Iraq and ISIS Discussion

Ah i see, so they really just never leave. It would seem to me then that the importance would then need to be placed on gaining the trust of the civilian population. Seems like nearly an impossible task when they are used as human shields :(
Regardless of where it occurs, insurgencies and UW consist of relatively the same elements. UW has the aim to coherce, disrupt, or overthrow a government- which is the same goal of an insurgency.

The UW model as defined by the US military consists of an auxiliary, an underground, and the guerillas. I'd argue that every insurgency in the world that's seen marginal success has similar elements.

The guerillas (the professional fighters), don't enter an area until the auxiliary has-
- a mechanism to get them into the area.
- a network of safe houses to support them.
- a mechanism to quickly move them out if the area.

We used this in WWII in France and SE Asia, @Ocoka One can probably attest to the VC using similar practices in and around Vietnam, and it is what IS is doing in Iraq.

ETA- the auxiliary is usually comprised of locals who have knowledge of the area and are able to move the fighters around quickly and effectively. To think that at least some portion of the population doesn't support the cause is flawed logic.
 
Regardless of where it occurs, insurgencies and UW consist of relatively the same elements. UW has the aim to coherce, disrupt, or overthrow a government- which is the same goal of an insurgency.

The UW model as defined by the US military consists of an auxiliary, an underground, and the guerillas. I'd argue that every insurgency in the world that's seen marginal success has similar elements.

The guerillas (the professional fighters), don't enter an area until the auxiliary has-
- a mechanism to get them into the area.
- a network of safe houses to support them.
- a mechanism to quickly move them out if the area.

We used this in WWII in France and SE Asia, @Ocoka One can probably attest to the VC using similar practices in and around Vietnam, and it is what IS is doing in Iraq.

ETA- the auxiliary is usually comprised of locals who have knowledge of the area and are able to move the fighters around quickly and effectively. To think that at least some portion of the population doesn't support the cause is flawed logic.

Absolutely. As Mao said, the people are the ocean in which the guerrilla fighter swims. Lack of support from the civilian population is one of the main reasons Che Guevara failed to incite revolution in the Congo and Bolivia. (Not to mention the CIA, Special Forces and US Army Rangers in La Esperanza helping the Bolivians to track him down and kill him.)
 
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Regardless of where it occurs, insurgencies and UW consist of relatively the same elements. UW has the aim to coherce, disrupt, or overthrow a government- which is the same goal of an insurgency.

The UW model as defined by the US military consists of an auxiliary, an underground, and the guerillas. I'd argue that every insurgency in the world that's seen marginal success has similar elements.

The guerillas (the professional fighters), don't enter an area until the auxiliary has-
- a mechanism to get them into the area.
- a network of safe houses to support them.
- a mechanism to quickly move them out if the area.

We used this in WWII in France and SE Asia, @Ocoka One can probably attest to the VC using similar practices in and around Vietnam, and it is what IS is doing in Iraq.

ETA- the auxiliary is usually comprised of locals who have knowledge of the area and are able to move the fighters around quickly and effectively. To think that at least some portion of the population doesn't support the cause is flawed logic.

Exactly how IS took Mosul.
 
I don't know, I think a lot of people take the headline/title of 'The End of History' and don't look at what the book actually said. It certainly turned out to be a wrong thesis - the triumph of liberal democracy as a form of government - but it was a valuable position and contribution to political science. I feel like people give all this shit to Fukuyama for that kind of stance but heap non on Samuel Huntington for the same thing. Nobody says 'Clash of Civilizations' or 'The Soldier and the State' got the state of the world or future exactly right - but they do value them for making huge contributions to political science scholarship.

I felt the same way about Fukuyama after the end of history and his flirtation with neo-conservatism but these two books really brought me back. Highly recommended.

The reason people beat up on Fukuyama and not Huntington is that Fukuyama got it wrong and Huntington didn't. In fact, Huntington wrote his essay-then-book in response to Fukuyama's work.

Huntington said the differences between cultures are real, and visceral, and conflictual. I think the evidence in support of this thesis is compelling and conspicuous and doesn't need further explanation.

Fukuyama's thesis was "the triumph of the Western idea," that basically we (the West) won. His concept of Western democracy as "the final form of government," arguable on its face when it was first published in the early 1990s, was completely discredited since. One only has to look at the Middle East to see that there is still a long road to travel before we reach "the end of history." His influence and those who share his perspective help promote the ill-founded "democratic peace theory" that led directly to the idea that we should (or even could) engage in nation building in places that were not only not ready for it, but we (IAW Huntington) fundamentally at odds with those ideas and willing to resist them violently.
 
The reason people beat up on Fukuyama and not Huntington is that Fukuyama got it wrong and Huntington didn't. In fact, Huntington wrote his essay-then-book in response to Fukuyama's work.

Huntington said the differences between cultures are real, and visceral, and conflictual. I think the evidence in support of this thesis is compelling and conspicuous and doesn't need further explanation.

Fukuyama's thesis was "the triumph of the Western idea," that basically we (the West) won. His concept of Western democracy as "the final form of government," arguable on its face when it was first published in the early 1990s, was completely discredited since. One only has to look at the Middle East to see that there is still a long road to travel before we reach "the end of history." His influence and those who share his perspective help promote the ill-founded "democratic peace theory" that led directly to the idea that we should (or even could) engage in nation building in places that were not only not ready for it, but we (IAW Huntington) fundamentally at odds with those ideas and willing to resist them violently.

I think I disagree on how strong Huntington's arguments have proven but I see your point on Fukuyama. I guess I think of both as academics adding to academic literature - not as folks offering a blueprint for how the world works and how we should live like Marx or Engels. I feel like in that context Fukuyama offered some valuable things in the end of history - just like Mearsheimer, Walt, Keone and others have - without having to have been right in every case.

Still, good to know how the academic community sees him.
 
I think I disagree on how strong Huntington's arguments have proven but I see your point on Fukuyama. I guess I think of both as academics adding to academic literature - not as folks offering a blueprint for how the world works and how we should live like Marx or Engels. I feel like in that context Fukuyama offered some valuable things in the end of history - just like Mearsheimer, Walt, Keone and others have - without having to have been right in every case.

Still, good to know how the academic community sees him.

There are plenty of people in the community who completely agree with what you said about both Fukuyama and Huntington (why do these people have such long names?). I taught both in my "intro to IR" class and it's fascinating to hear the discussions.
 
His influence and those who share his perspective help promote the ill-founded "democratic peace theory" that led directly to the idea that we should (or even could) engage in nation building in places that were not only not ready for it

I don't necessarily believe in the democratic peace theory outright, but I have trouble seeing it as ill-founded. It was definitely misused and operationalized into "let's make the world democratic so there are no wars", but the basic premise that democratic countries do not fight each other seems to have been true. I mainly believe it has to do with incentive structures and the "us vs the other" mentality where we see westernized/westernizing societies in the "us" block. I think that will change in the next 50-100 years as each country's incentive structures change, but for the times we live in, it is certainly much less likely for any westernized democracy to go to war with each other any time soon.
 
I don't necessarily believe in the democratic peace theory outright, but I have trouble seeing it as ill-founded. It was definitely misused and operationalized into "let's make the world democratic so there are no wars", but the basic premise that democratic countries do not fight each other seems to have been true. I mainly believe it has to do with incentive structures and the "us vs the other" mentality where we see westernized/westernizing societies in the "us" block. I think that will change in the next 50-100 years as each country's incentive structures change, but for the times we live in, it is certainly much less likely for any westernized democracy to go to war with each other any time soon.

That's the problem, it's not the "Westernized democratic peace theory," it's the "democratic peace theory." The fundamental premise is that democracies don't fight each other. Except they do.

Democracies, especially new ones, are the most pugnacious types of government out there. They can, and do, fight each other. So to fit the model, they had to change it to "mature democracies don't fight each other," and then "mature Western democracies don't fight each other." People who believe in DPT ascribe causation when there is only correlation. There are other things at play besides democratization that explain why Western democracies don't fight each other, but they make people uncomfortable to talk about.
 
That's the problem, it's not the "Westernized democratic peace theory," it's the "democratic peace theory." The fundamental premise is that democracies don't fight each other. Except they do.

Democracies, especially new ones, are the most pugnacious types of government out there. They can, and do, fight each other. So to fit the model, they had to change it to "mature democracies don't fight each other," and then "mature Western democracies don't fight each other." People who believe in DPT ascribe causation when there is only correlation. There are other things at play besides democratization that explain why Western democracies don't fight each other, but they make people uncomfortable to talk about.

I agree with that, but is there another type of democracy that doesn't fall under the category of westernized? What constitutes westernized? I meant it to fall in line with a "free" economy, more liberal values, and democracy such as Most of Europe, India, South Korea, Japan and such, but now, that I think about it, I don't know of a democracy that doesn't fall under those parameters.

The main causal argument that I've heard is the will of the people in going to war where the will is simply not there because it is difficult to come up with a really solid argument for war when the opponent does not fall into the "other" category. Why go to war with them if they aren't "evil" or some other short-sighted reason that the public doesn't care about. That causal argument obviously doesn't cover any of the realist explanations for casus belli, but surely, you might concede that it certainly carries at least a little bit of weight, sir. Public opinion is of the main reasons for our ill-advised pullout in Vietnam.
 
I agree with that, but is there another type of democracy that doesn't fall under the category of westernized? What constitutes westernized? I meant it to fall in line with a "free" economy, more liberal values, and democracy such as Most of Europe, India, South Korea, Japan and such, but now, that I think about it, I don't know of a democracy that doesn't fall under those parameters.

The main causal argument that I've heard is the will of the people in going to war where the will is simply not there because it is difficult to come up with a really solid argument for war when the opponent does not fall into the "other" category. Why go to war with them if they aren't "evil" or some other short-sighted reason that the public doesn't care about. That causal argument obviously doesn't cover any of the realist explanations for casus belli, but surely, you might concede that it certainly carries at least a little bit of weight, sir. Public opinion is of the main reasons for our ill-advised pullout in Vietnam.

Yes, of course, there are many non-Western democracies. And some them regularly fight each other.

India/Pakistan

Russia/Ukraine

Israel/Palestine

Numerous African states

No I don't believe DPT holds much weight, unless you caveat it into uselessness, or start considering author causes of stability such as a regional hegemon, nuclear weapons, or "they haven't started fighting each other... yet."
 
Yes, of course, there are many non-Western democracies. And some them regularly fight each other.

India/Pakistan

Russia/Ukraine

Israel/Palestine

Numerous African states

No I don't believe DPT holds much weight, unless you caveat it into uselessness, or start considering author causes of stability such as a regional hegemon, nuclear weapons, or "they haven't started fighting each other... yet."

I do see your point about over defining the DPT into uselessness. To my fault, I didn't consider Russia, Ukraine, or any of the African countries. I suppose the realist perspective continues to dominate unrelentingly. Thank you for the discussion, sir.
 
So what's the current scoop on ISIS, I'm catching small stories of IA having some success here and there. But not anything screaming out that this shit show is in the bag yet. Any insight would be cool to read.
 
So what's the current scoop on ISIS, I'm catching small stories of IA having some success here and there. But not anything screaming out that this shit show is in the bag yet. Any insight would be cool to read.

Gains are slowly being made as far as territory controlled, this will stretch on for some time and it remains to be seen if the Iraqi gov't can hold onto what it "controls." The whole situation is a giant turd.
 
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