This is the latest version of a topic that has been on my mind since I was in 5th Group back in 2003. Basically, the underlying issue is that there is no centralized, large-scale screening process whatsoever for enablers (i.e. anyone not 18-series) looking to go to Group. On the intel side, an assignment to Group is as easy as picking up the phone and asking your branch manager to slot you against an available opening. This results, in my opinion, in more than their fair share of non-hackers making their way into an SF support assignment. Once in the unit, many of non-hackers choose to stay indefinitely, while the "good" enablers choose to move on to other SOF units or return to the regular Army. Over time, this situation sometimes helps create a vicious circle of unmet expectations and low opinion of the effectiveness of intelligence enablers, culminating in a non-optimal level of support.
Having had the opportunity to work with or at least observe most of the rest of the major U.S. SOF units, I've seen the difference that a screening process can make, and learned the importance of a structured training program to the ability of intelligence enablers to "hit the ground running" and be able to keep up with the people they support.
Many people have written that a problem exists, but few have provided a detailed plan that might be able to address some of the fundamental issues. This paper is my attempt to do that. It is derived in part from a thesis I wrote last year, which in turn was a followup of a previous work I did that was published about five years ago.
My goal in posting this here is to solicit input before I post it at a couple of other sites I frequent, in advance of sending it out to be published. Comments are welcome; current or prior service in an SF Group is not a requirement. I am particularly looking for corrections to any factual errors that this paper might contain; if USASFC or USASOC have already stood up a similiar program, for example, that would be a really good thing for me to know before I try to get this published ;) .
I want to close by thanking the SF and SF support contingent on the site who have already provided very useful and insightful comments (that doesn't mean they agreed with me or that I agreed with them, it just means that I value their input :) ).
Thank you for your time, I hope you find the read interesting.
Having had the opportunity to work with or at least observe most of the rest of the major U.S. SOF units, I've seen the difference that a screening process can make, and learned the importance of a structured training program to the ability of intelligence enablers to "hit the ground running" and be able to keep up with the people they support.
Many people have written that a problem exists, but few have provided a detailed plan that might be able to address some of the fundamental issues. This paper is my attempt to do that. It is derived in part from a thesis I wrote last year, which in turn was a followup of a previous work I did that was published about five years ago.
My goal in posting this here is to solicit input before I post it at a couple of other sites I frequent, in advance of sending it out to be published. Comments are welcome; current or prior service in an SF Group is not a requirement. I am particularly looking for corrections to any factual errors that this paper might contain; if USASFC or USASOC have already stood up a similiar program, for example, that would be a really good thing for me to know before I try to get this published ;) .
I want to close by thanking the SF and SF support contingent on the site who have already provided very useful and insightful comments (that doesn't mean they agreed with me or that I agreed with them, it just means that I value their input :) ).
Thank you for your time, I hope you find the read interesting.
Kids these days... they need to spend more time in front of an open book instead of in front of the ol' xBox.
