse...and I want it known up front this wasn't meant as criticism of SFs acknowledged expertise in this arena.

The gist of my original thinking was that COIN at the outset is a significant challenge, even for the experts. And that a central element of COIN is _time._ And if that critical element--time to succeed--is removed, COIN as a doctrine becomes less viable. It becomes, for lack of a better analogy, like CAS without enough gas to get to the target. You can drop a few bombs along the way but the mission does not get accomplished. And given the public attitude that has prevailed since Vietnam, the impatience with long campaigns, it is now almost a given that COIN operations will _not_ be given the time they need to succeed.

John Q. Voter, and perhaps more importantly, John Q. Liberal--who's currently running the show and who's ignorance about things military is almost a point of pride--is saying, hmmm, we've been fighting in Afghanistan for almost _nine_ years already...and the generals are asking for more time?


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## AWP (Sep 8, 2009)

arizonaguide said:


> So, what is the status of the Gov't now, after the election?
> Is there really a National Government/infrastructure that the population trusts to "protect" them from the return of the Taliban so we can leave?



Karzai is under fire. He'll probably win the election but he is rapidly losing credibility. Pick up Rashid's _Descent into Chaos_ which has a pretty good roll-up of Karzai's success, failures, strengths, and shortcomings.


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## surgicalcric (Sep 8, 2009)

7point62 said:


> ...I want it known up front this wasn't meant as criticism of SFs acknowledged expertise in this arena...



I think I can safely speak for the rest of my Brothers in saying that none of us got that vibe from you.

Crip


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## arizonaguide (Sep 8, 2009)

Freefalling said:


> Karzai is under fire. He'll probably win the election but he is rapidly losing credibility. Pick up Rashid's _Descent into Chaos_ which has a pretty good roll-up of Karzai's success, failures, strengths, and shortcomings.


Thank you Free. Will do.
And also MUCH agree with what 7point said above about not being a criticism of SF in any way. I hope my questions don't come across that way either.
:2c:



7point62 said:


> John Q. Voter, and perhaps more importantly, John Q. Liberal--who's currently running the show and who's ignorance about things military is almost a point of pride--is saying, hmmm, we've been fighting in Afghanistan for almost _nine_ years already...and the generals are asking for more time?


This is so true these days. We need to build support with GOOD news back home somehow.
We're losing the media war here back home.


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## moobob (Sep 8, 2009)

I think that we were... lucky... that someone like GEN Petraeus was put in charge of Iraq. His ideas were not typical of other senior guys. The fight in Afghanistan is an SF fight. Conventional troops are necessary for firepower and while the indig Army is developing, but SOF, specifically SF, should be in command.

It makes zero sense to me that U.S. Army SF are considered the subject matter experts on UW/FID/COIN, but are not in charge of the theater.  GEN McChrystal might be an excellent officer, but he still spent the vast majority of his career in units with kinetic, "Kill Our Enemies/GTFO" missions. (nice acronym btw)... 

SF is woefully underrepresented in the senior GO ranks. It makes 100x more sense to me to get a career SF officer up the ranks and put in charge of the entire fight. I have no illusions that a SF GO is going to magically solve all the problems there, but after the initial UW campaign, it seems like there's been a square peg, round hole approach to filling the top command billet there. It's more of an Army culture thing I guess...


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## Gypsy (Sep 8, 2009)

moobob said:


> your entire post.



Stop being so logical.  ;)


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## BravoOne (Sep 8, 2009)

"taking HUMINT from higher echelons and putting them down for direct support at the company level would help a lot. Also the newer concept of creating a position for a 35F or a COIST (Company Intel Support Team) creates a atmosphere of purpose for patrols going out. Allowing the COIST members to work for the S2 and the Humint team to be workign for the S2X would allow for a focus of requirements in most AOs."

You can say THAT again and again until someone with sufficient Pay grade hears it...

I read this http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/07/28/cias-phoenix-program-flies-again/ and must say I agree. Wondering what you guys thoughts are? I think that with minor changes it would do a hell of a lot of good. Replace the Vietnamese National Police with A'stan Army/Police that have been trained properly in UW and set them loose with SF advisors, and a CI/HUMINT team attached to every unit. Also, allow them to run cross border operations whenever necessary. "Anyone" that doesnt like it or wants to protest about their "National Sovereignty" could get their aid cut by 75% immediately (or roll with the program)


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## snake_doc (Sep 8, 2009)

BravoOne, I agree completely with your first paragraph. As for the last part about cutting aid and cross border ops, that is a sticky point. You can only do so much of that before other nations make us out to be the political bad guy. I wish we could pursue a strictly military focused war, but we cannot forget about the political and economic (another term for political, except you get right to the point and talk about $$$) pieces.


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## arizonaguide (Sep 9, 2009)

So, with a National Government that is rapidly losing credibility...how do we build (upon that) an infrastructure that is trusted by the populace? Is THAT not the basis of current COIN? Just askin. How do we "win" this?


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## 7point62 (Sep 9, 2009)

arizonaguide said:


> So, with a National Government that is rapidly losing credibility...how do we build (upon that) an infrastructure that is trusted by the populace? Is THAT not the basis of current COIN? Just askin. How do we "win" this?




That's the question, isn't it?

We win it through COIN/UW/CW/CA, political pressure, intrigue, arty, close air, terminal guidance, drone attacks, Paki cooperation, American public support, tons and tons of fuckin money and more money after that plus _a dedicated iron-hard inflexible committment to see the job through for the next ten years at least._

None of us here are naive enough to think that fucking half-assed measures or a half-assed committment will win a war, especially one in a place like Afghanistan.


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## Rabid Badger (Sep 9, 2009)

7point62 said:


> We win it through *COIN/UW/CW/CA*, political pressure, intrigue, arty, close air, terminal guidance, drone attacks, Paki cooperation, American public support, tons and tons of fuckin money and more money after that plus _a dedicated iron-hard inflexible committment to see the job through for the next ten years at least._



so basically, what you just said was *'start over' * [*2001*] when *SpecOps* was actually running the show and killin mofos needed kiln, winning the GWOT while the Tal was on the run...

The 'Afghan Template' would have worked in both AO's, until CONVENTIONAL 'Shock and Awe' took place...:uhh:



> We seem to find it far harder to learn from the past than we should, and we repeat it whether we remember it or not. ~ Anthony H. Cordesman~



:cool: :2c:


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 9, 2009)

RB said:


> so basically, what you just said was *'start over' * [*2001*] when *SpecOps* was actually running the show and killin mofos needed kiln, winning the GWOT while the Tal was on the run...



That is it, small numbers of specially trained SME dudes doing what they know how to do. Using FID and UW to fight a war from with in and allowing the Afghani people to win their own freedom. 

NOT

Conventional “Shock & Awe” we come in take the ground; kill anybody who is around at the time. Kick some ass and hand it over to the people who we just killed a bunch of and say here is your freedom. Now go make it work!

This is why I say conventional forces have no business in COIN operations. The notion that conventional is need to help for security of that ODA or to do what FID is supposed to accomplish (Afghanis fighting for their own freedom) goes against the whole strategic purpose of SF/CA/PSYOP fighting a COIN war.

This also limits the ability of media involvement as well as allowing the ODA’s to control what is being seen back in the USA (Afghanis fighting to win their freedom) and not US Soldiers winning it for them. Leaving a positive notion in the USA public and gain support and not the other (Time lines for with draw).


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## arizonaguide (Sep 9, 2009)

We need some sneaky, manipulative, street smart strategy with these fuckers. :2c:
Some Good cop, bad cop, or something.


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## arizonaguide (Sep 9, 2009)

7point62 said:


> None of us here are naive enough to think that fucking half-assed measures or a half-assed committment will win a war, especially one in a place like Afghanistan.


Exactly, yet I believe that's what's happening At Home...or starting to happen, at least.


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## 7point62 (Sep 9, 2009)

RB said:


> so basically, what you just said was *'start over' * [*2001*] when *SpecOps* was actually running the show and killin mofos needed kiln, winning the GWOT while the Tal was on the run...
> 
> The 'Afghan Template' would have worked in both AO's, until CONVENTIONAL 'Shock and Awe' took place...:uhh:
> 
> ...





Well, y'know RB, I can sit back here and chew the cud and spit out opinions, of which I probably have too many, and take my shots about a place I've never been to...and nothing I tap out here on my little ergonomic keyboard means do-do squat to the boys and girls at the sharp edge.

All I can opine is this: If our objective was to kill OBL/AQ and Taliban, disrupt their operations to the point where they became ineffective, ally ourselves with the various mujh clans and sub-clans who could help us achieve this objective, then, yes...let SpecOps teams run the show, back them up with whatever they need and have at it. The only problem is, now our objective has changed. Now it's Big Industry.

I feel like I'm running around in circles with my posts on this thread. A few more pages and I may end up 180 degrees from where I started out.


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## arizonaguide (Sep 9, 2009)

One thing I want for our troops is more support in the media and in politics...no matter WHICH direction we choose. If we stay...understand why we're staying, and...if we leave...also understand why. Hearts and minds at home, as well as in theatre.

More public understanding of COIN maybe, and what's attempting to be accomplished would help...some clear cut realistic objectives (and success reaching them)...that will help even a liberal congressman believe in this as a "good war" again.

Right now it's a vague war, in a far away country to most people...and all we see on the news is IED losses, and bad news.
Publicize some REAL successes! ASAP, or public support (and then congress) will soon dry up. (IMHO)


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## TheSiatonist (Sep 9, 2009)

surgicalcric said:


> That is someone else's .02...



Poor wording on my part. Apologies.



JJ sloan said:


> Interesting... but what are your thoughts?  Don't be scared.



Thanks but I wouldn't want to disrupt the discussion by adding my inexperienced views on the table. I just wondered if you guys may have read the PDFs and how you view the author's POV.

However, I do have a question: Is the war in Afghanistan still considered a COIN op considering that many conventional troops on the ground?

Thanks.


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## Ranger Psych (Sep 9, 2009)

If you're going to pipe up, pipe up completely. Either you're right and we agree, you're wrong and get instructional criticism regarding your viewpoint (and learn something), or you're wrong and hard headed and the lesson is lost.


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## TheSiatonist (Sep 9, 2009)

Well, I am open for a lot of schooling on these things. Fact is, I have been following this thread and I seem to get comparison's about COIN vs conventional war in every other post.

My question above stems from the thought of 'Has NATO truly defined this war as a COIN op or not?'. True, there are a lot of considerations to make like winning hearts and minds but when there are more conventional guys out patrolling with ANA and getting killed by Taliban using unconventional tactics, you have to wonder if the majority of the boots on the ground are trained to deal with these types of threats.


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## surgicalcric (Sep 9, 2009)

Ranger Psych said:


> ...or you're wrong and *hard headed and the lesson is lost*.



And there is already enough of that.

Crip


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Sep 9, 2009)

surgicalcric said:


> And there is already enough of that.
> 
> Crip




Yeah tell me about it!:uhh:


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## arizonaguide (Sep 10, 2009)

Sand Man said:


> My question above stems from the thought of 'Has NATO truly defined this war as a COIN op or not?'. True, there are a lot of considerations to make like winning hearts and minds but when there are more conventional guys out patrolling with ANA and getting killed by Taliban using unconventional tactics, you have to wonder if the majority of the boots on the ground are trained to deal with these types of threats.


Good question IMHO. Good folks here, to answer that. We've discussed training issues before, and always have some good info/suggestions for improvement. :2c: Can ALWAYS use more ($$$) training troops on the ground. 151 qualification rounds, then into combat, and such.


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## archade (Sep 12, 2009)

new food for the mind...:2c:


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## archade (Sep 12, 2009)

Dear warriors
Please feel free to check the Oman's file...
My € .02


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## archade (Sep 12, 2009)

five others studies. :2c:


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## archade (Sep 12, 2009)

Here we go ! Promise I will stop soon :2c:


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## archade (Sep 12, 2009)

Those are the last files under 1mb
have a good read
My €.02


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## archade (Sep 13, 2009)

Miss time to read all?:)
:2c:


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## archade (Sep 13, 2009)

iraq


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## peefyloo (Oct 26, 2009)

Figure I'd post in this thread instead of posting a new one...

They are talking about adding about 44,000 troops to condunct counterinsurgency or adding about 15,000 to conduct "counterterrorism plus".

Isn't that ass backwards?


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## archade (Dec 11, 2010)

more studies:)


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## archade (Dec 11, 2010)

other ones


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