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Iraq and ISIS Discussion
- Thread starter Kraut783
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Falais Pocket anyone?
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Shi'a Militia in blocking positions west of Mosul. Only in 2016.
Mosul Iraq battle: Shia militias aim to take Tal Afar
Mosul Iraq battle: Shia militias aim to take Tal Afar - BBC News
Mosul Iraq battle: Shia militias aim to take Tal Afar
Mosul Iraq battle: Shia militias aim to take Tal Afar - BBC News
One very salient reason, I believe, why limited forces like IS can dominate large portions of a population much more effectively than conventional forces is because they can use methods and tactics unavailable to most "civilized" Western-style militarys...like extortion, kidnapping and various forms of intimidation up to and including mass public executions. Nothing like naked fear to motivate the herd. This gives the insurgents enormous leverage, far beyond proportion. It's an economy of power that we can't hope to match with good intentions, free weapons and foreign internal defense. Our way takes way too long, requires enormous logistics and resources, building up rapport, winning hearts and minds, civic action initiatives, nation building etc etc...
All they have to do to get instant results is shoot some people... and the rest will fall all over themselves trying to cooperate.
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SpongeBob*24
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Simply put: ISIL doesn't follow a weak sauce ROE!!!!
I agree, to a point. I think it's much more analogous to the police and criminals. A street gang can implement a variety of brutal tactics within a population but still enjoy enough support to operate freely if not dominate. A police force on the other hand cannot utilize even a portion of the same tactics without being rejected by the population as a whole. I would think it is a topic for further sociological and political science study but I would wager it rests on a couple of factors.
The criminal element lives within the population and is a part of the cultural make-up - positive and negative - of the population. Their power is also limited - they can gain fear/respect, limited participation of the populace, and adherence to some normative principles (no snitching, avoiding certain areas, tolerance of non-property crime - but they will never be able to totally control a population, initiate significant changes, or integrate the population into a wider community. The Police or other elements of the state can achieve that level of power - but they are also separated from the population so will always be judged on a scale of bringing external change and being a part of the 'other' in repressing the local population. in that way I think it dovetails entirely with the in-group/out-group psychological factors Lawrence Eagleman talks about as being a part of our social and psychological make-up.
To me it really gets after those principles of COIN that deal with enabling local government and making allies. I think our (US) superficial parables about 'winning hearts and minds' falls woefully short in this area. The bottom line is you have to get the local populace, and more importantly local government/power structure (which may be entirely informal) to invest in your objectives. But, they're going to find their own reasons (or not) not necessarily those you offer them.
I understand what you're saying about the level of power able to be harnessed and utilized by elements of the state, from an organizational standpoint. I also agree with you that these limited forces exerting criminal influence over a certain population are also limited in what they can achieve beyond a certain point. I defer to your knowledge and experience in Iraq with the larger issue here. But I just wonder if its valid to compare ISIS and it's activities to those of a criminal gang operating in a predominantly lawful society. There doesn't seem to be any element of the state, or police force, or opposition to counter the influence of ISIS in places like Mosul. At least not at the moment. And before you can get the local government/power structure to invest in your objectives, there has to be a local government and power structure.
In remote areas, like in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the people who have the power are the people who have the guns and who just happen to be, at that moment, standing in front of your house.
To me, the most important elements of COIN are killing enough of the enemy to make him fear trespassing into your area, and to maintain a presence for however long it takes to make the population feel secure and safe from enemy intimidation. If you can't do at least that, your other initiatives don't have a chance. And we don't seem to be able to invest the time.
I'm hoping I followed you here.
Yeah, I think you're right on the differences. Imperfect analogy on my part.
Not sure if I've mentioned it on SS before or not but Francis Fukuyama wrote two books in the last couple years on the rise of political systems from pre-history to the modern era. The first 'The Origins of Political Order' I think is really applicable to this discussion - and his work was what I was thinking of when trying to craft my response.
He lays out how social structure is an evolutionary advantage and how political organization arises from primitive tribal groups to complex civil societies. I think there is a lot of applicability to his work when talking about the rise of political organizations like ISIS which are coercive but still more than tribal (leveraging kinship ties).
I think that's where we get into the salience of the term 'Islamic Terror.' Islam - or the association with it - is the ideological bond ISIS uses to gain and maintain legitimacy. The Obama administration has expressed pretty clearly their unwillingness to say 'Islam' in any reference to ISIS in an effort to hamper (or at least not to help) that legitimacy. I think there's a strong argument to say what the administration calls it isn't going to build or fail to build legitimacy but that's what the administration believes - and it's a logical position. It's one of the reasons I find these 'Obama hates America and loves ISIS because he doesn't say Islamic Terrorism' arguments to be facile and disingenuous. I'd be much more sympathetic to 'this is why the administration's belief is wrong and the benefit we'll get from calling a spade a spade.' I've yet to hear that argument anywhere on the right.
Not sure if I've mentioned it on SS before or not but Francis Fukuyama wrote two books in the last couple years on the rise of political systems from pre-history to the modern era. The first 'The Origins of Political Order' I think is really applicable to this discussion - and his work was what I was thinking of when trying to craft my response.
He lays out how social structure is an evolutionary advantage and how political organization arises from primitive tribal groups to complex civil societies. I think there is a lot of applicability to his work when talking about the rise of political organizations like ISIS which are coercive but still more than tribal (leveraging kinship ties).
I think that's where we get into the salience of the term 'Islamic Terror.' Islam - or the association with it - is the ideological bond ISIS uses to gain and maintain legitimacy. The Obama administration has expressed pretty clearly their unwillingness to say 'Islam' in any reference to ISIS in an effort to hamper (or at least not to help) that legitimacy. I think there's a strong argument to say what the administration calls it isn't going to build or fail to build legitimacy but that's what the administration believes - and it's a logical position. It's one of the reasons I find these 'Obama hates America and loves ISIS because he doesn't say Islamic Terrorism' arguments to be facile and disingenuous. I'd be much more sympathetic to 'this is why the administration's belief is wrong and the benefit we'll get from calling a spade a spade.' I've yet to hear that argument anywhere on the right.
Good points, sir. I'll have to look into the Fukuyama books.
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The term the Arabic speaking media uses to describe IS translates roughly to "Gang State." I don't see why we haven't adopted something like that.
Then again, if you look at examples like "jihadi" and Hilary's reset button, we are habitually terrible with languages here in the US (and the rest of the world knows it).
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Fuck those Daesh bitches!
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I was wondering if you guys could help me understand a few things regarding the tactics used to retake a city like Mosul. I have spent the last few months reading as much as I can in preparation for my own enlistment and I find found the more I read, the less I know :) . So far I am having a hard time grasping how the Islamic State can consistently dig and control the populations of large regions yet manage to flee fairly easily when overwhelmed. Is it just logistics that these cities cannot be surrounded and controlled? How is it that they can just abandon the area simply return again to retake it as soon as the occupying force leaves? It seems like unless its a huge air strike they normally take small numbers of casualties and just tuck and run.
Fukuyama is a good writer and a deep thinker, but he lost a lot of credibility after "The End of History."
I don't know, I think a lot of people take the headline/title of 'The End of History' and don't look at what the book actually said. It certainly turned out to be a wrong thesis - the triumph of liberal democracy as a form of government - but it was a valuable position and contribution to political science. I feel like people give all this shit to Fukuyama for that kind of stance but heap non on Samuel Huntington for the same thing. Nobody says 'Clash of Civilizations' or 'The Soldier and the State' got the state of the world or future exactly right - but they do value them for making huge contributions to political science scholarship.
I felt the same way about Fukuyama after the end of history and his flirtation with neo-conservatism but these two books really brought me back. Highly recommended.
One of the hallmarks of asymmetric warfare is the ability of the insurgents to blend in with the civilian population. Essentially they are often able to disperse and "disappear" when pressured and reform and regroup when the situation becomes more advantageous.
Ah i see, so they really just never leave. It would seem to me then that the importance would then need to be placed on gaining the trust of the civilian population. Seems like nearly an impossible task when they are used as human shields
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Iraq and Syria don't have roads like we are used to. Most cities only have one or two main highways running through them. The terrain between the highways is usually impassable by any type of wheeled vehicle due to deep creek beds.
Here's a rough example- the enemy controls city X, and on the north side of city X is enemy terrain; to the south side of city X is friendly-held territory. City X has a main north-south highway, and another east-west highway. The east-west road would be irrelevant, and it would be impossible for the north highway to be cutoff unless the friendly forces committed to a long distance dismounted movement, at night, with a lot of heavy equipment.
That last sentence is what most forces, Kurds, Iraqis, Syrians, and IS are not willing to do.
Makes sense.
I watched a few video with some embedded journalists who were with the Peshmerga and they were very lightly armed. It was to the point where they just held some high ground and fired warning shots to anything that approached but they couldn't even really engage them at all. Then snipers kept them pinned too, they didnt having anything more than a few mortars to respond to that.
Not necessarily. In Vietnam and Afghanistan, for instance, the insurgent forces can disperse and withdraw from contested areas and regroup later in mountains or jungle, where their supplies are cached in hidden positions. There they can refit and wait for another opportunity to infiltrate and strike.
I differ to @Etype and our other Iraqi veterans here with regard to IS...their options for withdrawal may be more limited because of terrain.
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