Budget cuts and Marine Corps chopper crashes -

[Ooh-Rah]

Ran across this today, I haven't read Stars and Stripes on a consistent basis in a long time, so am somewhat surprised to see them running a 'real' news story and offering an opinion about something.

WASHINGTON — A threefold increase in helicopter crash deaths last year is raising questions about whether budget cuts are endangering troops by forcing deep cuts in maintenance and training. Twelve helicopter crashes in 2015 killed 30 servicemembers — three times as many deaths as in 2014. Twelve more died Jan. 14 when two U.S. Marine CH-53 Super Stallions collided off the coast of Oahu in Hawaii during a night training flight.

Slew of military helicopter deaths raises question of whether budget cuts endanger troops

The opening slideshow at the beginning of the article is pretty powerful, unfortunately I was not able to embed within this post.

 

[Devildoc]

Within the article a source said that while there was not a one-for-one correlation, decreased flying hours do impact (flying) performance. Before reading the article that was my first thought: while there may be correlation, can one show causation?

I had heard a former military aviator say once that flying is a skill, and the more you do it the better you get. The inverse is probably true.

 

[Ranger Psych]

That's exactly it, the shit hot pilots are the ones with the lifetime's worth of hours doing it, in combination with the intimate understanding of the airframe with regards to what you can, and cannot do with it. Confidence in abilities through experience versus expectation and/or bravado.

I had to fly to work, and home from work, every two weeks... and later on, worked at an airport. While the "we can get it in there" attitude is great in some regards, having the ability and understanding to know when conditions or terrain are outside of your safe operational envelope is HUGE and why I would happily fly with who we had doing flights, and wouldn't fly at all as well as pushed to not have service our location, other companies/pilots. Unfortunately, my understanding of those companies and pilots proved right, as they put a bird into the ground in our airstrip and another company's lead pilot put his aircraft into a mountain.

 

[AWP]

Given competent initial training, low risk or high risk activities you can't beat experience. I haven't tracked them in years, but for a long time the bulk of jumping fatalities were those under 200 jumps or those who rarely jumped. If you read any aviation AIB report, one whole section is devoted to qualifications, experience, and flight hours over the last 90 days.

 

[Ranger Psych]

A perfect example was a very competent pilot, owner of the company..... well, they got their Carvair nose and rear door loading top cockpit circa 747 DC-4 mod up and running.... inaugural flight with actual cargo on our rather........interesting airstrip, they came in, and now the wreckage is either still there or buried to the side of the runway. Everyone onboard survived, however that pilot really screwed up.

The runway's leading edge for a north approach was a 40 foot rock embankment, South approach was untenable for anything other than a Herc due to a 50 foot hill directly at the end of the runway. He didn't know it, but the impact points of where the gear hit showed (once I did the math, NTSB never actually came out to look) that with the additional distance between cockpit on a DC-4 and the Carvair, he came in on a perfect DC-4 approach.... but with that vertical variation, he came in with nearly exactly the cockpit location variance offset... putting him about 15 feet or so LOW.

Airframe currency and experience played a huge part in that crash, obviously.

 

[Devildoc]

I read a book about 10,000 hours being the "magic number" in which to be an expert, but I also think that has been debunked. I also recall reading something about 400 hours being the magic number in which a "new" pilot "feels" like he has transcended into being an expert from novice, which actually makes him more dangerous, and the number of accidents go up around that number.

Regardless, I am no efficiency expert but I know enough to know the more you do something the better you get.

Edited to add, I worked as a flight medic, and all of our pilots were former military pilots. The safety parameters in the civvy world are just outstanding and except for one just-released-from-the-Army pilot felt extraordinarily safe with these guys.....because they had flown, a lot, for many, many years, and knew that they and the aircraft could do.

 

[AWP]

Airframe currency and experience played a huge part in that crash, obviously.

Bingo. People think "hours is hours" which isn't the case as you know. 1000 total VFR hours in a single engine Cessna isn't the same as even a few hundred multi engine hours in IFR conditions. A few hundred hours in Alaska carries far more risk and planning than a few hundred hours in FL or the desert. Total time is good, but time in type plays a huge role alongside currency.

Standards shift. 1,000 jumps and 1k hours skydiving used to be a big deal. A D license was 200 jumps and 100 jumps a year was considered a norm. Now I see jumpers saying 300 jumps a year is good, 100 jumps a year is like barely better than student status, and 1000 jumps isn't as meaningful as "back in the day." In some respects the sport and gear haven't changed, but our perceptions have.

 

[RetPara]

The combination of the various opinions

I have a little aviation experience (S2 NCO for VMFAT-101 back when they flew F4's in Yuma, S2 NCO for 501st Attack in Katterbach and S2 for 4th Bde) 6 hours in F4 backseat, and 4-5 hours in OH-58's left seat. Staying close to the 3 shop, especially in a fighter training unit, you can learn some things. As Freefalling put flight hours are not all equal. There is a lot of muscle memory in flying (especially rotor) and multi-tasking to learn. One thing that limited training in the late 70's in the Marines was the number of flight hours to bring a Pilot & RIO to a deployable level to the fleet. The birds were beat to shit (36 bird squadron) and parts resupply was very slow and fuel costs slowed training. The reduction in flight hours in the mid-80's in Germany because of fuel and part shortages had the safety people on edge.

Flight hours on a specific type aircraft, is just that, hours on that aircraft. Blackhawk hours don't translate to Cobra flight hours. The difference in performance envelopes is too vastly different. Also, while simulator training can be intense... most old pilot I knew did not think it was a substitute. (Even in the 80's in Germany rotor simulations were so intense aircrew were not allowed to drive or fly for 24 hours after a session (really screwed with depth perception).

If the Marines have cut back on flight hours or maint availability it will be made clear or covered up, I don't know which way it will go. It is reaching into the realm of political. What has to be eval'd is the flight records of the pilots on both aircraft, especially night hours w/wo NODs.