1st Marine Parachute Regiment

[Gunz]

They never made an actual combat jump. The 1st battalion was decimated at Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal and later, like the Raiders, disbanded. But they were tough and fought hard. Ira Hayes, the Pima Indian who was later one of the six men in the famous flag raising on Iwo Jima, was a jump-qualled ParaMarine with the 1st Marine Parachute regiment.

The U.S. Airborne during WW II - Attached Units - 1st Marine Parachute Regiment(Paramarines)

 

[Red Flag 1]

They never made an actual combat jump. They were decimated at Edson's Ridge on Guadalcanal and later, like the Raiders, disbanded. But they were tough and fought hard. Ira Hayes, the Pima Indian who was later one of the six men in the famous flag raising on Iwo Jima, was a jump-qualled ParaMarine with the 1st Marine Parachute regiment.

The U.S. Airborne during WW II - Attached Units - 1st Marine Parachute Regiment(Paramarines)

Nice find, Ocoka!!

 

[Kraut783]

Really nice find, I had no idea there was such unit then, very interesting part of history.

 

[Gunz]

Here's a bit more.



http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Publications/Publication PDFs/Silk Chutes and Hard Fighting US Marine Corps Parachute Units in WWII.pdf


Ira Hayes in standard Marine jump school graduation photo, in dress shoes and khakis no less.

The Raider and Para units were disbanded around the same time. I don't think it was predjudicial on the part of Big Marine Corps, it was a question of tactical necessity. The Corps was engaged in either jungle fighting or big unit amphibious beach assaults on heavily fortified islands, neither situation condusive to commando or airborne operations. Even before the battle of Guadalcanal was over, Merritt "Red Mike" Edson was moved from command of his famous Raider Bn to CO of 2nd Bn 5th Marines.

 

[Devildoc]

Thanks for sharing. I love this kind of history, and a good example of the trials and tribulations of raising new units. Knowing how utterly cumbersome and bureaucratic the military is I have always been interested in how the military stands up new units so quickly, funding, manpower, logistics, etc. WWII was famous for this.

 

[AWP]

Thanks for sharing. I love this kind of history, and a good example of the trials and tribulations of raising new units. Knowing how utterly cumbersome and bureaucratic the military is I have always been interested in how the military stands up new units so quickly, funding, manpower, logistics, etc. WWII was famous for this.

And the GWOT, a much longer running war, is not.

 

[Johca]

WWII was full mobilization war having significant manpower requirements, the GWOT is not a full mobilization war. If it was conducted as full mobilization war the GWOT would have ended by now. Further the rule of engagement governing the fighting of WWII were not hampered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additions to these agreements signed by Nations-State governments since then.

 

[TLDR20]

WWII was full mobilization war having significant manpower requirements, the GWOT is not a full mobilization war. If it was conducted as full mobilization war the GWOT would have ended by now. Further the rule of engagement governing the fighting of WWII were not hampered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additions to these agreements signed by Nations-State governments since then.

Key commentary, I would have never known!

 

[Devildoc]

WWII was full mobilization war having significant manpower requirements, the GWOT is not a full mobilization war. If it was conducted as full mobilization war the GWOT would have ended by now. Further the rule of engagement governing the fighting of WWII were not hampered by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additions to these agreements signed by Nations-State governments since then.

And by full mobilization, it was FULL mobilization. Roosevelt assumed powers that were constitutionally nebulous and federalized much of industry and created resources by verbal command. That war touched every American in some way. Too true that the GWOT does not/did not.

 

[AWP]

The breadth of mobilization has little to do with importance or innovation. As DevilDoc put it:

Knowing how utterly cumbersome and bureaucratic the military is I have always been interested in how the military stands up new units so quickly, funding, manpower, logistics, etc. WWII was famous for this.

He's exactly right. Our bureaucracy and politics, in and out of uniform, have crippled our ability respond to existing and emerging threats. We can do it, you see traces of it in the MC-12 acquisition process, counter IED technology, and the odd weapons system, but we fell short in other areas. In part the systems are complex, but mainly we lack the will or humility to develop certain capabilities.

The only way the size or scope of our mobilization/ involvement matters is "visibility" in the form of political capital or pressure.

 

[Devildoc]

Our bureaucracy and politics, in and out of uniform, have crippled our ability respond to existing and emerging threats.

It seems to me that in WWII, everyone--the government, the citizenry, the industry--was fully behind the war effort and it was "go big or go home." Now, it's more "let's see just how little we can spend (vis-a-vis time, materiel, personnel, money) to meet the minimum goal."

Absolutely agree the visibility and optics have taken priority over the overwhelming will to win.

 

[AWP]

It seems to me that in WWII, everyone--the government, the citizenry, the industry--was fully behind the war effort and it was "go big or go home."

In many ways they did. In others there were roadblocks. One could argue that problems we see today were on display (if behind the scenes) during WWII.
- Marines in the ETO. I think it was Marshall who lost his mind over the prospect of Marines in Europe. He was vicious on this point, so much so the handful of Marines in the OSS didn't wear their uniforms as much as their Army and Navy counterparts. They had to hide from their own gov't.
- The B-29. HUGE teething problems led to the Battle of Kansas (or Wichita in some accounts). The difference between it and the F-35 (a lot of programs now) is how it was handled.
- Tanks vs. tank destroyers. One reason the Sherman sucked is because of a huge internal fight favoring cheap tank destroyers. The position was that TD's were cheaper than tanks (they are) and more capable (nope) because you could make more for less. That hampered the fielding of the M-26 Pershing.
- The U-boat fight. FDR advocated subchasers which utterly failed. The Navy wanted destroyers which were more expensive in all respects and that meant they never had enough. The Brits propsed destroyer escorts and while sort of misnamed, they were better for convoy escort duties and made at a fraction of the cost of a new DD.

That's what I recall off the top of my head. Even when everyone was committed they had their dog in the fight and screw everyone else.

 

[Devildoc]

In many ways they did. In others there were roadblocks. One could argue that problems we see today were on display (if behind the scenes) during WWII.... Even when everyone was committed they had their dog in the fight and screw everyone else.

Most definitely. I am finishing a very, very good book--American Warlords: How Roosevelt's High Command Led America to Victory in WWII--that goes into some of these issues.

Politicians are what they are, and everyone has a dog in the fight (no pun intended). Of course, Roosevelt nationalizing just about everything made for certain efficiencies.

 

[DA SWO]

In many ways they did. In others there were roadblocks. One could argue that problems we see today were on display (if behind the scenes) during WWII.
- Marines in the ETO. I think it was Marshall who lost his mind over the prospect of Marines in Europe. He was vicious on this point, so much so the handful of Marines in the OSS didn't wear their uniforms as much as their Army and Navy counterparts. They had to hide from their own gov't.
- The B-29. HUGE teething problems led to the Battle of Kansas (or Wichita in some accounts). The difference between it and the F-35 (a lot of programs now) is how it was handled.
- Tanks vs. tank destroyers. One reason the Sherman sucked is because of a huge internal fight favoring cheap tank destroyers. The position was that TD's were cheaper than tanks (they are) and more capable (nope) because you could make more for less. That hampered the fielding of the M-26 Pershing.
- The U-boat fight. FDR advocated subchasers which utterly failed. The Navy wanted destroyers which were more expensive in all respects and that meant they never had enough. The Brits propsed destroyer escorts and while sort of misnamed, they were better for convoy escort duties and made at a fraction of the cost of a new DD.

That's what I recall off the top of my head. Even when everyone was committed they had their dog in the fight and screw everyone else.

P-51.

The B-17 almost got canned as too expensive/complicated.

 

[Gunz]

And the stakes were higher then, obviously. That alone helps to grease the wheels. But there was plenty of contention. FF mentioned the B-29's major teething problems. The American Mark XIV torpedo was another horror story. They were innocuously clanging off Japanese hulls and sinking to the muck for a full 18 months before anything was done about it.

Nevertheless, between then and now the levels of indifference on the part of the public and the media are night and day.

 

[AWP]

P-51.

The B-17 almost got canned as too expensive/complicated.

The P-51 is a great one but I thought the -17 was a pre-war decision. Pre US involvement at least. Our fighter development was hampered by strategic bombing advocates, but I'm mainly thinking of programs during the war.

And the stakes were higher then, obviously. That alone helps to grease the wheels. But there was plenty of contention. FF mentioned the B-29's major teething problems. The American Mark XIV torpedo was another horror story. They were innocuously clanging off Japanese hulls and sinking to the muck for a full 18 months before anything was done about it.

Which was a major, huge indeed, but a pre-war engineering failure that carried into the war. The Germans had a similar issue that wasn't resolved until 42/ 43.

---

WWII and Vietnam saw us make some huge, long-lasting developments in our military's capabilities. Not just equipment but TTP's in some cases (carrier aviation in WWII comes to mind). The GWOT didn't do much in comparison despite its length and the money spent. That should be a cause for concern.

 

[DA SWO]

The P-51 is a great one but I thought the -17 was a pre-war decision. Pre US involvement at least. Our fighter development was hampered by strategic bombing advocates, but I'm mainly thinking of programs during the war.



Which was a major, huge indeed, but a pre-war engineering failure that carried into the war. The Germans had a similar issue that wasn't resolved until 42/ 43.

---

WWII and Vietnam saw us make some huge, long-lasting developments in our military's capabilities. Not just equipment but TTP's in some cases (carrier aviation in WWII comes to mind). The GWOT didn't do much in comparison despite its length and the money spent. That should be a cause for concern.

We were not challenged technologically by the GWOT.
VN was the last time we were challenged technologically, and our EW capabilities skyrocketed because of that challenge.

 

[Gunz]

The GWOT strikes me as soldiers from the future fighting soldiers from the past. Technologically you'd almost have to dumb-down.

 

[DA SWO]

The GWOT strikes me as soldiers from the future fighting soldiers from the past. Technologically you'd almost have to dumb-down.

Disagree, mentally and morally we need to dumb down.
We overthink shit and let PC drive tactics.

 

[Dienekes]

Disagree, mentally and morally we need to dumb down.
We overthink shit and let PC drive tactics.

I don't mean to attempt to derail the thread, but could you expound on this a bit more? Specifically the morally. I don't know the specific upper limits of the ROE or their evolvement throughout the wars other than, it was much much much more lenient in the initial invasion than today.