# SOF all set to lose more RW support - HSC-84/85 to shutdown in 2016



## Homer11 (Dec 18, 2014)

Just heard last week that this was official.  This is a monumental mistake.  SOF will lose 1000's of  operational support hours and 30% of all training support because of a budget stand-off between Navy and SOCOM amounting to $30M/year.  More background provided in the link below.

http://www.navytimes.com/story/mili...ec-ops-helicoper-squadrons-shutdown/70025352/


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## DA SWO (Dec 18, 2014)

You don't want to lose capability, but neither side gets what it wants under the current setup.

IIRC, The are aligned under naval Air Reserve Forces, which puts them under a conventional commander; so I am sure SOCOM doesn't like having to pay for assets not under a SOF umbrella.
Likewise, the conventional Navy believes a SOF assets should be paid out of SOCOM dollars,and not the non-SOF budget.


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## Homer11 (Dec 18, 2014)

SOWT said:


> You don't want to lose capability, but neither side gets what it wants under the current setup.
> 
> IIRC, The are aligned under naval Air Reserve Forces, which puts them under a conventional commander; so I am sure SOCOM doesn't like having to pay for assets not under a SOF umbrella.
> Likewise, the conventional Navy believes a SOF assets should be paid out of SOCOM dollars,and not the non-SOF budget.



You are correct.  SOCOM doesn't want to pay and neither does Navy.  Navy has been providing free capability to SOF with these two squadrons for nearly 40 years and would officially chop them under SOCOM if SOCOM would take them.  In my opinion, this is actually the best possible solution for all involved.  The offer to transfer the units has already been made and subsequently declined which is, like I said before, a major mistake.  Once this capability is gone, it will likely be gone forever.   From Navy's point of view, since everything these units do is in support of SOF, SOCOM should share the expenses.  Navy is under extreme budget pressure due to sequestration and the BCA, and doesn't view SOF support as a core Navy mission.  When you're worried about losing aircraft carriers and entire airwings of aircraft and personnel (among other things), cutting RW units that are not directly supporting the fleet is a no-brainer (in the eyes of the CNO).  The sad thing here is that this is a prime opportunity to add 2 squadrons (and 24 additional H-60s to SOF inventory) which are already built, for very little cost.  Shortfalls in SOF RW support are already significant, as evidenced by the fact that these two conventional units support 30% of all resourced training requirements for SOF in general (they cover 70% for NSW, and 40% of MARSOC requirements).   

It's important to note also that these squadrons are not like other conventional units that provide RW support to SOF.  They are wholly dedicated to the mission and train exclusively to it.  While deployed, they chop directly to the TSOC for OPCON (unlike other Navy RW that might support SOF operationally).  Collectively, the squadrons executed 13,800+ combat flight hours in Iraq operating with the 160th, 20th/21st SOS, AC-130's, and STS under the CJSOAC supporting CJSOTF-AP.  Over 50% of their hours were in support of DA's.  At risk of offending a 160th bubba, these units are very much like them, minus the extensive resources (however, these units have enjoyed more abundant funding than fleet units because of reserve funding lines).  Most of their training standards and TTPs are identical, they field the most senior crews, conduct training detachments all over CONUS (sometimes OCONUS), shoot over a million rounds per year from the aircraft and are the most combat experienced squadrons in Naval Aviation.  There are no other units in Navy RW who come close.  It's also quite likely that they are the most decorated Naval aviation community since Vietnam.

They are deployed now, supporting real-world requirements, and will have to redeploy home this spring to shut down by the end of the FY.


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## DA SWO (Dec 19, 2014)

The question is who is saying no?
NavSpecWarCom or SOCOM?


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## SkrewzLoose (Dec 19, 2014)

SOWT said:


> The question is who is saying no?
> NavSpecWarCom or SOCOM?


Sir, I think it's Big Navy (not NSW) Vs. SOCOM. I would assume that if NSW had the resources/funding without Big Navy's help this wouldn't even be a discussion.


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## DA SWO (Dec 19, 2014)

SkrewzLoose said:


> Sir, I think it's Big Navy (not NSW) Vs. SOCOM. I would assume that if NSW had the resources/funding without Big Navy's help this wouldn't even be a discussion.


If NSW wanted the assets they could work with SOCOM to get them.  I can not imagine SOCOM saying no to a sea-based rotary winged asset, especially considering the background of some of the last few SOCOM Commanders.
I could also see an Army Staffer at SOCOM committing the 160th to pick up the loss.


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## Homer11 (Dec 19, 2014)

Actually SkrewzLoose is correct.  It is a Big Navy vs. SOCOM issue.  The two 4-stars were the ones conducting final negotiations on this.  Although I have nothing but the utmost admiration and respect for him, I am actually pretty disappointed with Adm McRaven here.  Not 100% sure why he wouldn't pull the trigger on this but he may have been concerned about perception of Navy bias/favoritism if he had.  Unfortunate because this was likely the best chance of substantive change that would benefit all.  I hear (through trusted sources) that CNO was quite irritated with SOCOM's stance after attempting numerous compromises only to be told no.  Especially since SOCOM was the one who raised the issue as a concern to OSD once they learned Navy was originally going to cut them in 2015.  SOWT is also correct.  Someone did tell OSD that SOCOM was backing off the requirement (to avoid spending MFP-11) and the 160th would pick up the slack (which they can't).  And, on at least one occasion, the cost of the units was misrepresented to the Admiral portraying them as too expensive.  My understanding is that staffers didn't believe the actual numbers because 84/85 were much cheaper than the 160th. 

On another note, SPECWARCOM isn't exactly blameless either.  My understanding is they were quite concerned about potential funding offsets to NSW should 84/85 become part of SPECWARCOM.  Aside from this, there is no doubt NSW wants the assets.  They will suffer the most from their loss.


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## CBTech (Dec 19, 2014)

What kind of squadron is going to be deployed on the Independence class LCS if it gets pushed into an NSW mission? VMM? HSC?


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## Homer11 (Dec 19, 2014)

CBTech said:


> What kind of squadron is going to be deployed on the Independence class LCS if it gets pushed into an NSW mission? VMM? HSC?



If you manage to get Naval RW support, it will likely be regular HSC.


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## SkrewzLoose (Dec 20, 2014)

I don't see the LCS class being able to perform NSW missions other than providing platforms for transportation, which basically all other classes of ships do right now. For infil/exfil, I think that's what the SWCC guys are around for as far as brown water capabilities go. Maybe they'll give the LCS ships the new fucking laser thing... 
Also, I was wondering who trumps who in CNO Vs. Adm. McRaven at SOCOM regarding who foots the bill for the 84/85 HSC. As I said previously, I figured it would be a Big Navy/SOCOM issue, not so much NSW/SOCOM. I would imagine that if NSW had its way and saw good reason to keep the 84/85 guys around, they'd make it work with SOCOM somehow.
Homer11 , thanks for your continued input. I'm glad to know there are parts of the Navy that don't suck.


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## Homer11 (Dec 20, 2014)

SkrewzLoose said:


> I don't see the LCS class being able to perform NSW missions other than providing platforms for transportation, which basically all other classes of ships do right now. For infil/exfil, I think that's what the SWCC guys are around for as far as brown water capabilities go. Maybe they'll give the LCS ships the new fucking laser thing...
> Also, I was wondering who trumps who in CNO Vs. Adm. McRaven at SOCOM regarding who foots the bill for the 84/85 HSC. As I said previously, I figured it would be a Big Navy/SOCOM issue, not so much NSW/SOCOM. I would imagine that if NSW had its way and saw good reason to keep the 84/85 guys around, they'd make it work with SOCOM somehow.
> Homer11 , thanks for your continued input. I'm glad to know there are parts of the Navy that don't suck.



OSD is who trumps but they chose not to be directive to two 4-stars.  Also, they sided with Navy's argument, leaving the ball completely in SOCOM's court.  The only reason 84/85 didn't go away in 2015 is because OSD stepped in and told the two sides to work out a solution.  The squadrons were funded at 66% this year while the two sides were supposed to work it out.  Essentially, this turned into a game of chicken in which no one blinked and OSD then decided not to take charge.  In my opinion, OSD should be looking at Defense Strategic Guidance, setting priorities and making decisions.  Something they are not doing (and not only in this case).  If they did this, I have no doubt they would direct one side or the other to fund the units since they missions they support are national priority missions (BPC, CT, COIN, counter-WMD, etc).   

Regarding NSW, they see good reason.  Before 9/11, HCS-4 and HCS-5 provided 55% of all RW support for NSW.  They supported 50% of NSW DA missions in Iraq between 2003-2011.  Last year HSC-84/85 (new names) supported 70% of NSW *sourced* requirements (there was still a shortfall).  Like I said earlier though, they are not blameless here.  As much as I love the SEALs, over the years they have been their own worst enemy regarding this issue (another long winded story).  As much as they value the support, they have chosen to gap requirements rather than risk possible impact to their TOA.  As soon as their RW support dries up though (like it did when HCS-5 was shut down in 2006), they start begging for it again.  Like SOCOM, NSW wants support and they want it for free.

Bottom line at this point: unless Congress steps in, the capability will go away.  Not because there is no valid requirement (the requirement is greater than ever) but because of bureaucratic BS and the fact no one wants to pay the bill.


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## Ranger Psych (Dec 20, 2014)

LCS's got more room and more native/inbuilt ability for quick, easy, and even flat out sequestered/segregated "aft of this bulkhead is SOF land only, we're driving to this point and only looking straight forward until the Captain says otherwise" than basically any other platform in the arsenal. Plus can get in closer with less chance of adding to the Relieved commanders list due to less draft, etc.

I've never ridden on a navy bird period, AFSOC or 160th with a few regular army backscratch rides when they wanted to train high-speed and we needed a ride... they usually did a bit of in-unit trainup before we hopped a ride just because we expected more out of em. No doubt they do good work, but it does beg the question: Given the multiple army-based SOF aviation elements, does the Navy unit actually bring anything truly special that another SOC aviation unit couldn't absorb or do?   

I mean, even with NAVSPECALPHABETHAIRJEL in tow at the kickoff of both parties, I didn't see a single navy RW platform period, even doing the conex shift and lift off the shitty hawk... that was the heavy hefters from you guessed it, US Army on the side...


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## AWP (Dec 20, 2014)

Sequestration forced everyone to check their priorities and funding, so I wouldn't be surprised if it caused the Navy to re-evalute 84/85's role and funding. Sometimes a snowball needs a slight nudge to roll down that mountain.

Also, in case some of you missed it (though it is on the same page as this thread), and ignoring some of the garbage:
http://www.shadowspear.com/vb/threads/hsc-84-and-hsc-85-the-navys-160th.20759/


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## DA SWO (Dec 20, 2014)

Ranger Psych said:


> LCS's got more room and more native/inbuilt ability for quick, easy, and even flat out sequestered/segregated "aft of this bulkhead is SOF land only, we're driving to this point and only looking straight forward until the Captain says otherwise" than basically any other platform in the arsenal. Plus can get in closer with less chance of adding to the Relieved commanders list due to less draft, etc.
> 
> I've never ridden on a navy bird period, AFSOC or 160th with a few regular army backscratch rides when they wanted to train high-speed and we needed a ride... they usually did a bit of in-unit trainup before we hopped a ride just because we expected more out of em. No doubt they do good work, but it does beg the question: Given the multiple army-based SOF aviation elements, does the Navy unit actually bring anything truly special that another SOC aviation unit couldn't absorb or do?
> 
> I mean, even with NAVSPECALPHABETHAIRJEL in tow at the kickoff of both parties, I didn't see a single navy RW platform period, even doing the conex shift and lift off the shitty hawk... that was the heavy hefters from you guessed it, US Army on the side...



I  worked an exercise with them (20th SFG) out of camp dawson WV.  Great group of guys to work with, but that was during the bad old days where any forecast ceiling meant no NVG flying.


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## busdriver (Dec 20, 2014)

The general gist seems similar to the rapid jump of AF rescue out of AFSOC back in '05.  SOCOM looks to consolidate all RW support into the 160th when given the chance.  If you look at it from the perspective of minimizing overhead senior officer and staff billets it makes sense.  It's actually a shame we haven't got to a point that we can have actual joint organizations.


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## Homer11 (Dec 20, 2014)

Ranger Psych said:


> LCS's got more room and more native/inbuilt ability for quick, easy, and even flat out sequestered/segregated "aft of this bulkhead is SOF land only, we're driving to this point and only looking straight forward until the Captain says otherwise" than basically any other platform in the arsenal. Plus can get in closer with less chance of adding to the Relieved commanders list due to less draft, etc.
> 
> I've never ridden on a navy bird period, AFSOC or 160th with a few regular army backscratch rides when they wanted to train high-speed and we needed a ride... they usually did a bit of in-unit trainup before we hopped a ride just because we expected more out of em. No doubt they do good work, but it does beg the question: Given the multiple army-based SOF aviation elements, does the Navy unit actually bring anything truly special that another SOC aviation unit couldn't absorb or do?
> 
> I mean, even with NAVSPECALPHABETHAIRJEL in tow at the kickoff of both parties, I didn't see a single navy RW platform period, even doing the conex shift and lift off the shitty hawk... that was the heavy hefters from you guessed it, US Army on the side...



HSC-84/85 do quite a bit of work with Army SF but not typically with Rangers (I assume you're a Ranger - hooah).  Other REGNAV RW units rarely work with Army SF at all.  This is one difference between units that are dedicated to SOF and those who are committed to Navy fleet requirements.  What the Navy unit brings to the fight is Maritime/Navy fleet operating expertise and aircraft that are built to operate and live on ships.  Pretty important now that SOF is going back to sea on AFSBs, etc.  Flying and operating in the maritime environment is different from over land.  Where 160th guys are certainly able to take off and land from boats, working and coordinating within Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups is the norm for Naval aviators.  Navy aircraft have some additional safety features, are marinized to battle corrosion and are also equipped with rotor brake and blade fold systems that are critical while operating on ships in high winds/heavy weather or busy flight decks.  Where I would expect Army bubbas to be more proficient in the mountains, Naval aviators are more proficient flying night, low light while overwater (where NVGs are almost worthless and instruments are key).  AFSOC only has CV-22s now which can't operate on small boys (single spot ships) at all.  The other thing that 84/85 bring are available aircraft.  As I said earlier, these two squadrons provided 30% of all SOF training support last year (including 70% of NSW and 40% of MARSOC requirements).  For NSW, SEALs have never faired well while trying to schedule the 160th for training.  Army assets are too busy while 84/85 are co-located with NSW.  Once 84/85 go away, will Army be able to absorb the load in Coronado and Norfolk?  Will they also be able to send _two more_ 4-plane dets overseas to fill the PACOM and CENTCOM requirements that 84/85 are currently filling?  By all indications, the answer is no.  It's not their fault, it's just numbers and requirements.


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## Ranger Psych (Dec 21, 2014)

For the record, I don't like seeing any SOF capability go away at all... but I'm playing devil's advocate with what I'm saying.


I can understand what the HSC's in question bring to the table due to having tertiary knowledge of shipboard flight operations dynamics/complexities (various recovery equipment the 160th wouldn't have for rough sea recovery, training in in-air tethered refueling for advanced sea state operations, the chess game on a larger ship's flight deck etc...  The maintenance/design aspects of Naval aircraft I was somewhat aware of as well, although flying in otherwise unforgiving but flat terrain under IFR is something I wouldn't consider a huge selling point when compared to the capabilities of the other service RW elements.

Given that the 2 squadrons, of which I am not currently privy to strength therein, were unable to cover wholly for the Naval SOF requirements and if accounts are to be correct, didn't even participate in the arguably biggest thing that NAVSPECWAR participated in in it's entire lifetime... they missed out through lack of capability or lack of ability (Due to positioning, not skill, I would hope) on the largest single "PR" event they could have used to specifically be able to remain relevant to both NSW as well as the USN as a whole.

Then there bodes the question of lift vs strength as a whole. The Army has arguably the largest SOF contingent if you consolidate SF, Ranger Regiment, and "others" and has been relying on AF/AFSOC/USA/160th for RW/FW lift to good effect for years, with larger numbers to boot when you look at overall manning. I've never specifically learned the complete manning for the Teams, but going off what open source I have seen they're short what Regiment is by a little under a thousand men... SF uses RW on occasion, but usually isn't hopscotching the fuck around like other elements due to being *usually* employed as a more area-based element versus a wider area of responsibility/effect technique like Regiment.

Through a failure of the command leaderships directly in charge/involved as well as higher commands in general that "own" them... they haven't owned them enough to where Navy covers Navy well enough that they didn't need other assets to give them a lift.  I can count on one hand the number of times I personally rode on or was tasked to ride on if the need arose, AFSOC RW assets "evolution-wise" for training or specific task/duty for combat. Everything else was a 160th ride minus 2 times I can remember which were both simply elevators on Lawson where anyone with fastrope gear and the ability to hover somewhat steadily over generally level terrain would have been able to accomplish the necessary training requirements.  Overseas the AF elements were used due to positioning, stateside it was to fulfill combined training objective blocks that were necessary for currency.

It seems from other peoples comments that the very Naval-oriented equipment that provides those special equipment-based features that facilitate easier naval operations are also function as a platform-dependent detriment... example being, unable to use both doors for fastroping or other related things where you can't pull off X on a USNSOF bird but can swing it on a USAFSOF/USASOF platform.   The Army has the distinct advantage in terms of RW operations in that it's the bread, butter, and cheese that is allowed of them in the first place as well as having effectively been able to place SOF aviation as the pinnacle/capstone of what Army Aviation consists of.... AFSOC, from my perspective it was either the truly loony that wanted to fly helos for the USAF, or otherwise the well qualified but otherwise unknowns that might have been thrown at rotary wing in order to ensure that enough RW pilots existed.  Most pilots go into the USAF to fly shit that drops bombs, not people and gear, ya know?  Perhaps the Navy suffers the same overall issue as well.

In any case, it seems they are going away and there's a necessity for other elements to now pick up what slack they can. Guess NSW now will thumb more rides or swim/float/walk more. 

What's the overall RW contingent squadron/etc strength of the USN for RW platforms that SOF would be interested in? Perhaps it might be good time to actually start stepping up the game across the board with regards to USN RW training/capability to be able to push expanding to anything that isn't ASW/resupply being a SOF tasking, and being able to step up the game with regards to those involved, higher standards etc with some equipment beefing at a date that is fiscally possible so both training and capability increase, effectively making Naval RW as a general rule hot shit?

I know Naval RW does RW insert/extract for boarding parties, VERTREP, ASW, the obvious discussion matter of anti-long-walk for NSW, and safety coverage for flight deck operations... how large a portion do they take on with regards to personnel transfers within CBG's? Obviously it would make sense that they would given a carrier can take on people from a longer distance trip on a greyhound, then branch out from the carrier via helo to effectively any ship size as necessary, flight deck to flight deck obviously being preferred.  What else do they have for tasking within the fleet?  

The reason I ask is because considering AFSOC and RW in general for the USAF, a large portion falls more in the SOF zone as far as either infil of troops or rescue operations, which would be inherently part of the RW boarding party infil/NSW infil/Safety operations for deck operations... ASW is ASW and a different mission unto itself as well as different equipment that's stuck on the airframe limiting it's viability for other purposes, and VERTREP is something that while not sexy, suits the well equipped but otherwise easily made "naked" platforms for maximum load transfer...   I hope you get where I'm going.


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## Homer11 (Dec 21, 2014)

Ranger Psych said:


> For the record, I don't like seeing any SOF capability go away at all... but I'm playing devil's advocate with what I'm saying.
> 
> 
> I can understand what the HSC's in question bring to the table due to having tertiary knowledge of shipboard flight operations dynamics/complexities (various recovery equipment the 160th wouldn't have for rough sea recovery, training in in-air tethered refueling for advanced sea state operations, the chess game on a larger ship's flight deck etc...  The maintenance/design aspects of Naval aircraft I was somewhat aware of as well, although flying in otherwise unforgiving but flat terrain under IFR is something I wouldn't consider a huge selling point when compared to the capabilities of the other service RW elements.
> ...



No one is saying the 160th doesn't have advantages over other services.  Everyone in Navy RW would readily admit that.  I would've loved to have 2 doors, a fuel probe and the vast resources of the 160th.  Had I possessed these in Iraq, I'm confident we would have been interchangeable in nearly every respect with the 160th (I make this statement having planned, briefed and flown numerous missions with them in combat and often times led missions with army 60's on my wing - hard to believe I'm sure, but true).  If the squadrons do manage to be saved, they will hopefully transition to the newest MH-60S with 2 doors.  The community will still need to fight for a probe because the Navy won't give it to them - this would be considered SOF peculiar and SOCOM would need to provide if they want us to have it.  

In my opinion there is no need to pit one service against the other here.  Frankly, I'm tired of it because parochialism often contributes to some foolish decisions (like this one).  I try to make my comments and state facts while being non-parochial.  We should all recognize that the services all have complementary capabilities and their own advantages and disadvantages.  As an FYI, I'll provide a little more background about 84/85 here because from your comments, I don't think you've had the opportunity to become familiar with them specifically (not meant to be a dig, just a point of observation - if I'm wrong please correct me).  Bottom line:  HSC-84/85 are much different than the REGNAV HSC squadrons.

First, the fact that the squadrons weren't involved in the SOF deployment on the Kitty Hawk in my opinion, means little.  They have supported other ops and back then, the squadrons were traditional reserve units with a much smaller personnel footprint and not under the SOCOM umbrella, thus not easy to task in a timely fashion (while still not part of SOCOM the community has greatly improved tasking processes since, but they are still tasked through RFF for deployments which is a slow process - there is no issue tasking them for training).  

Over the last 20 years, the units supported SOF in Uphold Democracy and Desert Storm as well as provided nearly 14000 combat flight hours of support over _the entirety of OIF_, which I would argue (along with Afghanistan) was actually the largest effort NSW has been involved in during recent years (vs. the Kitty Hawk deployment).  HCS-5 (now HSC-85) was deployed with ST-3 in Kuwait when OIF kicked off and moved forward with them to Baghdad less than 2 months later.  Between them and HCS-4 (now HSC-84) they flew ~50% of the DA's conducted by NSW while also supporting SF missions over the 8 years.  As part of the CJSOAC working with 3rd Bat 160th, 20th/21st SOS, the AC-130's, STS and other units, 84/85 also participated in over 50% of all of CJSOAC-supported DA missions, performing anything from Infil/Exfil, ISR, CASEVAC, CAS/CFF, or Aerial QRF (ARF) and sometimes all on the same mission (ISR and ARF were unique to us - none of the other helo players performed them).  And while it sucked having one door, we often conducted infil via FASTROPE.  It wasn't perfect but everybody flexed and we made it work.  Luckily fuel wasn't much of an issue since we could fly longer _un-refueled_ with our tank configuration than an Army Blackhawk and there were FARPs all over Iraq (would still love to have had a probe though).      

Over the course of OIF, the squadrons grew in size and added active component personnel.  Today, while they are still reserve squadrons, they can deploy dets without mobilization because their footprint is over 430 personnel each with 40% being active component (only 24% of personnel are reservists).  Each squadron added 150 personnel and 4 aircraft since OIF began and are now built for continuous deployments.  Their training standards are in line with the 160th, have been vetted on numerous occasions by SOCOM and are the most robust in Navy RW aviation.  The aircraft at homeguard deploy regularly all over CONUS in support of SOF training requirements (something the REGNAV has no budget for).  Full mission profiles are the preference and a requirement for pilot and aircrew training, the door gunners are the best and the pilots are the most experienced in the Navy. 

Historically NSW has struggled for training support.  Before 9/11, NSW experienced and average annual training shortfall of 33%.  81% of what they received was from Navy assets (including fleet aircraft) and only 19% from SOAR, AFSOC and others.  HCS-4/5 provided 55% of all RW support to NSW from 1989-2003.  In general, Army assets supported Army SF and SEALs could not get Army support.  Today, NSW requirements are significantly higher and 84/85 support about 70% of their _sourced_ requirements.  Part of the issue is due to location.  84/85 are located with the NSW groups in San Diego and Norfolk and Army assets are not.  Another reason it is a dumb move to let them go.  To pick up the slack in the future, Army would have to send dets of aircraft to San Diego and Norfolk regularly while they're already busy as Hell.  Personally, I won't be holding my breath.     

Unfortunately, helicopters in general are undervalued in the Navy (similar to AF) and the SOF support mission even less so (as again evidenced by Navy not caring if SEALs or MARSOC are supported with RW - Navy views this as SOCOM's responsibility).  The Navy is jet-centric and more concerned with ships and submarines over everything else, hence there is no advocate for the mission within the Navy.  Truth is, the only advocates who truly understand the mission and value the 5 SOF Truths are the pilots and aircrew who fly it (and a few guys like me, who used to fly it). 

Hopefully this provides better clarity about the community and some understanding that we're not talking about your typical General Purpose Forces.


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## busdriver (Dec 30, 2014)

If an O-2 was the pilot on the controls it was 100% a learning experience for him, not representative of what you should expect in the real world.  You have to keep in mind, us pilot types need to learn too and part of that learning is to realize that with real live bodies jumping out of the aircraft the margin for error is much smaller.  

You may be right, that whole community may suck, but I doubt it, the vertrep videos I've seen tell me otherwise.  If you want organic Navy support to your ops, you will have to commit to helping them get better in training.  That means training with them and giving honest, constructive feedback.

One of the SOF truths is that people and training are more important than hardware.  Aviation is no different.


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## busdriver (Dec 30, 2014)

Agree on all points, my point is that this is a training issue, not a capability issue.  If you want capability X, you need to commit to pay for it in training dollars..

If NSW wants an organic capability, it needs to commit to the training cost to include the basics.  God knows I've done enough elevators to train ground dudes on fast rope.  Don't even get me started on the waste of time airborne sniper is for me.


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## Homer11 (Dec 30, 2014)

JK07 said:


> Oh dear God no. The last time I was on a regular Navy bird it took the pilot (who was an O-2 who we later found was fresh out of flight school)
> literally 3-4 minutes to get down to the proper height so we could cast out of the bird. On the second pass I'm in the water watching as he's slowly ascending as guys are leaving the AC until finally the HRST master stops the 4th guy bc they were probably 20+ft at that point. Another platoon at the team worked with the same squadron less than a month later and had the aircraft slide while hovering off the edge of the flight deck of a destroyer while guys were fast roping. One of the guys had to lock in his hands and feet to prevent from possibly going into the drink.
> 
> No thanks, we'll walk.



There is a significant difference between regular Navy (or fleet) aviators and the pilots and aircrew of HSC-84/85.  The average fleet squadron is comprised of approximately 70% 1st tour aviators who average between 700-1000 total flight hours of experience while conducting numerous missions in support of the fleet.  The majority of flight time for these units is spent conducting Search and Rescue (SAR) or logistics support (roughly ~70-80% of their flight time).  Just by pure numbers, most first tour pilots do not have the opportunity to obtain the required flight time needed to gain anything more than exposure to basic skills (like FASTROPE, Cast and recoveries, K-Duck, etc).  Bottom line:  proficiency in the higher speed tactical missions will not occur in a pilot's first tour.  Additionally, fleet squadrons have little ammo allocation for their crewmen to become proficient with crew served or other on-board weapons.

The MINIMUM experience for aviators arriving at HSC-84/85 are first tour complete with the majority of aviators arriving post-2nd (usually post-instructor) tours.  Also, SELRES pilots and aircrew in the units provide continuity as they typically stay in the squadrons for 10 years or more and do nothing but fly SOF missions.  Average flight time for pilots in 84/85 is 2200-2600 hours and nearly all their hours are devoted to operational support, training support, or unit level training for SOF missions and personnel.  The gunners are the most proficient and fire more rounds than most all other Navy aircrewmen combined.  Each squadron has a 7.62mm allocation of more than 500k rounds and they often accept additional rounds from SEALs or SF that they work with.  One squadron's ammo allocation is greater than that of all the co-located fleet RW units combined (per respective coast - 8 operational HSC squadrons -  16 total ).


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## AWP (Dec 30, 2014)

Not being an aviator, someone help me out. New guy needs stick time. Got it, I'm onboard. Has to learn how to conduct those operations? I'm onboard. So...isn't that something to practice before handling troops? Descent rates, hovering over water at night, or whatever else you can do without troops? Second, if he's the new guy shouldn't someone with more time be in the other seat? Why wouldn't he take over? He had to know the a/c was climbing and that's bad or drifting off the target and that's also bad. What would prevent the other pilot from taking over and avoiding potential injuries to the customer (and maybe the airframe if things go really wrong)? Cultural, procedural, human error...I'm spitballing, but hopefully you get my drift. Is that something which can't be done in a simulator (weight leaving the a/c)? If they resulted in a loss of life, it sounds like an AIB would have a field day with the scenarios described in JK07's post.


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## busdriver (Dec 31, 2014)

Freefalling said:


> practice before handling troops? more time be in the other seat? wouldn't he take over?  Cultural, procedural, human error...


Absolutely, should be, should have, probably a little bit of all of that, I don't know about a simulator (ours are terrible) but certainly non-live first.


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## JB(A) (Jan 15, 2015)

JK07 said:


> For the record I have only had good experiences working with 84 (east coast guy so never worked with 85.) The other fleet squadrons, not so much. And like I said I'm not trying to knock the other squadrons, they just don't devote the time or money needed to be proficient SOF RW support (and righfully so.) The occasional training evolution working with us when we can't get 84 or 160th is not really going to change that either.



Unfortunately, the Navy's solution for NSW support is now going to consist of those fleet units trying to provide support. I have to agree with your earlier comment about walking instead of riding. Truth be told, I wouldn't fly a DA with a fleet HSC squadron as part of the crew, and this is not a knock against them. This is just the result of time in training with the SOF mission. 84/85 know the risks and how to mitigate them and they understand the consequence of the failure to properly train. 

Time and time again I have seen fleet pilots come to 84 thinking they knew how to do the mission. The proof is in the pudding and their heads are spinning as fast at the rotor-head the first time they co-pilot a live exercise, SA in the drink. Ask them 2 years later about the learning curve and almost all respond with "you just don't know what you don't know" or something similar.  Even those that drank from the Navy RW tactical cup of Kool-aid renounce their previous devotion to the traditional thought processes of the Helicopter Weapons School/NSAWC, which is the Navy RW tactical knowledge institution. These institutions are sub-standard for RW, and that is putting it as nicely as I can. They simply don't have the real-world knowledge....or even the practical training knowledge to produce helicopter crews capable of #1 the basic tactical skillets and #2 the ability to perform real-time tactical risk assessments in the high-tempo mission cycle, from planning to execution. They are, to paraphrase Gen. Boykins, 'confusing enthusiasm with capability.'


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## DA SWO (Jan 15, 2015)

Bottom line is the 160th will get tasked harder.


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## DA SWO (Jan 16, 2015)

Interesting article from War is Boring:

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/navy-ospreys-could-do-more-than-haul-cargo-3d054985642d

BLUF: HV-22's replace the C-2 and HH-60H's aircraft.
Doable, but I doubt they will train the flightcrews accordingly


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## Freggel (Jan 22, 2015)

Would hate to see them go. Had their support not too long ago in NL for the SOCEUR led excercise Jackal Stone. Great team with matching skills and proffesionalism
Their naval knowledge should be preserved and taken into SOCOM imo


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## JB(A) (Jan 22, 2015)

To your point:
84/85 fight a constant battle against Weapons Schools and Wing Commanders on both coasts, who consistently try to inject their "operational knowledge" into the training. 3 times in about 4 years the units had to revamp their training syllabus to appease these entities. Imagine having people who have never flown in support of a SOF op tell you how to train to fly (or actually fly) a DA....thanks but no thanks. I'll just do what I know how to do instead. The one positive would be that the V-22 program would be so high profile that their needs might actually get met by commanders....which would be a new concept altogether. That bird has limitations though as I am sure you well know. The area better be permissive and you better have some high-confidence intel of that fact. 
Case in point: 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/...-osprey-crews-a-tale-of-bullet-riddled-p.html

@Freggel, nice to see the guys are still performing well. Unfortunately, the cancelation of the units will eliminate that institutional knowledge altogether. That knowledge will not be 'absorbed' by the fleet units that the pilots and crews will be reassigned to, unfortunately. Once it is gone...you won't be able to get it back. We are in agreement on the SOCOM point. Stay safe.


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## CrewGuy (Feb 3, 2015)

busdriver said:


> God knows I've done enough elevators to train ground dudes on fast rope.  Don't even get me started on the waste of time airborne sniper is for me.



What does it matter if it's a waste of time for you? As I'm sure you're aware It's not about you, it's about getting the customers to the target and supporting them any way we have to. Are sniper platforms used very often anymore? Not really, but neither is a lot of the stuff we train for. 

Back on topic. 

It's a shame the Ground Forces primarily NSW and MARSOC will lose this asset for training support over someone not wanting to take them in and pay for them. If only we had a dedicated joint special operations aviation unit to support all the forces equally with the same TTP's and put the pissing contests in SpecOpsAV to bed.


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## busdriver (Feb 3, 2015)

CrewGuy said:


> What does it matter if it's a waste of time for you? .........it's about getting the customers to the target and supporting them any way we have to.


OK, getting the customers to the target:  what if the target is 200 miles into an IADS?  The training burden to get the team there is significant.  My only point is that you can't ignore the training needs of the aircrews just because it's cool to say it's all about the customer.  We don't expect fires platforms to be good without training with JTACs and vice versa.  

Back to aerial sniper, when I was stationed at Kadena we happily paid the cost of helping the Marine SOTG with their aerial sniper needs because they helped us with OPFOR for contested objective training.  Same thing for all the elevators I've done for fast rope training, that same team would then help me with the training I needed for my guys.  It was always, let's help each other kind of relationship.  Keep in mind I'm primarily a CSAR guy with ancillary SOF support.

To bring it back to the thread topic: my point is that if the SEAL community wants aviation support from the larger Navy helo world, and expects any kind of competency they need to dedicate some level of training support to help the helo guys learn how to do it and build some level of proficiency.  The larger Navy helo community doesn't have the luxury of screening aircrew from a massive pool of applicants like the 160th does.  I'm sure you remember the first time you put an actual team down a fast rope onto a roof top it was a bit different than when you were just simulating.


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## JB(A) (Feb 3, 2015)

The Navy won't allocate the flight hours to proficiency. As it sits, they have about 6 mission areas they want crews to train for. Helicopter units know they will never be tapped for real-world, so they simulate a lot of crap and sign off their crews as 'mission qualified.' 
The Weapons Schools, who are supposed to be the masters of all that is tactical, don't have real-world knowledge to be effective. That is right, the very institution that is supposed to promote combat readiness for naval helicopters is inadequate. Quite often, a SWTI, or Seahawks Weapons and Tactics Instructor (the supposed 'masters') lacked fundamental knowledge concerning combat operations in general, much less how to conduct a SOF operation. So, if the 'masters' can't get it right...how will the operational pilots ever be able to get proficient? The entire system is fundamentally flawed. 
Trust me....even the guys who used to wear the SWTI patch that came over to our world would tell you, after experiencing our training pipeline and what we were able to expose them to, that they just had no clue the extent of training they lacked. They just aren't used to flying with multiple assets and reacting to an evolving mission in real-time. Being able to make critical time-senstive decisions is a major part of the training we instituted to prepare new guys, and the only way you get people able to function in that chaos is by exposing them to major exercises on a regular basis.....something the Navy just won't do. 
I realize what I just wrote is pretty damning to the Naval Aviation institution...but you won't find a qualified 84 or 85 pilot or crewman who will disagree with me.


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## busdriver (Feb 3, 2015)

JB(A) said:


> Being able to make critical time-senstive decisions is a major part of the training we instituted to prepare new guys


Part of the problem is do you train guys to do mission XX?  Or do you train them to be critical thinkers?  You can train to do mission XX based on a template, and guys will memorize that template.   If anything comes up outside of that template and they'll freeze.  Or do you spend training time making them critical thinkers with a baseline core skill set so they can apply that core skill set to any situation?  As a DoD we have fucked away our training structure.


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