525 BFSB

[RetPara]

It's been changed back to an MI Brigade? WTF?

 

[Florida173]

Only thing I could find on it.

The 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade has been redesignated as an expeditionary military intelligence brigade -- the first of its kind.

525th Military Intelligence Brigade Unveiled on Fort Bragg | Military.com
Fayetteville (N.C.) Observer | Oct 30, 2014

 

[DA SWO]

It's been changed back to an MI Brigade? WTF?

Some O-6 needed a bullet on his/her OER

 

[Il Duce]

The Battlefield Surveillance Brigades (BFSB) started out with an intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance mission - sending elements out to gain intelligence for the commander. To me it was a great idea, the consolidation of function allowed for greater training management and execution, especially on highly technical collective skills. However, the organization of the Army made it move towards a maneuver element as LRRS, a lot of aviation, and much of the scouting functions were under the maneuver rubric. MI folks stopped leading the organizations so they became another maneuver command. MI 2020 (which is the Army vision for intelligence organization over the next several years) tried to align MI formations into a more standardized construct - the same with their support relationships. They took all of the MI pure elements out of the BFSBs and made them Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigades (E-MIBs) and renamed the existing Theater Intelligence Brigades (TIB) as Military Intelligence Brigade Theater (MIB-T). I'm in a MIB-T myself.

 

[AWP]

The Battlefield Surveillance Brigades (BFSB) started out with an intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance mission - sending elements out to gain intelligence for the commander. To me it was a great idea, the consolidation of function allowed for greater training management and execution, especially on highly technical collective skills. However, the organization of the Army made it move towards a maneuver element as LRRS, a lot of aviation, and much of the scouting functions were under the maneuver rubric. MI folks stopped leading the organizations so they became another maneuver command. MI 2020 (which is the Army vision for intelligence organization over the next several years) tried to align MI formations into a more standardized construct - the same with their support relationships. They took all of the MI pure elements out of the BFSBs and made them Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigades (E-MIBs) and renamed the existing Theater Intelligence Brigades (TIB) as Military Intelligence Brigade Theater (MIB-T). I'm in a MIB-T myself.

With Bacardi clouding my mind...this "name change" also reflects a return to more of an MI mission rather than a maneuver element with a pseudo MI mission?

 

[Il Duce]

So, this is me editorializing so take it with a grain of salt:

I think the Army G-2 (LTG Legere, soon to be MG Ashley) would say yes but I don't think the mission was ever really in question - gaining intelligence was always the mission. The issue they're trying to deal with is control, i.e. do intel whackers get a command, set training requirements and standards, and perhaps most important to senior leaders do they control the budgets and billets for these organizations.

The model they've gone to is one where forces are consolidated for organization, manning, training, and equipping - something that makes it easier to train intel-specific tasks. But, in terms of employment it's a force provider - a unit out in the force has an E-MIB element (multi-functional team, CI/HUMINT team, or analysis and control team) show up to fill a requirement for extra collection, analysis, and/or processing. I think the SF Groups make the model work pretty well with support squadrons but the further up the chain you go the more difficult the model is to work. 525 is one of only 3 AC E-MIBs, and they're a pretty small structure - not even close to being able to support half the BCTs out in the world, not to mention all the non-BCT units that might need intelligence support.

Anyways, that's kind of a rambling answer to say yes, it brings the E-MIBs back to an MI-pure construct in terms of MOS functions in the Army. But, the construct continues to have the same problem the entire force has - treating the fight for intelligence as a task of specialists instead of one for the commander. I remember reading a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) article interviewing an outgoing BCT commander in 2007. He was explaining how innovative his BCT had been because 'sometimes they launched operations just to gain intelligence.' I mean, we're talking about a BCT CDR, someone who graduated Ranger school, was selected CSL for command twice, and has spent 20+ years dedicated to the profession of arms - and this motherfucker thinks he just invented fighting for intelligence. It boggles my mind and I think is a reflection of the false walls we put up in operations by the way we organize and label functions in the military.

Alright, climbing down off my soap box...

 

[AWP]

He was explaining how innovative his BCT had been because 'sometimes they launched operations just to gain intelligence.' I mean, we're talking about a BCT CDR, someone who graduated Ranger school, was selected CSL for command twice, and has spent 20+ years dedicated to the profession of arms - and this motherfucker thinks he just invented fighting for intelligence.

I think I'm going to drink more and post less tonight. I just hit "peak stupid." In other news, cars roll better on round vs. square wheels and "welcome to the party, Colonel."

 

[RetPara]

Wonderful... just fucking wonderful.

I realize this is some what ancient history, II Duce, but the second paragraph tracks on the basic rationale of the CEWI concept.... The Corps associated MI Bde's spent decades sending out penny packets to support deployments as needed. IE, the 519th MI had guys in the Battle of the Black Sea in '93. They were guides for the armored column that went to pull 3rd Batt back in.

The comments of the former BCT Commander is what I have seen spout from a number of mid and senior level combat arms leader mouths from the 70's on. It seemed to decline with some mech/heavy leadership after the NTC rotations started sending Bn & Bde Commanders home with two or three cases of humble pie. A direct result of of NOT fighting the counter recon fight or aggressively patrolling forward of their positions and to their flanks.

Sometimes trying to explain a patrol plan to a 3 shop as something they need work with the 2 shop on in the afternoon for night execution can be like teaching kindergarten sometimes.

 

[Il Duce]

Roger @RetPara - I think we lost a lot when we lost the CEWI BNs. EN and FA branch have been smart about getting back the capabilities they lost in modularity - MI has gone the opposite way (making the jokes about it being an oxymoron make more and more sense). I think the operating paradigm in Army MI, as envisioned by the DA G-2, is intelligence is just something you do in a room with an internet connection. It's a terrible mistake in my view and will be proven so the next war when the intel is all fucked up AGAIN.

Ok, I said I was climbing off my soapbox - but looks like I gave you bad intel on that one too.

 

[Brill]

The issue they're trying to deal with is control, i.e. do intel whackers get a command, set training requirements and standards, and perhaps most important to senior leaders do they control the budgets and billets for these organizations.

For the win!

@RetPara , this is old news http://archive.militarytimes.com/article/20131229/NEWS/312290003/5-BCTs-set-inactivate-year-MEBs-also-going-away

Check out some of these slides. The first one from the Dep G2 has good details.

 

[Florida173]

I'm just troubled on how far the pipeline for army MI is with DIA. There is nothing to be learned in the enlisted pipeline

 

[RetPara]

I think the operating paradigm in Army MI, as envisioned by the DA G-2, is intelligence is just something you do in a room with an internet connection. It's a terrible mistake in my view and will be proven so the next war when the intel is all fucked up AGAIN.

The main problem MI senior leadership has had for decades is that they're just too damn smart. The USAICS has from the outset been dominated by officers and NCO's on the Seoul/Hiedleburg track with only a very minor portion ever coming from the real tactical or SOF side. They forcus on all kinds of high speed shit, but fail to teach the young officers and warrants the basic needs of what a Bde, Bn, or Co Commander want to hear.

I'm just troubled on how far the pipeline for army MI is with DIA. There is nothing to be learned in the enlisted pipeline

BULLSHIT. The question is, how hard the enlisted troops want to push themselves and how the MI NCO leadership really get beyond the damn motor pool and look for training opportunities that are out there funded by national level agencies. There used to be funding (REDTRAIN) that would send junior NCO's and enlisted to work at national or theater level organizations. The problem being is that in MI units that often cut down on the number of available troops for details as the opportunities were months long.

You can develop a specific regional expertise on your own. I have a hard back library on the middle that is seven foot tall and nine feet wide. I was able to write papers for PGIP without leaving the house. Also if your unit has a regional focus, internal training on the history, politics, economics, religions, an ethnic make up are great training topics. Additionally at the tactical level working with the S3 to understand friendly operations, fire support, and aviation really will round out an MI trooper. Another source of learning is the unit Staff Weather Officer. If your at the Battalion or Brigade level it can be a PITA to make this work, but getting a basic understanding of meteorology can reduce the 105 rounds in direct fire mode from the Commander when 'What's weather going to be tomorrow 2?' Tactical intell ain't easy and being a junior enlisted is harder. But, like MI LT's, you gotta raise 'em right.

 

[Florida173]

There used to be funding (REDTRAIN) that would send junior NCO's and enlisted to work at national or theater level organizations. The problem being is that in MI units that often cut down on the number of available troops for details as the opportunities were months long.

I'm with you on most of it, and absolutely concede on most counts because I have very little experience at the conventional and tactical level intel levels. My experience is limited to going through the NCOA courses and being blown away at the lack of higher level understanding. Doing more DCGS training gets people no where if it will be replaced by the next best thing soon enough. One systems fit all approach to analysis is complete fail. SLC is the first time where there may be opportunities to learn at a highside level, but by that point you are already transitioning to the babysitting phase of the enlisted corps. Again, my understanding of the conventional tactical side is limited, but I see the guys coming from it to support the TSOCs and SOCOM all the time and I am not impressed.

My point to how I'm troubled is how what you are describing seems exceptional.

On the idea of REDTRAIN, you still have it through Foundry. reference AR 350-32 Army Foundry Intelligence Training Program. I am not all that familiar with actually taking the classes, but we had some people from INSCOM pushing it down as an opportunity.

I prefer some of the JSOU courses and DIA offers some great courses through MTTs that fall inline with DISAP requirements... or whatever they are calling it these days. Intelligence Collection Course is a prereq for the Intelligence Collection Management Course. Somewhat confident on the names, but it's been a few years. Either way.. I learned more in two weeks from the first course than any other course that has been offered in the traditional pipeline as I know it.

 

[Ves]

Another source of learning is the unit Staff Weather Officer. If your at the Battalion or Brigade level it can be a PITA to make this work, but getting a basic understanding of meteorology can reduce the 105 rounds in direct fire mode from the Commander when 'What's weather going to be tomorrow 2?' .

I guarantee you can get guys to come over to do this, and training can be mutually beneficial. SWOs in general need a better idea of weather's impacts on their supported units, especially considering the swath of places we can be assigned. Plus it breaks up the monotony of the staff side of things.