http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/marsoc-aviation-capability-already-exists
Author:
LtCol A. Che Bolden
I will congratulate the Gazette editorial staff on the January 2011 issue. I cannot recall if I have ever read a complete issue from cover to cover, but this one had me riveted. While I have opinions on almost every article, there was one in particular that I feel compelled to respond to; therefore, “MarSOC Aviation” by LtCol Glen Butler will bear the brunt of my perspectives. I applaud the author’s forward thinking and emphasis on advancing the capabilities of Marine Special Operations Command (MarSOC) and its contributions to U.S. military diversity and prowess. However, I am not convinced of the “vitality” of providing MarSOC with its own aviation combat element (ACE).
Ten years ago, when I was the Operations Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, the Commandant of the Marine Corps tasked Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), to develop viable courses of action for the provision of Marine forces to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). Due to the unique capabilities and specialized skill sets resident in the reconnaissance community, many within the ranks were brought into the discussion in order to best develop ideas and concepts in support of this request. As a result, the discussion began to frame itself. On one side, there were those who wanted to contribute a force that was capable of direct action (DA) and foreign internal defense (FID), thus further augmenting the number of teams available to USSOCom. The other proposed that the Marine Corps make a distinctive contribution to the special operations world by providing a uniquely organic capability that leveraged our specialized expertise in deep reconnaissance/surveillance and amphi-
bious reconnaissance, areas that are still lacking both within the Marine Corps and within the joint world.
Unfortunately, USSOCom wasn’t really asking the Marine Corps to provide a unique capability. It merely wanted more bodies, and after laborious and contentious discussions, the PP&O action officer presented a five-phase course of action that culminated with the creation of a special operations MAGTF with it’s own ground combat element, logistics combat element, and ACE. Many in the crowd, myself included, deduced that this capability was already in existence—the MEU (special operations capable).
Regardless of the machinations that gave way to present-day MarSOC, I was (and still am) in violent agreement with its creation—but as a unique force capable of contributing to the overall potential of the MAGTF and, as part of a MAGTF, fully integrated in order to produce effects across the range of military operations unlike any other force in the world.
The effect of aviation with respect to DA and FID is a means to an end and involves simple coordination rather than integration. I recently returned from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM where I was the Future Operations Officer, 3d MAW (Forward), which was the MAGTF ACE. There were numerous occasions where the ACE provided aviation support to MarSOC as part of a special operations task force. The preponderance of ACE support in each of those instances came from Marine assault support and served as an infil/exfil platform. Assault support is one function of Marine aviation (out of six) that the ACE provides to the MAGTF. Based on this admittedly small sampling, provision of an ACE to MarSOC would be very one dimensional and does not adhere to a basic tenet of a MAGTF, integration and coordination of elements across warfighting functions.
MarSOC is not a MAGTF. If MarSOC wants an ACE, maybe it should look to increase the capabilities of an existing, proven MAGTF and provide forces to the MEU or initiate the creation of a special purpose MAGTF. It bears mentioning that we deal in a zero-sum game. In order to step outside current structure, it’s going to cost the Marine Corps, somewhere. Mother Corps does not have the personnel (table of organization), assets (table of equipment), or acquisitions acumen to carve out a new MAGTF only to chop it away to USSOCom.
While this rebuttal is by no means an indictment of the author’s overall knowledge of the Marine Corps, or its doctrine, I can’t help but question the basic understanding of what the MAGTF means to us as a Service and to the country as a whole. I agree that open dialogue that draws upon the expertise from across the MAGTF is in order. However, this dialogue must be a two-way discussion that asks what MarSOC can provide to the Marine Corps, not just what the Marine Corps can provide to USSOCom. While it bothers me to say, I do not believe the author’s second recommendation is physically, or fiscally, tenable at this time. Were we to take a hard look at some of our current aviation programs and future platforms to evaluate their worth to the MAGTF, I would gladly change my tune; that’s a different discussion for a different time. Consider the conversation started and the discussion open.
Author:
LtCol A. Che Bolden
I will congratulate the Gazette editorial staff on the January 2011 issue. I cannot recall if I have ever read a complete issue from cover to cover, but this one had me riveted. While I have opinions on almost every article, there was one in particular that I feel compelled to respond to; therefore, “MarSOC Aviation” by LtCol Glen Butler will bear the brunt of my perspectives. I applaud the author’s forward thinking and emphasis on advancing the capabilities of Marine Special Operations Command (MarSOC) and its contributions to U.S. military diversity and prowess. However, I am not convinced of the “vitality” of providing MarSOC with its own aviation combat element (ACE).
Ten years ago, when I was the Operations Officer, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, the Commandant of the Marine Corps tasked Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), to develop viable courses of action for the provision of Marine forces to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom). Due to the unique capabilities and specialized skill sets resident in the reconnaissance community, many within the ranks were brought into the discussion in order to best develop ideas and concepts in support of this request. As a result, the discussion began to frame itself. On one side, there were those who wanted to contribute a force that was capable of direct action (DA) and foreign internal defense (FID), thus further augmenting the number of teams available to USSOCom. The other proposed that the Marine Corps make a distinctive contribution to the special operations world by providing a uniquely organic capability that leveraged our specialized expertise in deep reconnaissance/surveillance and amphi-
bious reconnaissance, areas that are still lacking both within the Marine Corps and within the joint world.
Unfortunately, USSOCom wasn’t really asking the Marine Corps to provide a unique capability. It merely wanted more bodies, and after laborious and contentious discussions, the PP&O action officer presented a five-phase course of action that culminated with the creation of a special operations MAGTF with it’s own ground combat element, logistics combat element, and ACE. Many in the crowd, myself included, deduced that this capability was already in existence—the MEU (special operations capable).
Regardless of the machinations that gave way to present-day MarSOC, I was (and still am) in violent agreement with its creation—but as a unique force capable of contributing to the overall potential of the MAGTF and, as part of a MAGTF, fully integrated in order to produce effects across the range of military operations unlike any other force in the world.
The effect of aviation with respect to DA and FID is a means to an end and involves simple coordination rather than integration. I recently returned from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM where I was the Future Operations Officer, 3d MAW (Forward), which was the MAGTF ACE. There were numerous occasions where the ACE provided aviation support to MarSOC as part of a special operations task force. The preponderance of ACE support in each of those instances came from Marine assault support and served as an infil/exfil platform. Assault support is one function of Marine aviation (out of six) that the ACE provides to the MAGTF. Based on this admittedly small sampling, provision of an ACE to MarSOC would be very one dimensional and does not adhere to a basic tenet of a MAGTF, integration and coordination of elements across warfighting functions.
MarSOC is not a MAGTF. If MarSOC wants an ACE, maybe it should look to increase the capabilities of an existing, proven MAGTF and provide forces to the MEU or initiate the creation of a special purpose MAGTF. It bears mentioning that we deal in a zero-sum game. In order to step outside current structure, it’s going to cost the Marine Corps, somewhere. Mother Corps does not have the personnel (table of organization), assets (table of equipment), or acquisitions acumen to carve out a new MAGTF only to chop it away to USSOCom.
While this rebuttal is by no means an indictment of the author’s overall knowledge of the Marine Corps, or its doctrine, I can’t help but question the basic understanding of what the MAGTF means to us as a Service and to the country as a whole. I agree that open dialogue that draws upon the expertise from across the MAGTF is in order. However, this dialogue must be a two-way discussion that asks what MarSOC can provide to the Marine Corps, not just what the Marine Corps can provide to USSOCom. While it bothers me to say, I do not believe the author’s second recommendation is physically, or fiscally, tenable at this time. Were we to take a hard look at some of our current aviation programs and future platforms to evaluate their worth to the MAGTF, I would gladly change my tune; that’s a different discussion for a different time. Consider the conversation started and the discussion open.
