# Opinions on Afghanistan



## AMRUSMCR (Oct 8, 2006)

I was curious how everyone who has been to Afghanistan and have a stronger understanding of the political and cultural climate, would weigh in with their opinions on the following article.  Any thoughts?

http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=514&u=/ap/20061008/ap_on_re_as/afghanistan_4

NATO Chief Warns of Afghan Tipping Point 
By FISNIK ABRASHI
Associated Press Writers 
1 hour, 39 minutes ago


KABUL, Afghanistan -        NATO's top commander in Afghanistan said Sunday the country was at a tipping point and warned Afghans would likely switch their allegiance to resurgent Taliban militants if there are no visible improvements in people's lives in the next six months. 

Gen. David Richards, a British officer who commands NATO's 32,000 troops here, warned in an interview with The Associated Press that if life doesn't get better over the winter, most Afghans could switch sides.

"They will say, 'We do not want the Taliban but then we would rather have that austere and unpleasant life that that might involve than another five years of fighting,'" Richards said.

Afghanistan is going through its worst bout of violence since the U.S.-led invasion removed the former Taliban regime from power five years ago. The Taliban has made a comeback in the south and east of the country and is seriously threatening Western attempts to stabilize the country after almost three decades of war.

"If we collectively ... do not exploit this winter to start achieving concrete and visible improvement," then some 70 percent of Afghans could switch sides, Richards told The Associated Press.

Richards will command NATO's troops in Afghanistan, including 12,000 U.S. forces, until February, when U.S. Gen. Dan K. McNeil will take command.

The British general said he'd like to have about 2,500 additional troops to form a reserve battalion to help speed up reconstruction and development efforts.

The south of the country, where NATO troops have fought their most intense battles this year, has been "broadly stabilized," Richards said.

"We have created an opportunity," following the intense fighting that left over 500 militants dead in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, he said. "If we do not take advantage of this, then you can pour an additional 10,000 troops next year and we would not succeed because we would have lost by then the consent of the people."


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## AWP (Oct 9, 2006)

Afghans tend to hate outsiders. Hell, they tend to hate each other thanks to the tribal situation over there but they will rally against what they perceive to be an invader.

We waffled too much with the carrot and the stick. 6 months carrot, 9 months stick, carrot and the stick aqt the same time....our emphasis seemed to change but the stick was always there even if it was ineffective.

25th ID put us where we are now. MG Olsen (sp?) was a tool. He stood down his units in Afghanistan (he was the CJTF-76 commander from spring of 04 to the spring of 05) to avoid casualties there. (His Stryker BDE in Iraq was getting chewed up). His IN guys did mostly local patrolling. When the 173rd took over the bad guys had already re-supplied themselves and haven't looked back.

We had them on the ropes and let them get away.

Add Pakistan's sham commitment and the borders are wide the fuck open. There are something like 200 known border crossing points used by the ACMs.

Our logistics over there are shot: not enough helos and our convoys are tying up a lot of bubbas that could be in the mountains looking for bad guys. The Soviets did this too and that was successful.....

So, the locals don't like us and see us as weak. Our CA guys are doing great work considering they are low on the depth chart.

The bad guys are learning from Iraq too, that doesn't help much.

Our SOF guys are hamstrung, conventional leaders won't turn them loose and let them be SOF...except for the black SOF units.

I'm not surprised at all to see this shift in the people's attitudes. We just aren't focusing on OEF and it shows.


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## AMRUSMCR (Oct 9, 2006)

Thanks for the information.  It is greatly appreciated!  It clears up some questions I had about our mission over there that I couldn't get from the main stream news reports.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 10, 2006)

I did find it interesting that the British general quoted in the article mentioned "consent of the people" in connection to "Afghanistan." ;) 

It's kind of hit-or-miss with regard to how much more people "know" about Afghanistan just because they've been there; I'd argue that just being somewhere doesn't necessarily mean one has a better understanding of the larger picture.  Many times peoples' view of the big picture is colored through the soda straw of their own experiences, and they apply their own narrow tactical experiences to the operational or strategic picture.    

Freefalling's post is an obvious exception to my comment above- he's been there & done that in Afghanistan, has a grasp of the big picture and can articulate it to the rest of us.  Thanks for posting that, Free.  

Two books I read in the last year that give interesting insight into the Afghan culture (I think their names are)  "Kite Flyer" and "The Bookseller of Kabul."  I'll be glad to loan them to anyone who wants them.  Also interesting to me (although pretty dry reads) were "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" and "The Other Side of the Mountain."


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## AWP (Oct 10, 2006)

I have your copy of Kite Runner, mara. I THINK I have your address somewhere around my house.

Been there and done that? Not really, but thank you. I was in an extraordinary position to talk not only to the guys doing the deed but also surf the SIPR and sit on daily staff briefs. I don't have the be all and end all views on the country but I'd like to think I have a grasp on OEF.

Oh, other challenges include Iran's participation (covertly now I think) in smuggling in their border region opposite Farah and Herat, coalition communication (US and UK have it down pat, the other countries don't and I don't think this is a language barrier at all), and command emphasis on OEF (Iraq owns the limelight, OEF is something CENTCOM does before leaving for the night) and I think we have some barriers to overcome.

As per the norm these days, finding them and killing them isn't the problem, but the support, leadership, and strategy aren't there.


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## AMRUSMCR (Oct 10, 2006)

Thanks Mara, and Free.  I will look for the books you recommended.  It's very hard to sit on my side of the ocean, watch the regular news, and say I have even a basic knowledge of the situation there.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 11, 2006)

"Kite Runner," not "Kite Flyer," thanks Free.


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## AMRUSMCR (Oct 11, 2006)

Thanks so much for the input.  I hate reading the news with "this" and "that" happening in Afghanistan and yet not having the bare bones basic knowledge of how everything works together (or apart) there.


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## Marauder06 (Oct 11, 2006)

One of the best ways to understand Afghanistan is to real a simple history of the country.  From that you'll learn about the different ethnic groups, why Afghanistan looks the way it does today, it's strategic value historically and in modern times, etc.  To me, nothing's changed over the centuries except for the weapons and the religion.  

Also take a look at Pakistan, happenings in Afghanistan have been heavily influenced by Pakistan virtually since the latter became independent.  There's a book, aptly titles "Afghanistan" (I think) that would interest you.  If I can find it when I get home I'll mail it out to you.


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## AWP (Oct 12, 2006)

Awesome post, Eyes.

Now explain the HiG and the HiK, their role in the Soviet occupation, the subsequent internal wars that resulted in the Taliban, and where they fit in today's Afganistan. ;)

Next week you get to discuss the Hazara's role in Afghan society.:cool:


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## AWP (Oct 12, 2006)

Kite Runner the movie?

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0419887/


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## Marauder06 (Oct 12, 2006)

Cool, as I read the book I thought, "This would make a great movie."


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## PurduePara203 (Oct 26, 2006)

Eyes said:
			
		

> They will do anything and sacrifice long-term greatness for sort-term mediocrity. BA




Very true.  Loyalty is a novel concept in Afghanistan.  The short term is usually the primary concern for most Afghans, at least in my experience with them, which of course is just my personal experience.


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## AWP (Oct 26, 2006)

PurduePara203 said:


> Very true.  Loyalty is a novel concept in Afghanistan.  The short term is usually the primary concern for most Afghans, at least in my experience with them, which of course is just my personal experience.



The Soviet occupation through the present supports this view. Money talks and loyalty is just a material possession or political alliance away. The warloard in the north (Dostum?) is kept in check only through large bri...errr, payments.

Kind of like DC, just more ruthless.


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## cthulhu235 (Oct 27, 2006)

What's up Brian.

You're COMPROMISED!

hahahahahaha

- DUDE


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## Looon (Oct 27, 2006)

*Opinions on Afghanistan:*

It looks good from my house!!!!:uhh:


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## Polar Bear (Oct 28, 2006)

Great thread don't let it die guys I have learned a lot


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## archade (Aug 14, 2009)

Will history repeat itself in Afghanistan?
British military intervention in Afghanistan has a chequered history, making it easy to conclude that British forces will fail again. But such a conclusion is a mistake and does a disservice both to troops fighting there and to history itself, writes military historian Dr Huw Davies.

General comparisons of Britain's first three wars in Afghanistan and the current conflict, are difficult and fraught with pitfalls and traps. However, if one compares the specific experiences of soldiers and officers, there is much to learn from Britain's history in Afghanistan.
Many know that the British tried three times between 1839 and 1919 to subjugate Afghanistan, and each time they failed.
But when dealing with the history of British military involvement in Afghanistan, and in the difficult business of looking for parallels between then and now, it is necessary to separate the general from the specific.
The reasons for the wars in the 19th Century were somewhat different and incomparable with the reasons for the war now. If general comparisons of the conflicts are made, without looking at the specifics, it might be easy to conclude that there is little hope for success in Afghanistan.
The First Anglo-Afghan War broke out when Britain invaded Afghanistan because she feared Russian encroachment into Central Asia. The British were eventually routed and the 16,000 strong army forced to flee Kabul in the winter of 1841. Only one man survived the retreat.
Britain invaded Afghanistan again in 1878 for largely the same reasons. Despite a terrible defeat at Maiwand on 27 July 1880, the British were surprisingly successful elsewhere on the battlefield.
Unlike today, the Afghans showed an inability to adapt their tactics and the British dominated in several battles. Yet the British failed to achieve a political settlement and, as they were unable to occupy the country, chose instead to isolate it, while retaining influence in Afghan foreign affairs.
The third war broke out when Afghanistan declared independence from this quasi-British rule in 1919. However, for Britain, the Bolshevik Revolution had reduced the Russian threat and, with military spending crippled in the wake of the World War I, interest in Afghanistan gradually waned.
General comparisons, then, suggest that Britain has neither the military capability, nor the political will, to complete or attain victory in a conflict in Afghanistan.
Much has changed since 1919, though. The British Army has fought innumerable counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere, the lessons of which are proving useful now. Technological advancements have also allowed swifter and more reliable analysis of intelligence, a critical aspect of any counter-insurgency campaign.
The Cultural Dimension It appears that there is also a renewed focus on the importance of understanding the culture, traditions and customs of the Afghan population. It is here that the specific experiences of British officers and soldiers in 19th Century Afghanistan can prove useful.


During the First Anglo-Afghan War, for example, certain British officers spent much of their time learning about the culture of the local populations. In doing so, political, economic and social solutions to violent problems were unearthed.
In 1839, the British military had the difficult task of convincing the Afghan population to accept the new ruler, Shah Shuja, as he was from a different tribe to that of the deposed ruler, Dost Mohammed.
Shah Shuja's ascension to the throne in Kabul inevitably caused a shift in the balance of power, and those who had enjoyed political power under Dost Mohammed were cast aside and replaced with their rivals. This in turn caused widespread political disenfranchisement that manifested itself in violent rebellion.
“ Why, then, did the British fail in Afghanistan in 1841, and will
the same thing happen today? ”
The instinctive reaction of the British then, as now, was to meet violence with violence. But then, as now, commanders quickly recognised that violence was not necessarily the solution.
Instead, the granting of some reasonable demands might buy off the support of those that were politically disenfranchised. Then, as now, the difficulty for the British lay in identifying and separating those who were die-hard supporters of the rebellion against British authority, from those who simply felt oppressed and whose loyalty could be bought.
Cultural understanding proved critical for the British in reaching these conclusions. Inevitably, then, as now, there were those whose resistance to and hatred of the West could never be defeated without recourse to violence.
Why, then, did the British fail in Afghanistan in 1841, and will the same thing happen today?
In 1841, those in political charge in Afghanistan and British India did not perceive this "cultural solution" as being worthy of any merit. Despite the efforts of a minority of officers and soldiers, the preferred British method was retaliatory violence. For most, the "cold, hard steel of the bayonet" enforced the authority of the British Empire.
Ultimately, this almost indiscriminate use of violence alienated that segment of the population that might otherwise have supported Britain and Shah Shuja.
The difference now is that much more attention is being devoted to understanding the culture of Afghanistan and to finding solutions that do not necessarily involve military action. Efforts are being made, with some success, to incorporate cultural understanding in all military activities, from fighting to reconstruction.
But with a resurgent Taliban, apparently committed to an extremist vision of Islam and harbouring terrorists, it will also be necessary and unavoidable to use military force.
Awareness of the cultural dimension will not necessarily guarantee victory, but ignorance of it, history shows us, will guarantee defeat.

Dr Huw Davies is a lecturer in Defence Studies, King's College, London based at the UK Defence Academy

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/h...ws/8151294.stm
BBC NEWS | UK | Will history repeat itself in Afghanistan? http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pag...int/news.bbc.c...


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## x SF med (Aug 14, 2009)

The Hindu Kush, Pathan Tribes, and the crossing of the Silk Road into the Near East... All names for the area, sources of wonder and fear for the early Indian Civilization, one place the Mongols avoided, the crux of Espionage in the Age of Empires... Influenced by others but never truly conquered... A loose association of tribal groupings whose alleigances shift with the wind but steadfastly remain with the local tribal chief.  Political borders mean nothing to the Pathan (used in the old sense for the major tribal grouping in the Kush) tribes people

3 decades of war in the area? Let's see, Rudyard Kipling published "Kim" in 1901 and described an area enveloped in war and espionage for hundreds of years over a century ago. Lawrence surveyed the area for the Brits, the French and the Russians used it as a crossing point...

The peoples collectively known as the Afghans will band together to secure their homeland then dissolve those bands when they feel the threat has lifted - they will shift alliances based on what they feel is the best deal for their tribe or association of tribes.  There is a cultural miasma in the area that predates even Islamic influence.  There is a societal long view -both forwards and backwards that calls for an unchanging structure in the area.  They like some of the modern conveniences, but are happy to live in the 1500's.

The area is a dichotomy, an enigma, and modern intelligence/political/social/cultural analysis  is not going to work unless the culture and area and history of the area are brought into the current situational review.  

Until we look at the area with a less politically modern set of eyes, we are going to end up as every other civilization that has tried to control the area - mired and confused and stymied.   FID and UW and CA are the most efficient ways to gain what trust we can, but these are a set of peoples that have been at this for a long time against many other 'invaders'.  We need to look at the bigger view, or the smaller view - depending.

Just my :2c:


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## Manolito (Aug 14, 2009)

OK if we accept Britains take on the current situation how do we sustain better. 

I don't see an infrastructure that can support prolonged econonic growth. I don't see us working to replace poppies with ? , building materials, clean water, health care, central pride, national respect. 

Wow I just had an idea lets reform their health care and leave ours alone. 

None of the needed changes can happen in 6 months if everybody was from the same tribe. Hell it takes longer than 6 mo. to change my personal economic conditions. 

I am not saying give up I just want to read the sustained plan not the secret squirrel stuff just the how are we going to improve the life of the average family. 

I fought in a different time and we had providence chiefs and all they care about is the local area and the quality of life for their little part of the country.:2c:


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## Mac_NZ (Aug 14, 2009)

x SF med said:


> The internet sound of the nail being hit on the head



The Troll nailed it.  IMHO to succeed the focus needs to move off Afghanistan as a whole and towards the tribal groups.  A lot of what needs to be done is SF work backed up by the big Army stick.  By that I don't mean just kicking in doors and grabbing HVTs I mean teaching these people a better way and getting them involved in the fight.  Most of the Afghanis I met were Hazaran and were very anti-taliban which does shape my thoughts on the matter.  A central govt will never rule completely in that country.  If you can get the provinces onside one by one the country will follow.  Hand in hand with that the external support and safe haven needs to end, if the Pakis don't want to come to the party than maybe they need to be brought kicking and screaming.


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## Looon (Aug 14, 2009)

x SF med said:


> Until we look at the area with a less politically modern set of eyes, we are going to end up as every other civilization that has tried to control the area - mired and confused and stymied.


And there you have it. 

I firmly believe that Afganistan is 'unconquerable'.

Going in with guns a blazen has never worked.


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## Boondocksaint375 (Aug 14, 2009)

I don't think it's necessarily unconquerable, we just need to adapt and overcome the correct way.


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## AWP (Aug 14, 2009)

Boondocksaint375 said:


> I don't think it's necessarily unconquerable, we just need to adapt and overcome the correct way.



I agree. People that know me know I'm a pessimist, but I do believe that we can beat down al Q, the TB, the HiG, the HiK, and anyone else that tries to stop a legitimate, pro-Western government from taking root. I believe that we can turn this country around.

We've blown a lot of credit with the people here, but we can win them back. I don't think they've turned their backs on us yet, but they could if we aren't careful.

We can still win this, but will we?


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## Looon (Aug 14, 2009)

Freefalling said:


> We can still win this, but will we?


The "we" is the key. Does this country have the stomach and the will to see it through? I don't think so.

One thing that has always pissed me off, is that we haven't totally destroyed the poppy fields.

That's a whole other 'political' dynamic.


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## x SF med (Aug 14, 2009)

Looon said:


> And there you have it.
> 
> I firmly believe that Afganistan is 'unconquerable'.
> 
> Going in with guns a blazen has never worked.


 
Afghanistan may be unconquerable as a collection of tribes, but the war is winnable. Ther eis a large segment of the population that is anti-Taliban and Anti Al Qaeda - for purely selfish or tribal reasons. There is also a large segment of the population that is ambivalent, and wants nothing more than to survive, unmolested and without foreign (meant as outside the tribe/clan) influence other than trade. One needs to understand the mindset and motivation of the partisans and the resistors as well as the sympathisers to the current regime. We are not talking about Americans with the same set of learned and observed behaviors - this is a different culture and set of social norms. One week/month/year the guys across the valley are your allies, the next your bloodsworn enemies - and that is likely to change.



Boondocksaint375 said:


> I don't think it's necessarily unconquerable, we just need to adapt and overcome the correct way.


 
see above.



Freefalling said:


> I agree. People that know me know I'm a pessimist, but I do believe that we can beat down al Q, the TB, the HiG, the HiK, and anyone else that tries to stop a legitimate, pro-Western government from taking root. I believe that we can turn this country around.
> 
> We've blown a lot of credit with the people here, but we can win them back. I don't think they've turned their backs on us yet, but they could if we aren't careful.
> 
> We can still win this, but will we?


 
That remains to be seen if the right type of influence and or force is applied. Dropping off bags of drought resistant food crop seed could go a long way - further than guns in many cases. Show them better ways to irrigate, help improve roads and sanitation. And take out the leadership of the local arms of AQ, Taliban, HiQ, etc. - quietly and with as little fuss as possible. It's doable if it's done properly in conjunction with a good FID/UW plan and CA support.



Looon said:


> The "we" is the key. Does this country have the stomach and the will to see it through? I don't think so.
> 
> One thing that has always pissed me off, is that we haven't totally destroyed the poppy fields.
> 
> That's a whole other 'political' dynamic.


 
Destruction of the poppy fields would be a diastrous step - see above for a better way to turn that corner. Why reduce an already scoured economy without some type of replacement - poppies buy food for these people, you need to give them a way to self suppoort, not a path to slow starvation and the grave - it's counter productive. Don't poison the river, teach them to fish and to conserve the fish population.

Can the politicians understand these methods - probably not, it is a hybrid that is totally foreign to them - Hearts and minds and blowing away the opposition all at the same time.  Education, support and military action at the same time.


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## Looon (Aug 14, 2009)

I saw a report early in the war. Growers were approached about growing other crops for export. They wanted nothing to do with it because NO OTHER crop would bring in as much $. The Afgan Govt was willing to overlook it as well.


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## AWP (Aug 14, 2009)

Looon said:


> I saw a report early in the war. Growers were approached about growing other crops for export. They wanted nothing to do with it because NO OTHER crop would bring in as much $. The Afgan Govt was willing to overlook it as well.



I think last year was the first year where wheat was more profitable than poppy. The gov't won't touch eradication with much vigor because Karzai's brother is one of the biggest exporters.


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## Manolito (Aug 15, 2009)

I can only go on what I read I have never been in country. Only 4% of the available land is in production mostly due to eradic snow fall and almost no irrigation. USGS has found large deposits of minerals and natural gas but no production has started. 

China has signed a 2.6 Billion dollar project to mine copper. Go figure we do the hard work and China moves in on the opportunities. 

We promised $26 Billion in aid and have only delivered a small portion as well as the other countries that promised support have backed out on their support. 

There is a real need for tractors and irrigation before we can expect the poppies to go away. In order to be profitable they will need mechanical plant and harvest equipment. I understand the poppie is scored by hand and the resin is harvested by hand not requiring any up front capitalization.

I truly believe if we don't fight on his soil we will have another loss on our soil.


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## rwtbkk (Aug 20, 2009)

*winning?*

Well from a VFOG I can tell you winning is political. Don't matter how many bodies you stack up, it ends up with who is holding the plate at the dinner table. 
So there are two problems. 
First is perception of winning, unfotunately we never manage that part too well becaus there are waaay too many politicians who can make hay by nay saying (can anyone say Murtha). 

Then there is security, something you will never have as long as an enemy has safe havens just across the border.. (believe me I know about this one). Without security no amount of aid works. Insecure people do whatever is best for NOW and screw the future. 

Opium can be eliminated if you did what the King of Thailand did. He didn't destroy the fields. He brought in agri specialist, found the right crops then built roads to deliver it to market. The the farmers figured it out, more money and no one trying to kill them over the production rights. Worked. Some might call it enlightened...

And Afghanistan isn't much different than a lot of tribal areas. They all are on about the same level whether Africa, Asia or anywhere else. 

I thought we learned this lesson once but then again we "lost" there so everone tried to forget it as soon as possible.


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## crapgame (Aug 20, 2009)

FWIW, Rory Stewart - yes, him - was interviewed this week on a radio program called To The Point.  I'd post a link with this to a audio file if I knew how.

I think he pretty much nailed the big picture about "winning" and "what we're doing there" and  explained also the bigger questions we're overlooking.

I'd be interested in learning if anyone else has listened to the interview, and what they think.


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## ///M3 (Nov 4, 2009)

saw this online, anyone read it yet?  I'm just starting to stab away at it:

http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf

"One Tribe at a Time"
Major Jim Gant


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## car (Nov 4, 2009)

Mac_NZ said:


> The Troll nailed it.  IMHO to succeed the focus needs to move off Afghanistan as a whole and towards the tribal groups.  A lot of what needs to be done is SF work backed up by *the big Army stick*.



I think the backup should be from the State Dept. Diplomacy and nation building is not the Army's job. We've already proved that point in Iraq. The USSD sent 2nd and 3rd stringers to Iraq who couldn't find their collective ass with both hands (because the 1st stringers didn't want to get their hands dirty - and disagreed with GW's policies), so the commanders on the ground did what they do best - ID'd a void and filled it, even though those filling the void weren't trained for the job. That's how Dave Petraeus made his bones......enough of that.

We shouldn't conquer A-stan any more than we should conquer Iraq. Just stabilize it so that there's no longer a threat to our way of life. They're gonna do what they want to when we leave anyway.....don't fool yourself. As stated early on - it has been, and will always be a global xroad - whether it's silk or opium, the goods will flow. Ameican ideas and ideals will never take hold. They've been getting along just fine without us since long before we became an "us." :2c:


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## AWP (Nov 4, 2009)

car said:


> We shouldn't conquer A-stan any more than we should conquer Iraq. Just stabilize it so that there's no longer a threat to our way of life.



Which is the issue..... Iraq is/ will be easier to accomplish, Afghanistan will be much, much more difficult to get to that point IMO. Calling it a third world country is classing it up a level or two beyond what it is. I think we are years away from stabilizing it such that it isn't a breeding ground for anti-American/ anti-Western threats. This is also a question of Pakistan as well, we can't divorce one country's problems or influence from the other. The result is that we have to "fix" two countries and not one.

I really question if we are up to it.


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## Shifty (Nov 4, 2009)

///M3 said:


> saw this online, anyone read it yet?  I'm just starting to stab away at it:
> 
> http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf
> 
> ...



The link isn't working, can you post again?  Major Gant is one hell of a warrior,  I would follow him as my Team Leader any day of the week.  During the period I was with him I learned more than I ever though I could.


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## Mac_NZ (Nov 4, 2009)

Agreed SGM but I would't want to be working out there in the wop wops without the CSS, FSPT and Aviation assets that big Army has.  I'm not too sure of how big a logistical footprint an SF Bn has, if they are self supporting in all those areas then it's a non point.



Shifty said:


> The link isn't working, can you post again?



This one will work Shifty.  Just click on the PDF download link from there.  I read this a few weeks ago, it's a very good read. http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/one-tribe-at-a-time/


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## ///M3 (Nov 4, 2009)

Shifty said:


> The link isn't working, can you post again?  Major Gant is one hell of a warrior,  I would follow him as my Team Leader any day of the week.  During the period I was with him I learned more than I ever though I could.



that's awesome.  very cool that you had the opportunity to serve with him.


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## 7point62 (Nov 4, 2009)

car said:


> I think the backup should be from the State Dept. Diplomacy and nation building is not the Army's job. We've already proved that point in Iraq. The USSD sent 2nd and 3rd stringers to Iraq who couldn't find their collective ass with both hands (because the 1st stringers didn't want to get their hands dirty - and disagreed with GW's policies), so the commanders on the ground did what they do best - ID'd a void and filled it, even though those filling the void weren't trained for the job. That's how Dave Petraeus made his bones......enough of that.




The State Department needs risk-taking Foreign Service Officers as civilian  counterparts to military units, people who will go out in the field and not just stay in the green zones. Military commanders shouldn't have to be saddled with nation-building, conflict termination, stability and political operations. There are plenty of experienced people, many of whom are contract employees of USSD or DHS, who'd probably jump at the chance for a career as risk-taker FSOs. COIN is as much political--if not more--as it is tactical.


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## 7point62 (Nov 5, 2009)

McChrystal understands what stabilization entails and requires, the resources and time that it will take. The most important thing is that the focus needs to shift to the development of Afghan involvement in every phase, security, political, economic, governance, military, etc, (while the hunt for UBL and AQ continues). If this means long-terming the advisory efforts and/or extending tours of critical personnel to 18-24 months, so be it.

This can't be _our_ victory, it has to be an _Afghan_ victory. The US/UN/NATO/ISAF is not going to win the hearts and minds of the Afghans--we have nothing in common with them--only the _Afghans_ can win the hearts and minds of the Afghans. We should move into a supporting role as soon as possible.

If the Administration wants to stabilize Afghanistan, it needs to get off its ass and send McChrystal what he needs: enough troops for security so the COIN/FID/Advisory specialists can work at ramping up Afghan participation to the point where they can dominate the battle and we can actually start stepping into the background. Obviously this is going to take time. The American/NATO/ISAF warfighters will have to buy that time.

Exiting is not the answer. Condoleeza Rice said if we abandon Afghanistan we will pay for it with another 9/11 scenario and I think she's right. If we give up and get out we will create a vacume, a free zone that empowers not only the Taliban and AQ but other Islamic Jihadist cells worldwide. 

Unfortunately, I don't think _anybody_ who keeps his or her job at the whim of the voters is going to have the balls to see this through. And I think Obama right now, with his indecision and delay, is like a mouse being chased by a fat lady with a broom...he wants to get the fuck away and he's scurrying around looking for a hole.


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## AWP (Nov 5, 2009)

Great post 7point62, but one thing is missing: the new troops being requested need not arrive until we figure out logistics, infrastructure, funding, and construction. We have some bases here with logistical shortfalls, poor infrastructure, not enough room, and no plan on the books to resolve this. Winter is coming so we can rule out construction in many parts of the country. New troops arriving next year are going to look around and wonder what in the hell we did in this country since 2002. Those who have gone to Iraq will be treated to an entirely different world when they step off a plane in Bagram or Kandahar.

We can send eleventy billion troops over here and it won't matter without the proper amount of support. To paraphrase Gen McC: we can do everything right and still lose this war.


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## car (Nov 5, 2009)

Free - You've made many posts bitching and moaning (not a disparaging term) about the lack of infrastructure. Why is that? (The lack of infrastructure, not your pissing and moaning ) I assume that it's because the focus has been on IZ, and with the change of administration, there hasn't been much focus anywhere over there. So, what's needed - other than what GEN McC has requested?

I, too, agree with 7.62. What makes my heart hurt is that we're re-learning lessons already taught. And it's been a pretty short time since we learned them the first time. Hell, it hasn't been that long since the Sovs did what they did -- and we should have learned lessons from their adventures  :doh:

What infrastructure isn't there - in your opinion?


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## AWP (Nov 5, 2009)

car said:


> Free - You've made many posts bitching and moaning (not a disparaging term) about the lack of infrastructure. Why is that? (The lack of infrastructure, not your pissing and moaning ) I assume that it's because the focus has been on IZ, and with the change of administration, there hasn't been much focus anywhere over there. So, what's needed - other than what GEN McC has requested?
> 
> I, too, agree with 7.62. What makes my heart hurt is that we're re-learning lessons already taught. And it's been a pretty short time since we learned them the first time. Hell, it hasn't been that long since the Sovs did what they did -- and we should have learned lessons from their adventures  :doh:
> 
> What infrastructure isn't there - in your opinion?



No offense taken, Sir.

In no particular order:

Communications: "Net-Centric" may be a cute buzz phrase but it is reality. As you know ISR platforms and methods are data-intensive....they soak up a lot of bandwith. You have to add to it email and Net activity, think of how many documents are sent via email or accessed on a Sharepoint server. This takes a toll on bandwidth, all of which is delivered via satellite. You also have cable, IP addresses, computers, phones..... A lot of moving parts that are not cheap. Without getting into specifics, we need more of the above and adding additional bodies will tax an already strained system.

Land: Some locations weren't built with the number of troops currently in country in mind. I spoke to one camp mayor this week that is looking at projected troop numbers vs. existing billeting and office space and he doesn't have enough of the latter. I went to one camp where the mayor was trying to find space to park all of his vehicles AND house an influx of new troops. Some camps HAVE to expand, they don't have any choice, but terrain is a limiting factor.

Supplies: We don't have Kuwait/ Basra to help keep us going. Karachi plus our air bridge is barely working. The bad guys know that they can attack our resupply routes in Pakistan with relative impunity; commanders are even accepting a certain amount of supplies being lost in Pakistan. The air bridge is too costly and can't support us, we need Karachi and Pakistan.

Buildings: B-huts that were supposed to be torn down in 2006 are still being used because we aren't buildinig permanent or semi-permanent facilities fast enough. We've tried employing the locals to help us build them.....some barracks and even pre-fabbed steel buildings are taking over a year to complete. Afghanis make our DOT look efficient. Our Corps of Engineers, Combat Engineers, and Red Horse units are.....not here and if they are we don't have enough of them and besides, building materials have to travel through Pakistan.

Aircraft: We don't have enough of any type, combat or support.

Here's what killed us: we spent 2003-2007 staring at Iraq while Afghanistan burned. We funneled money and support into the country, staffs were ordered to ignore Afghanistan in order to focus on Iraq (phone calls and email went unreturned for days while staffs in the rear worked on Iraq), officers and NCOs viewed Afghanistan as a career-killer and preferred to go to Iraq.....

Iraq is a major reason why were are in this boat today. I think our rapid, SOF-based victory made us think the war was over and if it did continue it would be easy to deal with. I am still amazed at the officers and senior NCOs who don't grasp that Afghanistan has mountains in excess of 15k feet and that many location are inaccessible during the winter.

We have enough challenges here without being our own enemy.


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## car (Nov 5, 2009)

Freefalling said:


> No offense taken, Sir.
> 
> In no particular order:
> 
> ...



Don't ever call me "Sir" again, or I"ll find a way through the miasma that you describe, to get there and beat your ass 


I agree with everything you said. I find it hard to believe that folks would have rather gone to IZ instead of the Stan, but I know the mindset you're talking about. But damn, that's where it started and that's where it's going to be for a while.......shit, I sat thru sandstorms at Arrifjan for a week trying to get to Bagram - because that's where my people were and that's where I believe the fight is (Not necessarily Bagram.....but A-stan).

Read "Cobra II," if you haven't. It's about the planning leading up to the invasion of IZ. For those of us who've been around, it's not very surprising about all the poilitics involved (and the pressure brought to bear on GEN Franks by the SECDEF), but it gives insight into just what you're talking about - how the focus shifted away from A-stan to IZ.


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## AWP (Nov 5, 2009)

I read Cobra II based on your recommendation, read it twice actually so far and will probably get to it again in 3-4 months (when I'm done with my 6th book covering the Great Game). It is a great book and reaffirmed my hatred for Rummy and his crew.

Bandwidth exists, but I agree that it is a problem worldwide. The real issue is that no one was forward-thinking enough to get ahead of the curve; we've reacted and it has hurt us at times. You can't wait until your pipe is saturated before requesting more....it is too late.

Terrain: I think the scope of the terrain and the size was something that some weren't prepared for. A great case: The Pech River valley is narrow and the mountains and ridges around it can be very steep at times, land is at a premium and we usually don't dominate the high ground. That has shaped certain aspects of our life here.

And back in 04-06 I had Army and AF O's and NCO's complain that they were here and not Iraq with many lamenting about the careers because they were sent to the, as one called it, "B Team war." If their worries were unfounded then we still have a problem when such a wide-range of personalities, jobs, and backgrounds were all thinking the same thing.

As a support guy I look at these things, critically at times, maybe too critically. I can never, will never, rationalize sending guys out to troll for IEDs or kick in doors or meet with village elders while providing them half-assed logistical, communications, and intelligence support. It isn't how I was raised many years ago and I'll go to my grave believing that world-class combat arms deserve world-class combat and service support. I think we have failed or are failing in some of those areas. We can turn things around, they aren't lost, but will we? Do we possess the depth of faith (and resources) to go as far as is needed?

Oh, I'll still call you "sir," I just won't capitalize it. Take that!


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## Manolito (Nov 5, 2009)

Free I understand some of your points but having not been there leaves me short on first hand information. Before I retired last year I toured some infrastructure belonging to the Big Army in the US. 

I will say that if we are no better at supporting infrastructure in country than we are in the US we are in trouble. I was Director of a public works owned by the Army and I can tell you what we house our troops in is discusting. We have to understand to pay for the fighting materials is not enough. We have to have infrastucture to house and support our troops and their families.

I draw a correlation between our gangs in the US and the tribal environment in Asia, HOA, and our current locations. We sure aren't doing very well on gangs here and I know first hand how we did in asia. I will have to rely on you and others to tell me how we are doing in your part of the world?

Every time we do something it is like the first time it has ever been done. Last year I read a report on the SIPRNET and the phrase Hearts and Minds was used. :doh:

Burn the Poppies plant crops send tractors and get the hell out. :2c:


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## 7point62 (Nov 5, 2009)

Free, any strategy or plan is only as good as the ability to manage and resource it. I think our leaders forget that...and I think you've made good points that illustrate that fact. Our leaders tend to focus on The Bottom Line and fail to grasp the complexities involved. You can never decouple strategy from resources. 

There is so much bullshit rhetoric that comes out in war and the harsh realities are buried under a pile of it. Politicians--and military leaders, too--can fall in love with illusions and denial. I saw it every day in VN and I see it, from a distance, now.


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## Rock42 (Dec 12, 2009)

If people who hang out all day on the boardwalk in KAF and in line at the DQ in BAF woulld do their jobs, this "war" would be over.


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## AWP (Dec 12, 2009)

Rock42 said:


> If people who hang out all day on the boardwalk in KAF and in line at the DQ in BAF woulld do their jobs, this "war" would be over.



Crazy talk! Those people are important! We need MORE fobbits, more I tell you!


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## Rock42 (Dec 13, 2009)

Anyone caught in PTs between 8-8 should be sent immediately to a Firebase. Stack the turds 10 high to replace the torn hescos. if they arent going to do their jobs, might as well protect the war fighters. 

The LNs are useless, this is going to be a long process to get them on their feet.  No amount money we dump in is going to get them a pair.


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## Trip_Wire (Dec 13, 2009)

In reviewing the whole thread this morning, I agree with what the troll said. Of course, most of what he said, (IMO) was based on the way SF soldier's are trained to think. I also have to agree with what Car had to say about our never ending failure to grasp the lessons of the past and in turn having to learn the same old lessons the hard way once again. I also like many of the points made by FF. My bottom line is that I hope we don't pull out of the 'Stan and have it turn into what it was before a haven and training for terrorists from all over the world. To me the key to winning in the 'Stan is solving the problems with and in Pakistan.


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## 8'Duece (Dec 14, 2009)

What really constitutes a "Win" in Afghan ???  What's the end game there ?  

Are we going to put the needed financial resources into building roads, waterworks, schools and help create a viable industry to which Afghan can begin in the future to import and export goods and services ?? 

Again, this is game of "whack a mole" and I really don't see a "Win" unless the entire population decides to take sides with us and form a 1,000,000 strong army and police force with air and ground assets which match that of our own capbilities. 

I have a feeling our SOF forces are in for a long stay.  Permanent bases ? PCS type orders for the next 40-50 years ???

I'm a bit out of my lane here since I haven't ever stepped foot in the middle east, but great thread thus far.


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