Seems to be working now. Still a good read!
The author is a genius. ;) ...
But he appears to have a great reliance on charts and not enough clip art, and it appears he may not have a very competent editing staff of qualified NCOs.
The article itself is well written, cogent and expains the enhancements necessary to the process to make the tactical/strategic intelligence collection and dissemination more efficient.
Very old post to be replying to, but I'm going to try using simple Army language-Okay, here's something I've been wondering for a while: Irrespective of collection methods/sources, how does the SOF targeting process differ from that of, say, a regular infantry battalion?
I have to throw in this: we do have a slightly unfair advantage due to the assets given/available to us to develop targets that the CF doesn't have. Regardless, I agree with Etype in that we go about it in the most efficient and common sense way.
So I was looking for some information regarding the process didn't find any papers on this site, unless I missed it somewhere. I did, however, find this link. It gives a pretty solid look at the process, in my opinion. Anyone notice it missing anything or can provide extra guidance?
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/f3ead-opsintel-fusion-“feeds”-the-sof-targeting-process
Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD), pronounced “F-three-e-a-d” or “feed,” is a version of the targeting methodology utilized by the special operations forces (SOF) responsible for some of the most highly-publicized missions in support of overseas contingency operations. F3EAD is a system that allows SOF to anticipate and predict enemy operations, identify, locate, and target enemy forces, and to perform intelligence exploitation and analysis of captured enemy personnel and materiel.
Well, you can either go the "evidence" route, or you can see 100% of your detainees walk after your holding period has expired.
I never tried the "he's bad because I said he's bad" route and I would never accept it from my analysts or the operators that brought the bad guys in. No evidence = he's out the door with a little money in his pocket for his time and trouble after our interrogators and analysts had a go at him.
I was coming from a SI perspective and alluding to the frustration that often happens when analysts are 100% sure Abu is The Abu because he's been "working" him for months but details are lost when sanitizing to SIPR-level. I fully agree that single source derog could result in incorrect ID however we've lost the "destroy the network" because JAG isn't a fan of digging deep.
You just described the problem: we've become a law enforcement organization, that doesn't understand that rehabilitating CT targets isn't effective.
I may be getting crotchety but we should be killing more and detaining less (not stop but less) but then since the US isn't involved in combat ops in Afghanistan or Iraq, I guess we should be detaining and charging suspects. I can imagine @Etype on the stand testifying at The Hague! Talk about a hostile witness!!!!
We've been doing this for 15 years now but AQ and IS are still effective insurgent forces. Kill more, talk less...UNLESS it's host nation taking all the credit.
I agree, and this is another place where a BOG count hurts us. Detainee Ops are manpower intensive.I'm all about detaining more and killing less... ...The Hague, so Etype is safe for now ;)