# 1st Marine Parachute Regiment



## Gunz (Jan 25, 2016)

They never made an actual combat jump. The 1st battalion was decimated at Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal and later, like the Raiders, disbanded. But they were tough and fought hard. Ira Hayes, the Pima Indian who was later one of the six men in the famous flag raising on Iwo Jima, was a jump-qualled ParaMarine with the 1st Marine Parachute regiment.

The U.S. Airborne during WW II - Attached Units - 1st Marine Parachute Regiment(Paramarines)


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## Red Flag 1 (Jan 25, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> They never made an actual combat jump. They were decimated at Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal and later, like the Raiders, disbanded. But they were tough and fought hard. Ira Hayes, the Pima Indian who was later one of the six men in the famous flag raising on Iwo Jima, was a jump-qualled ParaMarine with the 1st Marine Parachute regiment.
> 
> The U.S. Airborne during WW II - Attached Units - 1st Marine Parachute Regiment(Paramarines)



Nice find, Ocoka!!


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## Kraut783 (Jan 25, 2016)

Really nice find, I had no idea there was such unit then, very interesting part of history.


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## Gunz (Jan 26, 2016)

Here's a bit more.



http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Publications/Publication PDFs/Silk Chutes and Hard Fighting US Marine Corps Parachute Units in WWII.pdf


Ira  Hayes in standard Marine jump school graduation photo,  in dress shoes and khakis no less.







The Raider and Para units were disbanded around the same time. I don't think it was predjudicial on the part of Big Marine Corps, it was a question of tactical necessity. The Corps was engaged in either jungle fighting or big unit amphibious beach assaults on heavily fortified islands, neither situation condusive to commando or airborne operations. Even before the battle of Guadalcanal was over, Merritt "Red Mike" Edson was moved from command of his famous Raider Bn to CO of 2nd Bn 5th Marines.


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## Devildoc (Jan 26, 2016)

Thanks for sharing.  I love this kind of history, and a good example of the trials and tribulations of raising new units.  Knowing how utterly cumbersome and bureaucratic the military is I have always been interested in how the military stands up new units so quickly, funding, manpower, logistics, etc.  WWII was famous for this.


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## AWP (Jan 26, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> Thanks for sharing.  I love this kind of history, and a good example of the trials and tribulations of raising new units.  Knowing how utterly cumbersome and bureaucratic the military is I have always been interested in how the military stands up new units so quickly, funding, manpower, logistics, etc.  WWII was famous for this.



And the GWOT, a much longer running war, is not.


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## Johca (Jan 26, 2016)

WWII was full mobilization war having significant manpower requirements, the GWOT is not a full mobilization war.  If it was conducted as full mobilization war the GWOT would have ended by now.  Further the rule of engagement governing the fighting of WWII were not hampered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additions to these agreements signed by Nations-State governments since then.


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## TLDR20 (Jan 26, 2016)

Johca said:


> WWII was full mobilization war having significant manpower requirements, the GWOT is not a full mobilization war.  If it was conducted as full mobilization war the GWOT would have ended by now.  Further the rule of engagement governing the fighting of WWII were not hampered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additions to these agreements signed by Nations-State governments since then.



Key commentary, I would have never known!


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## Devildoc (Jan 26, 2016)

Johca said:


> WWII was full mobilization war having significant manpower requirements, the GWOT is not a full mobilization war.  If it was conducted as full mobilization war the GWOT would have ended by now.  Further the rule of engagement governing the fighting of WWII were not hampered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additions to these agreements signed by Nations-State governments since then.



And by full mobilization, it was _FULL_ mobilization.  Roosevelt assumed powers that were constitutionally nebulous and federalized much of industry and created resources by verbal command.  That war touched every American in some way.  Too true that the GWOT does not/did not.


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## AWP (Jan 26, 2016)

The breadth of mobilization has little to do with importance or innovation. As DevilDoc put it:


Devildoc said:


> Knowing how utterly cumbersome and bureaucratic the military is I have always been interested in how the military stands up new units so quickly, funding, manpower, logistics, etc.  WWII was famous for this.



He's exactly right. Our bureaucracy and politics, in and out of uniform, have crippled our ability respond to existing and emerging threats. We can do it, you see traces of it in the MC-12 acquisition process, counter IED technology, and the odd weapons system, but we fell short in other areas. In part the systems are complex, but mainly we lack the will or humility to develop certain capabilities.

The only way the size or scope of our mobilization/ involvement matters is "visibility" in the form of political capital or pressure.


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## Devildoc (Jan 26, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> Our bureaucracy and politics, in and out of uniform, have crippled our ability respond to existing and emerging threats.



It seems to me that in WWII, everyone--the government, the citizenry, the industry--was fully behind the war effort and it was "go big or go home."  Now, it's more "let's see just how little we can spend (vis-a-vis time, materiel, personnel, money) to meet the minimum goal."

Absolutely agree the visibility and optics have taken priority over the overwhelming will to win.


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## AWP (Jan 26, 2016)

Devildoc said:


> It seems to me that in WWII, everyone--the government, the citizenry, the industry--was fully behind the war effort and it was "go big or go home."



In many ways they did. In others there were roadblocks. One could argue that problems we see today were on display (if behind the scenes) during WWII.
- Marines in the ETO. I think it was Marshall who lost his mind over the prospect of Marines in Europe. He was vicious on this point, so much so the handful of Marines in the OSS didn't wear their uniforms as much as their Army and Navy counterparts. They had to hide from their own gov't.
- The B-29. HUGE teething problems led to the Battle of Kansas (or Wichita in some accounts). The difference between it and the F-35 (a lot of programs now) is how it was handled. 
- Tanks vs. tank destroyers. One reason the Sherman sucked is because of a huge internal fight favoring cheap tank destroyers. The position was that TD's were cheaper than tanks (they are) and more capable (nope) because you could make more for less. That hampered the fielding of the M-26 Pershing.
- The U-boat fight. FDR advocated subchasers which utterly failed. The Navy wanted destroyers which were more expensive in all respects and that meant they never had enough. The Brits propsed destroyer escorts and while sort of misnamed, they were better for convoy escort duties and made at a fraction of the cost of a new DD.

That's what I recall off the top of my head. Even when everyone was committed they had their dog in the fight and screw everyone else.


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## Devildoc (Jan 26, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> In many ways they did. In others there were roadblocks. One could argue that problems we see today were on display (if behind the scenes) during WWII.... Even when everyone was committed they had their dog in the fight and screw everyone else.



Most definitely.  I am finishing a very, very good book--American Warlords:  How Roosevelt's High Command Led America to Victory in WWII--that goes into some of these issues.

Politicians are what they are, and everyone has a dog in the fight (no pun intended).  Of course, Roosevelt nationalizing just about everything made for certain efficiencies.


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## DA SWO (Jan 26, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> In many ways they did. In others there were roadblocks. One could argue that problems we see today were on display (if behind the scenes) during WWII.
> - Marines in the ETO. I think it was Marshall who lost his mind over the prospect of Marines in Europe. He was vicious on this point, so much so the handful of Marines in the OSS didn't wear their uniforms as much as their Army and Navy counterparts. They had to hide from their own gov't.
> - The B-29. HUGE teething problems led to the Battle of Kansas (or Wichita in some accounts). The difference between it and the F-35 (a lot of programs now) is how it was handled.
> - Tanks vs. tank destroyers. One reason the Sherman sucked is because of a huge internal fight favoring cheap tank destroyers. The position was that TD's were cheaper than tanks (they are) and more capable (nope) because you could make more for less. That hampered the fielding of the M-26 Pershing.
> ...


P-51.

The B-17 almost got canned as too expensive/complicated.


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## Gunz (Jan 26, 2016)

And the stakes were higher then, obviously. That alone helps to grease the wheels. But there was plenty of contention. FF mentioned the B-29's major teething problems. The American Mark XIV torpedo was another horror story. They were innocuously clanging off Japanese hulls and sinking to the muck for a full 18 months before anything was done about it.

Nevertheless, between then and now the levels of indifference on the part of the public and the media are night and day.


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## AWP (Jan 26, 2016)

DA SWO said:


> P-51.
> 
> The B-17 almost got canned as too expensive/complicated.



The P-51 is a great one but I thought the -17 was a pre-war decision. Pre US involvement at least. Our fighter development was hampered by strategic bombing advocates, but I'm mainly thinking of programs during the war.



Ocoka One said:


> And the stakes were higher then, obviously. That alone helps to grease the wheels. But there was plenty of contention. FF mentioned the B-29's major teething problems. The American Mark XIV torpedo was another horror story. They were innocuously clanging off Japanese hulls and sinking to the muck for a full 18 months before anything was done about it.



Which was a major, huge indeed, but a pre-war engineering failure that carried into the war. The Germans had a similar issue that wasn't resolved until 42/ 43.

---

WWII and Vietnam saw us make some huge, long-lasting developments in our military's capabilities. Not just equipment but TTP's in some cases (carrier aviation in WWII comes to mind). The GWOT didn't do much in comparison despite its length and the money spent. That should be a cause for concern.


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## DA SWO (Jan 26, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> The P-51 is a great one but I thought the -17 was a pre-war decision. Pre US involvement at least. Our fighter development was hampered by strategic bombing advocates, but I'm mainly thinking of programs during the war.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


We were not challenged technologically by the GWOT.
VN was the last time we were challenged technologically, and our EW capabilities skyrocketed because of that challenge.


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## Gunz (Jan 26, 2016)

The GWOT strikes me as soldiers from the future fighting soldiers from the past. Technologically you'd almost have to dumb-down.


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## DA SWO (Jan 26, 2016)

Ocoka One said:


> The GWOT strikes me as soldiers from the future fighting soldiers from the past. Technologically you'd almost have to dumb-down.


Disagree, mentally and morally we need to dumb down.
We overthink shit and let PC drive tactics.


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## Dienekes (Jan 27, 2016)

DA SWO said:


> Disagree, mentally and morally we need to dumb down.
> We overthink shit and let PC drive tactics.



I don't mean to attempt to derail the thread, but could you expound on this a bit more? Specifically the morally. I don't know the specific upper limits of the ROE or their evolvement throughout the wars other than, it was much much much more lenient in the initial invasion than today.


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## AWP (Jan 28, 2016)

Dienekes said:


> I don't mean to attempt to derail the thread, but could you expound on this a bit more? Specifically the morally. I don't know the specific upper limits of the ROE or their evolvement throughout the wars other than, it was much much much more lenient in the initial invasion than today.



I won't speak for DA SWO, but considering we need a JAG's approval to initiate contact and they are part of the targeting process? We're so concerned about civilian casualties we can't trust commanders in the field to make that decision?


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## Johca (Jan 28, 2016)

Rules Of Engagement  (ROE) are more politically driven than mission need driven.  While Research and Development to gain new technologies have a stronger direct connection to mission need and desire to reduce operational risks.  The DC-130 video DC-130 Hercules  Drone Carrier although focusing on the Southeast Asia conflicts does disclose the Cold War need by mentioning drone flights over China and Korea.  However these drones were flown over other regions as were Extreme High Altitude Reconnaissance (weather) balloons.  Part of the early drone mission need was to do tactical reconnaissance over  areas nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction had been or were being used.  The development of these technologies have direct connection to the loss of a U-2 flying over the Soviet Union and the capture of its pilot on 1 May 1960 and the shoot down and loss of other manned reconnaissance flights that were flying along the borders and coasts of China and the Soviet Union.

ROEs are foremost connected to compliances with International Laws of Armed Conflict of which the most prominently known and agreed to are the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and amendments to the five Geneva Conventions since then.  ROEs are also heavily influenced by U.S. Domestic Politics as the poltical parties and elected officials of those parties use these laws to stay in power.   The article *Dodging The Legal Bullets of The Post Modern War: The Right Way Back to Total War, by COL James M. Patterson, USA (Ret) and LTC David G. Bolgiano, USAF (Ret). *in the Winter 2015 Drop Magazine gives some good insight into politics influencing ROEs.


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## Devildoc (Jan 28, 2016)

Johca said:


> The article *Dodging The Legal Bullets of The Post Modern War: The Right Way Back to Total War, by COL James M. Patterson, USA (Ret) and LTC David G. Bolgiano, USAF (Ret). *in the Winter 2015 Drop Magazine gives some good insight into politics influencing ROEs.



I read this yesterday.  Great article and the principles can be extrapolated to so many other areas.


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## Dienekes (Feb 2, 2016)

That's awesome, thank you. I'm writing a paper soon for a class attempting to morally justify Total War and that article will help a lot.


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## Ooh-Rah (Feb 2, 2016)

Dienekes said:


> That's awesome, thank you. I'm writing a paper soon for a class attempting to morally justify Total War and that article will help a lot.



Did you choose this position, or was it assigned to you as a topic?


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## Dienekes (Feb 2, 2016)

I chose this position. 



> Philosophers have studied war from a moral perspective for millennia, and they generally center their inquiries on questions of the “rightness” and/or “goodness” of some aspect of military conflict. In this paper, you are asked to take up a contested moral issue that arises either from the cause(s), conduct, or consequences of warfare. You need not limit yourself to wars of modernity, but be aware that topics relating primarily to wars of antiquity will be much more difficult to research and debate. Relevant Topics: Any issue relating to war that can be contested philosophically is fair game.


That's pretty much the only parameters. Professor's examples were the use of child soldiers, chemical weapons, terrorism as a justified action, etc..., and I wanted no part of justifying those. She said she even had a student justify the Holocaust in a paper once.


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## x SF med (Feb 3, 2016)

You better bone up on your John Stuart Mill, Jefferson, DeToqueville, possibly Mao, Lenin, Trotsky...  what era are you thinking of using as the base for the paper?  The further back you go, you could bring in Thuridyces, Pope Clement, Augustine, Aurelius...  You bit off  big chunk, hope you can chew it up well enough that you can feed the baby birds.


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## Dienekes (Feb 3, 2016)

For the era, I'm going to stick to modernity as the main example like WW2 and provide a postulate as to what contemporary total war would like. Then, I'll J ustify that using examples of total war throughout history(Sherman's March to the Sea, some French 19th century wars, etc...) using jus ad bellum as a function of jus in bello, and if I can swing it, throw in some unconventional warfare as part of the conduct of total war.


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## AWP (Feb 4, 2016)

Dienekes said:


> For the era, I'm going to stick to modernity as the main example like WW2 and provide a postulate as to what contemporary total war would like. Then, I'll J ustify that using examples of total war throughout history(Sherman's March to the Sea, some French 19th century wars, etc...) using jus ad bellum as a function of jus in bello, and if I can swing it, throw in some unconventional warfare as part of the conduct of total war.



What is your page limit or target?


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## Dienekes (Feb 4, 2016)

It's only 6-8 pages, and less philosophical  than I made it out to be. We only have to justify based on the Just War Tradition principles that we have learned in class. It's a political science trying to be philosophical than a pure philosophy class as we don't have a philosophy department or even a class.


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## AWP (Feb 4, 2016)

Right on. That's a good topic for a single-spaced report.


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