# Speech by Deputy SECDEF Bob Work



## Il Duce (Apr 16, 2015)

http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1930

The link is to a speech given by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work, on the future of land combat.  I thought it was very interesting with a number of significant implications.

It's very technology-focused but still valuable to see where our senior leaders' strategic thinking is headed.

I think it bears directly on the 'women in Ranger School' discussion on going and some of the conflicts it has exposed (heavy vs light, Cav vs Infantry/LRRS, future role of women in the force).

In the disaggregated, combined-arms force imagined in Mr. Work's comments the critical capabilities of ground forces become intelligence, adaptive, tech-savvy, and culturally sensitive leaders capable of operating across multiple echelons and warfighting functions - not so much on formations to close with and destroy the enemy. 

In such a force combining Infantry and Armor branches into 'Maneuver', integrating females into all branches, and creating units serving much more as force providers than deployable elements makes total sense.

I'm not convinced you gain more than you lose with those paradigms but I think it gives an interesting strategic driver to the decisions being made vice the common argument our leaders are just 'politically correct.'  Which, of course, is not mutually exclusive from the other strategic motivations.


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## DA SWO (Apr 16, 2015)

Il Duce said:


> http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1930
> 
> The link is to a speech given by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work, on the future of land combat.  I thought it was very interesting with a number of significant implications.
> 
> ...


So big Army becomes SF?


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## Il Duce (Apr 16, 2015)

We've already got the black berets so, 80% of the way there...


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## Dienekes (Apr 16, 2015)

Very good speech, but I see it as him trying to turn war into COD: Advanced Warfare and the like, which may or may not be very far off. I obviously don't know enough about warfare or technology to determine the future, but it is unbelievably interesting to contemplate.


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## TLDR20 (Apr 16, 2015)

Sometimes you need a guy to climb down a hole and slay the enemy where he is. Nothing culturally sensitive about that.


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## Il Duce (Apr 16, 2015)

@TLDR20 I think that's definitely one of the weaknesses of the strategic concept.  I'd take it even further, we need units that have trained and operated together to be able to deploy, locate, close with, and destroy the enemy through combined arms operations.  You can't create that mix-matching personnel and disaggregating units to the nth degree almost regardless of their individual quality and capabilities.


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## 0699 (Apr 16, 2015)

The MEUs spend six months training up and working together before they deploy.  Task-organized units always perform better than administratively-organized units.


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## x SF med (Apr 17, 2015)

Even in the basic Infantry, a cohesive 12 man squad can beat the living piss out of a larger element if that squad is task oriented and bonded.


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## AWP (Apr 17, 2015)

I think he's on the right track, but takes too much at face value. Nearly every OPORD or mission statement has the line about conducting full spectrum operations. Intellectually deficient leaders will pay lip service to a "new" concept because they believe they already possess that capability. We double down on those intellectual and ethical failures by believing we won in Iraq or Afghanistan, but even worse when we utter the lie "We were winning when I left." If we lack the honesty to address our failures then we cannot move forward because our "house" is predicated upon falsehoods.

He's very right in that combined arms is the basis for every contingency. If you can't execute that 80% then the other 20 will fall apart. The problem then becomes knowing when to move from one mission set to another.

I thought his comments about technology and Eisenhower were ironic. I guess he forgot about the Hurtgen forest and battles through the winter of 44-45. We fought a war of attrition, not one of technology. Our tanks were never superior to the German's, but we had a lot of them...quantity has a quality all its own. Technology isn't a panacea. His revelation that the Soviets fight in echelons was known to us since...the 40's. That isn't something we discovered in the 70's.

He makes some great points, but I think he's overstating our ability to change and adapt. All through the 90's the buzz was about "low intensity conflict," Somalia and the Balkans demonstrated that, yet less than a decade later in Afghanistan our leaders were gobsmacked by the irregular nature of warfare. Even during the Surge commanders, despite all of our talk about modular brigades, still deployed fobbits in droves because they are a part of the brigade, not because of their need.

The failure is one of blood. So long as our leaders are fighting for OER bullets, fiefdoms, and the next pay grade, we can't trust them to execute any doctrine that isn't in line with their career ambitions. They will manipulate and scam the system for their own good while masquerading behind a generic mission statement.

The 1's and 0's won't matter unless we first address the human component.


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