Air Force Leaders Show Lack of Commitment to CAS

[Gunz]

...if the Air Force had its way back then there would have been zero helicopters with door gunners in Vietnam.

Essentially, the AF was converting C-130s and C-119s into gunships while at the same time the Army was pushing the AH-1. According to a GAO report from 1972, there wasn't a great deal of cooperation between the two services.





https://www.gao.gov/assets/b-176702.pdf

 

[Johca]

Piasecki H-21 in US Army Aviation
A US Army H-21 named Amblin Annie made the first non-stop transcontinental helicopter flight across the United States, a distance of 2610 miles, in 37 hours on 24 Aug 1956 using in-flight refuelling.

 

[AWP]

Piasecki H-21 in US Army Aviation
A US Army H-21 named Amblin Annie made the first non-stop transcontinental helicopter flight across the United States, a distance of 2610 miles, in 37 hours on 24 Aug 1956 using in-flight refuelling.

I've done some dumb stuff in my life, but then there's...

 

[Devildoc]

Oh, the Key West agreement that left the Army without any type of CAS platform for...like 15 years! Getting rockets and machine guns on helicopters was such a pain...if the Air Force had its way back then there would have been zero helicopters with door gunners in Vietnam.



That summary is simplifying the fact that the Air Force actively stopped the Army from having fly-fly things with guns. (And is still attempting to prevent the Army from having fixed wing with guns).

Same Key West agreement that prevented the AF from operating Rapier Missile Systems in the UK. Missiles had to be maintained and operated by the RAF Regiment.

That knife cuts both ways.

Correct, although fly-fly things with guns might have been driven by the Geneva Convention stipulation of medical aircraft not be armed and must be appropriately marked. As far as door gunners it may have been more attributable to acquisitions of military helicopters to design specification not requiring a door gunner capability which is why even the Air Force lacked mounts for door guns.

Key West Agreement (well, not really an "agreement," an agreement like how an "agreement" works with the Mafia) was a classic compromise: no one left happy.

 

[Johca]

(35) US Army/US Air Force Understanding of Relationship of Helicopters and Fixed-Wing Aircraft in Close Air Support, 16 September 1975

As a result of their experience in Vietnam, the Army and Air Force agreed on a concept of relationships regarding close air support assets. When given the opportunity, the Army had been unwilling to specify its requirements for a fixed-wing, close air support aircraft. The Air Force had adopted the Vought A-7D as an interim aircraft in the late 1960s and early 1970s, while it developed its A-X <which became the Fairchild
Republic A-10) close air support aircraft. When viewed from outside the services, the A-10 appeared to duplicate the mission filled by the Army's armed attack helicopters, whose numbers had vastly increased as a result of the McConnell-Johnson Agreement of 6 April 1966 and the successful employment of rotary-wing aircraft in Vietnam.

Due to the appearance of duplication, the House Committee on Armed Services sanctioned hearings on the matter. It resulted in a letter <included below, see p. 404) from the two chiefs of staff to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee which explained the complementary nature of Army-Air Force close air support assets. The Army viewed the attack helicopter as an extension of its ground units' organic firepower, while Air Force fixed-wing assets were centrally controlled and were more flexible in responding to theaterwide exigencies.

My experience of CAS is limited to the A-7 and F-4 and CSAR ORIs. Of the two I preferred working with the F-4 (besides CAS we used then for tactical photo recon for ground operations planning purposes. Never got opportunity to work A-10s until participating in Flintlock exercises circa 1986-1989. The A-10s were mostly being used to hunt tanks and not normally tasked to support CSAR sorties and provide CAS and tactical photo recon to PJ teams as needed. Never encountered an A-10 configured for tactical photo recon purposes either.

 

[Gunz]

Oh, the Key West agreement that left the Army without any type of CAS platform for...like 15 years!

"Hamstrung by a misinterpretation of agreements dating back to 1948, the Department of Defense believes that the Army agreed not to procure fixed-wing combat aircraft and can’t arm those they do have. It turns out that’s not true — such an agreement was never codified in writing. What they did agree to was to not duplicate a function assigned to the Air Force. It’s long past time to slay this unicorn and erase a completely artificial line that hampers airpower options to the detriment of servicemen and women worldwide."


Slaying the Unicorn: The Army and Fixed-Wing Attack - War on the Rocks

 

[Johca]

I've done some dumb stuff in my life, but then there's...

That is pretty much how H-3s accomplished ship to air refueling back in the day. It wasn't done very often by the AF though. The H-3 is the only AF helicopter I'm aware of that had this capability as an internal to the cargo/passenger compartment design specification and it being published in the Dash-1.

Helicopter Refueling From A Ship!

 

[Gunz]

My experience of CAS is limited to the A-7 and F-4 and CSAR ORIs. Of the two I preferred working with the F-4 (besides CAS we used then for tactical photo recon for ground operations planning purposes. Never got opportunity to work A-10s until participating in Flintlock exercises circa 1986-1989. The A-10s were mostly being used to hunt tanks and not normally tasked to support CSAR sorties and provide CAS and tactical photo recon to PJ teams as needed. Never encountered an A-10 configured for tactical photo recon purposes either.

My experience was F4s and VNAF A-1s. And Marine F4s would risk hitting the treetops. But since we were with VN troops, we got Spads more often than not. And loved them.

 

[Johca]

But since we were with VN troops, we got Spads more often than not. And loved them.

I enlisted July 1973 (age 17), by the time I finished PJ training pipeline (age 18) Vietnam and the A-1s was mostly history other than the Fall of Saigon and the USS Mayaquez incident. During 1974/75 I was assigned to NAS Keflavik Iceland. So, I have no I was there in Vietnam stories for me to reminisce about. But thank you for your service and getting out of SEA alive.

 

[Johca]

In October 1951, Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter and Army Secretary Frank M. Pace signed a memorandum of understanding to eliminate the weight restrictions on Army aircraft. Defining Army aviation in terms of functions to be performed within a 50-mile radius of the combat zone, the Pace-Finletter agreement stipulated there would be no duplication of the roles and missions assigned to the Air Force at Key West.

Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, Secretaries Pace and Finletter signed another memorandum of understanding in November 1952 reinstating the weight restrictions at even higher levels of 5,000 pounds and redefining the combat zone to “50 to 100 miles in depth.” These changes allowed
the Army to proceed with plans to activate helicopter transport battalions and provide additional transport helicopters in Korea.

During the Korean War the Air Force also implements policy restricting what is now called JTAC duties to rated jet engine fighter aircraft pilots (Air Force was going jet). Air Force got a hair up its butt when it was discovered enlisted and officers who were not rated and qualified jet engine fighter pilots were performing these duties in Laos, ca. 1966. Complicated history as nothing in policy prohibited enlisted and non-rated officers performing JTAC using propeller type aircraft, but this contributes to the enlisted TACP AFSC not appearing until 1977 and lack of authorization for enlisted in this AFSC to be JTACs not appearing until the mid to late 1980s.