I thought this article was very interesting: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/w..._th_20150528&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=41336949 in the NYT today.
The topic is Ukraine and Russian aggression but I started a new thread in the intelligence section because to me the open source angle was what is interesting for discussion. MODs, please feel free to move it if you don't agree.
Prior to my last tour in Afghanistan I wrote a white paper on our support to Afghan intelligence. What's described in this article is an exemplar of what my essential argument was - and I think it's applicable in other theaters. The argument was essentially: don't try to create a classified, stovepiped, specialized intelligence architecture in 2nd and 3rd world partners - instead build a collection, analysis, and dissemination structure based on open-source and digital media. The example I found most compelling for the argument was an election fraud tracking application being used by an NGO in Africa, I can't remember to name of it now but I'll see if I can find it.
I think the type of analysis and dissemination being done in the article is something easily trainable, cheap, scalable through COTS purchases and training, and above all is easy to disseminate. There are more penetration vulnerabilities in open-source but I think even in the realms of HUMINT/CI and SIGINT there are ways to protect data, sources, and methods - even on NIPR. I mean, the NYT and other investigative journalism sources do a pretty good job of protecting HUMINT sources. Say what you will about their arguments and positions but Seymour Hersch and that Greenwald douche have managed to do some pretty high-level HUMINT work against a pretty good adversary - us. Google and other technology companies do a great job of protecting the technical sources they utilize.
The topic is Ukraine and Russian aggression but I started a new thread in the intelligence section because to me the open source angle was what is interesting for discussion. MODs, please feel free to move it if you don't agree.
Prior to my last tour in Afghanistan I wrote a white paper on our support to Afghan intelligence. What's described in this article is an exemplar of what my essential argument was - and I think it's applicable in other theaters. The argument was essentially: don't try to create a classified, stovepiped, specialized intelligence architecture in 2nd and 3rd world partners - instead build a collection, analysis, and dissemination structure based on open-source and digital media. The example I found most compelling for the argument was an election fraud tracking application being used by an NGO in Africa, I can't remember to name of it now but I'll see if I can find it.
I think the type of analysis and dissemination being done in the article is something easily trainable, cheap, scalable through COTS purchases and training, and above all is easy to disseminate. There are more penetration vulnerabilities in open-source but I think even in the realms of HUMINT/CI and SIGINT there are ways to protect data, sources, and methods - even on NIPR. I mean, the NYT and other investigative journalism sources do a pretty good job of protecting HUMINT sources. Say what you will about their arguments and positions but Seymour Hersch and that Greenwald douche have managed to do some pretty high-level HUMINT work against a pretty good adversary - us. Google and other technology companies do a great job of protecting the technical sources they utilize.
