OK, you cited the part about a ranger unit, but you never cited the whole point of this debate and that is the one about MARSOC's capabilities, and the other comments you made about the Marine Corps.
OK, you cited the part about a ranger unit, but you never cited the whole point of this debate and that is the one about MARSOC's capabilities, and the other comments you made about the Marine Corps.
Yep, totally agree with you. But he is right about his assessment (RRC being comparable to MSOC and not any other Ranger or ranger unit).
The way I see it, you are letting a mistake you made (comparing somekind of a generic "ranger" unit, with a current MSOC) drag you around.
Dosen't really matter to me I was enjoying a good debate, but I agree its off topic.
B
Boot
Guest
I think what no one is realizing or even aware of is Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG), and what their role is. An exert;
MCTAG's mission; "Provide
conventional training and advisor support to Host Nation Security Forces
(HNSF) or to GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PARTNERING WITH HNSF (read: SC MAGTF)
IOT...."
Its not mentioned but I do know MCTAG's focus is FID/COIN. It was stressed to me that they ARE NOT SF. Now if someone can tell me the difference in the execution of advising or FID/COIN from a MSOAG or ODA TEAM, please let me know, I think there is probably not much difference. When I worked w/ MiTT's in Iraq, the best MiTT Team Leaders were SF Major's who elected to do MiTT's. One in particular who had spent 10 years w/ 5th and 7th Group, told me that being a MiTT Team Leader was the purest "SF" mission he has ever done. He had a good team, but since the were all big Army (except his 18E) they were ready to quit by the 10th month in Baghdad. My point is that FID/COIN isn't something limited to SF but certainly SF (Army ODA teams) have been doing this for the last 40 years, and they know a thing or two about it. I think FID/COIN can be executed by other forces who aren't SF types BUT as I witnessed first hand in Iraq, not every soldier/Marine is cut out for that sort of mission. What will be key for an organization such as MCTAG and SC MAGTF are the people entrusted w/ this mission. Quality over quantity and the training given to them. There is a good chapter in OP 19 (Ch 13) written by a couple of folks who outlined what FMTU selection should consist of. You could be an outstanding DA type but that doesn't mean you are cut out to be an adviser.
Sorry to ramble on.
SF
Edit; Article on MCTAG
News from Inside the Navy
provided by the InsideDefense NewsStand
Spelled out in ‘Long War’ concept
MARINES ENVISION ADVISERS FOR PARTNER NATIONS’ SECURITY ASSISTANCE
_______________________________________________
Date: February 25, 2008
A new Marine Corps force-employment concept calls for creating teams of Marine advisers who will help train and equip partner nations for “security assistance” efforts.
The service’s new “Long War” concept -- signed in December by Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway and released this month by the service -- calls for beefing up the nascent Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) that Conway commissioned last October.
This group of advisers was initially established to address “staffing and sourcing requirements” for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Long War concept states. However, that vision of the advisers’ group has expanded within the concept.
The 42-page concept document lays out plans for creating Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SC MAGTFs) -- units with expanded capabilities in the lower end of the expeditionary force spectrum that are task-organized for security cooperation in Africa, Southwest Asia and South America (Inside the Navy, Feb. 18).
The concept says the Marine advisers’ group’s purpose is to “source the Marine Corps’ advisory capability to support mission requirements that exceed those of SC MAGTFs.”
The advisers will provide training, education, advice, equipment and material to “select partner nation security forces,” it says.
“An embryonic capability now, [the Marine advisrrs’ group] will eventually grow to constitute a cadre of trained advisors organized into regional branches that deploy scalable teams of Marine advisors to partner nations,” the concept states.
The service sees the advisers helping to introduce Security Cooperation MAGTFs into theater and to develop relationships between the forces and partner nations.
The advisers, when not deployed, will train the Security Cooperation MAGTFs and other units conducting so-called “building partner capacity” activities, according to Marine Corps plans.
“Ultimately, the Marine advisors will provide a critical continuity for Marine efforts to engage across the shaping and deterrence phases of operations,” the Long War concept says.
The Marine Corps acknowledged the requirement for some kind of advisory battalion a few years ago, when officials thought the service would be drawing down its size, Col. Rob Abbott told ITN in an interview. Since then, the Marine Corps has learned it will not be decreasing in size and has kicked off a program to increase its active-component end strength to 202,000 by FY-11.
“So we realized that clearly in the new environment we’re going to need advisers,” Abbott, branch head of the plans section within the plans, policies and operations shop at Marine Corps headquarters, said Feb. 11 at the Pentagon.
“Exactly what that advisory capability is going to look like, we couldn’t tell you right now,” he added. “We think that will be largely determined by what the demand signal is coming from the combatant commanders.”
Abbott said he believes more will be known about the advisory capability in the next six to nine months.
The service is embarking on a period of detail analysis on the Long War concept, Abbott said Feb. 11.
“By early fall everybody should come back and say, ‘This is how we think we’re going to implement the Long War concept,’” he said. “And at that time we should put out some more detailed guidance.”
In the Marine Corps, security assistance is now executed through the Marine Corps’ Security Cooperation Education and Training Center and through Marine Corps Systems Command, via initiatives focused on foreign military sales and specialized training.
However, “recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to the recognition that a more robust SA [security assistance] capability is needed within the Marine Corps,” the Long War concept states. -- Emelie Rutherford
Hap4302
Unverified
Yup.
The reason is simple: version control. During our first couple of years, change was the status quo and we made a concerted effort to ensure briefs about what "might be" didn't end up on the street and outdated ten minutes later. That said, I'm wide open to direct questions from any member of the public, including, of course, but certainly not limited to civilian media. Drop me a line any time via our website link at www.marsoc.usmc.mil. The site looks better today than it did a year ago, but it's still pretty thin. All the same, stop by for a visit and ping me with whatever questions you may have.
My apologies to you and all that my visits here haven't been more frequent. I run a three-Marine public communications team (with a recently added videographer) and the pace of operations makes it a tad difficult to engage consistently at all points the way I would like to.
Semper Fidelis!
Maj. Cliff "Hap" Gilmore
MARSOC Public Affairs Officer
The reason is simple: version control. During our first couple of years, change was the status quo and we made a concerted effort to ensure briefs about what "might be" didn't end up on the street and outdated ten minutes later. That said, I'm wide open to direct questions from any member of the public, including, of course, but certainly not limited to civilian media. Drop me a line any time via our website link at www.marsoc.usmc.mil. The site looks better today than it did a year ago, but it's still pretty thin. All the same, stop by for a visit and ping me with whatever questions you may have.
My apologies to you and all that my visits here haven't been more frequent. I run a three-Marine public communications team (with a recently added videographer) and the pace of operations makes it a tad difficult to engage consistently at all points the way I would like to.
Semper Fidelis!
Maj. Cliff "Hap" Gilmore
MARSOC Public Affairs Officer
S
Simmerin' SigO
Guest
The difference is the difference between FID and UW (Unconventional Warfare).
Look it up. Do the research. Embrace the distinctions.
Once you discern the difference, you'll understand why what the MARSOF guys are doing is not the same as Special Forces.
Hap4302
Unverified
The Evolution of Warfare...
Lots of solid discussion here. Made for a good read. And the debate over the difference between the newly forming MCTAG within the conventional force and the MSOAG within the special operations side is worth having. Received that very question via my organizational mailbox the other day and straight up there is no answer to that question within the current rhetorical rules that would make everyone happy.
My suggestion at this point is that folks start considering the historical evolution of warfare and that yesterday's "unconventional" tends to become today's conventional. Or, put another way, things that happen regularly tend not to be irregular.
Lots of talk here about who does what and how they do it better than this guy or the other guy. Funny thing about that line of debate is how easy it is to forget that nobody does anything somebody else can't do; Some of us just do things that nobody else can do right now. And that kind of thinking tends to restrict, well, thinking.
Plenty of demand for on-the-fly evolution in the years ahead. It should be interesting to see which organizations manage to keep up. For my part, I suspect some of us will get distracted by semantics.
-- Hap
Lots of solid discussion here. Made for a good read. And the debate over the difference between the newly forming MCTAG within the conventional force and the MSOAG within the special operations side is worth having. Received that very question via my organizational mailbox the other day and straight up there is no answer to that question within the current rhetorical rules that would make everyone happy.
My suggestion at this point is that folks start considering the historical evolution of warfare and that yesterday's "unconventional" tends to become today's conventional. Or, put another way, things that happen regularly tend not to be irregular.
Lots of talk here about who does what and how they do it better than this guy or the other guy. Funny thing about that line of debate is how easy it is to forget that nobody does anything somebody else can't do; Some of us just do things that nobody else can do right now. And that kind of thinking tends to restrict, well, thinking.
Plenty of demand for on-the-fly evolution in the years ahead. It should be interesting to see which organizations manage to keep up. For my part, I suspect some of us will get distracted by semantics.
-- Hap
This level of arguments and thinking do raise the bar and add to a high quality forum. Most people are a bit confused by the sudden change in MARSOCs "center of gravity" regarding missions and capabilities. Others are trying to figure out exactly how MARSOC fits alongside SF regarding mission profiles and capabilities.
This is not strictly a theoretical question, since an almost exact dublication of capabilities (having a "Marine SF" so to speak, as some people presume will happen) does raise eyebrows (specialy in parts of the SF community).
The main question they ask is "why reinvent the wheel" since the Special Warfare Center has a long history and could be the only training establishment for SF mission profiles (with a UW/FID/COIN focus).
For a big organisation like the USMC its only natural not to "give up" its troops to be trained by (a very special part indeed) of another -bigger-organisation, like the US Army.
Also it does not fit well with the "elite" fighting culture of the Corps.
On the other hand, many would argue that this would be the most cost-effective and results oriented solution.
Difficult and complex issue to be sure.
This is not strictly a theoretical question, since an almost exact dublication of capabilities (having a "Marine SF" so to speak, as some people presume will happen) does raise eyebrows (specialy in parts of the SF community).
The main question they ask is "why reinvent the wheel" since the Special Warfare Center has a long history and could be the only training establishment for SF mission profiles (with a UW/FID/COIN focus).
For a big organisation like the USMC its only natural not to "give up" its troops to be trained by (a very special part indeed) of another -bigger-organisation, like the US Army.
Also it does not fit well with the "elite" fighting culture of the Corps.
On the other hand, many would argue that this would be the most cost-effective and results oriented solution.
Difficult and complex issue to be sure.
It doesn't matter how often an enemy engages in unconventional warfare it does not change that type of fighting to conventional or "regular" warfare. Unconventional defines the type of warfare, not its regularity. There are distinct differences between them. This is not linear warfare and you cant solve the problems associated with conducting it by throwing bullets and bodies at it, you have to get inside it and that doesnt happen over night. Conducting FID is one thing, UW isnt quite the same.
Do try to keep up... :)
Crip
I think the Major was just saying how things change. Like 225 years ago conventional warfare was meeting at a predetermined place, standing up in file and marching towards each other shooting until the other side surrendered or was dead. It was considered (at least by mainstream) uncivilized, cowardly, and unconventional to take cover, "snipe", or ambush an opposing force. Now a days that’s the norm and we think nothing of it, but if we were to take our basic infantry tactics back to the 1700's, hell, they might just call us witches and try to burn our ass :).
I now what your saying though. I think its about time the Marine Corps officially got into the game, but I sometimes worry about the gov pushing too fast and too hard for things to happen. Like you said it won't happen over night.
After reviewing Hap's earlier post, I kinda viewed this from our side of the fence.
The more unconventional they've become, the more unconventional we've necessarily become. Or, better said, that we've finally REALIZED that we have to fight fire with fire, become a more unconventional military. Hap can jump in, but that's the whole reason behind the MARSOC intention (story/Draft)....fighting fire with fire.....
The FID portion of any countries defense is so that UW doesn't get to the OOB level. FID is Step 1.
IMO you, Hap, and I are saying the same thing, just on different floors of the same building.
;):2c:
B
Boot
Guest
Thank you, I know the difference and have done the research. Don't be a dick.
FID and UW are different, they can also be intertwined. Reread my post. I'll get down to it, can you tell me the difference in how an advisor team "advises" and executes FID from one organization to another? I bet you can't. Never mentioned UW. FID has long been a province of Army SF, recent world events have changed things. Those aren't my words but the words of the SecDef. I think people have short memories; In 1966 Gen. "Brute" Krulak proposed his plan for winning in Vietnam. It called for extensive use of CAP platoons. Gen. Westmoreland fought him on this. Gen. Krulak briefed President Johnson (the CMC didn't have a seat on the JCS at the time) and President Johnson politely led him out of the office and favored Gen Westmoreland's plan of search and destroy.
In 1940 the Marine Corps released the "Small Wars Manual", of which SF based their FID manual on. That was released based on lessons learned during the small dirty wars of peace such as the Banana Wars, Phillipene insurrection and a half dozen other places around the world. In those days SF didn't exist, fast forward to today and since that time and Vietnam SF came into being. FID/COIN and UW have been going on since warfare started, just because SF does it now doesn't mean no one else can. Read a book called "Rifleman Dodd". Then tell me that is conventional warfare.
Look it up, do the research.
B
Boondocksaint375
Guest
chill out folks.
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