Seems to be working now. Still a good read!
F3EAD
- Thread starter slick
- Start date
But he appears to have a great reliance on charts and not enough clip art, and it appears he may not have a very competent editing staff of qualified NCOs.
The article itself is well written, cogent and expains the enhancements necessary to the process to make the tactical/strategic intelligence collection and dissemination more efficient.
I have it on good authority that no NCOs were harmed in the writing of that article ;)
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Very old post to be replying to, but I'm going to try using simple Army language-
On the conventional side, especially when deploying as a BSO to A-stan/Iraq- the 5Ws of the mission are very generic. Everything that's learned in NCOES/career courses/staff schools is disregarded and "combat reconnaissance patrols", route clearance, and KLEs (with little direction or tactical importance) fill the void. The BSOs seem to lack intense focus, scatter their efforts, and dissolve effectiveness. I don't know how many times I'd just be BS'ing with squad leaders from the BSO about the happenings in the area and they'd have no idea as to what I was talking about in regards to key players, whats happening to the N-S-E-W of us, recent SIGACTs, etc. Hell, I know when I was in the 82nd I had no idea who the governor was, or the name of the local al Qaeda cell leader- I just knew that if I saw someone with an AK and no uniform that I was going to kill the hell out of him.
When SOF units go through their MDMP the facts and assumptions are scrutinized to the highest degree and great care is taken in developing CCIR. EEFI is then protected ruthlessly(look at the security at a SOTF or Ranger camp compared to a conventional BDE HQ, or an VSP compared to a COP). Missions are driven by PIR until enough of the holes have been filled for deliberate ops. When the DA missions do start really flowing, your intel section is still going to provide you with specific PIR to look for on that specific operation. There's also a large amount of cross talk between SOF units, both across task forces and multi-nationally.
So in closing- we don't do it differently, we just do it right.
I have to throw in this: we do have a slightly unfair advantage due to the assets given/available to us to develop targets that the CF doesn't have. Regardless, I agree with Etype in that we go about it in the most efficient and common sense way.
Absolutely. But part of it is what we do with those resources; "success breeds success." In the squabbles for say ISR, I can envision a SOF commander saying, "This is what we've done with the four Reapers you have already given us" <throws up statistic of how many ops/how many kill or captures/results of those targets> "Now, this is what I could do if you give me two more, and that EP3 from III Corps that I've been asking you for months to throw my way" <different, even more impressive results shown>.
Time to update this article, so it's time to resurrect this necro-post.
Anyone currently using F3EA/F3EAD and have a comment on this piece?
Tier One Targeting: Special Operations and the F3EAD Process
Anyone currently using F3EA/F3EAD and have a comment on this piece?
Tier One Targeting: Special Operations and the F3EAD Process
Brill
SOF Support
You pissed me off when you went down the "evidence" route. It's just for a feel good moment to convince the JAG that Abu Dipshi'ite is really the guy who I've been saying he is.
"How do you know it's him?"
"It's my fucking job and why you pay me."
When has ANYONE questioned the JAG about their calls?
"How do you know it's him?"
"It's my fucking job and why you pay me."
When has ANYONE questioned the JAG about their calls?
Well, you can either go the "evidence" route, or you can see 100% of your detainees walk after your holding period has expired.
I never tried the "he's bad because I said he's bad" route and I would never accept it from my analysts or the operators that brought the bad guys in. No evidence = he's out the door with a little money in his pocket for his time and trouble after our interrogators and analysts had a go at him.
I never tried the "he's bad because I said he's bad" route and I would never accept it from my analysts or the operators that brought the bad guys in. No evidence = he's out the door with a little money in his pocket for his time and trouble after our interrogators and analysts had a go at him.
Florida173
SOF Support
We recently developed a tool that helps expedite the "evidence" substantiation on targeting. Helps with what ever the current criteria is at the moment for diversity of INTs and quantity of reporting from each.
Brill
SOF Support
I was coming from a SI perspective and alluding to the frustration that often happens when analysts are 100% sure Abu is The Abu because he's been "working" him for months but details are lost when sanitizing to SIPR-level. I fully agree that single source derog could result in incorrect ID however we've lost the "destroy the network" because JAG isn't a fan of digging deep.
You just described the problem: we've become a law enforcement organization, that doesn't understand that rehabilitating CT targets isn't effective.
I may be getting crotchety but we should be killing more and detaining less (not stop but less) but then since the US isn't involved in combat ops in Afghanistan or Iraq, I guess we should be detaining and charging suspects. I can imagine @Etype on the stand testifying at The Hague! Talk about a hostile witness!!!!
We've been doing this for 15 years now but AQ and IS are still effective insurgent forces. Kill more, talk less...UNLESS it's host nation taking all the credit.
Florida173
SOF Support
A lot has changed over there
There are different degrees of bad. Especially in Afghanistan. I'm pretty sure everyone that got brought into our facility was dirty in some way; after all, they were still alive. But most of them weren't dirty enough for us to absorb the risk of sending them up to the big house. In addition to the cost, the big prisons were Jihad U. for the people imprisoned there. If they weren't muj'd up before they went in, and many of them weren't, they definitely were when they came out.
I'm all about detaining more and killing less. Dead people tend to not talk as much. We can't use corpses as HUMINT sources, or use them for operational messaging, or use them to spread mistrust within networks. The worst of the worst / least cooperative bad guys tend to not allow themselves to be captured in the first place and end up KIA on the battlefield. Just about everyone else we have a shot at doing something with, whether they're deliberately cooperative or not.
We are trying to establish rule of law in Afghanistan and Iraq so we can GTFO. We can't do that with martial law and arbitrary, indefinite detentions. It's got to go into the legal system at some point... unless we're just going to absorb the criminal justice system there as well. I remember at least one of the JAGs on the tribunals at Bucca and Parwan was read on to TS, so we were able to lay out the classified evidence.
...and at the end of the day, if they're still bad when they get kicked loose, you can JDAM them later.
I don't think we ever turned over any detainees to be tried at The Hague, so Etype is safe for now ;) And the
Hague Invasion Act ensures none of us are going to be dragged in as defendants.
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I agree, and this is another place where a BOG count hurts us. Detainee Ops are manpower intensive.
- The type of mission that would result in detainees vs. KIAs is higher risk, so it requires more manpower.
- Detainees need to be guarded at every phase of the operation.
Restrictive BOG counts usually result in these folks not making the list, or the unit simply not having enough personnel to accomplish the task.
As to testifying, I'm not saying anything in a courtroom. I'd go in there to testify against a j-walker and come out of there a suspect in a 1983 rape case (I've watched Law and Order), no talking to lawyers for me.
(...and I wasn't born until 1985.)
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