7
7point62
Guest
What we are trying to accomplish in Afganistan, with too few men, is identical--I mean identical--with what we in the Combined Action Platoons were trying to accomplish in Vietnam. Trying to maintain a presence in primitive hamlets, letting the locals know we were there to help, trying to hunt and disrupt the Viet Cong by night, being hampered in our efforts in the villages by Viet Cong intimidation and murder of suspected collaborators, thereby limiting the amount of reliable intel from local sources...you can read what I have just written and substitute "Taliban" for "Viet Cong" and you would be on the money.
Only the terrain is different. The people are the same. Dirt poor, scared sh*tless. And in every ville, the young men are gone...You'll find the old men, old women and kids...but the young men are off with the (Viet Cong), i.e. Taliban.
You can go into a ville and chit-chat with the village elders and promise them civic action, a new well, an irrigation ditch, school supplies, maybe your Corpsman can treat a few sores and dispense some pills...but then you move on and hump to the next ville or your next ambush site and the VC/Taliban move back in and exert their influence on people who are going to be predisposed anyway to side with their own countrymen--guys who speak their language and worship their Gods--than they would be predisposed to side with some well-meaning young men from freakin Minnesota or Texas. Young men who have to call in air support from time-to-time against an enemy who hides himself among the population thereby increasing the chances of collateral damage and casualties which further enhances the insurgent position.
On top of that, you have a corrupt official government in Saigon/Kabul that has exerted almost no influence--except perhaps in a negative way--on these remote and distant villages.
It is a clusterf*cking conundrum of major proportions and the only way out is either A. run like a scalded dog or B. Get as many men on the ground as you can, totally integrate your forces into the villes and village life; (forces, by the way, who have been fully indoctrinated to the ways of the locals, and who are embedded with well-trained indigenous troops.) No compounds, no barbed wire, no sandbags. You live in and near the villes during the day and you aggressively and actively patrol and ambush. You make the enemy move at night because your night eyes are better than his. And you move at night, too. You don't sit around on your ditty box in one place. You're in one village one day and the next day at dawn you show up somewhere else. Stay mobile, stay alive. Get your resupply by helo. Or eat what the locals eat. And that, combined with effective civic action and a maybe a concerted effort higher-up against the poppy trade, may give you some stability in Afganistan.
I know this because I have done it in two AO's with 12 men against a well-organized, resourceful enemy who's country enjoyed the support of two superpowers. If it can be done in Vietnam--and we did it in a number of places and would have done it more if we'd had the support of Westmoreland and if we'd worked the bugs out of it sooner--it can work in Afganistan.
Only the terrain is different. The people are the same. Dirt poor, scared sh*tless. And in every ville, the young men are gone...You'll find the old men, old women and kids...but the young men are off with the (Viet Cong), i.e. Taliban.
You can go into a ville and chit-chat with the village elders and promise them civic action, a new well, an irrigation ditch, school supplies, maybe your Corpsman can treat a few sores and dispense some pills...but then you move on and hump to the next ville or your next ambush site and the VC/Taliban move back in and exert their influence on people who are going to be predisposed anyway to side with their own countrymen--guys who speak their language and worship their Gods--than they would be predisposed to side with some well-meaning young men from freakin Minnesota or Texas. Young men who have to call in air support from time-to-time against an enemy who hides himself among the population thereby increasing the chances of collateral damage and casualties which further enhances the insurgent position.
On top of that, you have a corrupt official government in Saigon/Kabul that has exerted almost no influence--except perhaps in a negative way--on these remote and distant villages.
It is a clusterf*cking conundrum of major proportions and the only way out is either A. run like a scalded dog or B. Get as many men on the ground as you can, totally integrate your forces into the villes and village life; (forces, by the way, who have been fully indoctrinated to the ways of the locals, and who are embedded with well-trained indigenous troops.) No compounds, no barbed wire, no sandbags. You live in and near the villes during the day and you aggressively and actively patrol and ambush. You make the enemy move at night because your night eyes are better than his. And you move at night, too. You don't sit around on your ditty box in one place. You're in one village one day and the next day at dawn you show up somewhere else. Stay mobile, stay alive. Get your resupply by helo. Or eat what the locals eat. And that, combined with effective civic action and a maybe a concerted effort higher-up against the poppy trade, may give you some stability in Afganistan.
I know this because I have done it in two AO's with 12 men against a well-organized, resourceful enemy who's country enjoyed the support of two superpowers. If it can be done in Vietnam--and we did it in a number of places and would have done it more if we'd had the support of Westmoreland and if we'd worked the bugs out of it sooner--it can work in Afganistan.
I'm not saying it's the troops fault for being stuck on their asses on these bases, but PMTs/ETTs are a far cry from effective SASO since hardly any combat operations are taking place.
Most of the ETTs/PMTs I've seen have been a hodge-podge of AD/RC component folks just thrown together too...not exactly a recipe for success.
Forget about trying to coordinate a medevac or CAS :doh:
