# Army to Cut LRSC/ LRSD Units



## AWP (Jul 18, 2016)

I understand the argument but think it is stupid. Losing the entire capability? Don't even keep the AD units? I guess that's one way to do it. I find it ironic that LRS is probably going away based upon their lack of use in the GWOT, but Cav Scouts are alive and well. I honestly would not doubt if this was more about politics and some bias than usage/ capabilities.

Army looks to deactivate Long-Range Surveillance companies



> SAN ANTONIO — The Army is moving to cut all nine of its Long-Range Surveillance companies from active duty and the National Guard this year as part of a plan to restructure its force, Army officials told Stars and Stripes.
> 
> The Pentagon will finalize a decision to deactivate three active-duty and six National Guard Long-Range Surveillance companies in the next 60 days.


----------



## x SF med (Jul 18, 2016)

Stupid is as stupid does, that's what momma always said, Lt Dan....


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 18, 2016)

Fucking stupid motherfuckers never learn.


----------



## Kraut783 (Jul 18, 2016)

Damn...in 60 days!

Lets cut the HUMINT ability in the USIC, cause we have these things called satellites now.........:wall:


----------



## moobob (Jul 19, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> I understand the argument but think it is stupid. Losing the entire capability? Don't even keep the AD units? I guess that's one way to do it. I find it ironic that LRS is probably going away based upon their lack of use in the GWOT, but Cav Scouts are alive and well. I honestly would not doubt if this was more about politics and some bias than usage/ capabilities.
> 
> Army looks to deactivate Long-Range Surveillance companies


Your mention of Cav Scouts made me spit my drink out, intentional funny or not.


----------



## reed11b (Jul 21, 2016)

No worries, SF can do the mission. Until they become overly engaged in all there other missions and don't have the time or resources to focus on that mission and the Army tries to rebuild the capability from scratch......again. And then are shocked that you can't make really effective small teams from scratch quickly.....again.
Reed


----------



## CDG (Jul 21, 2016)

Well, like the article said, at least RRD is around.  From what I understand, those dudes are just sitting around wishing they had work these days.


----------



## AWP (Jul 21, 2016)

Good luck getting a USASOC/ JSOC entity to support a conventional mission. It does and has happened, but figure the odds.


----------



## Ranger Psych (Jul 21, 2016)

If RRD is bored, then I am a liberal.


----------



## Gunz (Jul 21, 2016)

If the Army ever has to fight in the jungle again, or in the mountains those LRS units will be sorely missed.


----------



## Kraut783 (Jul 21, 2016)

Can you imagine, for an example,  being a TXARNG guy who finally makes it to a LRSD unit on jump status, gets there and told this information.......:wall:


----------



## pardus (Jul 21, 2016)

CDG said:


> Well, like the article said, at least RRD is around.  From what I understand, those dudes are just sitting around wishing they had work *these days*.



Apart from anything else, the highlighted words make this a stupid proposition.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 21, 2016)

I cannot see a scenario where an ODA would fall under a conventional Corps or Brigade and provide them with reconnaissance during major combat operations. Getting rid of LRS is a bad idea. It is true that there isn't a lot of call for long range reconnaissance nowadays. The same can be said about tank battalions. Should we scrap them too?


----------



## ThunderHorse (Jul 22, 2016)

Kraut783 said:


> Can you imagine, for an example,  being a TXARNG guy who finally makes it to a LRSD unit on jump status, gets there and told this information.......:wall:


Well TX ARNG is transitioning from a ID to a Sustainment Command...saw it with my own eyes.  The Army really liked to wreck our guard brethren of capabilities.  

This is stupid...yes we Cav will have to do it...oh wait...LRS is a specialty honed over years of being together in the bush.  Regular Cav units have way too much baggage to get that proficient, it sucks.  Unless that unit is lucky to get ten guys RSLC qualified who are then given a ton of time to train their Soldiers on the techniques and tactics.  It can be done, but when I was in an IBCT the only guy who had attended RSLC was a fellow LT and he was at Knox while the unit was deployed.  In an ABCT...my unit had no ARC or RSLC qualified soldiers in the entire SQDN.  A few officers were, but that doesn't help much when it comes to training.  You have to have institutional knowledge, and we're about to have zero.


----------



## CDG (Jul 22, 2016)

Teufel said:


> The same can be said about tank battalions. Should we scrap them too?



The difference is that Congresspeople don't make money off of kickbacks from having LRS in their states.  Tanks that people have to manufacture however......


----------



## CDG (Jul 22, 2016)

pardus said:


> Apart from anything else, the highlighted words make this a stupid proposition.



Dude, sarcasm.


----------



## Etype (Jul 22, 2016)

The new narrative is basically, "recon as we once knew it is dead."

We have them satellite things that spin around 3 or 4 times a day, and some that just float in one spot, and those little planes with the miniature pilots and stuff.


----------



## Marauder06 (Jul 22, 2016)

Well. at least we won't have to argue about whether or not they're SOF anymore.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 22, 2016)

ThunderHorse said:


> You have to have institutional knowledge, and we're about to have zero.



It also takes a lot of time, money and effort to redevelop effective and safe military freefall and dive programs at a unit.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 22, 2016)

Etype said:


> The new narrative is basically, "recon as we once knew it is dead."
> .



"Recon as we once knew it is dead .....in the Army." The Marine Corps still has organic units whose primary focus is long range reconnaissance.


----------



## ThunderHorse (Jul 22, 2016)

Unless there is a fundamental shift in MTOE slotting for conventional Cavalry units to build a similar capability, this will be one of those things that gets lost.  Culturally I've been in a Cavalry unit that did the Recon and Security Fight and another that was used more like a a smaller infantry battalion.  And to build this capability within a conventional Cavalry unit it will take a cultural shift in supporting it.  I just know that getting guys to school and guys that want to go to school was tough when I was on the line.  Plenty of guys that wanted to go to SFAS though.

I guess we should have seen this coming when they removed the conventional portion of the reconnaissance capability from the BFSB in the transition to EMIB.  I will point out the Corps Recce BDE Concept is coming back around and there's an exercise with FORSCOM on it during the next fiscal year.  In current doctrine the Corps or Division Commander will task organize a BDE for an R/S BDE.  The formation becomes pretty robust, but I am still trying to figure how you properly staff it since you're taking a conventional BDE and giving it this mission.  And to do it effectively it would require doing that mission for a period of years.

I was told by one of the SAMS planners here in the shop there will be a monograph coming out, the author was a former LRC Coy CDR and basically wrote a recommendation to retire them since they were not value added to the fight.


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 22, 2016)

ThunderHorse said:


> Well TX ARNG is transitioning from a ID to a Sustainment Command...saw it with my own eyes.



Where do you hear or see that TXARNG is restructuring?


----------



## ThunderHorse (Jul 22, 2016)

See PM


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 22, 2016)

Thanks.


----------



## Etype (Jul 22, 2016)

Teufel said:


> "Recon as we once knew it is dead .....in the Army." The Marine Corps still has organic units whose primary focus is long range reconnaissance.


Yeah, but you folks also still use mildot scopes. I heard those were all the rage for dinosaur hunting.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 22, 2016)

Etype said:


> Yeah, but you folks also still use mildot scopes. I heard those were all the rage for dinosaur hunting.



Dead is dead. I remember sending dirt bags to Allah with iron sights. Never forget that wars are won by hard men and not equipment.

In any event a Marine Reconaissance scout has an assortment of optics available to him to see and photograph distant targets.  

I was in favor of the MOA sniper scopes we used back in the day but the Marine Corps transitioned away from them. Are you referring to long gun sights or carbine?


----------



## Etype (Jul 22, 2016)

Teufel said:


> Dead is dead. I remember sending dirt bags to Allah with iron sights. Never forget that wars are won by hard men and not equipment.
> 
> In any event a Marine Reconaissance scout has an assortment of optics available to him to see and photograph distant targets.
> 
> I was in favor of the MOA sniper scopes we used back in the day but the Marine Corps transitioned away from them. Are you referring to long gun sights or carbine?


I don't really know what you guys use, I was just poking.


----------



## Poccington (Jul 23, 2016)

No amount of poxy satellites or drones will ever be better than having a detachment of lads, in position and with eyes on target.

That's my view on it anyway.


----------



## AWP (Jul 23, 2016)

Don't forget that ADM Turner, the DCI under Carter, wanted to virtually eliminate field agents. He did in fact make huge cuts in personnel in favor of IMINT and SIGINT. This sentiment isn't new and I think it is another example of a very risk adverse culture in the military.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 23, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> Don't forget that ADM Turner, the DCI under Carter, wanted to virtually eliminate field agents. He did in fact make huge cuts in personnel in favor of IMINT and SIGINT. This sentiment isn't new and I think it is another example of a very risk adverse culture in the military.


Worst case scenario they put dinosaur hunters like me on ice until we are needed like they did in that documentary movie Demolition Man.


----------



## reed11b (Jul 23, 2016)

Teufel said:


> "Recon as we once knew it is dead .....in the Army." The Marine Corps still has organic units whose primary focus is long range reconnaissance.


Damn it Teufel... I almost gave you a hate simply for being right. And for pointing out that IN THIS CASE, the USMC is a little smarter than the Army.
Reed


----------



## Etype (Jul 24, 2016)

Poccington said:


> No amount of poxy satellites or drones will ever be better than having a detachment of lads, in position and with eyes on target.
> 
> That's my view on it anyway.


Satellites are never compromised on the OBJ, they don't have to infil and exfil, they don't get tired, they don't run out of food or water, satellites aren't DF'd when they key their radios...


----------



## AWP (Jul 25, 2016)

*INT is a tool, all of them valuable. You don't replace a jigsaw just because a circular saw also cuts wood.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 25, 2016)

Etype said:


> Satellites are never compromised on the OBJ, they don't have to infil and exfil, they don't get tired, they don't run out of food or water, satellites aren't DF'd when they key their radios...



They also aren't persistent and can't control fires.


----------



## Etype (Jul 25, 2016)

Teufel said:


> They also aren't persistent and can't control fires.


Not entirely true.

eta-

Scout platoons still exist at the Bn level. In addition to that, zone and area recon is a platoon level mission that they should all be able to accomplish. Tactical recon is still covered.

As far as strategic and theater recon assets, we have units who can and do handle that.  The Army isn't giving up a capability.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 25, 2016)

Etype said:


> Not entirely true.
> 
> eta-
> 
> ...



Something still has to exist to cover the large gap left between battalion level and national level requirements. 

There are specialized units that can conduct these reconnaissance missions, however they are finite and not organic to the conventional Army. The same can be said about satellites. 

A Marine Expeditionary Brigade commander has organic assets  that can conduct long range amphibious and ground reconnaissance for him using a variety of specialized insertion and extraction skills. This capability was demonstrated in Grenada, Somalia, Desert Storm, and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army used to have similar units but is choosing to retire this capability within its general purpose force. 

The Navy used to have the UDT/SEALs do all their beach and shallow water reconnaissance. It was one of the missions they were tasked with when SEALs used to float on Naval shipping. This ended abruptly the moment the Navy assigned the SEALs to USSOCOM. The Navy's requirements for beach reconnaissance did not change but USSOCOM had different priorities for their new unit and the Navy's requirements were gapped.

There will always be competing demands for specialized resources of all kinds in major combat operations. This is why it's important to have organic assets to answer all of your warfighting requirements. This is why every intelligence discipline exists in every service as well as SOF.


----------



## CDG (Jul 25, 2016)

What happens in MCO when we aren't able to utilize our satellites?


----------



## ThunderHorse (Jul 25, 2016)

Teufel said:


> Something still has to exist to cover the large gap left between battalion level and national level requirements.
> 
> There are specialized units that can conduct these reconnaissance missions, however they are finite and not organic to the conventional Army. The same can be said about satellites.
> 
> ...



There is an ARCIC test for the Division and Corps level Recon coming up with a task organized Reconnaissance and Security BDE.  The Army has dedicated reconnaissance assets above the BN Scout platoon in the Reconnaissance squadrons assigned to each BDE.  But beyond that there is no DIV Level or Corps Reconnaissance formation or assets now that the BFSB and the LRS Companies are being cut.  The R/S BDE is just a task organized BCT filling a role within doctrine, they get beefed up, but at some point that BDE will give up that mission.


----------



## Etype (Jul 25, 2016)

CDG said:


> What happens in MCO when we aren't able to utilize our satellites?


The same thing that happened in ODS, OEF, OIF, et al.

We used our special units for their special missions.

eta- 



Teufel said:


> Something still has to exist to cover the large gap left between battalion level and national level requirements.


Such a thing does exist, and it's currently manned in every GCC.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 25, 2016)

Etype said:


> The same thing that happened in ODS, OEF, OIF, et al.
> 
> We used our special units for their special missions.
> 
> ...



"Such a thing" will not normally work for a brigade commander.  There are often unity of effort and unity of command issues when using SOF forces, especially highly specialized ones, in support of smaller conventional units. 

These entities, and SOF in general, are finite given their specialized nature.  These forces may be available in a small contingency operation but will be harder to come by in a large scale conflict because of operational requirements and priorities of effort.  This is why we have SIGINT and HUMINT assets in every service for example.


----------



## DA SWO (Jul 25, 2016)

Teufel said:


> "Such a thing" will not normally work for a brigade commander.  There are often unity of effort and unity of command issues when using SOF forces, especially highly specialized ones, in support of smaller conventional units.
> 
> These entities, and SOF in general, are finite given their specialized nature.  These forces may be available in a small contingency operation but will be harder to come by in a large scale conflict because of operational requirements and priorities of effort.  This is why we have SIGINT and HUMINT assets in every service for example.


SF did a lot of SR for XVIII Airborne Corps in the first Gulf War.  
Theater Commander will have a lot of say when SOF Taskings are levied.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 25, 2016)

DA SWO said:


> SF did a lot of SR for XVIII Airborne Corps in the first Gulf War.
> Theater Commander will have a lot of say when SOF Taskings are levied.



I'm not saying that it will never happen.  It also happened a lot during the invasion of Afghanistan.  I'm saying that not every corps and brigade will get that kind of support unless they have organic assets.


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 26, 2016)

Unfortunately I think the risk adverse leaders in the Army would not properly use LRS at the brigade level. I saw too many LRS guys pulling bullshit missions and always felt for them. As highly trained as they are, they were being treated like a redheaded step child. 

It will take another conventional war, before their necessity is realised again. 

I will say there has been a dramatic drop in standards for LRS in heavy units. Commanders and 1SG without Ranger Tabs, TL/ATL's without tabs, many you see with nothing more than Airborne and several soldier without even Airborne.  The whole RSTA and RS concept fucked that shit all up.


----------



## Gunz (Jul 26, 2016)

The risk averse leaders in the military are under the thumb of risk averse civilian politicians and political appointees, who aside from being risk averse are also, like many generals, enamored by techno-gadgetry, and since few of them nowadays have served in uniform they have limited conceptions of the capabilities of HUMINT or recon units at the sharp edge and beyond. To them exposed CIA officers or captured American soldiers are political embarrassments.

We've been in love with our technology since Vietnam. It's a dangerous fixation and one of the main criticisms the IDF and Mossad, for example, have had against our GWOT practices. Technology is great but a satellite can't drink coffee with the Arabs.


----------



## Johca (Jul 26, 2016)

Diamondback 2/2 said:


> It will take another conventional war, before their necessity is realised again.


Reference Ranger and LRS. Read the Ranger utilization history of WWII and Korea.  By the mid course of WWII the Ranger units were no longer being utilized as envisioned and when resurrected during the Korean war the Ranger units were never utilized as a behind enemy lines commando or guerrilla capability.  Much of this was a result of uncertain popular support of such operation among the indigenous populations and the fact such forces do not blend in among non Western European populations.   The Korean War was cause for realization guerrilla forces are best gathered and trained from the portion of the indigenous population that supported US and allied fighting  efforts or political interests.


----------



## ThunderHorse (Jul 26, 2016)

So over the weekend LTG McMaster announced the cancellation of the LRV (Light Reconnaissance Vehicle) program.  Apparently ARCIC is testing a vehicle with a 30mm canon manned turret cannon.  Which led to a discussion in my shop, that because of the battlefield and the risk averse populace you will never see light formation do what they're meant to do in a DA fight.  They will be given heavily armored wheeled vehicles.


----------



## AWP (Jul 26, 2016)

ThunderHorse said:


> So over the weekend LTG McMaster announced the cancellation of the LRV (Light Reconnaissance Vehicle) program.  Apparently ARCIC is testing a vehicle with a 30mm canon manned turret cannon.  Which led to a discussion in my shop, that because of the battlefield and the risk averse populace you will never see light formation do what they're meant to do in a DA fight.  They will be given heavily armored wheeled vehicles.



The guy from 73 Easting is in favor of the heavy solution? No surprise there.


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 26, 2016)

ThunderHorse said:


> So over the weekend LTG McMaster announced the cancellation of the LRV (Light Reconnaissance Vehicle) program.  Apparently ARCIC is testing a vehicle with a 30mm canon manned turret cannon.  Which led to a discussion in my shop, that because of the battlefield and the risk averse populace you will never see light formation do what they're meant to do in a DA fight.  They will be given heavily armored wheeled vehicles.



Yeah that's going to work just great until we end up in another tropical jungle war. 

I'm probably kinda odd on this, but I actually like and respect what heavy units bring to the table. As a grunt, nothing was more calming in a gunfight than when a Bradley rolled up or an Apache was hovering over head. 

That said, we have to maintain our light capabilities,  airborne, air assault,  and yes, leg. 

LRS falls into a different category.  Regardless of the terrains,  the enemy, the style of warfare.  We always need someone boots on the ground, eyes on the target, feeding back real time information.  The fact that the conventional Army would give up their only organic assets that do that, is mind boggling. "Oh we will just get an ODA on loan". Yeah, fucking right...


----------



## Etype (Jul 26, 2016)

I think Corps or Div level assets would complicate operations when it comes to MCO and a true maneuver war. 

Think- the company commanders are controlling 3 platoons based on this Bn CDRs guidance. They are the n direct contact with the guy who controls the scouts. Now add LRS to the matter, the scouts are 3 or 4 echelons removed from the line companies.

OEF, OIF, and ODS moved too quickly for such cumbersome command issues.  The FLOT moved so quickly, they would've been overtaken before they were relevant.

On top of that, the BDE, DIV and Corps levels own their own UAVs. 

Theater assets will already by reconnoitering areas of strategic importance.

In my opinion, in terms of speed and agility, LRS just doesn't have a place in the modern maneuver battle. They were an overly redundant echelon.


----------



## Etype (Jul 27, 2016)

Diamondback 2/2 said:


> We always need someone boots on the ground, eyes on the target, feeding back real time information.


If we always need it, then why has it not been common practice for the last decade???

Only in training, because of antiquated exercises, do we actually do that.


----------



## Etype (Jul 27, 2016)

Shadow Spear in response to technology-


----------



## Gunz (Jul 27, 2016)

Johca said:


> Reference Ranger and LRS. Read the Ranger utilization history of WWII and Korea.  By the mid course of WWII the Ranger units were no longer being utilized as envisioned and when resurrected during the Korean war the Ranger units were never utilized as a behind enemy lines commando or guerrilla capability.  Much of this was a result of uncertain popular support of such operation among the indigenous populations and the fact such forces do not blend in among non Western European populations.   The Korean War was cause for realization guerrilla forces are best gathered and trained from the portion of the indigenous population that supported US and allied fighting  efforts or political interests.



The same can be said of the Marine Raider battalions and the Para-Marines. Disbanded and absorbed into the rifle regiments by 1943.


----------



## DA SWO (Jul 27, 2016)

Etype said:


> If we always need it, then why has it not been common practice for the last decade???
> 
> Only in training, because of antiquated exercises, do we actually do that.


Because conventional commanders would rather use (and lose) SOF assets for the role.

Add the slots to SOF and dedicate those elements to the Conventional Ground Force Commander when deployed.


----------



## Etype (Jul 27, 2016)

DA SWO said:


> Because conventional commanders would rather use (and lose) SOF assets for the role.
> 
> Add the slots to SOF and dedicate those elements to the Conventional Ground Force Commander when deployed.


SOF usually is under the command of conventional leadership, usually at the MG level.

The conventional leader can identify gaps in Intel, which SOF can fill.  The caveat to that is that the conventional commander doesn't get to tell them HOW to fill those gaps.


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 27, 2016)

Etype said:


> If we always need it, then why has it not been common practice for the last decade???
> 
> Only in training, because of antiquated exercises, do we actually do that.



Dude, I've spent too much time in LP/OP's and hides all over Iraq to agree with you on that. We always had boots on the ground with eyes on, for just about everything we did. If we set up a bullshit snatch TCP, we had an over watch team, if we hit a building we had surveillance on it a day to two days prior. I can go on and on, but to get to the point, we will always need that confirmation on the ground, we'll unless we just use drones, but good luck with that in triple canopy jungles, etc.


----------



## Etype (Jul 27, 2016)

Diamondback 2/2 said:


> Dude, I've spent too much time in LP/OP's and hides all over Iraq to agree with you on that. We always had boots on the ground with eyes on, for just about everything we did. If we set up a bullshit snatch TCP, we had an over watch team, if we hit a building we had surveillance on it a day to two days prior. I can go on and on, but to get to the point, we will always need that confirmation on the ground, we'll unless we just use drones, but good luck with that in triple canopy jungles, etc.


Those are all great examples of commanders at the tactical level using their men wisely.

Which stands with my reasoning that a Corps or Div level commander doesn't need a recon element.


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 27, 2016)

If we get into another conventional war (invade another country). Corps and Division levels need that capability to plan, asses, and just because an asset belongs to divison, doesn't mean it's not being utilised at the tactical level. 

The biggest reason I saw LRS not being used on deployments, is because commanders were to afraid to actually use them. 

But anyway, they are gone now (or at least will be). Water under the bridge until they are needed and come back again, like they have done since the late 1950's, or even going back through Ranger history, the Alamo scouts, etc. There will alway be a need for deep behind the lines, eyes on, what is going on over here type units.


----------



## Etype (Jul 27, 2016)

Diamondback 2/2 said:


> Ranger history, the Alamo scouts, etc. There will alway be a need for deep behind the lines, eyes on, what is going on over here type units.


We still have those!

The only real history LRS units have is from Vietnam, and those were rolled up into the Ranger Regiment.


----------



## ThunderHorse (Jul 27, 2016)

LRS and R/S BDE would deploy immediately on WARNO 1, in fact LRS would deploy even ahead of the R/S BDE so CORPs' would need to give them the Five Ws and put them on a plane for an infiltration and then support them via air resupply.  The R/S BDE would deploy on publication of WARNO 1, pretty much in the middle of RSOI for the majority of the force.  So their shit would be either from pre-staged stocks or already at the port before WARNO 1 would be published.  And LRS should truly be out there alone and unafraid.


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 27, 2016)

Etype said:


> We still have those!
> 
> The only real history LRS units have is from Vietnam, and those were rolled up into the Ranger Regiment.



I'm very aware of the SR capabilities throughout SOF. And if the SOF community is going to play nice and conduct LRS missions for conventional units, I think that's great. I don't see that happening,  but nonetheless,  that's about the only option after they disband LRSC's.

As for the history of LRS. I disagree that their history is only in Vietnam.  The LRRP units actually started in the 50's, in Europe,  during the cold war. But the concept of deep behind the line snoop and poop has been around since the revolutionary war. 

Anyway, the LRS mission is important and not the same as SR or CTR, but yet need more training than a squad of Rangers. I truly think this is a major fuck up on the Army's part.


----------



## Etype (Jul 28, 2016)

ThunderHorse said:


> LRS and R/S BDE would deploy immediately on WARNO 1, in fact LRS would deploy even ahead of the R/S BDE so CORPs' would need to give them the Five Ws and put them on a plane for an infiltration and then support them via air resupply.  The R/S BDE would deploy on publication of WARNO 1, pretty much in the middle of RSOI for the majority of the force.  So their shit would be either from pre-staged stocks or already at the port before WARNO 1 would be published.  And LRS should truly be out there alone and unafraid.


That's about as feasible as a nuke on Raqqa.


----------



## ThunderHorse (Jul 28, 2016)

Yeah...well how things should work and do work are always completely different you know.


----------



## Gunz (Jul 28, 2016)

My unit was, in effect, in enemy territory 24/7 and we were often the eyes-on for more conventional forces. We could give early warning of larger VC/NVA units infiltrating through our TAOR toward the Danang rocket belt; but most of the time the 12 of us took the fuckers on because we could pull the chain on steel rain and nape and Cobra gunships. There are many types of terrain, not just jungle, where vehicles can't go, where there are no roads, where the enemy is hidden in caves or tunnels, where they can't be detected by air/space assets...where boots are the only way in. American war at ground-level still comes down to men with rifles, frags, guts and terminal guidance.


----------



## AWP (Jul 28, 2016)

I still mourn the loss of capability, but am warming to @Etype's  argument. LRS may have played some role in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its validity lies in a static environment. The nature of our doctrine doesn't support static operations, but a blitzkrieg (Sorry, "Air Land Battle" or WTF we call a blitzkrieg these days). I'm curious how often they were employed during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Most commanders didn't use them as intended anyway. The Indiana guys worked as PSD's during their deployment. I'm sure they did some LRS work, but it wasn't the bulk of their deployment. Their maneuver commander didn't know how or wouldn't deploy them as designed. The 25th ID's LRS in Afghanistan 2004 ran missions, but not always. They also hopped from region to region and never built up a solid understanding of their operating environments. One team lamented moving from Kandahar to Nangahar (solid book title, hmmm) which are about as different as you will see there.

Like cav scouts, LRS wasn't used as designed...but the cav scouts remain. Meh.


----------



## reed11b (Jul 28, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> I still mourn the loss of capability, but am warming to @Etype's  argument. LRS may have played some role in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its validity lies in a static environment. The nature of our doctrine doesn't support static operations, but a blitzkrieg (Sorry, "Air Land Battle" or WTF we call a blitzkrieg these days). I'm curious how often they were employed during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
> 
> Most commanders didn't use them as intended anyway. The Indiana guys worked as PSD's during their deployment. I'm sure they did some LRS work, but it wasn't the bulk of their deployment. Their maneuver commander didn't know how or wouldn't deploy them as designed. The 25th ID's LRS in Afghanistan 2004 ran missions, but not always. They also hopped from region to region and never built up a solid understanding of their operating environments. One team lamented moving from Kandahar to Nangahar (solid book title, hmmm) which are about as different as you will see there.
> 
> Like cav scouts, LRS wasn't used as designed...but the cav scouts remain. Meh.



The only reason LRS only works in "static" environments is from when we replaced the "P" with the "S". Self inflicted by the risk adverse big army.


----------



## Teufel (Jul 28, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> I still mourn the loss of capability, but am warming to @Etype's  argument. LRS may have played some role in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its validity lies in a static environment. The nature of our doctrine doesn't support static operations, but a blitzkrieg (Sorry, "Air Land Battle" or WTF we call a blitzkrieg these days). I'm curious how often they were employed during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
> 
> Most commanders didn't use them as intended anyway. The Indiana guys worked as PSD's during their deployment. I'm sure they did some LRS work, but it wasn't the bulk of their deployment. Their maneuver commander didn't know how or wouldn't deploy them as designed. The 25th ID's LRS in Afghanistan 2004 ran missions, but not always. They also hopped from region to region and never built up a solid understanding of their operating environments. One team lamented moving from Kandahar to Nangahar (solid book title, hmmm) which are about as different as you will see there.
> 
> Like cav scouts, LRS wasn't used as designed...but the cav scouts remain. Meh.



As many of you know, I am a huge fan of history and am convinced that most the answers to our current problems can be answered by reflecting on the past.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shaped the way we look at war in the modern era but keep in mind that these were conflicts between a modern military force and a significantly less advanced opponent.  Iraq and Afghanistan didn't have the technology, training or mass to compete with the coalition forces assembled to invade them.  I do not believe we would be able to generate nearly as much momentum against a near peer enemy.  Additionally, the proliferation of anti-access area denial (A2AD) weapons is already changing the way we look at our current and future operating concepts.  We were able to conduct "blitzkrieg" attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan because we were able to secure large APOD/SPODs and slowly build up supplies and personnel in nearby countries prior to the invasion.  What happens when enemy forces can easily strike our staging bases with cheaply acquired, precision guided, long range missiles, mortars and rockets?  I think it will much more difficult to mass forces in the future and we may have to rely on numerous smaller entry points to build mass.  I think that ground reconnaissance has a role to play in a prolonged conventional war with a near peer enemy and I think it also valid against a hybrid threat that relies on modern technology and irregular tactics.

That being said, it would appear to me that the conventional Army relies on armored and SOF for their reconnaissance requirements.  It's hard to develop a bonafide ground reconnaissance capability when you don't have a cradle to grave military specialty, significant funding and advanced training opportunities.  I firmly believe that the requirement exists but you can't answer that requirement if commanders are unwilling to employ units properly.


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 28, 2016)

A buddy of mine has some pretty awesome pictures of him running around on a dirt bike with a MP5-SD in 2003. They worked quite a bit before and during the invasion.


----------



## Diamondback 2/2 (Jul 28, 2016)

reed11b said:


> The only reason LRS only works in "static" environments is from when we replaced the "P" with the "S". Self inflicted by the risk adverse big army.



I agree, LRS can and has been very mobile in the past. And we shouldn't forget the secondary capabilities they bring, BDA, Infrastructure security,  personnel recovery, etc.


----------



## Etype (Jul 28, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> LRS may have played some role in Iraq...


18th Abn Corps LRS guarded the gold from the Central Bank of Baghdad, then was PSD for the MNF-I commander.


----------



## ThunderHorse (Jul 29, 2016)

Freefalling said:


> Like cav scouts, LRS wasn't used as designed...but the cav scouts remain. Meh.


Scouts are Scouts, sucks the long range brethren are getting the axe.  Reconnaissance units not being used effectively is at the BDE, DIV and Combatant Commander level of accountability.


----------

