# WARRIOR LEADER: Air and Ground Mobility in Afghanistan, SOF Workload



## Ravage (Mar 19, 2011)

http://www.special-operations-techn...qaa-command-sergeant-major-george-bequer.html





_Command  Sergeant Major George Bequer graduated from the Special Forces  Qualification Course in 1984. Upon graduation, he was assigned to  Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha 722, Bravo Company, 1st  Battalion, 7th Special Force Group (Airborne), where he served as a  junior weapons, senior weapons, and senior engineer sergeant until 1989.  He was then reassigned to Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Special  Warfare Training Group as a company TAC until 1990, and then served as  an instructor/writer at the Special Forces Weapons Sergeant Course until  1992._
_He  was then assigned to Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG (A) (CIF)  Panama as an assaulter on ODA 791 and as a sniper SO leader and  operations and intelligence sergeant on ODA 796 from 1994 through 1996.  He assumed duties as the team sergeant of ODA 773, Alpha Company, 3rd  Battalion, 7th SFG (A), from 1996 through 1999. He was further assigned  as the first sergeant of Group Support Company 7th SFG (A). Bequer was  selected for the U.S. Army Sergeant Major Academy in 1999, attending  class 50. After graduation, he was reassigned to Bravo Company, 2nd  Battalion, 3rd SFG (A) (CIF) where he served as a company sergeant major  from 2001 through 2003. Selected for CSM in 2003, he has served in the  following CSM positions: CSM 4th Battalion, 1st SWTG(A), CSM 2nd  Battalion, 7th SFG(A), CSM, 7th SFG(A), and CSM, Combined Joint Special  Operations Task Force-Afghanistan from 2003-2004 and 2008-2009. He is  currently serving as the CSM, Special Operations Command Central  [SOCCENT]._
_In  addition to completing noncommissioned officer professional development  training at every level, his military education includes completion of  the basic airborne course, ranger course, special forces qualification  course, jumpmaster course, naval gunfire course, special forces  operations and intelligence course, special operations target  interdiction course, basic instructor course, combat lifesaver course,  basic military free fall course, U.S. Border Patrol tracking course and  KEYSTONE._
_His  awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal with two oak leaf  clusters, Defense Meritorious Service Metal, Meritorious Service Medal  with five oak leaf clusters, Army Commendation Medal with five oak leaf  clusters, Joint Service Achievement Medal, Army Achievement Medal with  one oak leaf cluster, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, Army Superior Unit  Award, Good Conduct Medal with seven oak leaf clusters, National Defense  Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Afghanistan Campaign Medal  with two campaign stars, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal,  Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Humanitarian Service Medal,  Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon with three oak  leaf clusters, Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Ribbon and the Northern  Atlantic Treaty Organization Medal. He has earned the Combat Infantryman  Badge, Special Forces Tab, Ranger Tab, Master Parachutist Badge, and  the Military Free Fall Badge._

*Q:  Sergeant Major, could we start with an overview of Special Operations  Command Central [SOCCENT] and how you would characterize the past year?  Obviously Iraq and Afghanistan figure largely in your AOR, but can you  briefly touch on what else is going on in the AOR?*
A:  Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this great command. I am  grateful for the chance to educate your readers on our mission and the  magnificent servicemembers we lead who are performing that mission.
SOCCENT  is a subordinate unified command in the busiest combatant command in  the Department of Defense. The vision of the SOCCENT commanding general,  Major General Charles T. Cleveland, is to build, command and fight the  finest multidiscipline joint/combined Special Operations Command in the  Department of Defense. Our forces proactively seek out, counter or  defeat threats to the U.S. and its interests in the CENTCOM area of  responsibility [AOR] by executing SOF campaigns that maximize partner  nation and interagency capabilities and U.S. unconventional warfare. On  order, we rapidly deploy a joint task force headquarters capable of  commanding both special operations forces and conventional forces.
During  the past year, we have been responsible for the planning, preparation  and command and control of all theater special operations forces in the  AOR—in, as you mention, Iraq and Afghanistan—but also in every country  in every stage of the defense cooperation spectrum, including the  Central Asian States, Pakistan, Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council  countries and Lebanon. We work with our partners and allies essentially  executing foreign internal defense missions, military information  support operations and civil military operations. Out of 20 countries in  our AOR, SOCCENT has a permanent presence in 12 of them—a direct  reflection of our commitment to the persistent, habitual relationships  we have in theater.
When  I think about the past year, I am humbled by the work our operators and  support personnel are accomplishing in these varied, vast areas. It is  truly impressive and I am continually amazed at the work ethic and  Herculean efforts I see accomplished everyday in the most austere and  difficult conditions.
The  relevance of special operations forces continues to grow as we  demonstrate their abilities to deal with the complex threats that we  face today. Our success is largely due to the fact that our theater  special operations forces are built to fight, win and dominate in the  complex, human-centric environment that characterizes warfare today and  into the foreseeable future.


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## Ravage (Mar 19, 2011)

*Q:  What is the command structure with the commanders in Afghanistan and  Iraq and how does that work for mission allocation and planning?*
A:  Early in his tenure, the commander recognized that Iraq and Afghanistan  both had ample theater SOF expertise at the tactical level, in the form  of the combined joint special operations task force. These formations  are the absolute best at what they do. What was missing, however, was  theater SOF expertise at the operational level, namely at ISAF and  USF-I.
To  fill the void, we fielded two one-star-level commands: Joint Forces  Special Operations Component Command–Iraq and Combined Forces Special  Operations Component Command–Afghanistan. These two headquarters  represent theater SOF and their by-with-and–through perspective in host  nation senior leaderlevel engagements, and in the U.S./coalition boards,  centers and cells that help shape the operational campaigns—campaigns  that are in many ways, very SOF-centric.
It’s  important to remember that nobody looks at the theater the way theater  SOF does. The two theater commanders are able, from the theater special  operations command level, to better support these [commands] by owning,  in part, their requirements.
We  have similarly pushed extensions of the TSOC into Pakistan and several  other critical countries where we have theater SOF working with partners  across the range of SOF operations on a permanent to nearly-permanent  basis. This distributed command and control allows the TSOC to get a  JSOTF-like effort from tailored command and control nodes without the  normal footprint. We continue to test the bounds of what can be done in  these nontypical campaign environments.


*Q:  As far as both the numbers of people and the number and types of  missions, what do you see as the trend for 2011—more or less assets,  more or less activities?*
A:  It’s impossible to see accurately into the future, and I wouldn’t  speculate anyway—but I will tell you that I see no shortage of work in  the future for SOF. Because of the very nature of our business, we are  always in demand—whether that’s in major combat operations or in  pre/post combat stability operations. SOF operations are pivotal to  success in both large-scale conflicts and in SOF training and advisory  missions with partner nation forces in establishing regional stability.


*Q:  Partnerships are important all around the world. Could you reflect on  some of the relations with your international special operations  colleagues in the Middle East?*
A:  We have found that most of the countries in our AOR eagerly seek out  opportunities to train together. Unfortunately, while we take every  opportunity to increase our engagement with our international special  operations colleagues, available U.S. forces remain constrained because  of commitments to the two war efforts. Operating with indigenous  populations, or simply increasing our periodic interaction, has led to  many of these colleagues becoming true friends over the years, but more  importantly, has opened many doors which had previously been closed to  us.
Our  partnered SOF efforts serve as prime examples of what I’m talking  about. The premium that theater SOF places on knowing the indigenous  population’s history and culture, as well as our expertise in special  operations skills, allows our operators to develop the confidence and  trust that is critical to the theater SOF approach to war fighting. To  operate in this environment, we require skilled leaders capable of  developing and executing SOF campaigns that center on fighting with  forces of that specific country. World-class training facilities such as  the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre outside of  Amman, Jordan, give us a place where we can come together to train and  sharpen critical SOF skills.


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## Ravage (Mar 19, 2011)

*Q: What are some initiatives you think are important to improve and grow these relationships?*
A:  Conducting enduring engagements with our international special  operations colleagues is a critical element in growing and improving our  link to the partner nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Levant  and other countries in the AOR. Strong, professional bonds with all of  our special operations forces counterparts open new opportunities to  engage at the operational and tactical levels. Ultimately, enduring  engagements enhance and shape partner nation SOF capability and  relationships, which improve U.S. and partner nation security in the  region. Our SOF elements focus on what is required, based on combined  analysis with our partner nations.
As  an example, in Jordan, we conducted the first SOF staff talks in June  2010 between SOCCENT, USSOCOM and Jordanian Special Operations Command  [JSOCOM]. We see this initiative as one we must sustain, and one we  would like to see mirrored in our other partnerships where the U.S.  government wants to help improve their SOF at the institutional level.  The SOF staff talks were the first service staff talks between special  operators in the history of U.S. engagement in the AOR, and they helped  us to further our relationship across a broad variety of requirements.  Discussions like the SOF staff talks lead to improvements in our  relationship that will help in expeditionary SOF war fighting in the  future.
Q:  The United Arab Emirates is an important hub for Middle East security.  What is being done to strengthen the ties between the special ops forces  of both countries?
A:  The best thing you can do to keep a relationship strong is to work hard  toward a common goal together. We do that every day in Afghanistan, and  through our command and control node at Joint Special Operations Task  Force–Gulf Cooperation Council. We conduct continuous and sustained  training with the United Arab Emirates’ Special Operations Command, and  we each have contributed liaison officers who live, work and communicate  side-by-side every day in the offices of our respective headquarters.  We routinely share ideas and viewpoints, both in informal settings and  in professional forums, such as this year’s SOF Regional Conference in  Abu Dhabi. The April conference, which we will co-host with The Emirates  Center for Strategic Studies and Research, is titled Strengthening  Regional Partnerships for the 21st Century, and will include SOF leaders  from across the AOR. The United Arab Emirates provide an incredibly  great service toward the fight against violent extremism, and we expect  that our partnership will remain mutually important and mutually  rewarding in the years to come.


*Q:  There has long been a special relationship with Jordan—King Abdullah  himself was at one time the commander of Jordanian Special Operations  Command. Do you expect this relationship to become even closer and how  can you help make that happen?*
A:  I expect our relationship with Jordanian special operations forces to  do nothing but improve. We are able to continue improving our  relationship through a candid understanding of what U.S. and Jordanian  requirements are, and subsequently working hard to ensure that they are  met. In order to make our partnership even closer, we hope to foster  future immersion opportunities between U.S. and Jordanian SOF such as  Jordanian NCOs traveling back to the U.S. for training and working  toward better access for U.S. special operations officers to the Royal  Jordanian Defense College. Our SOCCENT liaison team, which includes an  officer living in Amman on permanent change of station status in order  to provide long-term continuity to JSOCOM, is currently working to  strengthen the new relationship between Jordanian special operations and  NATO SOF headquarters, as well as advise SOCCENT on other measures that  we believe will help JORSOF optimize their force and their contribution  to regional stability.


*Q:  How have U.S. special forces met the challenge of a continuing presence  in Iraq during the drawdown and the increase in regular force levels in  Afghanistan?*
A:  This really is a question for the force provider—not us. We are the  consumer of trained and ready forces. With that caveat, I will tell you  that challenges of force structure in Iraq and Afghanistan persist due  to the high demand for special operations forces, and the formations  that support them in rotation after rotation. Deployment tempo is high  and corresponds to the high demand for SOF. In Iraq, reliance on SOF has  actually increased as U.S. forces transition to stability operations.  We know that reliance on us will remain high as forces draw down and  prepare to leave Iraq by December 2011.


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## Ravage (Mar 19, 2011)

*Q: What is the availability and readiness of rotary wing assets you have at your disposal?*
A:  Our Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component has  operational-level control of several U.S. Navy HH-60 helicopters, as  well as several U.S. Army special operations MH-47 and MH-60  helicopters. These units support special operations missions throughout  Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, we are supported by some conventional  CH-47 Chinooks, as well as HH-60s and AH-64s from our partner nations.
To  sum up, we have sufficient rotary wing assets to accomplish our  mission, but we can always use more. An effective variety of airframes  provided by each of the U.S. military services and some of our  international partners support the full range of humanitarian and  military missions we are charged with performing. The maintenance and  associated availability rates of the aircraft have been excellent, which  is a tribute to not only our maintenance force, but to the logistic  system that makes use of multiple supply channels to get parts and  materiel wherever and whenever we need them. Could we use more aircraft?  Of course—but our current availability of rotary wing aircraft  adequately supports our strategy in theater.

*Q:  What are your biggest mobility issues in Afghanistan? A: I’ll break  this answer down into two parts: ground mobility and air mobility.*
With  regard to ground mobility, we are seeing great success with the RG  family of MRAPs. They are required as a basic mobility platform for SOF  formations across Afghanistan. The RG MRAPs weigh more than the standard  M-ATV, which reduces the chance of the vehicle being flipped during a  sustained blast to the underbelly, and it was built to withstand a  higher net explosive weight before a hull breach is experienced.
The  RG MRAP is not always the ideal mobility platform for all areas and  mission sets in Afghanistan, however. They are restricted by the tight  terrain associated within areas of Afghanistan like Oruzgan, East  Paktika, Bahglan, Nangarhar, Nuristan and Khost provinces. The SOF  mission set associated with village stability operations also precludes  the use of oversized, heavy RG MRAP platforms which physically can’t get  to or successfully operate in small/remote villages located on top of  mountains, in and around soft/loose dirt, or because it presents a  militaristic presence that intimidates or too closely resembles  conventional formations.
The  ideal situation is to provide each SOF formation with an array/menu of  tactical and non-tactical mobility platforms because they will ideally  select several in order to accomplish each mission set. The RG family of  MRAPS, the Oshkosh M-ATV, the M1113/M1165 GMV, the Kawasaki Tyrex  LT-ATV, the indigenous motorcycle, and/or the up-armored non-tactical  vehicle are all potentially-required mobility assets that support the  current SOF foreign internal defense, Afghan local police and village  stability operations missions being executed in Afghanistan today. With  regard to air mobility—I will start with a five-year-in-themaking  success story: short takeoff and landing [STOL] aircraft. Especially in  Afghanistan, we require these specialized aircraft because many of our  operations take place in areas without road access, and as you saw from  my answer to your previous question, because it is optimal to travel  using airlift in many instances. Large, full-size airfields are not  widely available near operations and outposts, necessitating the need to  land in smaller and more restrictive spaces. The STOL has the ability  to use these smaller areas, and STOL airdrop is a timely and expedient  way to execute infiltration/exfiltration and resupply. In order to  receive aerial resupply, a SOF element has to move to the selected drop  zone, clear it of potential hazards and secure it. A team-size element  clearing and establishing security for a drop zone is a challenge due to  its limited size. Add to this challenge the fact that recovery  operations often require materiel handling equipment to quickly recover  bundles we drop—one A-22 bundle of JP-8 fuel, for example, weighs 1,600  pounds—and you have a complicated, dangerous mission. These  moderate-risk, lengthy, manpower-intensive operations are reduced if  dedicated STOL or rotary wing aircraft are available to conduct air,  land or sling-load operations directly into a village stability staging  area in lieu of airdrops.
Mobility  issues in Afghanistan will continue to be difficult no matter what  because of the tyranny of distance and terrain that continues to present  operational and logistical challenges for special operations forces.  Mountain passes and underdeveloped road networks create challenges for  us, and provide an additional layer of protection for the enemy.
Despite  all of these difficulties, the sustainers [who make up only 4 percent  of the entire CJSOTF populations] are getting the mission done,  requiring constant engagement in order to resupply operators without a  loss of effectiveness. Here are some facts and figures from the CJSOTF  in Afghanistan alone that illustrate what I mean: In 2009, the CJSOTF  dropped 7 million pounds of cargo during 250 airdrop missions using  4,726 bundles. In 2010 the CJSOTF dropped more than 19 million pounds of  cargo during 875 missions using 14,516 bundles. The CJSOTF culminated  in the month of November 2010 dropping 2.3 million pounds of cargo, 1.9  million pounds of which were rigged from our two facilities in  Afghanistan.


*Q: Any closing thoughts about the people you have operating in SOCCENT?*
A:  I am tremendously proud of the efforts our operators and support  personnel are making, both in theater and at our headquarters  facilities, both forward-deployed at SOCCENT Main and at SOCCENT Rear in  Tampa, Fla., to effect the results I’ve witnessed in the last year.  This is the busiest TSOC in the inventory, and our OPTEMPO shows no sign  of slowing down. I am continuously amazed at the standard of excellence  that I see displayed every day by these selfless servants of our  nation, and by their honest desire to serve a cause greater than  themselves—the security and defense of the United States. ♦


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