US Army Special Operations Aviation history

[Ravage]

http://fightersweep.com/393/special-operations-aviation-part-1/

About the author: Matt Gardner is a retired Chief Warrant Officer 4, and former standardization instructor pilot of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), flying the MH-47G. His career overseas tours included Europe, Korea, and Central America. His combat and contingency tours included operations Desert Storm, Joint Guardian, and multiple tours as part of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

There are many parts of the modern military that, while appearing to have always existed, are actually somewhat modern developments or refinements of older ideas, or things used only at certain points of time in certain places. Special Operations aviation is one of those things.

To anyone who has primarily learned military history within the last twenty years, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) has seemed a constant. It began making its way into the pop-culture lexicon following Operation Gothic Serpent and the subsequent book by Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, detailing much of the Regiment’s work in Mogadishu, and specifically the shoot down and capture of Michael Durant and the concurrent Battle of the Black Sea.

What might surprise some is that in October of 1993 the unit was barely a dozen years old. This series will explore how the 160th came to be, who they have become, and how they fit into the fabric of modern warfighting.

The use of aircraft and helicopters in special operations is nothing new. As far back as 1944, the Army Air Corps developed the capabilities of aviation in support of unconventional forces, establishing what became known as the 1st Air Commando Group in the China-Burma-India theater of operations (followed by the 2nd and 3rd ACGs in quick succession). Used in the Pacific theater, they performed both conventional and unconventional support missions behind enemy lines, and are credited with performing the first combat aircrew rescue by helicopter. At the time, their sole helicopter asset was the Sikorsky YR-4. Deactivated after World War II, similar missions were briefly performed during the Korean War. Again, however, once hostilities ended, the units were deactivated.

Members of the 1st Air Commando Group, US Army Air Force. Credit: AFSOC.

The rise of helicopters as a primary mode of transportation and war fighting during Vietnam solidified the relationship between aviation and the ground force commander. The terrain and tactical challenges of Vietnam demanded high mobility, and the rapid development of combat helicopters in the intervening years provided a great variety of platforms in both the Army and Air Force.

On the Army side, aviation support of the Special Forces Groups began in 1962 with the 22nd Special Warfare Aviation Detachment (SWAD) at Ft Bragg. The unit was soon renamed the 22nd Aviation Detachment (Special Forces). They were created to provide aviation support to the 5th SFG, the 7th SFG, the US Army Special Warfare School, and the 1st and 13th Psychological Warfare Battalions. The unit was deactivated in late 1963, but was followed soon afterward by the establishment of the 281st Assault Helicopter Company.

Activated at Ft Benning, GA, the 281st soon formed its headquarters in the 5th SFG compound in Nha Trang Bay, Republic of Vietnam. Considered the first organized special operations helicopter unit in the US Army, it is seen as the legacy unit for the 160th SOAR. Their mission was the movement of troops and supplies under the direction of the 5th SFG commander. As the SF groups developed over the following years, each group gained its own organic aviation detachment, generally comprised of four UH-1D aircraft and crewmembers.

UH-1D supporting ground forces, Vietnam, 1966. By James K. F. Dung, SFC, Photographer (Public domain)

The Air Force developed a formal Special Operations designation and organization for rotary winged assets. Within the Special Air Warfare Center and subsequent USAF Special Operations Force, the USAF developed and trained crews in combat search and rescue and SOF support. Their crews and aircraft executed the now-famous Operation Kingpin. Also known as the raid on the Son Tay Prison in North Vietnam, the USAF elements provided the airlift capability to the 56 US Army SOF personnel main assault element.

HH-53C over Vietnam, 1972
Credit: Ken Hackman, USAF (Public Domain)

History often teaches us nothing; as with the two conflicts previous, the years following Vietnam saw the inactivation of many special operations capabilities. The Air Force was eventually reduced to a single Special Operations Wing, and the US Army SFG detachments remained organic units without unified equipment, command, training, or accession. And, as often occurs in history, a need will arise whether the capability exists or not. Thus was the case in 1979, when the Iran Hostage Crisis presented such a need.

 

[Ravage]

http://fightersweep.com/399/special-operations-aviation-part-2/

Operation Eagle Claw, as the mission to rescue the American hostages held in Iran was known, became a lightning rod that shaped the development of Special Operations, and Special Operations aviation, within the United States military like no other event in history. As the Holloway Commission reported, the missteps and failures of the planning and execution of the mission were multi-faceted. The lessons learned within that failure led to the development of the modern Special Operations landscape as we know it today.

RH-53 at Desert One, following the failed rescue attempt (AP Photo)

At that time, there was no Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), nor a United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Each individual service retained a small and often highly under-funded special operations capability, but during this time (and prior to the Defense Department reorganization following the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986), each service had no obligation to work with the others. Planning and execution for Operation Eagle Claw was heavily hamstrung by inter-service rivalry and misunderstandings relative to skill and capabilities.

Within this construct of limited command experience with special operations; under-funded units with disparate equipment, capabilities, and tactics; and near-constant internecine conflict among most of the players, a massive penetration of a foreign nation to perform a hostage rescue was planned. It is somewhat miraculous that so little went wrong. But, wrong it did go. Eight service members lost their lives, the nation was embarrassed, and the hostages remained under Iranian control. This was in no way a failure of intent or of effort on the part of those involved, but a failure in management and organization.

To be prepared to act militarily, you must have conceived the need and built systems and organizations to meet those needs. Prior to 1979, not much thought had been given to formally creating a Special Operations aviation organization whose primary mission was to fly in denied territory at night. Sure, there were war plans for every theater, but those depended on massive build-ups, support elements, and troop numbers. What if you needed to do it quietly? Covertly?

Night vision equipment had been employed in helicopters in some variation since Vietnam, with limited and inconsistent success. While night vision goggles for aviation had come along in the early ’70s, the overall experience with them was highly limited. Units might own them, but they were hated and roundly ignored if at all possible. The ‘full face’ AN/PVS-5 goggles of those years required the pilot to focus one tube to see the instruments inside the cockpit, and one tube outside to see terrain and obstacles…a headache-inducing prospect at best.

AN/PVS-5 ‘Full Face’ model; notice the inability to look beneath the goggles within the cockpit.

As I told my Aviation Warrant Officer Advanced Course during an informational briefing on Eagle Claw, the 34 aviators in the room at that moment in 2009 likely contained more combined night vision goggle flying experience than existed in the entire world in 1979. That’s a sobering thought when considering the dedication and gumption of those who went on that mission.

That shortfall drove a shift when the Carter administration asked for a new force for a follow-up attempt, focusing more intently on the flying portion of the mission. The Army chose elements of the 101st Airborne Division, which had the most diverse and experienced helicopter crews of the day. This provisional task force, originally dubbed Task Force 158 (since many of the members came from the 158th Aviation Battalion), was comprised of modified UH-60A Blackhawks and CH-47C Chinooks, along with OH-6 Cayuses that had not been on the ‘official’ inventory since Vietnam. The pilots and crews began an intensive night vision goggle cross-country tactical training program. The second attempt, dubbed Operation Honey Badger, was called off when the hostages were released on the morning of President Ronald Reagan’s inauguration.

Luckily, the continued need for such a force was recognized, and the unit was not disbanded. On 16 October 1981, it was officially recognized and designated as the 160th Aviation Battalion. To the members of the unit, it was known as “the day the Eagles came off,” in that they officially no longer wore the Screaming Eagle patch of the 101st Airborne.

The 160th soon saw action during Operation Urgent Fury, in Grenada. This trial by fire cost the unit its first combat casualty, but also gained them the motto they still use to this day – Night Stalkers Don’t Quit.

During a mission to assault and clear enemy forces from the Richmond Hill Prison area, the 160th Black Hawks were beaten back by heavy anti-aircraft and small arms fire on their first attempt to infiltrate the Ranger elements they were carrying. The force regrouped and pressed on, again facing withering fire, which would eventually take the life of one pilot. A Ranger commander present at the time later commented, “Those Night Stalkers just wouldn’t quit!”

A motto, earned under fire, was born.

 

[Ravage]

http://fightersweep.com/402/special-operations-aviation-part-3/

The 160th would continue to fine-tune and develop their warfighting and night flying techniques in the years that followed Operation Urgent Fury. The mentality throughout was simple: at no time would a ground force mission fail due to lack of planning or capability on the part of their air support.

Additionally, the idea of “no fail” extended to what the unit promised to a ground force commander. If they said they could do it, they could – but they wouldn’t make that promise until it was guaranteed. As training and practice continued, the tactics, techniques, and procedures developed built a unit-wide TACSOP that ensured seamless operation across airframes, mission types, or locations.

Critical to building this capability was the concept of repeatability. There is often a misconception that special operations aviators perform differently than their regular force brethren. While occasionally the equipment is…different…the basic tasks are functionally identical.

What makes them special is the consistency and safety built into their techniques and standard operating procedures. This consistency mitigates risk and helps ensure the desired outcome needed on special missions. Many aviation forces can do something cool and high-speed one time and get away with it, but how about night after night, for months on end, and be consistently good and safe while doing it? That is the true special in Special Operations Aviation. And, it is much harder than one might think.

An early MH-60

As time passed, the unit grew and developed into a more formal organization. In 1990, the designation was changed once again and the unit became known as the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne). As the compound at Ft. Campbell, KY grew, so did the unit’s mission set. Able to deploy worldwide in a matter of moments, the unit became an integral part of the special operations world, working in close concert with the units it would support, from within both USSOCOM and JSOC.

Up until the early ’90s, the airframes used by the Regiment were modified versions of regular Army aircraft. The UH-60A and CH-47C or D model aircraft in their original form were given updated navigation systems, FLIR capability, over-the-horizon communications, and state-of-the-art aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) and countermeasures. Redesignated as MH-60 and MH-47 (the M standing for Special Mission), they continued to add technology and capability throughout the 1980s.

Maturity and budget growth led to increasingly rapid technology development. Because it was the only unit of its kind in the force, the acquisitions of equipment and development of technology were similarly outside the normal lines. This, combined with the ability to develop and purchase for a smaller number of airframes (as opposed to the Army having to develop items for hundreds of Chinooks or Black Hawks), meant the Regiment was constantly adding to and improving their aircraft and their capabilities. These aircraft were developed specifically for the special operations mission and, most importantly, BY the people who would fly them.

MH-47E

MH-60K

Their original modified MH-60A aircraft gave way to the MH-60L, a still modified but newer stop-gap aircraft based on the UH-60L model. The MH-60K was the first purpose-built special operations airframe, incorporating a four-screen glass cockpit (with independent inertial navigation units), terrain-following radar, and in-flight refueling probe. Following close behind was the MH-47E. It shared the avionics suite of the K model, as well as the terrain-following radar and in-flight refueling. It added ‘fat’ fuel tanks, twice the size of the normal Chinook fuel tanks, giving the aircraft a distinctive head-on profile.

AH-6, sporting rockets and mini-guns

The OH-6 ‘Little Bird’ had been constantly modified and massaged as the years progressed. Initial improvements had been to modify the main rotor and tail rotor for better performance. Limited by weight and size, these aircraft were often missing the host of electronic assistants their larger brethren carried, and for many years their pilots needed to hone and retain their more ‘pure’ piloting skills of time, distance, and heading flying. Regardless, they were always on time, on target, plus or minus 30 seconds, as the unit advertised. To do that in a small craft at 90 knots, low level, at night, managing navigation based on a compass, a clock, and a hand-marked map…well, let us just say that it is more challenging than any description can capture.

The Little Bird aircraft used by the 160th are divided into two types. The AH-6 attack variant is just that; the small and highly accurate close air support of choice for many of their missions. Each had a variety of weapons available, from multi-barreled guns, rockets, or guided missiles. The packages changed with the mission and with the times. Having an organic attack element included in the unit was critical to both the secrecy and operational security of their missions, as well as to the safety of the ground troops themselves, able to work closely with the attack pilots and develop fire control measures that enabled them to provide support with a closeness and accuracy that would be nearly impossible to achieve otherwise.

MH-6 inserting troops

The MH-6 assault variant is the one most visually associated with helicopters and special operations; the ‘people pod’ on each side of the aircraft that is capable of holding up to three ‘operators’. The small size and agility of the aircraft, combined with its low profile and generally low noise signature made it a perfect insertion vehicle for urban operations, especially tight spaces (think streets or intersections) and rooftops. The addition of fast rope capabilities further enhanced their usefulness in almost any environment.

The most interesting aircraft currently used by the Regiment is the organically-developed attack version of an MH-60L, known as the “DAP.” Known colloquially as the “Direct Action Penetrator,” or in later versions as the “Integrated Defensive Armed Penetrator,” this variation mated short wing stores holding missiles, rockets, and chain guns to the Black Hawk airframe, providing a heavier attack capability that still retained parts and flight commonality with the other aircraft in the fleet. While it can use a variety of guided missiles depending on mission set, it can be equally effective with its simple use of 2.75” rockets and the withering fire from the M230 30mm chain gun.

In addition to growth and change in the aircraft used, the unit also expanded beyond Ft. Campbell, establishing 3rd Bn, 160th, based out of Hunter AAF, GA, as well as a detached company responsible for operations in the Central and South American areas. Additionally, for a short period of time, it supported the development of a SOA capability in the National Guard, with the 1st Bn, 245th Aviation Regiment of the Oklahoma National Guard.

The unit grew exponentially throughout the ’80s and ’90s, increasing skill, capabilities, and firepower accordingly. Their training pace was constant, and they continually practiced with the special mission units and other SOF entities that they were tasked to support, creating a long history of trust and interoperability that allowed them to work seamlessly together. These years of development and innovation would come to be tested greatly as the world, the military, Special Operations forces and Special Operations aviation changed dramatically, beginning in 2001.

 

[Ravage]

http://fightersweep.com/440/special-operations-aviation-part-4/

The hours, days, and weeks immediately following the impact of the first plane into the World Trade Center were transformational for everyone in the country, and nowhere was this more true than in the halls and training areas of the Special Operations community. For those assigned to the 160th SOAR, it was no different.

MH-47G in Afghanistan (Combat Camera Photo)

On 19 October 2001, an MH-47E touched down in Afghanistan carrying the first SF ODA to have boots on the ground. Operation Enduring Freedom and the war in Afghanistan would become the longest running conflict in American history. Since that date, personnel and aircraft of the 160th SOAR have been on the ground or flying in that theater. Not only does it establish a record in longevity of war, it sets a record of continuous participation by a unit of that size. While the personnel and aircraft are constantly rotating back and forth, there has not been a day in the intervening 13 years that the Regiment was not part of the order of battle across Afghanistan. The task has been difficult, painful, and challenging. But most Night Stalkers wouldn’t have it any other way.

Operations in Afghanistan forced a change in how all segments of the military operated, and Special Operations aviation was no exception. It was often joked in the days prior to 2001 that a pilot should ‘fly it like he stole it’, skillfully but thoroughly using the aircraft to the maximum extent of its ability to provide the most capability to the customer. The Afghanistan terrain, however, can be a cruel taskmaster.

Weight is the limiting factor in helicopter performance, especially at extreme temperatures and high altitude. A landing helicopter, while operating at slow speeds and before arriving in ‘ground effect’ near the surface, is using the most power it will use throughout the entire mission. Mission planning within the SOA assault world is focused on this point, because it is the critical point of failure—it does no one any good to arrive on time and on target, only to crash due to lack of power.

And let us not forget; all of this work must be done in close proximity to the ground (generally between 300 and 500 feet above ground level) and in jagged terrain on the darkest nights available. Planning for every possible contingency means the fewest surprises on those dark nights.

MH-47G operating with Rangers, Afghanistan

The backwards planning involved is extensive. Where is the mission starting? Where is the supported ground force? How far is the target? How long do we need to loiter in the area for immediate CASEVAC? How far away is refuel? Fuel is often the critical factor. Not only is it a valuable commodity (and in the early days of the war, nearly impossible to find), fuel is weight. Therefore, you only keep exactly the amount you need, so as to not take away from the ground force commander’s capabilities. That means planning down to the minute and to the pound, with very little margin for error. Pilots will calculate the maximum power available at that point on the earth (elevation and temperature being most important), and then give themselves a small margin for safety. This number translates to a weight they can safely carry to that place.

Helicopter capability (especially within the world of air assault) is most often expressed in terms of ‘ACL’, or ‘allowable cargo load’. This number, expressed as weight, is what SOA aviators give to the ground force commander. With this, he can determine the composition of his forces and what equipment they can bring. If he needs more than the aircraft involved can provide, you start modifying the plan or adding aircraft to the mission (assuming they are available, and if the tactical situation allows).

Within weeks of beginning regular operations in Afghanistan, aircraft were sustaining damage on landing in the extreme dust, altitudes, and terrain of the area. While the incident might not be life threatening, repairing such damage can take an aircraft out of the fight. Even events such as an ‘over torque’, where more than the allowable level of power was applied, drove the need to replace or inspect components. And, given the limits of support available at austere outstations, repairs could be difficult at best. Aviation is a great tool, but it is finite; there are only so many helicopters and crews to go around.

So, as with all other services, tactics and procedures began to change. The ‘margin’ of power required in planning was incrementally widened. This had the effect of slightly reducing the ACL, but increasing maneuverability and capability at the most critical part of a flight aerodynamically. Additionally, this also was the point at which the aircraft was most vulnerable to ground fire, to rotor wash from other aircraft, and to loss of visual references due to dust…in other words, the places at which extra power is most needed. Larger margins and a slightly different mindset led to less damage, more consistency, and greater longevity on the battlefield, something they would sorely need.

As the Special Mission Units changed their tactics, so did Special Operations Aviation. The pace of war began to move faster and faster, with the increase in intelligence gathering and targeting capability. Units began to move more and more dynamically, and their air support had to move with them. Normally, moving fast means things get lost or missed; but those things are not an option for missions at this level. Ironically, the capabilities that developed came less from a plan and more from simple practice.

In risk mitigation, practice and trust are critical beyond measure. The practice of working together, of knowing what each member of the team needs, of how they will perform a certain task; these all build trust, confidence, and predictability within the group. No one can ever predict how a battle will go, but it can know all the players well enough to predict how they will react to the changes that occur. Target squirted? Element A will do this, Element B will do that, Element Air will do this. Practiced in training and then in combat, each member of the team reacts exactly as anticipated. That consistency, even in exercising a contingency, breeds safety, which breeds repeatability.

As the wars progressed, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, this relationship grew in depth and allowed for unprecedented speed of action, both for the ground force and for their air support. At the peak of this action, there might have been as many as eight to ten air assault-based SOF missions occurring between the theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan every single night, using special operations troops from every level. These missions often included regular Army aviation assets, providing support under the SOA umbrella. This represented a zenith of Special Operations never seen before.

MH-47G in Iraq (Combat Camera Photo)

It could easily be said that the culmination of this capability was exercised on 2 May 2011, during the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. While certain aspects of the mission were particular to the target, the functional components of the mission had been performed almost nightly by all of the forces involved, and over similar terrain, for nearly a decade prior. It was a perfect confluence of skill, tools, training, and experience.

 

[Ravage]

http://fightersweep.com/548/special-operations-aviation-part-5/

As the GWOT progressed, the landscape and tools of the Regiment began to change.

Until 2001, it was organized into three battalions. 1st Battalion was comprised of the AH/MH-6 companies (one each) and the MH-60K assault and MH-60L DAP companies. 2nd Battalion was solely an MH-47 battalion, comprised of two assault companies. 3rd Battalion, based at Hunter Army Airfield, GA, had a mix of one MH-60 assault company and one MH-47 heavy assault company. Each battalion (1st, 2nd, and 3rd) also includes a dedicated maintenance company.

The ‘bench seat’ and fast rope mounts on an MH-6. The rope is released remotely by the pilots once the insertion is completed.

Similar to all special operations units across the services, the 160th SOAR began to expand and transform. 4th Battalion, based at Joint Base Lewis McChord, WA, stood up in 2007. Their specific area of responsibility is the Pacific Command, incorporating West Coast- and Pacific-based Special Operations teams as their training partners.

As part of the transformation, and based in part on the lessons learned early in Afghanistan, the Chinook fleet was expanded from approximately 40 to over 60. This transformation also changed the organization of most of the battalions. 2nd Battalion added an assault company of MH-60s, and 3rd Battalion added another heavy lift company of MH-47s. As new aircraft are added, the regiment will eventually create an identical structure for 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions of 2 MH-47 companies, an MH-60 company, and a maintenance company.

Technology has changed continuously throughout the Global War on Terror. New communications devices and improved aircraft systems are constantly being integrated onto the airframes. The AH/MH-6J aircraft incorporated FLIR and updated GPS navigation, and the recently-arriving MELB (or ‘Mission Enhanced Little Bird’) upgrades continue to expand the capabilities of this unique aircraft.

Roll-out of the first MH-47G at Boeing’s Ridley Park Facility, May 2004

The MH-47G, also in planning prior to the start of hostilities, began deliveries in 2005 and began combat deployments in 2007. All MH-47 aircraft in the Regiment have been upgraded to this version. The enhancements include a Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS), giving it full glass-cockpit capabilities, greatly enhanced situational awareness, and dynamic mission planning capability. Boeing’s support of the Special Operations community is still growing; USASOC just announced the test flight of the first ever new-build Chinook airframe for Special Operations, one of around ten planned.

The CAAS cockpit is also shared with the upgraded MH-60L DAP and newly arrived MH-60M. The M sports a significant increase in engine power and carrying capability. Also common among all three of these airframes is a newer Electro Optical Sensor System, comprised of FLIR, near-infrared and color TV cameras, target illuminators, eye-safe laser range finders, and image merging capability.

The CAAS cockpit layout of an MH-47G

The logic of sharing cockpit and avionics components across multiple airframes is self-evident. Deployment packages are heavily reduced in both stocked parts and equipment needed to support those parts. Additionally, technicians can work much more easily across airframes, requiring less ‘airframe specific’ training. Whether supporting MH-47s or MH-60s, the functional tasks are often the same. Time and equipment saved is exponential in its impact.

Another common capability between the Black Hawk and Chinook airframes is the Multi-Mode Radar, or MMR. This radar provides terrain flight capabilities, even in areas of zero visibility. It enables a force to truly mask itself within terrain while mitigating the risk for such low-level operations. It is especially helpful while passing through areas of reduced visibility, ensuring a true ‘all weather’ capability for the force. Additionally, even when not being used in a true ‘terrain following’ function, it can be used constantly as a ‘terrain avoidance’ radar, providing situational awareness of the terrain ahead and providing predictive obstacle clearance. A new generation of this venerable system is in the works, and will likely be fielded soon.

The aircraft survivability equipment (or ASE) on the SOA airframes is generally one generation ahead of what would be found in the regular aviation forces, and is also more robust. The need to operate in denied territory, including territories with advanced, lethal Integrated Air Defense Systems, drives the need for constant research and improvement. Unlike conventional forces, Special Operations Aviation will routinely be the first aircraft to penetrate enemy air defenses; they often will not have the luxury of operating after the first line of those defenses have been engaged and degraded. Tactics and ASE truly make the difference in those situations. The current suite provides passive and active defense of both shoulder-fired and radar-guided missiles, as well as sensors for detection and identification of radar and laser tracking systems.

The newly-arrived MH-60M, with upgraded engines and avionics.

In few other segments of aviation can you find a unit that has so specifically changed the world in which they operate, especially in such a relatively short time. 34 years ago, their mission and their specialty did not truly exist. Today, they are so endemic and singular in what they do that it seems odd to consider a day in which their capability did not exist.

Despite the changes in tactics, technology and focus demanded by more than a dozen years of continuous fighting, the core of Special Operations Aviation remains unchanged. Born from a failed mission at a pivotal time in history, their job was and is to provide the special operations ground force commander every capability they can muster, at the place that commander needs it, plus or minus 30 seconds. It is a mission that has been continually refined for almost thirty-five years, from an ad hoc collection of aviators and helicopters to the most professional, capable and lethal helicopter force in the world.

This mission focus is epitomized by their Creed, excerpted here:

The mission and my precious cargo are my concern. I will never surrender. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy, and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Gallantly will I show the world and the elite forces I support that a Night Stalker is a specially selected and well trained soldier.

I serve with the memory and pride of those who have gone before me for they loved to fight, fought to win and would rather die than quit.

NIGHT STALKERS DON’T QUIT!

 

[HAMMER11]

What happened to the 20th Green Hornets in Nam ? Where is the 22nd SOS in Nam, Where is "Scar Face," Where is the 19th Helicopter Squadron (AFRN).

These guys ALL supported us starting in 1965 to 72. I do think they/we were qualified to be
called "working behind and/or across the lines.