Zero Returns to the Skies over Japan

[Devildoc]

FDR was gripped by a few factors. One, and the most glaring, he was a politician, and one across the pond. He just didn't have skin in the game as did Britain, which was the temporary home to Polish government in exile (and it was Britain who really raised holy hell about Katyn and other atrocities and really argued against the pro-Soviet government that was eventually put in place). Second, FDR believed the concessions he got from Stalin outweighed the negatives. Third, he really thought that Stalin and Co. would really come around to the US way of thinking eventually.

Of course, at Yalta Stalin called for a "free and independent" Poland, and we all knows what that means to the Soviets. Churchill knew, too, but Roosevelt just didn't care. It just wasn't in the US geopolitical sphere.

It is true that FDR was all about image, and to him the image of him, Churchill, and Stalin being in accordance was very important, although often not the reality.

Stalin could not have cared less about the allies in the Med/North Africa. He wanted one thing and one thing only: the second front in Europe. At least that's what I got from the reading I have done. I think he knew the Germans could send divisions from France to the Med without diverting too much from their eastern front; a front in France WOULD require Germany to divert troops from the Russian front, and that's what he wanted.

I doubt the allies could have opened a second front on France's west coast very early, but there was a lot of support that we could have opened up a second front on the coast of Mediterranean France earlier than we did. Part of the problem was that the US was pushing for a faster entry in Europe (because that's what FDR promised to Stalin) but felt that the British-driven desire to put a crapload of troops in Italy prevented them from using the divisions necessary in Europe. That said, Marshall did concede that an earlier attack in France may have required more manpower than the US had.

As for the American citizens, it seems that more were interested (up until June 1944) in the Pacific than what was going in Europe. The Pacific was another factor that shelved the early France invasion: King was loathe to send any more ships and landing craft to the ETO than he absolutely needed to. Of course, that torqued Marshall, but Churchill didn't mind. He DID mind ANY change of focus from the ETO to the Pacific, which was an issue with King.

As for Stalin in Yalta, I think it is true that he wasn't listening to anyone's particular arguments. Stalin wanted what Stalin wanted, and he was going to get his way (although now we know he didn't get all of the concessions he wanted).

Truman was mightily pissed at what Stalin wanted from the Yalta conference, and he had many conversations with his chiefs about prosecuting the war in the Pacific without their help, and just writing them off.

Man, I love talking about this stuff.

 

[BuckysBadger24]

I agree, I don't think there's any argument that Stalin only cared about what was important to the USSR (and more importantly, what was important to Stalin).

But without Germany becoming seriously occupied by Western forces with U.S. bolstered support in the Med., I question whether forces would have had to be diverted from the East in any significant number. Without Operation TORCH, Germany is fighting a very reeling England, led by a very timid Montgomery. Germany could have diverted a large amount of troops from Italy and even more from the Afrika Korps if they needed too, as England is simply on their own. MAYBE short of Patton, Rommel was easily the cream of the war when it came to maneuver warfare. He still led impressive victories against the Allies up until supplies began running short, including replacing lost tanks, half-tracks, etc. Without the U.S. bringing in forces, I see no reason why Rommel doesn't continue his victories in the region, even with divisions being moved to Normandy to face what would be a mainly U.S. force, with nowhere near the amount of men, materiel, and experience it would come to have in '44, and with no bulk of forces being kept at the Pas-de-Calais to prepare for what Hitler was sure was the true invasion by a then not well known Patton. Hell, Rommel may have even been willing to sit tight for a while until Germany decided the invasion of Europe. Germany would bring all forces in Normandy to bear on the invasion, because most likely any feint wouldn't be considered as seriously, as the U.S. wasn't in much of a position to pull off such a successful one. I have to think that that invasion would fail, and Stalin loses a lot more men than he did. Not to mention, while the Allies probably still would have eventually won the war, the U.S. pretty much loses all face in the end.

Ha its funny how, just like during the war, the conversation started on the Pacific, and the interest and conversation quickly moved to the ETO isn't it?

 

[Gunz]

Churchill had a hard-on for what he called the "soft underbelly" of Europe, going in through Italy (and later the Balkans, which, thankfully, never happened.) And he convinced FDR to sign off on the mainland Italy campaign; and IIRC, Marshall and the other chiefs thought it was a bad idea. In any case Italy turned into a meat-grinder, Salerno, Anzio, Monte Cassino, etc. Churchill had this fixation with the Med going back to the first World War, and lost his job as First Lord of the Admiralty because of his part in the engineering of the Gallipoli disaster. But he was also brilliant in so many ways and had a great deal of influence on FDR. And that had to rattle King.

During the Guadalcanal Campaign in late '42, which comprised the land battle and a number of incredibly ferocious naval surface actions, there was serious concern as to the outcome...so much so that eventually FDR told the Chiefs to give Nimitz what he needed to finish the job, even if they had to rob from the upcoming TORCH. (See how I shifted this back to the Pacific?)

(BTW, just as a personal note, my Daddy was an Army Engineer and went into the ETO during the DRAGOON operation in Southern France. He built Bailey Bridges all the way to Austria.)

 

[AWP]

During the Guadalcanal Campaign in late '42, which comprised the land battle and a number of incredibly ferocious naval surface actions, there was serious concern as to the outcome...so much so that eventually FDR told the Chiefs to give Nimitz what he needed to finish the job, even if they had to rob from the upcoming TORCH. (See how I shifted this back to the Pacific?)

Midway didn't break the back of IJN aviation as much as the Guadalcanal/ Solomons campaign. She lost more pilots there than at Midway. The two greatest losses to come out of Midway were carriers (duh, I know) and skilled maintainers. A/C maintainers suffered disproportionately to pilots. The Solomons was a meat grinder and the Navy took more casualties than the Marines. That isn't to minimize the Marines' sacrifices, but most people don't know how many sailors we lost.

 

[Gunz]

I'm reading for probably the 8th time, The Battle for Guadalcanal by Samuel Griffith, (a book published when I was in 4th grade), and the best account of the entire campaign I've ever read, and he gives equal treatment to the naval engagements. Horrific losses in ships and sailors, as you say, and so much so that the American public couldn't be told, for fear of the demoralizing effect it would have.

(BTW, the author, Brig Gen Griffith was the XO of the 1st Raider Battalion under Red Mike Edson and took over command of the Raiders when Edson was made CO of 5th Marines.)

 

[AWP]

I'm reading for probably the 8th time, The Battle for Guadalcanal by Samuel Griffith, (a book published when I was in 4th grade), and the best account of the entire campaign I've ever read, and he gives equal treatment to the naval engagements. Horrific losses in ships and sailors, as you say, and so much so that the American public couldn't be told, for fear of the demoralizing effect it would have.

(BTW, the author, Brig Gen Griffith was the XO of the 1st Raider Battalion under Red Mike Edson and took over command of the Raiders when Edson was made CO of 5th Marines.)

Book Review: Neptune's Inferno

Excellent book on the naval campaign around Guadalcanal. I highly recommend the author's work.

 

[pardus]

I agree, I don't think there's any argument that Stalin only cared about what was important to the USSR (and more importantly, what was important to Stalin).

Like every other Allied leader.

But without Germany becoming seriously occupied by Western forces with U.S. bolstered support in the Med., I question whether forces would have had to be diverted from the East in any significant number. Without Operation TORCH, Germany is fighting a very reeling England,

A "very reeling England"?
First of all, it's the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland), and in fact, it's the Commonwealth (India, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa etc...) that fought in the North African campaign.
Secondly, "Reeling"? Al Alamein was fought successfully in OCT-NOV '42, Before TORCH commenced (albeit a couple of days before).
The greatest contribution to the Allied forces in the North African campaign by the US was supply ships, not troops.

led by a very timid Montgomery.

Ah, the tired old American anti Montgomery line... sigh... BULLSHIT!
Monty was a commander who didn't want to see unnecessary slaughter of his troops as he had seen in WWI. Therefore he was a commander who demanded a correct superiority of forces before commencing an attack, in order to have the best chance of success at the least loss of life to friendly forces.
A strategy that he used to great success at Al Alamein, Normandy and to a slightly lessor extent, OP Market Garden.

Germany could have diverted a large amount of troops from Italy and even more from the Afrika Korps if they needed too, as England is simply on their own.

You clearly miss the importance of the RAF and RN in the destruction of Axis shipping support to North Africa.


MAYBE short of Patton, Rommel was easily the cream of the war when it came to maneuver warfare. He still led impressive victories against the Allies up until supplies began running short, including replacing lost tanks, half-tracks, etc. Without the U.S. bringing in forces,

Really? That is insulting to the Brits who decimated the Afrika Korps supplies via submarine and air attack.

I see no reason why Rommel doesn't continue his victories in the region, even with divisions being moved to Normandy to face what would be a mainly U.S. force,

Mainly US force? Have a look again...

with nowhere near the amount of men, materiel, and experience it would come to have in '44, and with no bulk of forces being kept at the Pas-de-Calais to prepare for what Hitler was sure was the true invasion by a then not well known Patton. Hell, Rommel may have even been willing to sit tight for a while until Germany decided the invasion of Europe. Germany would bring all forces in Normandy to bear on the invasion, because most likely any feint wouldn't be considered as seriously, as the U.S. wasn't in much of a position to pull off such a successful one. I have to think that that invasion would fail, and Stalin loses a lot more men than he did. Not to mention, while the Allies probably still would have eventually won the war, the U.S. pretty much loses all face in the end.

Ha its funny how, just like during the war, the conversation started on the Pacific, and the interest and conversation quickly moved to the ETO isn't it?

 

[AWP]

Okay, @Red Flag 1 why the disagree for my Zero/ firepower post?

Regarding @pardus post above:

There's no denying the US played a secondary role in N. Africa. One major contribution though was aiding the Commonwealth at a time when Her navies were stretched thin and providing an anvil for Monty's hammer. The RN et. al. had their hands full with the Med, India, and the Atlantic convoys. Our entrance into the war, but in the Med especially helped lock down that "pond." The Commonwealth was hurting, but still very capable, and the US in late '42 helped to slow the bleeding.

Monty....I'm anti-Monty but for some different reasons. He was kind of the proto-Colin Powell as far as decisive force, but he really made his bones in N. Africa. He was the right guy for that time, but I think he found himself overmatched in Normandy. Some of that was his approach (which some view as "timidity" but he harbored his resources which can be understandable), but in '44 he was also hampered but dwindling manpower reserves. The Commonwealth, especially the UK, was reaching the end of its rope in '44. Still immensely capable, but running out of men. Years of war had bled them dry and that's no one's fault, that's just war. He DID tie down large amounts of German armor, but that was a mixture of truth and post-war spin. He tied it down because he or his army could take Caen. A tough nut to crack, but tying down the armor was a by product of being stalled. The US bogged down in the hedgerows and Monty kept the Germans from massing their forces in front of the Americans, but that was an accidental benefit in a bad time. He was a polarizing character and his supporters vocal and rabid at times. He was the right guy in Africa and maybe not the best choice for Normandy, BUT he was a national hero so his position in France was a foregone conclusion. His Market Garden idea was a folly then and history isn't kind in that regard, nor should it be....but Market Garden is another discussion.

I really think the key to N. Africa was Malta and to a lesser extent Gibraltar. The former was an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the right place and the latter an armed bottleneck which prevented the Germans from reinforcing the theater. Their U-boats were a disaster in the Med.

As for manpower or the mainly US force, I think you're dead wrong. I won't list the numbers, but the US had more divisions on D-Day and later more in Europe. Again, not a fault of the Commonwealth because a conflict like WWII guarantees a finite amount of manpower. The CW was being bled dry and even the US had to take measure like ending the ASTP program. We had "deeper pockets" from start to finish, but that wasn't felt until '44. That's just a function of resources, not heart.

HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Supreme Command (ETO) [Appendix E]

 

[Red Flag 1]

Okay, @Red Flag 1 why the disagree for my Zero/ firepower post?

Regarding @pardus post above:

There's no denying the US played a secondary role in N. Africa. One major contribution though was aiding the Commonwealth at a time when Her navies were stretched thin and providing an anvil for Monty's hammer. The RN et. al. had their hands full with the Med, India, and the Atlantic convoys. Our entrance into the war, but in the Med especially helped lock down that "pond." The Commonwealth was hurting, but still very capable, and the US in late '42 helped to slow the bleeding.

Monty....I'm anti-Monty but for some different reasons. He was kind of the proto-Colin Powell as far as decisive force, but he really made his bones in N. Africa. He was the right guy for that time, but I think he found himself overmatched in Normandy. Some of that was his approach (which some view as "timidity" but he harbored his resources which can be understandable), but in '44 he was also hampered but dwindling manpower reserves. The Commonwealth, especially the UK, was reaching the end of its rope in '44. Still immensely capable, but running out of men. Years of war had bled them dry and that's no one's fault, that's just war. He DID tie down large amounts of German armor, but that was a mixture of truth and post-war spin. He tied it down because he or his army could take Caen. A tough nut to crack, but tying down the armor was a by product of being stalled. The US bogged down in the hedgerows and Monty kept the Germans from massing their forces in front of the Americans, but that was an accidental benefit in a bad time. He was a polarizing character and his supporters vocal and rabid at times. He was the right guy in Africa and maybe not the best choice for Normandy, BUT he was a national hero so his position in France was a foregone conclusion. His Market Garden idea was a folly then and history isn't kind in that regard, nor should it be....but Market Garden is another discussion.

I really think the key to N. Africa was Malta and to a lesser extent Gibraltar. The former was an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the right place and the latter an armed bottleneck which prevented the Germans from reinforcing the theater. Their U-boats were a disaster in the Med.

As for manpower or the mainly US force, I think you're dead wrong. I won't list the numbers, but the US had more divisions on D-Day and later more in Europe. Again, not a fault of the Commonwealth because a conflict like WWII guarantees a finite amount of manpower. The CW was being bled dry and even the US had to take measure like ending the ASTP program. We had "deeper pockets" from start to finish, but that wasn't felt until '44. That's just a function of resources, not heart.

HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Supreme Command (ETO) [Appendix E]

The "disagree" came up because my fingers are too big for my I-Pad sometimes. It was meant as a chechmark "agree", in particular with the loss of good veteran combat pilots, to not only fly and fight; but to train newer pilots. My apologies for not having caught it in my "Read, check agree" and move on. I don't recall ever hitting disagree without explaining why I disagreed. My apologies, amigo.

 

[Gunz]

The "disagree" came up because my fingers are too big for my I-Pad sometimes. It was meant as a chechmark "agree", in particular with the loss of good veteran combat pilots, to not only fly and fight; but to train newer pilots. My apologies for not having caught it in my "Read, check agree" and move on. I don't recall ever hitting disagree without explaining why I disagreed. My apologies, amigo.

:-"

 

[Gunz]

The Japanese had a fighter that could match anything the US had in the air late in the war. It was the Nakajima KI-84. It didn't go into production until late '43. From the account I'm reading it had a faster rate of climb, better agility, could fight at 30,000 feet, had self-sealing tanks and four 20mm guns. But...because of raw materials shortages and declining numbers of experienced pilots "...it's true potential could not be realized..."

Still, 3500 were manufactured.

 

[pardus]

Okay, @Red Flag 1 why the disagree for my Zero/ firepower post?

Regarding @pardus post above:

There's no denying the US played a secondary role in N. Africa. One major contribution though was aiding the Commonwealth at a time when Her navies were stretched thin and providing an anvil for Monty's hammer. The RN et. al. had their hands full with the Med, India, and the Atlantic convoys. Our entrance into the war, but in the Med especially helped lock down that "pond." The Commonwealth was hurting, but still very capable, and the US in late '42 helped to slow the bleeding.

Monty....I'm anti-Monty but for some different reasons. He was kind of the proto-Colin Powell as far as decisive force, but he really made his bones in N. Africa. He was the right guy for that time, but I think he found himself overmatched in Normandy. Some of that was his approach (which some view as "timidity" but he harbored his resources which can be understandable), but in '44 he was also hampered but dwindling manpower reserves. The Commonwealth, especially the UK, was reaching the end of its rope in '44. Still immensely capable, but running out of men. Years of war had bled them dry and that's no one's fault, that's just war. He DID tie down large amounts of German armor, but that was a mixture of truth and post-war spin. He tied it down because he or his army could take Caen. A tough nut to crack, but tying down the armor was a by product of being stalled. The US bogged down in the hedgerows and Monty kept the Germans from massing their forces in front of the Americans, but that was an accidental benefit in a bad time. He was a polarizing character and his supporters vocal and rabid at times. He was the right guy in Africa and maybe not the best choice for Normandy, BUT he was a national hero so his position in France was a foregone conclusion. His Market Garden idea was a folly then and history isn't kind in that regard, nor should it be....but Market Garden is another discussion.

I really think the key to N. Africa was Malta and to a lesser extent Gibraltar. The former was an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the right place and the latter an armed bottleneck which prevented the Germans from reinforcing the theater. Their U-boats were a disaster in the Med.

As for manpower or the mainly US force, I think you're dead wrong. I won't list the numbers, but the US had more divisions on D-Day and later more in Europe. Again, not a fault of the Commonwealth because a conflict like WWII guarantees a finite amount of manpower. The CW was being bled dry and even the US had to take measure like ending the ASTP program. We had "deeper pockets" from start to finish, but that wasn't felt until '44. That's just a function of resources, not heart.

HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Supreme Command (ETO) [Appendix E]

The US was the final straw on Hitler's back, no doubt at all. The US ships were a huge factor in the winning of the war. The numbers of Victory ships along with constantly improving anti U-Boat measures saved the UK, no doubt.
Churchill himself stated that his greatest fear (or words to that effect) was the U-Boat threat, it very nearly brought the UK to it's knees.
Malta, yes absolutely was a vital lynch pin in saving the Med from Axis victory. There is a very interesting book ( I don't recall the name off the top of my head) out that I read years ago regarding a US made oil tanker that had the living shit bombed out of it trying to get to Malta, this tanker's fate was also the fate of Malta itself, so desperate the situation was.



As for D-Day...

"Commonwealth personnel, nearly all British and Canadian, outnumbered the Americans on D-day. Of the 156,000 men landed in France on 6 June, 73,000 were American, and 83,000 were British and Canadian, while the Commonwealth naval contingent was twice that of the Americans."

BBC

On D-Day, the Allies landed around 156,000 troops in Normandy. The American forces landed numbered 73,000: 23,250 on Utah Beach, 34,250 on Omaha Beach, and 15,500 airborne troops. In the British and Canadian sector, 83,115 troops were landed (61,715 of them British): 24,970 on Gold Beach, 21,400 on Juno Beach, 28,845 on Sword Beach, and 7900 airborne troops.

D-Day Museum and Overlord Embroidery

Also there can be no denying that it was mainly the Brits and Canadians who took on the brunt of the fighting in Normandy and wore down the German forces.
That is no slam whatsoever on the American forces.
http://www.ddaymuseum.co.uk/d-day/d...f-normandy-your-questions-answered#whichtroop

 

[BuckysBadger24]

The Japanese had a fighter that could match anything the US had in the air late in the war. It was the Nakajima KI-84. It didn't go into production until late '43. From the account I'm reading it had a faster rate of climb, better agility, could fight at 30,000 feet, had self-sealing tanks and four 20mm guns. But...because of raw materials shortages and declining numbers of experienced pilots "...it's true potential could not be realized..."

Still, 3500 were manufactured.

Thanks for the post, had no idea they were even closer to an aircraft of that caliber, let alone producing them. Too late to be any factor, but had they been able to get them into motion, could have caused stupid headaches.

Learn something new every time I log in to this site. As @Devildoc said, I love talking and reading about this stuff.

 

[AWP]

Churchill himself stated that his greatest fear (or words to that effect) was the U-Boat threat, it very nearly brought the UK to it's knees.

As for D-Day... BBC


D-Day Museum and Overlord Embroidery

Also there can be no denying that it was mainly the Brits and Canadians who took on the brunt of the fighting in Normandy and wore down the German forces.
That is no slam whatsoever on the American forces.

U-Boats: Short answer's "no." The UK didn't suffer as much as the narrative portrays. Clay Blair spent a lot of time covering the reasons why/ why not. Churchill made that statement but given what is known his reason(s) for it aren't understood. WWI is a different story and maybe the worry or perception was there regarding WWII, but the Germans were never even close to knocking out the UK via U-Boats.

Overlord/ Normandy: You win this round. Curses, foiled again!

 

[Devildoc]

RE: FDR, Stalin, and Yalta, I read this today:

Roosevelt’s Failure at Yalta

 

[Red Flag 1]

RE: FDR, Stalin, and Yalta, I read this today:

Roosevelt’s Failure at Yalta

Another great read is," FDR's Last Year" by Jim Bishop. FDR was physically not a well man at Yalta. The attending Docs were very worried about FDR even surviving the trip, let alone the whole Yalta interface. Much was done for the POTUS by aides and other informed minds. Just looking at the photos of FDR at Yalta are very revealing. FDR's big worry was keeping Stalin and Churchill apart. Churchill did not like or trust Stalin at all. If you can find a copy of Jim Bishop's book, it will give you a better idea of what FDR was up against, just getting through the day.

 

[Devildoc]

Another great read is," FDR's Last Year" by Jim Bishop. FDR was physically not a well man at Yalta. The attending Docs were very worried about FDR even surviving the trip, let alone the whole Yalta interface. Much was done for the POTUS by aides and other informed minds. Just looking at the photos of FDR at Yalta are very revealing. FDR's big worry was keeping Stalin and Churchill apart. Churchill did not like or trust Stalin at all. If you can find a copy of Jim Bishop's book, it will give you a better idea of what FDR was up against, just getting through the day.

And Yalta was dank, had bedbugs, communal bathrooms. It was not set up for success, except for the Russians. Not only did Churchill and Stalin not like one another, FDR played each off the other.

 

[pardus]

FDR's foolish and naive stance with Stalin was a major cause of the Cold War, and cost millions of lives as a result. I don't have a lot of respect for him at this point.