Strategic Utility of US Navy SEALs

Polynikes

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Thought it would be interesting to share:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a501950.pdf

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"The current insurgency in Iraq has necessitated the overwhelming use of special
operations forces (SOF) in operational and tactical roles. With an expected draw down
in Iraq, it is time to refocus SOCOM on the strategic utility of SOF, specifically on
the Maritime arm of SOCOM, the Sea Air Land (SEALs). SEALs bring unique capabilities
based on their comparative advantage in direct action and their familiarity with the
maritime domain. This comparative advantage contributes to their strategic utility as
a short duration, direct action force working from land and sea.
The SEAL culture, based on the history of the organization, their recruitment,
selection and training, has historically focused on direct action operations.
Insistence of indirect action will atrophy the skill sets of these maritime commandos.
Historic research will illustrate successful strategic uses of SEALs in an effort to
provide guidelines to decision makers. These decision makers must incorporate a
balanced approach to the war, where an over-reaction and over commitment of forces to
one mission set will likely imperil, not help, U.S. strategy. The Navy SEALs have an
historic and proven comparative advantage in direct action based operations and best
serve SOCOM’s strategy fulfilling their strategic utility."
 
That's fine and all, but the reality is that everyone wants to go where the action is, regardless of if it fits into their mission set or not.

Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan would be a great example of that.
 
Also, realize this master's thesis paper was written by a SEAL Officer....so it's gonna be biased....just saying!
 
That's fine and all, but the reality is that everyone wants to go where the action is, regardless of if it fits into their mission set or not.

Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan would be a great example of that.

Doesn't really pertain to this subject, but I listened to your podcast on sofrep. You gave a great interview, hope you do another one sometime soon.
 
https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/c...e_67/biographies/commander_eric_peterson.html

I'm assuming this is the same guy, I'm assuming it is because he was a Lt. commander at the time it was written (now he's a Commander). Nothing on his bio indicates a background as a SEAL.

Nice try, but if you're gonna try to be a smart ass at least pay attention to detail. It might help if you actually read the shit you post, instead of trying to impress people:

*This paper was written by LCDR Erick Peterson in 2009 at the Naval Post Graduate School. In it he acknowledges his "brothers-in-arms" from the Naval Special Warfare community. Also, it has reference to the fact that he got a B.A. from CSU Long Beach in 1994.

After reviewing CDR Eric (no k) Peterson's bio, he is a former SWO and now Naval Aviator. He attended the Naval Academy in 1991 and went to the National War College in 2008 (It's on the complete opposite coast of NPS).

In conclusion, two totally different people.
 
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@Lycurgus do many SEALs go the aviation route? It seams that Peterson is not the first I have heard of to travel that path. I know that there are quite a few Rangers that decide to go the rotary wing route, I'm wondering if the numbers are comparable on the NSW side (fixed or rotary)?
 
Nice try, but if you're gonna try to be a smart ass at least pay attention to detail. It might help if you actually read the shit you post, instead of trying to impress people:

*This paper was written by LCDR Erick Peterson in 2009 at the Naval Post Graduate School. In it he acknowledges his "brothers-in-arms" from the Naval Special Warfare community. Also, it has reference to the fact that he got a B.A. from CSU Long Beach in 1994.

After reviewing CDR Eric (no k) Peterson's bio, he is a former SWO and now Naval Aviator. He attended the Naval Academy in 1991 and went to the National War College in 2008 (It's on the complete opposite coast of NPS).

I meant no disrespect at all, I apologize.
 
I'm not going to take the time to read that whole thesis, but I think it's interesting the author is making what is basically an economics argument about why SEALs need to stick with DA:

SEALs bring unique capabilities based on their comparative advantage in direct action and their familiarity with the maritime domain. This comparative advantage contributes to their strategic utility as a short duration, direct action force working from land and sea. The SEAL culture, based on the history of the organization, their recruitment, selection and training, has historically focused on direct action operations. Insistence of indirect action will atrophy the skill sets of these maritime commandos.

A comparative advantage implies that you produce a marketable product more effectively than your competitors. The "comparative" part of "comparative advantage" means there is something else with which to compare one's own production. The clear implication here is that SEALs do DA better than everyone else. I'd be interested to see how the author quantifies the implication that SEALs do DA better and that they produce more effective DA forces comparative to other SOF units.

The problem with comparative advantage is, of course, that it's possible to over-specialize in one area of trade to the exclusion of other production possibilities. This means when the market in your one particular good is saturated, or if no one is buying, then you have specialized yourself out of the market.

IMO, the SOF "market" is saturated with people who do competent DA: SEALs, SF, Rangers, Delta, MARSOC, etc. Every one of those organizations is going to be competing for missions, money, and manpower as our military constricts. Again IMO, organizations that are able to satisfy more national-level requirements are going to be better postured to ensure their long-term legitimacy and relevancy. Those who choose to overspecialize, especially in something like DA which many might consider the least complicated of SOF's traditional missions, might run the risk of getting left behind in the funding and operational use battles that are coming up or getting rolled up into someone else's task force instead of operating independently.

Lycurgus and other SEAL members, are you concerned that an evolution to a "we do DA only" SEAL force might ultimately mean the marginalization of SEALs in the long term? The next commander of SOCOM is likely not going to be a SEAL, and it is not likely that another SEAL will head up JSOC in the near future. With the drawdown, a reduction in missions, and commanders coming from other communities, is it wiser to focus the SEAL mission more narrowly, or to open the aperture?
 
Lycurgus and other SEAL members, are you concerned that an evolution to a "we do DA only" SEAL force might ultimately mean the marginalization of SEALs in the long term? The next commander of SOCOM is likely not going to be a SEAL, and it is not likely that another SEAL will head up JSOC in the near future. With the drawdown, a reduction in missions, and commanders coming from other communities, is it wiser to focus the SEAL mission more narrowly, or to open the aperture?

The aperture has already been widened. We are hard at work training all of the skills that have been put on the shelf and marginalized the last decade. Getting our feet back in the water so to speak. The hardest part is expectation management for new SEALs and some that only want to do the sexy stuff! If you don't evolve, you become irrelevant. One of the current commanders at SOCOM put it best: "The days of the unilateral direct action are over." (with some exceptions obviously) Guys will have to adapt to the new normal.
 
In general, you always hear about a gulf or disconnect between the Team level and higher, regardless of the branch. The guys at the ground level see a need but command sees something different. That gulf has always existed and always will, BUT (and the premise of my post) how wide will that gap be in say 5-10 years? DA is a "lazy" way out for a commander. It generates numbers, looks cool, doesn't require language training or "hard" skill sets (long or difficult to acquire), and has been the norm for most units over the last decade. (Rangers, this obviously doesn't apply to you. As pointed out, DA has always been your focus).

I have to wonder if we've created a generation of lazy commanders. Shoot houses are cooler and show better to congressional staffers than SR and hide sites, "FID with a bullet" is easier to explain, practice, and justify than "archaic" methods such as talking to some tribal chieftain and drinking his putrid goat milk or whatever.

My musings from the sidelines.
 
SR and hide sites could be cooler to show congress and staffers if you did it right. Give them a couple day tour of the base, as an example... then hand them a product of what they dug up. It'd blow their minds, honestly. Especially considering the digitalization of everything, it'd really throw them for a loop exactly what a proper SR team of any "brand" can pump out given simply a mission.
 
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