If we can discuss solutions for a common uniform and the decline and rebirth of the NCO corps, then my idea is just as
A sad day for the soldier/seaman/airman on the ground.... (A-10/CAS Discussion)
- Thread starter Kraut783
- Start date
If we can discuss solutions for a common uniform and the decline and rebirth of the NCO corps, then my idea is just as
Ouch, perhaps not in terms you are familiar with, but you ought to ask Army aviation about the term close combat attacks.
Army helicopter aviation is typically organic to the units whereas Air Force CAS assets are more combined operations and diverted from other theater priorities. Thus the need for liaisons to prioritizing getting the support from the Air Force. CCA is Close Combat Attack.
From several current Army doctrine policy publications and it has been and around for some time in one form or another.
1-1. The aviation brigade is organized to synchronize operations of multiple aviation battalions simultaneously. Because the brigade is modular and tailorable, it can task organize as required for reconnaissance, security, close combat attack (CCA), interdiction attack, air assault, and air movement operations in support of ground forces.
3-24. The ARB and ARS of the aviation brigade provide the commander with the capability to support ground forces that are engaged. CCA is carried out with direct fire weapons supported by indirect fire and CAS. The range between combatants may vary from several thousand meters to hand-to-hand combat. During CCA, attack reconnaissance aircraft engage targets near friendly forces, thereby requiring detailed integration of fire and maneuver of ground and aviation forces. To achieve desired effects and reduce risk of fratricide, air-ground integration must take place down to team levels. Refer to FM 3-04.126 for additional information on CCA operations.
3-22. A CCA is a coordinated hasty or deliberate attack by attack reconnaissance aviation aircraft against enemy forces that are in close proximity to friendly forces engaged in close combat. In most instances, the attack aviation may already occupy holding areas, battle or support-by-fire positions or are in overwatch of the ground unit as it begins its assault. The AATF employs CCA procedures to ensure that these aviation fires destroy the enemy with minimal risk to friendly forces (See FM 3-04.126).
3-34. Close air support is air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 3-0). Like CCA, close air support can be conducted at any place and time friendly forces are in close proximity to enemy forces based on availability. All leaders in the AATF should understand how to employ close air support to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay.
3-37. The ALO and JTAC personnel in the tactical air control party are the primary means for requesting and controlling close air support. However, reconnaissance units conducting shaping operations, such as reconnaissance and surveillance missions that have joint fires observer certified personnel, may observe and request CAS through the JTAC. (See FM 3-09.32 or JP 3-09.3 for examples.)
Just so you know, I was From 1989 to 1993 I was attached to the Army Reserve’s 7th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, Scott AFB. During this period I flew typically as a crew chief, scanner and gunner on the units UH-1 and CH-47s and subsequently the H-60s when the unit converted to H-60s to sustain my aircrew mission ready certifications. I also flew several SAR/MAST missions as the medic on this units helicopters. This unit was known as the Lancers and deployed during DESERT STORM to location at the King Khalid Military City and in a forward capacity at the Kuwait International Airport. I didn’t however, deploy with them. I began flying on Army helicopters as an attached or augmenting mission crewmember in 1977.
It should be noted the PJ CFETP identifies as core skill requirement "Fixed-wing immediate close air support (ICAS) call for fire procedures" and "Rotary-wing immediate close air support (ICAS) call for fire procedures" A requirement that was around long before I enlisted in 1973. If you actually look at source documents for Detachment 6, 1st Commando Wing to Udorn (Waterpump, Project 404, PALACE DOG) you will find eight PJs were involved with those operations and specific mention of "And on several occasions TSgt Stan Monnie-our para-rescue man who also had FAG training—would control strikes". The bottom-line is I'm pretty certain Army uses helicopters to do CCA/CAS if the unit has organic helicopters supporting the ground forces engaging or being engaged by the enemy.
Last edited:
I'm not saying the Army doesn't use their helos in for CCA/CAS. I am familiar with the CCA. The difference is that they don't consider them a CAS platform, like the USMC does so the restrictions on them engaging targets is not the same. The very definition of CAS is "in close proximity to friendly forces and requiring detailed integration with the fire and movement of those forces". The difference between CAS/CCA comes in with the role the helo pilot plays in airspace deconfliction. It takes a lot more SA when dealing with Army helos because transmission of the CCA 5-line is giving them clearance to roll in and prosecute targets, unless you specify an "At My Command" mission. Even then, they have a reputation for just rolling in anyways and doing what they want. So they can really present a problem if you already have fast movers on station and you're about to prosecute a target and you just want to hold the Army helos until the attack run is over. USMC helos have a CAS 5-line that is transmitted and they will hold where you put them until you clear them to engage. So it may seem like arguing semantics, but on this end it is a big difference. Not too mention the fact that all it takes is one PL or PSG to decide CAS is taking too long and he calls in a CCA right in the middle of your engagement. From what I have been told, that is not a rare occurrence.
Which is one of the reasons for TACP and ALO specialties exist. These specialties are part of the interface between Army and air support agencies of other Services in the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of airspace use. Unfortunately the perspective of Army Helo pilot role offered is somewhat disturbing as it indicates a lack of understanding of the Army’s perspective of who controls tactical airspace around its ground maneuver operations.
Air space conflicts especially in the altitudes from ground level to 5000 feet ( I might be off on the upper airspace level) between Army operations and Air Force operations has been a problem since the Korean War. The Army’s perspective of Air Space incorporates artillery, mortar, and area defensive operational capabilities. Even within the combat air rescue realm many Air Force pilots and Air Force Intel personal lacked an understanding of who owns the airspace around Army maneuver elements during the 1980s and 1990s when I began to get involved in battlestaff level mission planning. During this period is when concepts of Low Intensity Conflict and asymmetric battlefields began to be taken seriously. During this same period the orientation shifted from combat rescue shifted focus from recovery of downed aircrew on the forward air interdiction airspace back to isolated personnel recovery which was the bread and butter before the SEA conflicts emphasized have helicopter, have hoist, have guns, no other capability is needed.
It should also be noted the topic was diverted from CAS and need for A-10 or similar type aircraft to JTACs, which I also agree there is a need for. However, within this focus of conversation it was TACP/JTACs are normally a brigade level asset for the Infantry, and can be a pain in the ass getting attached for a basic patrol. Its one thing to know you are going to raid or assault an objective, you can tack on all the support you would ever want or need. Its another thing to get caught up in a complex ambush after doing a day long patrol, and having to work the situation with whatever support assets you have available.” There is a lack of awareness TACP as a specialty was never envisioned by main stream Air Force or the US Army to be supporting the typical combat patrol.
Part of the original radio maintenance purpose of the ROMAD stems from the fact that prior to Grenada, command and control had been intentional kept specialized. Army radio equipment and radio nets seldom had the UHF, VHF. and HF frequency capability compatible with the radios put into Air Force aircraft. Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) lessons learned did much to move back to combined arms operations and joint operations. Another issue was the radio communications was of such bulk and weight it needed to be hauled around on a vehicle. JTAC duties is something TACP is trying to gain proprietary ownership for many reasons, some good and some not in the best interests of effective and efficient war fighting. Regardless this will eventually get resolved as it is unlikely TACP will gain proponent proprietary ownership of JTAC duties and if I’m wrong I guess I’ll be eating my hat.
I attached a CAS history document written in 2003 that offers an Army perspective.
The attached doc is a 2008 Rand study supporting the establishing of the 13L ALO AFSC. Pages 14-15.
In addition, interviews with current ALOs and TACP personnel suggest that Army officers’ impressions do not consider all the factors of ALO competency. The TACP personnel are part of TACS, and proper use of the TACPs is essential to maximize the capability of the TACS. While most ALOs do a very effective job in commanding the TACP resource, there were comments that suggested that misuse occurs and can fall into one of two categories.
The first case of misuse of TACP personnel occurs when inexperienced ALOs allow Army commanders to manage the deployment and use of the TACP personnel. Examples given in the interviews included convoy duty, routine foot patrols, guard duty, and kitchen police.
The second case of misuse of TACP personnel occurs when ALOs improperly employ TACP personnel due to a lack of knowledge or experience. Centralized command and decentralized execution form a major doctrinal tenet of the U.S. armed forces.
In a ground combat context, it recognizes the Army commander’s role in setting objectives and defining the “commander’s intent.” Decentralized execution leaves the detailed execution of the plan to individual unit commanders. ALOs have the doctrinal responsibility to employ TACP assets in such a manner as to fulfill the Army commander’s intent. When inexperienced ALOs defer to the Army commander on the deployment of TACP personnel, there is the potential that a valuable asset, the TACP personnel, will be misused. And as a result, the TACS will be inefficiently employed.
In addition, interviews with current ALOs and TACP personnel suggest that Army officers’ impressions do not consider all the factors of ALO competency. The TACP personnel are part of TACS, and proper use of the TACPs is essential to maximize the capability of the TACS. While most ALOs do a very effective job in commanding the TACP resource, there were comments that suggested that misuse occurs and can fall into one of two categories.
The first case of misuse of TACP personnel occurs when inexperienced ALOs allow Army commanders to manage the deployment and use of the TACP personnel. Examples given in the interviews included convoy duty, routine foot patrols, guard duty, and kitchen police.
The second case of misuse of TACP personnel occurs when ALOs improperly employ TACP personnel due to a lack of knowledge or experience. Centralized command and decentralized execution form a major doctrinal tenet of the U.S. armed forces.
In a ground combat context, it recognizes the Army commander’s role in setting objectives and defining the “commander’s intent.” Decentralized execution leaves the detailed execution of the plan to individual unit commanders. ALOs have the doctrinal responsibility to employ TACP assets in such a manner as to fulfill the Army commander’s intent. When inexperienced ALOs defer to the Army commander on the deployment of TACP personnel, there is the potential that a valuable asset, the TACP personnel, will be misused. And as a result, the TACS will be inefficiently employed.
Since we've drifted from the topic of the OP....
Airspace deconfliction isn't the exclusive domain (authority or responsibility) of the Army or the JTAC/ ALO. A Control and Reporting Center (CRC) also plays a large role in controlling the skies. Which elements "owns" the airspace is something I don't know, but what I do know is the work put in by CRC's and the impact they have on the battlespace.
Without getting into details, the CRC presented here is dated somewhat, but the mission sets presented are accurate.
http://www.552acw.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=14016
The Marines have several (4 or 5?) Marine Air Control Squadrons which perform the CRC mission.
The Army is aware of them at least, even it is a copy-paste from the AF's website:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=36142
I will take a semi-educated guess and say that the on-scene control is where it starts to break down (patrol commander vs. JTAC/ ALO vs. rotary commander), but there is one other player involved. I don't think that the CRC's mandate extends below a certain altitude which is where problems arise, but good luck in receiving CAS in a timely manner without the CRC.
During my 23 years of service there were no officers doing pararescue duties. A PJ team leader of TSgt/MSgt rank got dragged into all sorts of versatile involvements to include commissioned commander level and action staff officer activities. I also served when JSOC, USSOCOM, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency were less significant than they are now. During this period there first started capabilities called Rescue Special Operations Low Level and Special Operations Low Level I and II. Level I and II was essentially the Army support tactical airlift C-130s and strategic airlift primarily C-141s and the occasional C-5s. This was the period during which forward refueling point tactics and methods were developed. I gained much flying hours flying C-141s and non Rescue and Special Operations Mission design series C-130s and C-141. On occasion I would be the primary jumpmaster for the Army on a 3 aircraft formation airborne assault training exercise. Typical scenario would be departing a location in California and flying low level typically to lesser utilized drop zones located at places such as Ft McCoy Wisconsin.
Also two WC-130 weather reconnaissance squadrons (54th WRS (typhoon) & 55th WRS (Hurricane) were aligned under the 41st Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing, but no combat weather jumpers.
From August 1987 to October 1990 there existed the 173oth Pararescue Squadron. This squadron had only two commissioned officers, the commander and the executive officer. It had the primary Squadron initially at Eglin AFB and subsequently at McClellan AFB. It had six globally separated detachments and three operating locations aligned under two detachments. These Detachments were for lack of a better word commanded by pararescue senior NCOs. I happened to be a MSgt assigned to Det 4 at RAF Woodbridge that had an operating location in Iceland and another in Spain. When deployed I was either running a team or over seeing the operations of two and occasionally 3 teams often doing operations with Army SF and occasional State Department and other agencies. My background also includes being a MFF instructor for the 23rd AF MTT and being an original member of DOD's first globally deployable mountaineering High Altitude Rescue Team. Needless to say my experience is one of being there doing.
http://www.nwas.org/digest/papers/1978/Vol03No4/1978v003no04-Henderson.pdf AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR FORCE WC-130 WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE, written in 1978,was to large of a file to upload, but sufficient to give an awareness of the past.
http://alaska.net/~jcassidy/pdf_files/HART History.pdf gives some awareness of the depth of weather reconnaissance pertinent to extreme high altitude balloons and why I emphasized no weather parachutists assigned to any 41 RWRW unit.
http://alaska.net/~jcassidy/pdf_files/PJs Korean War.pdf gives an idea of PJ mission utilizations before JSOC, USSOCOM, AFSOC and JPRA gained current influences. I was there participating in the growing pains of the AFSOC/Special Tactics and JPRA organizations and had a rear seat back of the room cheap seat direct knowledge of other growing pains.
Also two WC-130 weather reconnaissance squadrons (54th WRS (typhoon) & 55th WRS (Hurricane) were aligned under the 41st Rescue and Weather Reconnaissance Wing, but no combat weather jumpers.
From August 1987 to October 1990 there existed the 173oth Pararescue Squadron. This squadron had only two commissioned officers, the commander and the executive officer. It had the primary Squadron initially at Eglin AFB and subsequently at McClellan AFB. It had six globally separated detachments and three operating locations aligned under two detachments. These Detachments were for lack of a better word commanded by pararescue senior NCOs. I happened to be a MSgt assigned to Det 4 at RAF Woodbridge that had an operating location in Iceland and another in Spain. When deployed I was either running a team or over seeing the operations of two and occasionally 3 teams often doing operations with Army SF and occasional State Department and other agencies. My background also includes being a MFF instructor for the 23rd AF MTT and being an original member of DOD's first globally deployable mountaineering High Altitude Rescue Team. Needless to say my experience is one of being there doing.
http://www.nwas.org/digest/papers/1978/Vol03No4/1978v003no04-Henderson.pdf AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR FORCE WC-130 WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE, written in 1978,was to large of a file to upload, but sufficient to give an awareness of the past.
http://alaska.net/~jcassidy/pdf_files/HART History.pdf gives some awareness of the depth of weather reconnaissance pertinent to extreme high altitude balloons and why I emphasized no weather parachutists assigned to any 41 RWRW unit.
http://alaska.net/~jcassidy/pdf_files/PJs Korean War.pdf gives an idea of PJ mission utilizations before JSOC, USSOCOM, AFSOC and JPRA gained current influences. I was there participating in the growing pains of the AFSOC/Special Tactics and JPRA organizations and had a rear seat back of the room cheap seat direct knowledge of other growing pains.
Last edited:
One minor correction, 3 Weather Reconaissance Squadrons, the 53rd at Keesler (Hurricane Hunters), 54th on Guam (Typhoon Chasers) and 55th at McClellan (Pole Vaulters flying WC-135's).
as an aside, 99% of the weather jumpers were assigned to Air Weather Service.
An article I just read on SWJ talking about the A-10 being cut. There is a free seminar on the 22nd in DC to talk about the A-10 and why cutting it is a bad move.
Participants will address questions surrounding (1) the vital importance of the Close Air Support mission, (2) the controversial decision to retire the A-10 in favor of the F-35, (3) what it will take to provide a CAS capability in the future, and most importantly, (4) how the Defense Department should proceed to insure our ground troops will be given the support they need and deserve.
The seminar will take the form of a discussion among people having long experience in this mission area -- from a variety perspectives -- from aircraft designers, to pilots with A-10 combat experience and, most importantly, the views soldiers and marines on the receiving end of close support in ground combat operations. In the interests of having a vigorous debate, pushbacks by people supporting the AF decision will be not only welcomed but emphatically encouraged and solicited. The goal is to promote a free market of ideas.
This seminar will take place on 0930 Nov. 22 at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and will be sponsored by the Strauss Military Reform Project, a subsidiary of the Project on Government Oversight.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/should-the-af-retire-the-a-10-a-seminar-on-a-seminal-question
Participants will address questions surrounding (1) the vital importance of the Close Air Support mission, (2) the controversial decision to retire the A-10 in favor of the F-35, (3) what it will take to provide a CAS capability in the future, and most importantly, (4) how the Defense Department should proceed to insure our ground troops will be given the support they need and deserve.
The seminar will take the form of a discussion among people having long experience in this mission area -- from a variety perspectives -- from aircraft designers, to pilots with A-10 combat experience and, most importantly, the views soldiers and marines on the receiving end of close support in ground combat operations. In the interests of having a vigorous debate, pushbacks by people supporting the AF decision will be not only welcomed but emphatically encouraged and solicited. The goal is to promote a free market of ideas.
This seminar will take place on 0930 Nov. 22 at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and will be sponsored by the Strauss Military Reform Project, a subsidiary of the Project on Government Oversight.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/should-the-af-retire-the-a-10-a-seminar-on-a-seminal-question
This month's Combat Aircraft Monthly has a blurb about this. It claims the AF's numbers say in FY12, A-10 operational and maintenance costs where about $1.1 billion compared to the F-15E's $1.3 billion and the F-16's $3.1 billion. However, the A-10's availability was less than the -15E's at 66.52 percent.
Curiously, later in the same edition it quotes a Mission Capable Rate in 2013 for the A-10 of 75.2 percent and the -15E at 79.3 percent. The article does not list the MCR for F-16's.
Curiously, later in the same edition it quotes a Mission Capable Rate in 2013 for the A-10 of 75.2 percent and the -15E at 79.3 percent. The article does not list the MCR for F-16's.
Kraut783
SOF Support
GOOD NEWS...A-10 not done yet 
House Spending Bill Blocks A-10 Retirement
The US House of Representatives on Thursday evening, during deliberation on the fiscal 2015 defense spending bill, voted to block the US Air Force’s plan to cut the entire A-10 fleet.
The chamber approved the an amendment, offered by Rep. Candice Miller, R-Mich., that would prohibit the Defense Department from using money to divest, retire, transfer or place in storage any A-10 aircraft, along with blocking the department from preparing to cut any of the aircraft.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/...0017/House-Spending-Bill-Blocks-10-Retirement
House Spending Bill Blocks A-10 Retirement
The US House of Representatives on Thursday evening, during deliberation on the fiscal 2015 defense spending bill, voted to block the US Air Force’s plan to cut the entire A-10 fleet.
The chamber approved the an amendment, offered by Rep. Candice Miller, R-Mich., that would prohibit the Defense Department from using money to divest, retire, transfer or place in storage any A-10 aircraft, along with blocking the department from preparing to cut any of the aircraft.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/...0017/House-Spending-Bill-Blocks-10-Retirement
GOOD NEWS...A-10 not done yet
House Spending Bill Blocks A-10 Retirement
The US House of Representatives on Thursday evening, during deliberation on the fiscal 2015 defense spending bill, voted to block the US Air Force’s plan to cut the entire A-10 fleet.
The chamber approved the an amendment, offered by Rep. Candice Miller, R-Mich., that would prohibit the Defense Department from using money to divest, retire, transfer or place in storage any A-10 aircraft, along with blocking the department from preparing to cut any of the aircraft.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/...0017/House-Spending-Bill-Blocks-10-Retirement
I'm glad to see that. Considering Congress and the DoD's current propensity for picking completely abysmal air frames to sink precious dollars into, I'm relieved that they're keeping something that works. This is just from my somewhat limited perspective, but if it ain't broke...
So where does the money come from?
I'm pretty sure it's NOT coming from cuts to the botched abortion known as the F-35, and I don't know enough about inter-service funding to say for sure whether or not it's coming from a cut to the Littoral Combat Ship program (with Austal shipyard located here in town, the reduction in ships to be made did make the news). Funding is probably imagined to come from troop reduction, when in actuality it's coming from some unsustainable line of credit somewhere.
Nope, they added funds (Thank you Sec Gates, wonder what state produces these gems?)
Nope, rare that Congress takes funds from one Branch and moves it to another Branch of the Military (though I hadn't heard about the LCS cuts)
I am willing to bet those Troop/TriCare/VA cuts will not be imaginary.
Kraut783
SOF Support
Kill some of these defense programs...i.e. F-35....just cut down the order a bit. But keep the best all day all weather CAS system in the inventory.
pardus
Verified Military
- Joined
- Sep 7, 2006
- Messages
- 10,534
Or give the CAS assets and everything needed to run them to the Army and Marines.
Yep.
Sign the A-10 over to the Army and let mis-manage the program.
Give them 12 months of support and let Aviation take it over after that.
