# The Current Commandant of the Marine Corps vs. ...all of the other former Commandants?



## Marauder06 (Apr 3, 2022)

I never served in the Marines and haven't paid close attention to this issue.  But when literally every one of your living predecessors comes out publicly against you, then it may be time to re-evaluate...

_The roster of personalities includes every living former commandant, along with a slew of other retired four-star generals revered within the Corps. And all of them are bristling at different aspects of foundational changes introduced by Commandant Gen. David Berger, who aims to make the Corps lighter, faster and more capable of doing everything from electronic warfare to sinking ships at sea._

How two dozen retired generals are trying to stop an overhaul of the Marines


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## AWP (Apr 3, 2022)

There's a bunch old guys yelling at clouds afraid of change and then there's...this. It always seemed to me that the Corps has the right idea, but was taking it too far. I'm also not a Marine or in those discussions so...

An interesting development all the same.


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## Cookie_ (Apr 3, 2022)

Almost every single argument I've seen from these retired generals is heavily steeped in comments of "Traditional role of the Marine Corps" or arguments that having fewer but more advanced assets will hurt capabilities because "more is better".

Like, the comments from Bing West in regards to Ukraine really seem out of touch: 



> One of the group’s more vocal forward-facing members, Vietnam vet Bing West, wrote in a recent article *that urban battles taking place in Ukraine*, and similar fights in Vietnam like Hue City and Fallujah in Iraq *prove the need for tanks and heavy armor in modern combat*. Without them, Marines “today are less capable than two decades ago.”



Literally the biggest thing being shown in Ukraine is how susceptible armor is to both well armed ground troops and UAS fire. I know the Russians are real shitty with using/defending their armor assets, but I'd love to see a better explanation of how more tanks would be helpful.


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## Devildoc (Apr 3, 2022)

Flag officers in the Marines is an exclusive and small group, and very much a go-along/get-along club.  Not my opinion; I believe that was in a book I read about Marine GOs since WW2.  As a fraternity they are not about rocking the boat so it seems as if (this part is my opinion) one of the flock drifts, the rest of the flock bleat about it until that goat is back amongst them, or gone.  I think (again, my opinion) is that is because the institutional paranoia of Corps leadership about having manning and funding taken away due the politicking of other branches.


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## Gunz (Apr 3, 2022)

I’d be interested to hear @Teufel s take on this.

I’ve always believed that the (special operations capable) Battalion Landing Team, the self-contained, self-supporting MEUs were and are the most unique option in the USMC arsenal. A compact fast-reaction force with everything it needs to hit hard at a Crisis point and hold the line.

The Marine Corps that I belonged to—that I wanted to belong to since age eight—was different things. It was big and Iwo Jima bad on one hand… and on the other hand, the one I experienced, it was small unit Banana War-style counter-insurgency warfare.

I just hope the Corps eventually finds an identity that keeps it relevant.


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## DA SWO (Apr 3, 2022)

Gunz said:


> Are these generals just resisting change? Is Berger trying to make the Marine Corps just a fast-food version of SOF? I’d be interested to hear @Teufel s take on this. But I think it’s a little bit of both.
> 
> I’ve always believed that the (special operations capable) Battalion Landing Team, the self-contained, self-supporting MEUs were and are the most unique option in the USMC arsenal. A compact fast-reaction force with everything it needs to hit hard at a Crisis point and hold the line.
> 
> ...


The Marines will always be relevant.  How many Army units want to spend 6 months at sea?  Seriously, join the Marines, and you know ARG time is coming.
MARSOC was force fed by Rumsfeld.  Deservedly so.


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## Teufel (Apr 3, 2022)

Gunz said:


> Are these generals just resisting change? Is Berger trying to make the Marine Corps just a fast-food version of SOF? I’d be interested to hear @Teufel s take on this. But I think it’s a little bit of both.
> 
> I’ve always believed that the (special operations capable) Battalion Landing Team, the self-contained, self-supporting MEUs were and are the most unique option in the USMC arsenal. A compact fast-reaction force with everything it needs to hit hard at a Crisis point and hold the line.
> 
> ...


Sensing in the littorals is relevant. You can’t optimize operations in a budget constrained environment without taking cuts though. CMC is being bold. Most of his critics didn’t change much when they had his job. It’s his turn to lead and he owns the risk for what happens next. That’s how command works.


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## Devildoc (Apr 8, 2022)

Well written response to the changes:

The Marine Corps and the Naval Campaign: The Necessary Context of Debate - War on the Rocks


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## Gunz (Apr 8, 2022)

The MLRs sound like enhanced redesigned versions of MEUs. The MEUs and the maritime/amphibious capabilities are what sets the Corps apart, then and now. It’s right to emphasize that traditional role.

It was the main focus of my units post-Vietnam. Most everything we trained for involved maritime operations: amphib assaults from landing craft in Cuba; on amtraks in Vieques from our LPD; vertical envelopment in Virginia from LPH3, the old Okinawa, 53s outbound, 46s inbound. I was a range NCO at Little Creek, giving organic weapon fam fire for USNA midshipmen, and other Navy personnel.

It was all about that traditional relationship with Navy.

Pretty hard to maintain that role when your fighting in land-locked desert and mountain regions for 20 years or door-kicking in places like Fallujah.


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## Devildoc (Apr 8, 2022)

Gunz said:


> The MLRs sound like enhanced redesigned versions of MEUs. The MEUs and the maritime/amphibious capabilities are what sets the Corps apart, then and now. It’s right to emphasize that traditional role.
> 
> It was the main focus of my units post-Vietnam. Most everything we trained for involved maritime operations: amphib assaults from landing craft in Cuba; on amtraks in Vieques from our LPD; vertical envelopment in Virginia from LPH3, the old Okinawa, 53s outbound, 46s inbound. I was a range NCO at Little Creek, giving organic weapon fam fire for USNA midshipmen, and other Navy personnel.
> 
> ...



We see these articles from time to time about doing away with the Marines and absorbing them into the Army or some such scheme.  My argument is, has been, that the MEU concept is one of the things that sets the Corps apart: yeah, but the 82nd Airborne can deploy within 'X' hours.  Yes, but they have to have Air Force aircraft to do it.  The MEU is packaged in a way and with organic capability built in to render it different than anything the Army has or can do.

I don't like everything CMC has done (to be fair, he didn't ask me); I am still burning about doing away with my beloved 8th Marines.  But he has been bold, and he seems convinced it is The Way.


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## Gunz (Apr 8, 2022)

Agreed. 

The only caveat is if the war we’re preparing for turns out to be the kind of war we haven’t prepared for. It happens sometimes.


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## Topkick (Apr 8, 2022)

Cookie_ said:


> Literally the biggest thing being shown in Ukraine is how susceptible armor is


Armor is always vulnerable in urban terrain if the enemy has the right tools, but I don't think you can use the Russians as an accurate gauge. IMHO its more telling of the quality of equipment, leadership, and the preparedness of their troops. As with any war in history, there are lessons to be learned.


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## ThunderHorse (Apr 8, 2022)

Cookie_ said:


> Almost every single argument I've seen from these retired generals is heavily steeped in comments of "Traditional role of the Marine Corps" or arguments that having fewer but more advanced assets will hurt capabilities because "more is better".
> 
> Like, the comments from Bing West in regards to Ukraine really seem out of touch:
> 
> ...


Eh, Tanks in Urban battlefields have a massive place.  

What we're seeing in Ukraine shows you how unsupported tanks with incompetent officers and ncos gets your ass handed to you. Saying they're susceptible in an Urban battlefield is like saying infantry is susceptible in urban terrain. 

Clearly Russia's IPB was trash.


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## AWP (Apr 8, 2022)

Fuck me, I'm agreeing with Cav on something...


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## Kaldak (Apr 8, 2022)

AWP said:


> Fuck me, I'm agreeing with Cav on something...



They're basically infantry 😉

I couldn't resist.


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## DA SWO (Apr 9, 2022)

ThunderHorse said:


> Eh, Tanks in Urban battlefields have a massive place.
> 
> What we're seeing in Ukraine shows you how unsupported tanks with incompetent officers and ncos gets your ass handed to you. Saying they're susceptible in an Urban battlefield is like saying infantry is susceptible in urban terrain.
> 
> Clearly Russia's IPB was trash.


UK artillery has been having a field (artillery) day with Russian armor outside urban areas.
This war may actually convince a ton of folks that the A-10 force can be reduced a bit.


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## ThunderHorse (Apr 9, 2022)

I think we have learned a lot about how ineffective and corrupt our near peer is...


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## Gunz (Apr 9, 2022)

ThunderHorse said:


> I think we have learned a lot about how ineffective and corrupt our near peer is...



Based on what we’ve seen so far our near peer is not so near a peer.


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## AWP (Apr 9, 2022)

The Soviet’s export business is taking a hit right now. Also, the war has a lot going on for lessons learned.


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## Gunz (Apr 9, 2022)

Cookie_ said:


> Almost every single argument I've seen from these retired generals is heavily steeped in comments of "Traditional role of the Marine Corps" or arguments that having fewer but more advanced assets will hurt capabilities because "more is better".
> 
> Like, the comments from Bing West in regards to Ukraine really seem out of touch:
> 
> ...



As much as I respect Bing West, he’s wrong. The “traditional” role of the Marine Corps is not Hue or Fallujah, it’s not large scale urban combat or armored warfare…it’s serving aboard navy ships and conducting landing operations, raids and expeditions from those platforms. The Corps has beefed up its capabilities as situations warrant from war to war, but they have all been add-ons.

Far from breaking with “tradition” the CMC wants to return to a modernized version of the Marines original role. And that means that the add-ons are no longer options. The Army will be tasked with any combat requiring tanks from now on and the Corps will stay on and off shore. This probably means a smaller role for the Marine Corps in future conflicts…and maybe that’s why these generals are grumbling.


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## AWP (Apr 9, 2022)

My outsider/ history nerd view has held that the Corps, like the 82nd, other Airborne units, and pre-9/11 Rangers are our nation's "door knockers." They put us in the fight and execute follow on missions to expand that beachhead/ air head, but anything beyond that is extracurricular; look at the last 20 years and you see a lot of extracurricular activity.

We're kidding ourselves if we think that any unit, conventional or SOF, can sustain all of its core mission sets with a high degree of readiness. There's only so much time in a year, and so much funding, to use for training.

"Near peer" (China, let's be honest) threats are forcing us to focus on mission sets we have largely ignored for two DECADES. The threat has changed, tech has changed, the terrain/ battlespace has changed, and we have to change accordingly.

Will the Commandant's vision survive history? The successful (Mahan) and unsuccessful (Douhet to an extent) alike have shaped warfare well beyond their years. The Marines and AFSOC have gone all in on a vision for 2030 and beyond. When people talk about using wargames to justify their decisions I roll my eyes so hard I get a migraine. Wargames tend to be absolute crap and even when they aren't the participants use them to justify decisions long since made.

Who knows, the Corps may be on to something. It may be a total failure, or it may have a path that with some tweaking a few years from now becomes cutting edge. Until German tanks steamrolled Warsaw, the US Army believed a "square" division was the key to success. Within a few years the Army transitioned to a basic formation that has survived longer than any other in our history.

The Army and Corps alike had some bad days before they figured out airborne and amphibious landings. The US Navy went from a third-rate carrier aviation force to the undisputed king of everything in about year. 2022 could be no different as we transition from a Forever War to a future war. 

The Corps' changes seem odd to me if not wrong. I'm not in those discussions, I'm not a Marine, so this is all academic in my world. I hope 2030/ 2035 finds a new Commandant making bold changes because the current Commandant's vision was never needed in the real world.

The Marines are still a cult and will remain so until the end of time. I'm just glad they are our Scientologists, even if they gave up their tanks.


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## Gunz (Apr 10, 2022)

AWP said:


> My outsider/ history nerd view has held that the Corps, like the 82nd, other Airborne units, and pre-9/11 Rangers are our nation's "door knockers." They put us in the fight and execute follow on missions to expand that beachhead/ air head, but anything beyond that is extracurricular; look at the last 20 years and you see a lot of extracurricular activity.
> 
> We're kidding ourselves if we think that any unit, conventional or SOF, can sustain all of its core mission sets with a high degree of readiness. There's only so much time in a year, and so much funding, to use for training.
> 
> ...



We really have to get a new “love” emoji.

When we were fighting for the United Fruit Company in Nicaragua in the years between the two world wars, whoever would’ve predicted that the Corps would swell to six reinforced divisions by 1945.

The CMC’s vision—right or wrong—will stand or fall by the whims of fate and the actions of our future adversaries.


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## Devildoc (Apr 10, 2022)

Gunz said:


> We really have to get a new “love” emoji.
> 
> When we were fighting for the United Fruit Company in Nicaragua in the years between the two world wars, whoever would’ve predicted that the Corps would swell to six divisions by 1945.
> 
> The CMC’s vision—right or wrong—will stand or fall by the whims of fate and the actions of our future adversaries.



As a former Sailor, @AWP had me at "Mahan"...

Those six divisions were by necessity, and as they forming them they were figuring out how to disband them to get back to mandated manning levels.


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## Gunz (Apr 10, 2022)

Devildoc said:


> As a former Sailor, @AWP had me at "Mahan"...
> 
> Those six divisions were by necessity, and as they forming them they were figuring out how to disband them to get back to mandated manning levels.



And who can predict with certainty that future circumstances won’t necessitate the formation of another heavyweight Marine Corps, if only temporary?


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## Devildoc (Apr 10, 2022)

Gunz said:


> And who can predict with certainty that future circumstances won’t necessitate the formation of another heavyweight Marine Corps, if only temporary?



Absolutely. By nature these things cannot be predicted, but you can assign probability values, and I think all the branches have done a marginal job of doing that with national guard and reserve many levels and restructuring. But still, you never know when you have to swell from 'n' number to 'y' number, quick-like.


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## Gunz (Apr 10, 2022)

Devildoc said:


> Absolutely. By nature these things cannot be predicted, but you can assign probability values, and I think all the branches have done a marginal job of doing that with national guard and reserve many levels and restructuring. But still, you never know when you have to swell from 'n' number to 'y' number, quick-like.



I agree. And there's still the possibility--the very real possibility IMV--of getting involved in another two-front war. Russia and China are potential mutual defense pact allies. We could find ourselves fighting the Russians in Europe, the Chinese anywhere in the South China Sea AO.


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## Grunt (Apr 10, 2022)

We fight “anyone” in any clime or place. We should train accordingly. Now, back to training….


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## Gunz (Apr 10, 2022)

Grunt said:


> We fight “anyone” in any clime or place. We should train accordingly. Now, back to training….



Thank you, bro, you are the voice of our beloved Chesty. Yes. We will kill any motherfucker that breathes oxygen.


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## Intel Nerd (Apr 13, 2022)

Gunz said:


> I agree. And there's still the possibility--the very real possibility IMV--of getting involved in another two-front war. Russia and China are potential mutual defense pact allies. We could find ourselves fighting the Russians in Europe, the Chinese anywhere in the South China Sea AO.



My concern is that our shift from a "two war military" to a "one war military" will = a "no war military."

If we're so vested in deterrence for one conflict to prepare for a second, because we can't win both, means our adversaries will calculate when they can achieve their goals best. If China were to invade Taiwan after Russia were to miraculously perform better and invade Poland, we'd be forced to choose who to support and the political dithering of the appointees junior in their field would prevent us from acting decisively.

I'm concerned for the future- not because I think the military can't perform, but because I think our civilian leadership will fail us harder than they did in Afghanistan for 20 years...


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## DA SWO (Apr 13, 2022)

Intel Nerd said:


> My concern is that our shift from a "two war military" to a "one war military" will = a "no war military."
> 
> If we're so vested in deterrence for one conflict to prepare for a second, because we can't win both, means our adversaries will calculate when they can achieve their goals best. If China were to invade Taiwan after Russia were to miraculously perform better and invade Poland, we'd be forced to choose who to support and the political dithering of the appointees junior in their field would prevent us from acting decisively.
> 
> I'm concerned for the future- not because I think the military can't perform, but because I think our civilian leadership will fail us harder than they did in Afghanistan for 20 years...


I think our Generals are just as corrupt.


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## ThunderHorse (Apr 21, 2022)

Interesting read.  T&P seems to be publishing a series of take down pieces on this transformation. 

Opinion | The Marine Corps' plan to redesign the force will only end up breaking it

Also, is rocket artillery actually an "expeditionary" capability?


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## AWP (Apr 21, 2022)

ThunderHorse said:


> Also, is rocket artillery actually an "expeditionary" capability?



To paraphrase a meme: everything's expeditionary if you're brave enough.


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## Gunz (Apr 21, 2022)

ThunderHorse said:


> Interesting read.  T&P seems to be publishing a series of take down pieces on this transformation.
> 
> Opinion | The Marine Corps' plan to redesign the force will only end up breaking it
> 
> Also, is rocket artillery actually an "expeditionary" capability?



In my opinion, the critical mistake of _Force Design 2030_ is that it assumes that future combat involving the Marines will conform to the capabilities of _Force Design 2030. _

It limits the Marine Corps' flexibility to adapt to different kinds of warfare.

It reminds me of Rumsfeld and his light footprint approach; assuming that what worked in the early phase of the Afghan War would be applicable to the Iraq War.


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## AWP (Apr 21, 2022)

If it wasn't for McNamara, Rumsfeld would be the worst SECDEF/ SECWAR in our country's history.


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## Gunz (Apr 21, 2022)

AWP said:


> If it wasn't for McNamara, Rumsfeld would be the worst SECDEF/ SECWAR in our country's history.


 
Yeah. Don’t get me started…


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## SOSTCRNA (Apr 21, 2022)

Gunz said:


> In my opinion, the critical mistake of _Force Design 2030_ is that it assumes that future combat involving the Marines will conform to the capabilities of _Force Design 2030. _
> 
> It limits the Marine Corps' flexibility to adapt to different kinds of warfare.
> 
> *It reminds me of Rumsfeld and his light footprint approach; assuming that what worked in the early phase of the Afghan War would be applicable to the Iraq War.*



This was the biggest mistake of the whole war.  Except maybe starting it in the first place.


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## Gunz (Apr 22, 2022)

SOSTCRNA said:


> This was the biggest mistake of the whole war.  Except maybe starting it in the first place.



Yep.


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## Marauder06 (Apr 22, 2022)

SOSTCRNA said:


> This was the biggest mistake of the whole war.  Except maybe starting it in the first place.


For me it was the combined process of de-Baathification and disbanding the Army.  Total shit-show.


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## Xenophon (Apr 22, 2022)

Gunz said:


> In my opinion, the critical mistake of _Force Design 2030_ is that it assumes that future combat involving the Marines will conform to the capabilities of _Force Design 2030. _
> 
> It limits the Marine Corps' flexibility to adapt to different kinds of warfare.
> 
> It reminds me of Rumsfeld and his light footprint approach; assuming that what worked in the early phase of the Afghan War would be applicable to the Iraq War.


It makes varying degrees of sense depending on how much one buys into the active-duty Marine Corps intelligentsia's frame of mind, which is grounded mainly in ideas like those expressed by "The Kill Chain" and "Ghost Fleet." If those theses are fundamentally accurate, units like the Marine Littoral Regiment are much more useful to the joint force by providing a survivable "sensing" capability than an outright "lethality" measured in the ability to weight the main effort, integrate with armor, and cover maneuver with fires: a Marine platoon in the defense is incredibly difficult to kill -- but a Marine platoon that can also remain concealed for long periods of time (hence the push for foraging and the like) while collecting on enemy forces? Game changer.

Interestingly, there's also a rumor in my corner of the world that General Berger is being considered for a promotion. About the same time we started hearing this rumor (a couple months ago?) Senator James Webb -- Marine Captain in Vietnam and later Secretary of the Navy -- published a WSJ article that seems to have kicked off, or at least been the initial volley, for the other articles from earlier thread. What that means for the veracity of the rumor is anyone's guess.


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## Topkick (Apr 22, 2022)

AWP said:


> If it wasn't for McNamara, Rumsfeld would be the worst SECDEF/ SECWAR in our country's history.


At least McNamara took responsibility for his mistakes.


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## Gunz (Apr 23, 2022)

Xenophon said:


> It makes varying degrees of sense depending on how much one buys into the active-duty Marine Corps intelligentsia's frame of mind, which is grounded mainly in ideas like those expressed by "The Kill Chain" and "Ghost Fleet." If those theses are fundamentally accurate, units like the Marine Littoral Regiment are much more useful to the joint force by providing a survivable "sensing" capability than an outright "lethality" measured in the ability to weight the main effort, integrate with armor, and cover maneuver with fires: a Marine platoon in the defense is incredibly difficult to kill -- *but a Marine platoon that can also remain concealed for long periods of time (hence the push for foraging and the like) while collecting on enemy forces? *Game changer.



I appreciate your views as someone involved in the process but not sure I'm buying into all of it. I think some of the criticism is justified while some, admittedly, may just be Old School resistance to change.

During the Vietnam war, the Corps was flexible enough to utilize three different tactical concepts: traditional rifle-platoon infantry operations and Combined Action units involved in FID and counter-insurgency operations comprising squad-size teams living in the bush 24-7 (the latter of which was my experience); as well as MEUs operating in other parts of the world. Over the years the Corps has expanded and contracted through force reductions and expansions to meet the demands of a particular conflict.

I admit I like the idea of the MLR, which I view as an evolution of the MEU/BLT. But why not retain at least one or two brigades of shock-force trained infantry which can also rotate through the MLRs and vice-versa?

Your sentence that I bolded just says _Recon Platoon_ to me.

I confess I haven't read the books you name but am very familiar with James Webb and his views.


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## Gunz (Apr 23, 2022)

Topkick said:


> At least McNamara took responsibility for his mistakes.



He regretted in his later years. But too late for many of the names on The Wall.


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## Xenophon (Apr 23, 2022)

Gunz said:


> *Your sentence that I bolded just says Recon Platoon to me.
> 
> I confess I haven't read the books you name but am very familiar with James Webb and his views.*


Yessir. And while no one has written about it yet, I wouldn't be surprised to see an argument along the lines of "The Commandant is just re-making the Marine Corps in the image of his own sub-community and justifying it _post-hoc." _It's compelling, for me at least, just not persuasive.

Only a handful of people I've met in the past couple years actually have read the books. But refusing to intellectually adhere to the tenets themselves is becoming increasingly iconoclastic.


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## AWP (Apr 23, 2022)

Xenophon said:


> Only a handful of people I've met in the past couple years actually have read the books. But refusing to intellectually adhere to the tenets themselves is becoming increasingly iconoclastic.



People believe what they want and then spend their energies defending their choices instead of actually learning and growing.


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## Gunz (Apr 23, 2022)

Xenophon said:


> Yessir. And while no one has written about it yet, I wouldn't be surprised to see an argument along the lines of "The Commandant is just re-making the Marine Corps in the image of his own sub-community and justifying it _post-hoc." _It's compelling, for me at least, just not persuasive.
> 
> *Only a handful of people I've met in the past couple years actually have read the books.* But refusing to intellectually adhere to the tenets themselves is becoming increasingly iconoclastic.



I've put them on my reading list, and thank you.


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## Devildoc (Apr 23, 2022)

AWP said:


> People believe what they want and then spend their energies defending their choices instead of actually learning and growing.



Nothing like a little confirmation bias to prop your own opinions....


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## Teufel (Apr 25, 2022)

Gunz said:


> I appreciate your views as someone involved in the process but not sure I'm buying into all of it. I think some of the criticism is justified while some, admittedly, may just be Old School resistance to change.
> 
> During the Vietnam war, the Corps was flexible enough to utilize three different tactical concepts: traditional rifle-platoon infantry operations and Combined Action units involved in FID and counter-insurgency operations comprising squad-size teams living in the bush 24-7 (the latter of which was my experience); as well as MEUs operating in other parts of the world. Over the years the Corps has expanded and contracted through force reductions and expansions to meet the demands of a particular conflict.
> 
> ...


There is one MLR now. Two regiments, one infantry and one artillery, are transitioning to MLRs in the next 2-3 years. The rest are largely unchanged.


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## ThunderHorse (May 7, 2022)

The Marine Corps is headed for a pilot exodus 

Interesting article. But the whole pilots fleeing in droves to commercial airlines is a bit overblown. And just because you fly a jet doesn't mean those hours qualify either. My BiL, solid guy, was relegated to being an instructor in Pensacola following a deployment at sea. No idea what happened but sometimes we get bad supervisors that screw us. Well he liked the Pensacola lifestyle so much that he chose to do the reserve instructor idiocy. 

And he flies for SW but thinks FedEx might be hiring him soon. Always looking for green grass.


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## Devildoc (May 7, 2022)

ThunderHorse said:


> The Marine Corps is headed for a pilot exodus
> 
> Interesting article. But the whole pilots fleeing in droves to commercial airlines is a bit overblown. And just because you fly a jet doesn't mean those hours qualify either. My BiL, solid guy, was relegated to being an instructor in Pensacola following a deployment at sea. No idea what happened but sometimes we get bad supervisors that screw us. Well he liked the Pensacola lifestyle so much that he chose to do the reserve instructor idiocy.
> 
> And he flies for SW but thinks FedEx might be hiring him soon. Always looking for green grass.



No branch is keeping pilots right now.  I don't know if the Marines' issues are better or worse than the Air Force and Navy in that regard.

I belong to Popasmoke, a Marine aviation organization (I'm a legacy because my father was with HMLA-167 and I did some SAR work with VMR-1), that sounds like the Marine aviation community morale is pretty crappy right now.


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## Devildoc (May 9, 2022)

Good article from SWJ, playing no favorites:

Forcing Design or Designing Force? The Reinvention of the Marine Corps | Small Wars Journal


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## ThunderHorse (Sep 27, 2022)

Uh, whatever floats your boat guys!

The Marine Corps’ new littoral combat team is changing the Marine rifle squad


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## Devildoc (Sep 27, 2022)

ThunderHorse said:


> Uh, whatever floats your boat guys!
> 
> The Marine Corps’ new littoral combat team is changing the Marine rifle squad



That's a great change of dynamic.  Not really 'new' in that they've been experimenting with different grouped elements, and it makes sense.

I wish I could go back in and go to that unit.


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## ThunderHorse (Sep 27, 2022)

Devildoc said:


> That's a great change of dynamic.  Not really 'new' in that they've been experimenting with different grouped elements, and it makes sense.
> 
> I wish I could go back in and go to that unit.


God Bless the Sergeant in the article, but also, bless his heart. All his quotes read straight out of corporate sales documents. I just don't buy any of it. 

"Oh, because we now have only two fire teams it makes it easier to do hip pocket training"


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## Devildoc (Sep 27, 2022)

ThunderHorse said:


> God Bless the Sergeant in the article, but also, bless his heart. All his quotes read straight out of corporate sales documents. I just don't buy any of it.
> 
> "Oh, because we now have only two fire teams it makes it easier to do hip pocket training"



The reality is the Marines have been doing stuff like that for a long time, just not embedded in doctrine.  I did laugh out loud at the hit pocket training thing though.  When I read it, I said to myself, "I'm not a boot..."

It does change the dynamic quite a bit, there's a whole lot more flexibility in this than the field manual doctrine.


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## AWP (Sep 27, 2022)

I kind of see where they are going with this. While I've never used a boat, if the Corps think this will make boat..."stuff" easier...and this is a littoral unit, then that makes sense.

Historically, the Corps has been slow to change. Either because of an entrenched corporate mentality, lack of funding, whatever...you don't think of the Corps as being progressive.

Who knows? Maybe this squad reorg lasts for a few years until the Corps uses it in our next in a series of ongoing wars; the Corps learns then kills the concept. Maybe the Corps is proven right and this becomes its new standard. What's really interesting is they've set up squads as mini platoons.

I still think dumping tanks was a dumb idea, especially when your anti-armor is now...a LAV or something? Ugh.


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## ThunderHorse (Sep 27, 2022)

AWP said:


> I kind of see where they are going with this. While I've never used a boat, if the Corps think this will make boat..."stuff" easier...and this is a littoral unit, then that makes sense.
> 
> Historically, the Corps has been slow to change. Either because of an entrenched corporate mentality, lack of funding, whatever...you don't think of the Corps as being progressive.
> 
> ...



As long as they're designing vehicles around unit size and not squad size around vehicle size like the other green service...


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## Devildoc (Sep 27, 2022)

AWP said:


> I kind of see where they are going with this. While I've never used a boat, if the Corps think this will make boat..."stuff" easier...and this is a littoral unit, then that makes sense.
> 
> Historically, the Corps has been slow to change. Either because of an entrenched corporate mentality, lack of funding, whatever...you don't think of the Corps as being progressive.
> 
> ...



Somewhere between the company level and...somewhere else...there is a big invisible wall regarding progressive tactics and strategy.  Maybe its commander-influenced; in my experience we were encouraged to 'toss the book.'  But you are dead on regarding the Corps as a parochial organization bound by organizational inertia.  I have also been told 'no, because we've always done it that way.'  That's gotten me in trouble; some day I will tell you the story on why an E4 doesn't call the O6 on the phone to talk about changes to a curriculum.

Ironically I think it is lack of funding that encourages more progressive thought: you have to do more with less.  The Corps does have a history of that (MEUSOC concept, maneuver warfare, reorg of MAGTF, etc.).


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## Xenophon (Sep 27, 2022)

Devildoc said:


> ... But you are dead on regarding the Corps as a parochial organization bound by organizational inertia. ... Ironically I think it is lack of funding that encourages more progressive thought: you have to do more with less.  The Corps does have a history of that (MEUSOC concept, maneuver warfare, reorg of MAGTF, etc.).



That's it exactly. The way we want to design the future force is: conceptual capability -> people -> systems -> training and education over time. It's a logical, intuitive model that works well for service-level planning. 

But because of money, it turns into systems -> capability -> people -> training and education, and nothing stifles innovation more quickly than being told on the one hand to "adapt and overcome" given the gear you have in order to meet mission, and on the other (by someone else) that you can't do any of the things you're trying to do. I have no first-hand knowledge of this but I suspect that (1) the tank "system" was just too expensive to maintain considering all the other stuff we're trying to do, and (2) people were just tired of dealing with the contracting system associated with tanks. 

The up-front cost of buying a LAV or a radio, for example, is nothing compared to the money we spend on its maintenance. At battalions, we can't "fix" radios and certain parts of the LAV (even though we have Marines whose entire MOS is designed to do just that, and even though we have the facilities to do just that) beyond wiping them down with a damp cloth (really) until we send it to a higher echelon of maintenance. And if we are able to do the maintenance, the process of ordering replacement parts is so long that if an LAV breaks, there's a decent chance we won't be able to train with it again for 6-12 months. Also, most of the solutions we come up with for service-level problems (emissions control, old-school fieldcraft and camouflage, littoral command and control equipment) would "technically" be "illegal selective interchange." Put a super cool civilian-off-the-shelf antenna system on a program-of-record vehicle? Not without a waiver from high up. I can't imagine the bureaucracy associated with experimenting the tank systems to meet the problem sets we're facing right now.


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## ThunderHorse (Sunday at 9:48 PM)

So, the Navy is getting rid of the Mark VI. And the Marine Corps is testing small combatant craft.  But I do find it interesting that this transformation is happening but it really requires cooperation of the Navy to provide boats and ships for the Littoral regiments. 

Again, maybe getting rid of tanks was a bad idea...

U.S. Navy’s Mark VI and 40-foot Patrol Boat Updates - Naval News


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## AWP (Monday at 7:00 AM)

ThunderHorse said:


> So, the Navy is getting rid of the Mark VI. And the Marine Corps is testing small combatant craft.  But I do find it interesting that this transformation is happening but it really requires cooperation of the Navy to provide boats and ships for the Littoral regiments.
> 
> Again, maybe getting rid of tanks was a bad idea...
> 
> U.S. Navy’s Mark VI and 40-foot Patrol Boat Updates - Naval News



The Marines have always depended upon the Navy for boats and ships. Why would Littoral operations be any different?


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## ThunderHorse (Monday at 8:27 AM)

AWP said:


> The Marines have always depended upon the Navy for boats and ships. Why would Littoral operations be any different?



For what ever reason I was expecting there to be some coordination regarding stratekgery around keels being laid to support the Corps in their idea for transformation.  And I don't know why I thought that would be the case. Just found it interesting that the Navy is getting rid of craft that would have likely been used to support a littoral regiment.

I supposed I was being a silly goose.


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## Devildoc (Monday at 8:35 AM)

ThunderHorse said:


> So, the Navy is getting rid of the Mark VI. And the Marine Corps is testing small combatant craft.  But I do find it interesting that this transformation is happening but it really requires cooperation of the Navy to provide boats and ships for the Littoral regiments.
> 
> Again, maybe getting rid of tanks was a bad idea...
> 
> U.S. Navy’s Mark VI and 40-foot Patrol Boat Updates - Naval News





AWP said:


> The Marines have always depended upon the Navy for boats and ships. Why would Littoral operations be any different?



I believe their new 2030 transformation has them tooling around island chains a la _McHale's Navy_ style (or _We Were Expendable_, your choice) and they want to be more independent with their littoral watercraft.  I agree it appears that one hand isn't knowing what the other is doing with the Navy getting rid of a boat that might be helpful for the Marines, but who knows what is going on behind the scenes.


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## BloodStripe (Monday at 10:57 AM)

AWP said:


> The Marines have always depended upon the Navy for boats and ships. Why would Littoral operations be any different?


Department of the Navy something something Marine Corps.


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## AWP (Monday at 11:30 AM)

Considering the Navy only has 12, I doubt these would be of much use due to their density alone.


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## Gunz (Monday at 1:30 PM)

So they chopped forty feet off the new contract with MetalShark and got this.

40 Defiant | Metal Shark


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## AWP (Monday at 4:57 PM)

Gunz said:


> So they chopped forty feet off the new contract with MetalShark and got this.
> 
> 40 Defiant | Metal Shark



One the one hand, they are meant to patrol harbors (according to the Navy). On the other hand...what the chicken fried fuck?

I'm gonna' spitball here and say the Navy isn't committed to this littoral warfare thing. Maybe it is putting its eggs in the FF(X) basket and drones? I don't know, it seems dumb to this outsider.


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## Devildoc (Monday at 5:25 PM)

AWP said:


> One the one hand, they are meant to patrol harbors (according to the Navy). On the other hand...what the chicken fried fuck?
> 
> I'm gonna' spitball here and say the Navy isn't committed to this littoral warfare thing. Maybe it is putting its eggs in the FF(X) basket and drones? I don't know, it seems dumb to this outsider.



I think the Navy is committed to getting the Marines to the fight, especially in light of requesting funding for more amphibs. However, my sense in reading the articles put out by USNI is there just as happy to dump the Marines and haul ass a la Guadalcanal.  I hope I am wrong in my interpretation.


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## Gunz (Monday at 6:56 PM)




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## AWP (Monday at 7:15 PM)

Devildoc said:


> I think the Navy is committed to getting the Marines to the fight, especially in light of requesting funding for more amphibs. However, my sense in reading the articles put out by USNI is there just as happy to dump the Marines and haul ass a la Guadalcanal.  I hope I am wrong in my interpretation.



Guadalcanal was such a bad look for the Navy, but I wonder how much of that decision took root going forward to now. History has proven it to be the wrong decision, but that's revisionist history which is sketchy at best. How many commanders given the information at the time would stay? I can't fault the Navy even if we know it to be the wrong decision because we weren't there.

Good, bad, or other, at some point we have to trust the combatant commander. It's a delicate line, but we can't neuter the guy/ gal in the field. Hate it or not, but decentralized command and control is a hallmark of American fighting prowess.

If our risk adverse nature removes that from the table then...I hope it works out. And hope is not a method.


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## Gunz (Tuesday at 7:53 AM)

AWP said:


> Guadalcanal was such a bad look for the Navy, but I wonder how much of that decision took root going forward to now. History has proven it to be the wrong decision, but that's revisionist history which is sketchy at best. How many commanders given the information at the time would stay? I can't fault the Navy even if we know it to be the wrong decision because we weren't there.
> 
> Good, bad, or other, at some point we have to trust the combatant commander. It's a delicate line, but we can't neuter the guy/ gal in the field. Hate it or not, but decentralized command and control is a hallmark of American fighting prowess.
> 
> If our risk adverse nature removes that from the table then...I hope it works out. And hope is not a method.



Fletcher said he had to refuel...but I think in truth he was worried about losing his carrier (and his career). Considering the heavy losses the Navy had sustained it's understandable if commanders were gun shy. The Japanese Navy was still immensely powerful even after the drubbing at Midway--as they were soon to prove in surface actions in the Slot. So, maybe Fletcher gets a raw deal in history.

Still, it looked like bugging out...and he left a mess on the beach.


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## Devildoc (Tuesday at 10:19 AM)

AWP said:


> Guadalcanal was such a bad look for the Navy, but I wonder how much of that decision took root going forward to now. History has proven it to be the wrong decision, but that's revisionist history which is sketchy at best. How many commanders given the information at the time would stay? I can't fault the Navy even if we know it to be the wrong decision because we weren't there.
> 
> Good, bad, or other, at some point we have to trust the combatant commander. It's a delicate line, but we can't neuter the guy/ gal in the field. Hate it or not, but decentralized command and control is a hallmark of American fighting prowess.
> 
> If our risk adverse nature removes that from the table then...I hope it works out. And hope is not a method.



"Risk averse nature" I think is what it is and why I brought up Guadalcanal (not to make a 1:1 comparison).  Based on what I have read from USNI and the shifting doctrine in the Pacific, with the Corps transitioning to holding islands and being in contested areas, it seems that the Navy is OK with putting them ashore and getting out of the area, supporting with drones/UAVs and missile fires.  That said, the Marines have a multi-generational leap of tech to play with now.  They are not necessarily beholden to 8" guns 10 miles off shore or needing a blocking force.

Anyhoo, that's just my feeling reading the articles.  I could be wrong.  It's 1018, and it would not be the first time today I would be wrong.


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