# COIN & the use of Conventional Forces in COIN.



## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 19, 2010)

I am not a COIN supporter and I have many reasons as to why I am not a supporter. In an effort to further explain why, I am opening this thread with my personal opinions and short studies in regards to COIN. Now before stating that I am 100% against COIN, I must say that I do believe that counter insurgency is possible; however I do not believe so under the current format of the FM 3-24 COIN Manual and I do not believe it is a capability that the conventional forces should focus on.

I have been told time and time again that COIN can and has been successful; however I have failed to see so in current history. El Salvador was a COIN war based off of what I read and yes it was successful in stopping the “revolutionist”, but how was that success measured? Results of a war torn, economically failed country that its biggest export is narco-terrorism into our own borders? MS-13 anyone? But before I get side tracked with the results of that war, how was that war won? What did the “Americans” do to win that war?

Well based off of what the unclassified information I have read says the Americans supplied the El Salvadorians with weapons, munitions and training and many cases advised them in the field. The El Salvadorians waged a very intensive, very bloody battle and very political war with the insurgency basically killing off the insurgency capabilities and its “USSR/Revolutionist” leadership. So in that aspects yes it was successful, however large surging conventional forces were not used, it was primarily kept out of the US media and the overall success has lead to a country left in shambles that is now imbedded with narco/AQ terrorism and is a hot bed for an insurgency that is currently taking place in the United States. So how affective has the outcome been?

Other example of this same problematic concept of COIN are seen around the world and brings me to my personal point of view on counterinsurgency. I am not looking at it from a theater of operations success, or an overall success of a campaign. I am looking at it from a strategy or otherwise strategic goal success. It’s not that we can’t stop or slow down an insurgency enough to “scream success” and back away from that theater of operations. We did this very well in Iraq, however what is the overall success in meeting our strategic goal for Iraq (a stabilized, pro-western democracy in the Middle East). Based off of the information I am getting out of Iraq by people I trust, it has failed to deliver the outcome we wanted based on the strategic goals we had set. So is it a success or a failure?

Other issues to point out; we were not 100% successful in defeating the insurgency in Iraq based off of our current COIN FM, we were greatly assisted by the sons of Iraq taking a step up to the plate and the insurgency took a step back due to the overall understanding that the US was going to pull out as soon as the country looked stable. Resulting in US forces stopping combat operations in Iraq and withdrawing combat troops. Now the insurgency has stepped back up and is currently pulling IA/IP troops into their ranks and surging their terrorism warfare efforts to further alter the stability of Iraq’s political system.

Now onto Afghanistan, we have a few Generals saying hey Iraq was a success and wanting to apply the same COIN tactics to that theater or operations to hopefully gain the same outcome. The problem is that Iraq was not truly successful, that Afghani people are different from the Iraqi people and that the warfare in Afghanistan is different from the warfare used in Iraq. Yes they both have suicide bombings, IED’s and basic terrorism. But the major difference is that the fighters in Afghanistan are better fighters, more dedicated to their cause and fighting in terrains that we cannot easily access. We did not have these problems in Iraq…

So what is the picture I am painting here? It comes down to the primary focus of the war and the strategic goals of the war. What most people fail to remember is that Iraq and Afghanistan are not “individual wars” but ongoing “theaters of operations” in a war. The “Global War on Terrorism” not the “Global War on Insurgency”. We are fighting a war against terrorist organizations and the countries that support those organization, and we should not be getting caught in this bog down of “nation building” of nations that harbor terrorist and their organizations. There is a reason why they support the organizations in the first place, there is a reason why the countries have been threats for thousands of years and nothing that we do in a 10 year span is going to change those nations.

So what is the correct doctrine? In my opinion it is counter terrorism and unconventional warfare. The use of UW assets in countries that we cannot directly engage (Iran, Pakistan, Chechnya ect) and the use of CT against countries that we can directly engage, Iraq and Afghanistan. We could also use a combination of the two in Pakistan. Getting away from the use of massive campaigns with large logistical support networks, getting away from the need of major conventional forces for long periods of time and allowing our political system and our people to see a direct result (we went in, we destroyed them, and we pulled out). 
It’s not that I am stating that we should not assist other nations; I just think we should do so when they come to us and ask for it. It’s not that I am saying that our boys and girls are not doing a good job in Iraq/Afghan, it’s that I am saying we got off track on what the mission was. If COIN is going to be used use it in a capacity similar to El Salvador where large surges of conventional forces are not used. Use it in a way where the American soldier is not standing on a street on patrol of a nation he could care less about, getting his arms and legs blown off. Use it where it can be affective… 

So anyway, there it is. This is my point of view and my reasoning’s. I am sure that some of you will say I am wrong and that’s fine; just realize that I did not develop my point of view over night. Although some of you may think I am retarded, I do actually study warfare and I am huge military history buff. My opinions are formed based off of my interests and studies in those areas along with my personal experiences. No I am not SOF or SF and no I am not claiming to know their capabilities outside of what an FM says. I am only spelling out my opinions for annoying “I hate COIN posts”.


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## skeeter (Oct 19, 2010)

I like the ideas behind COIN, and believe it can be extremely useful in the right context. However, I think that COIN is an SF mission. They are the guys trained to do that, and without the proper training it could be easy to screw up. I also think that the COIN operations being conducted by conventional forces we are hearing about more and more often are not truly COIN Ops, but the changing of the rules of engagement to create a "friendly" environment for appearances sake... Just my humble opinion base on what little I understand. 



> Well based off of what the unclassified information I have read says the Americans supplied the El Salvadorians with weapons, munitions and training and many cases advised them in the field. The El Salvadorians waged a very intensive, very bloody battle and very political war with the insurgency basically killing off the insurgency capabilities and its “USSR/Revolutionist” leadership. So in that aspects yes it was successful, however large surging conventional forces were not used, *it was primarily kept out of the US media *and the overall success has lead to a country left in shambles that is now imbedded with narco/AQ terrorism and is a hot bed for an insurgency that is currently taking place in the United States. So how affective has the outcome been?


 Do you think we could be more successful if the media today wasn't allowed into modern war zones? Just wondering about opinions on this.


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## pardus (Oct 19, 2010)

COIN if used properly is a very effective tool and the best strategy to use when faced with an insurgency. 

You say 





> I do actually study warfare and I am huge military history buff.


 which is great, you can read about some successful COIN operations.
Here are a couple...

Dhofar

Malaya




> It’s not that I am stating that we should not assist other nations; I just think we should do so when they come to us and ask for it.



We cannot afford to be isolationist, in fact we need to be proactive, Identify areas that may become trouble in the future and start COIN immediately, well before bullets start flying, hearts and minds, when we are the good guys doing good things in an area/country it will be that much harder for the enemy to subvert the populace and if bullets do start flying we already have local contacts etc... to start us off one or more steps ahead of our enemy.





> We are fighting a war against terrorist organizations and the countries that support those organization, and we should not be getting caught in this bog down of “nation building” of nations that harbor terrorist and their organizations. There is a reason why they support the organizations in the first place, there is a reason why the countries have been threats for thousands of years and nothing that we do in a 10 year span is going to change those nations.



We must nation build, that is essensual to COIN.

If we use your plan and kick ass then leave what happens? They regroup and start again, then we must go back again and again, all the time the country is falling further and further into ruin making it more and more likely to be suseptable to fall under the influence of the enemy until the point that it is an entirely hostile populace and country that will side with China/Russia/North Korea/Iran etc.... What did we achieve? We kicked ass over and over and drained our economy and killed our troops. 

COIN is the best thing for an insurgency. It's as simple as that.

Now, the problem is...

COIN isn't always used correctly. 

Lets use El Salvador as you brought that up. I don't know shit about that conflict at all but I will address what you wrote.



> El Salvador was a COIN war based off of what I read and yes it was successful in stopping the “revolutionist”, but how was that success measured? Results of a war torn, economically failed country that its biggest export is narco-terrorism into our own borders? MS-13 anyone?



So you say the economy failed and the country is worn torn, then COIN was not used properly (BTW you advocated not nation building earlier, here is an example why we need to. ;) ).

Coin will fight the insurgents with bullets while convincing the populace to not follow the insurgents and instead follow our side because of the much better life they will have with us.
That includes building up the infrastructure of the country as well as the economy.

So ideally the populace sides with us, feeding us intel about the insurgents who we defeat militarily. the fighting slows and eventually stops altogether with either total defeat or bringing the insurgents to mainstream politics and becoming part of the country/govt.
We aid the country become economically strong and we trade with them, benefiting both countries.
That country is now an ally who helps us in many ways in that particular region.

The US doesnt have a great track record with COIN unfortunately so I can understand your frustration etc... with the concept but you must understand that is the failure of people in command as opposed to COIN itself.


Scotth.



> Do you think we could be more successful if the media today wasn't allowed into modern war zones? Just wondering about opinions on this.



The media should NOT be allowed in a combat zone, period!

Look at the Dhofar operation years long and successful and the media was no where to be found, the operation free to do what it needed to win and it did. Just one small example.
Look at Vietnam, if the media had been kept out I'm sure we would have won that war. Could you imagine the world today if we won in Vietnam?

The Military has it's own media so they can gather the stories and pass them on to the mainstream media if the Military/govt thinks it's appropriate. 


That's all for now :cool:


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## pardus (Oct 19, 2010)

Can a mod delete post #3, fucking annoying now that I cant edit my posts lol danke.


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## car (Oct 19, 2010)

pardus said:


> Can a mod delete post #3, fucking annoying now that I cant edit my posts lol danke.


 
Done. I can delete many more of your posts if you like.....LOL


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## Manolito (Oct 19, 2010)

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/irreg.pdf
I have been trying to understand COIN and a lot of what I read seems to be left to interpretation. The attached was published in 06 and appears to be accepted. Would this doctrine be considered coin in a broad sense?
bill


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## pardus (Oct 19, 2010)

Manolito said:


> http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/irreg.pdf
> I have been trying to understand COIN and a lot of what I read seems to be left to interpretation. The attached was published in 06 and appears to be accepted. Would this doctrine be considered coin in a broad sense?
> bill


 
I read into page 5 and I would say yes this is a good COIN publication. :2c:

Interesting that Clausewitz espoused this approach as well.


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## RackMaster (Oct 19, 2010)

car said:


> Done. I can delete many more of your posts if you like.....LOL



I think he was really asking to have himself deleted, not his account but him.


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## AWP (Oct 19, 2010)

"COIN" and "conventional" go together like oil and water. It isn't that Joe Snuffy 11B CAN'T perform COIN, he is UNTRAINED to performed COIN. Having skimmed 3-24 I had to laugh at how it presented SOF in Chapter 2. Even the Army's FM couldn't agree on how to use SOF or how important SOF's role is in COIN.

Line units performing COIN without extensive training in COIN are doomed to failure. Even Pardus' excellent examples were of the SAS.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 19, 2010)

> Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an _[FONT=TimesNewRoman,Italic][FONT=TimesNewRoman,Italic]insurgency [/FONT][/FONT]_as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.
> 
> 
> [FONT=TimesNewRoman,Italic]_[FONT=TimesNewRoman,Italic]Counterinsurgency [/FONT]_[/FONT]is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.
> ...




Okay so this is from FM 3-34 (COIN), the problem is that anything and everything can fall under “insurgency” and anything and everything can fall under “counterinsurgency” and that starts the frustration for me. I do not believe that a civil war can be described as an insurgency, however I do believe a revolutionary war can be described as an insurgency. I do not believe terrorism can be described as an insurgency, it is what it is “a criminal tactic used to terrorize a population” and we are at war with groups who use terrorism against our nation and allies….

There are two things that took place in Iraq when I was there, a civil war between two ethnic groups and terrorism. Insurgency was not one of them in my personal opinion. 

al-Zarqawi was a terrorist, he was a member/leader of AQ-Iraq. Counterterrorism is what killed him. 

al-Sadr's is a militia leader who started a civil war, his followers were not defeated and he is now still raging his civil war. COIN did not defeat him or his militia b/c they are not insurgents, they are Iraqi’s fighting for what they believe in. 

What should have happened in Iraq (after the removal/capture of saddam) was the hunting down and killing of any AQ using “counterterrorism” and we should have stayed the fuck out of the civil war process of Iraq’s politics. Or we should have aloud the Bath party to retake control of the country and used that card as a war effort support system. Because we interfered we were forced to fight a two pronged offensive, a civil war control if you would and counterterrorism. If we would have aloud the civil war to run it’s course and applied our primary focus on CT, we could have killed/captured more of the people we wanted too and Iraq would not be restarting their civil war again. The same way we try to play politics in all these other nations, we don’t need to be involved in that as a Army. That is for the politicians not the soldiers, we execute policy not make it.
　
Pardus, great point’s and thank you for the reading material, I’ll need to read up on this stuff before I respond to it…….. However it is obvious that we disagree on many level of COIN.


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## pardus (Oct 19, 2010)

JAB, terrorism is not a form of warfare like civil war or and insurgency, terrorism is a tool to use while conducting an insurgency or civil war etc...

Most use it and it's very effective.

Iraq is a classic insurgency. Local and foreign fighters supplied by border countries trying to turn the populace against the govt in order to take control of the country. Pretty clear. 
They used terror very effectively as a weapon.

One case I could have cited as a victory in COIN was Borneo, but I think it falls outside of an insurgency because that was mainly a foreign power fighting inside the allied country to overthrow/take control. Not really an insurgency because the locals weren't really involved in the fighting for the most part.  



J.A.B. said:


> Okay so this is from FM 3-34 (COIN), the problem is that anything and everything can fall under “insurgency” and anything and everything can fall under “counterinsurgency” and that starts the frustration for me. I do not believe that a civil war can be described as an insurgency, however I do believe a revolutionary war can be described as an insurgency. I do not believe terrorism can be described as an insurgency, it is what it is “a criminal tactic used to terrorize a population” and we are at war with groups who use terrorism against our nation and allies….
> 
> There are two things that took place in Iraq when I was there, a civil war between two ethnic groups and terrorism. Insurgency was not one of them in my personal opinion.
> 
> ...


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 19, 2010)

pardus said:


> JAB, terrorism is not a form of warfare like civil war or and insurgency, terrorism is a tool to use while conducting an insurgency or civil war etc...
> 
> Most use it and it's very effective.
> 
> ...


 
Would you consider the American civil war an insurgency or the revolutional war?

ETA: this is kind of my point again how can you define insurgency as everything?


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## car (Oct 19, 2010)

J.A.B. said:


> Would you consider the American civil war an insurgency or the revolutional war?


 
How do you define how we conducted war in our war for independence? Check out Francis Marion - the Swamp Fox?


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## pardus (Oct 19, 2010)

J.A.B. said:


> No terrorism is a tactic, used by criminals to cause fear.
> 
> There was no government when the civil war started, and the terrorism used by AQ-Iraq was a totally separate issue.
> 
> Would you consider the American civil war an insurgency or the revolutional war?


 
A tactic is a tool, same thing. Insurgents are criminals.

I don't understand your comment about AQ and them using terror :uhh:

There was someone in power the USA, that is the govt defacto maybe but govt all the same.

The Civil War was a Civil War.


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## SpitfireV (Oct 19, 2010)

When I think of an insurgency I think of a local group fighting a foreign occupying power. IE the French Resistance. Terrorism is a bit more difficult to pin down but I will give that a shot later in the day when I dig out some of my books.


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## car (Oct 19, 2010)

SpitfireV said:


> When I think of an insurgency I think of a local group fighting a foreign occupying power. IE the French Resistance. Terrorism is a bit more difficult to pin down but I will give that a shot later in the day when I dig out some of my books.


 
Very good point, Spitty! Comparing insurgency to terror is almost like comparing apples to grapes. But the tactics are often the same.


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 19, 2010)

Okay terrorism is defined in many ways by many different people. However the common understanding is that it is a tactic or strategy used by criminal (NGO’s) to inflict fear into the population. AQ is a terrorist organization that uses terrorism as a means of strategy to attack other religions or western populations or rage a "holy war".

The civil war in Iraq as far as I know was never linked to AQ-Iraq. To be more specific AQ-Iraq was in Iraq prier to the invasion and the “insurgent fighters” from neighboring countries were not all there for the civil war, just like they were not all there for the “holy war”. My point is that “terrorism” and “civil war” are being lumped together under insurgency and COIN was being used as a doctrine to fight “terrorism” and civil war. And both are completely different strategies, that require different countering strategies.

Iraq was lawless for about a year bro, the only government was pvt joe snuffy and his M4 or tank. The civil war was caused by the start of a political foundation by the CPA, where the Sunnis and Shiites Started to fight for power. AQ-Iraq was raging a holy war by use of a terrorism strategy.

If civil war is civil war then why was it called an insurgency? This is my point...


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 19, 2010)

SpitfireV said:


> When I think of an insurgency I think of a local group fighting a foreign occupying power. IE the French Resistance. Terrorism is a bit more difficult to pin down but I will give that a shot later in the day when I dig out some of my books.



However if you look at our COIN FM3-24, it says its anything and everything... This is my big problem with COIN, they can't even define what the hell we are countering.


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## skeeter (Oct 19, 2010)

http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=6630779&m=6630780

Above is a audio clip from an interview with LT. Col.John Nagl on the Counter Insurgency manual.
I found it interesting that it took ten years on average to fight an insurgency. Especially now that we are coming up on the ten year mark in Afghanistan. I would like to know how many of the examples used to create this average were run with conventional forces.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 19, 2010)

J.A.B., good initial post and interesting points.

I think the defeat of the LTTE by Sri Lanka might be a good modern example of successful COIN.

The current war in Iraq may turn out to be another example, although the jury's still out.


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## Manolito (Oct 19, 2010)

I thought I had it then it was gone like smoke. Remember I am a 286 in a pentium world. Should we deploy COIN on our southern borders? I am going to make the jump that we are experiencing an insurgency? Would the COIN doctrine work to support the mexican gov. and fight the cartells? The cartells have groups hunting people in Arizona. I know this is small potatoes compared to the two wars going on now but I am trying to equate COIN to something I can understand. 
Bill


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## moobob (Oct 19, 2010)

I believe that COIN will only succeed if the supporting nation(s) have support at home. When a war escalates, i.e. Vietnam, and our casualties increase, support is lost at home. The presence of the media makes it that much worse.

Malaya is often used as an example of a successful COIN campaign. The level of external support the insurgents had in Malaya was nil compared to what the Taliban have in Afghanistan. They have safe haven in a neighboring country, as well as financial/logistical/intelligence support from at least one, if not more.

We are fighting with our hands tied behind our back. Although I believe that we could be successful, eventually, I do not believe that our country's citizens nor our civilian leadership will have the stomach for much longer.


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## JJ sloan (Oct 19, 2010)

pardus said:


> JAB, terrorism is not a form of warfare like civil war or and insurgency, terrorism is a tool to use while conducting an insurgency or civil war etc...
> 
> Most use it and it's very effective.
> 
> ...


 
As a student of bost counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, I would have to say I agree with Pardus (reluctantly).  Insurgencies are made of of three elements: (1) Underground (2) auxilliary (3) guerilla force or militant wing.  The underground in Afghanistan is in the form of a shadow government and a network of subversive individuals within the government and tribal leadership.  This piece plans for and executes subversive activities, e.g. propaganda, and provides direction for the militant wing  (although, sometimes the two are not connected by any means in order to mitigate crosspolinization, but this is not the case in Iraq (IZ) and Afghanistan (AF)).  The auxilliary is a network of individuals and cells set up to provide logistical support, e.g. hawala operators, explosive facilitators and smugglers.  The French resistance was masterful at utilizing the auxilliary.  The third wing is the militants.  This wing can conduct attacks utilizing conventional attacks such as ambushes, as we quite often see in both AF and IZ, or those same individuals may be conducting unconventional attacks such as bombing a government building in order to terrorize the populace.  Terror is simply a tool of an organized insurgency.  Both AF and IZ are perfect examples of an active insurgency utilizing terror as a method for success.  It is possible to have terrorism without an insurgency and vice versa, although an active insurgency campaign must include an action arm of some sort.

For an insurgency to be effective, the local populace must be largely in favor of the insurgents.  Without support, the insurgents cannot recruit the auxilliary and guerilla force to carry out the missions neccesary for success.  A large portion of counterinsurgency is fought from within the populace, against the center of gravity for the insurgent underground. The other portion is to find, fix and finish the leadership in order to cripple the mechanism.  For conventional troops to be successful in COIN operations it is crucial that the upper echelons of command truely understand the mission.  I don't believe that the majority of commanders understand, or that maybe they are more interested in politics than success. (?)  Conventional soldiers are very capable of conducting COIN operations given the proper leadership and direction.  SF should be the lead by conducting partner force training, host nation key leadership interaction, and planning for population interactions conducted by conventional forces.  Other SOF contingencies should take the lead, as they are, in eliminating key insurgent personalities.  So much is wrong with the current methods for conducting COIN operations in AF and IZ, but I don't believe that the conventional soldiers are the problem.  Conventional minded commanders are.  I also have to agree with Moobob, we also have to fight the COIN fight at home in order to win.


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## pardus (Oct 19, 2010)

J.A.B. said:


> However if you look at our COIN FM3-24, it says its anything and everything... This is my big problem with COIN, they can't even define what the hell we are countering.


 
Again, you are blaming a perfectly fine tool because the people using it don't know how to operate it properly.



Manolito said:


> I thought I had it then it was gone like smoke. Remember I am a 286 in a pentium world. Should we deploy COIN on our southern borders? I am going to make the jump that we are experiencing an insurgency? Would the COIN doctrine work to support the mexican gov. and fight the cartells? The cartells have groups hunting people in Arizona. I know this is small potatoes compared to the two wars going on now but I am trying to equate COIN to something I can understand.
> Bill


 
Bill, I don't think COIN would be good for the Mexican situation, (bare in mind I've given this 30 seconds of deep though lol ) The cartels aren't trying to win popular support from the people in order to overthrow the govt (unless I'm missing something). They are trying to secure supply routes to further their logistical ops. :uhh:

I think this is a case for direct action, hard and fast, fuck up anyone who is involved without mercy, break them.

You can't really seal a border but you can make it so difficult and expensive to cross that it becomes nonviable. 

Ambush the hell out of it, predators, tracking teams, fighting patrols, air, boats etc... 

My :2c:


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## Diamondback 2/2 (Oct 19, 2010)

A lot of good stuff coming out and I have some agreements and some disagreements.

1. The use of conventional forces in COIN being viable I believe to be incorrect. One of the main key pieces of COIN as it is written is Cultural Sensitivity, this is something that Joe’s are have a major lack in. This played a key factor in my time in Iraq 03 to 05; we simply did not give two shits about the culture and more over mocked at every chance we got. Even with our commanders and many NCO’s chewing ass on Joe, Joe is Joe and he will act like the arrogant American he is.

2. The overall success of a COIN operation is measured by the ability to wait for an insurgency to die out. The ability to neutralize the effectiveness of the insurgency, taking away the ability of the insurgents to fight, disrupts or cause political influence on the populations. In order for the insurgency to be waited out, requires major time and patients. That is something Americans do not have IMHO, and something that cannot be expected to receive with the use of major conventional forces. (It’s one thing to have a few ODA’s rotating in and out; it’s another to have 80k troops doing that).

3. It’s been pretty clear to me that the road to success is not nation building but cultural acceptance on our part. We cannot and will not be able to change the world; however we can change our selves. I think this area should be explored more vs the “nation building” ideology we currently use. However, I doubt that Americans will have the ability to come to a level of acceptance that allows for AQ, and their many counter parts. Thus bringing me back to the kinetic warfare “counterterrorism” to eliminate these threats, you can’t build enough schools and police check points to make those guys happy (and they don’t give two shits about anything we do for the populous). 

4. I think that there is a major disconnect it what is being called an insurgency and what is being rolled up under the insurgency umbrella in Iraq and Afghanistan. As I stated before Iraq I do not believe had a true insurgency, I believe it was more of a civil war and a terrorist network AQ-Iraq. I believe Afghanistan has an insurgency the TB, but I do not think AQ falls under that same umbrella. The importance of understanding the difference is that in Afghanistan the TB is the area where I believe COIN should be applied by SF/PSY/CA. However AQ is where CT or whatever you want to call it (Kinetic warfare) should be applied. The same way that in Iraq we applied more CT towards the AQ (Iranians in my old A/O) and applied more of a COIN type doctrine with the Mahdi militia.

JJ, I appreciate your clearing some things up and please don’t take it as me arguing your expertise in the matter. I by no means have any form of the experience/expertise you have and I am well aware of that. I am only try to point out my views and my understandings however twisted they be, so that I can gain a better understanding on all aspects. 
Thanks all who are putting forth their opinions and Idea’s, I am picking things up here and there. ;)


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