Right on, well I will STFU about it and see you guys in the stan next year. :doh:;)
Right on, well I will STFU about it and see you guys in the stan next year. :doh:;)
Interesting discussion, everyone.
I'd like to share my .02, as well, just in case any one of you guys have not read this, yet.
Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes
... and a follow-on:
Shaping the Future of Counterinsurgency Warfare: A Strategic Approach
Thanks.
I'd like to share my .02, as well, just in case any one of you guys have not read this, yet.
Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes
... and a follow-on:
Shaping the Future of Counterinsurgency Warfare: A Strategic Approach
Thanks.
That is someone else's .02...
J
JJ sloan
Guest
Interesting... but what are your thoughts? Don't be scared.
Florida173
SOF Support
taking HUMINT from higher echelons and putting them down for direct support at the company level would help a lot. Also the newer concept of creating a position for a 35F or a COIST (Company Intel Support Team) creates a atmosphere of purpose for patrols going out. Allowing the COIST members to work for the S2 and the Humint team to be workign for the S2X would allow for a focus of requirements in most AOs.
That is what we did in Iraq on this deployment that I just came home from, and it worked very well. My being HUMINT now and former infantry I was able to click with the grunts and put into simple words what I needed. I worked side by side the COIST and when they got something that I wasn't there for, I'd just send the answers to requirements up via PG.
In a area like Iraq that idea is almost essential with the warrant based targetting.
That is what we did in Iraq on this deployment that I just came home from, and it worked very well. My being HUMINT now and former infantry I was able to click with the grunts and put into simple words what I needed. I worked side by side the COIST and when they got something that I wasn't there for, I'd just send the answers to requirements up via PG.
In a area like Iraq that idea is almost essential with the warrant based targetting.
Yes.
FWIW- 10th Mtn (2/22 Inf) and the 101st both chopped units to the CJSOTF at the Start of OEF. FOB security was the initial mission (after the Bosnia side trip). Then worked into other ops, it was a good relationship, and the SOF guys did not abuse the conventional units (it's usually the other way around).
Question for the masses. What was the first dicked up operation in OEF, who ran it, and was it a SOF or Conventional Op?
I have no idea if we've done it since 9/11, but prior to that it wasn't uncommon in training scenarios (read: JRTC) to chop out several ODAs under the umbrella of a SOCCE to an infantry BDE.
As a minor aside, given that an ODA can train up to a BN of indigs.....I think it could effectively manage a PLT/ CO of allied infantry if the need arose.
Somedays you use a ratchet or a nutdriver for the same task. Maybe you only had the ratchet, maybe the space was too confined for a ratchet, but having multiple tools is not necessarily a bad thing.
As a minor aside, given that an ODA can train up to a BN of indigs.....I think it could effectively manage a PLT/ CO of allied infantry if the need arose.
Somedays you use a ratchet or a nutdriver for the same task. Maybe you only had the ratchet, maybe the space was too confined for a ratchet, but having multiple tools is not necessarily a bad thing.
I was not there, but according to the recorded accounts:
Also as for personal information from a buddy in the 101st who was there the first conventional forces boots on ground were US Marines from the 15th MEU and built and manned Camp Rhino in Kandahar and were relived in place by the 101st.
A
arizonaguide
Guest
Questions from back home...
So, what is the status of the Gov't now, after the election?
Is there really a National Government/infrastructure that the population trusts to "protect" them from the return of the Taliban so we can leave? Are they predicted to be friendly to American interests (for real) when we leave, or just "biding their time"? Realisticly, are we currently just spinning our wheels with the culture? Have we made much progress (or loss) in the last year?
So, what is the status of the Gov't now, after the election?
Is there really a National Government/infrastructure that the population trusts to "protect" them from the return of the Taliban so we can leave? Are they predicted to be friendly to American interests (for real) when we leave, or just "biding their time"? Realisticly, are we currently just spinning our wheels with the culture? Have we made much progress (or loss) in the last year?
7
7point62
Guest
Let me just sidestep in here and say this is a great discourse...and I want it known up front this wasn't meant as criticism of SFs acknowledged expertise in this arena.
The gist of my original thinking was that COIN at the outset is a significant challenge, even for the experts. And that a central element of COIN is time. And if that critical element--time to succeed--is removed, COIN as a doctrine becomes less viable. It becomes, for lack of a better analogy, like CAS without enough gas to get to the target. You can drop a few bombs along the way but the mission does not get accomplished. And given the public attitude that has prevailed since Vietnam, the impatience with long campaigns, it is now almost a given that COIN operations will not be given the time they need to succeed.
John Q. Voter, and perhaps more importantly, John Q. Liberal--who's currently running the show and who's ignorance about things military is almost a point of pride--is saying, hmmm, we've been fighting in Afghanistan for almost nine years already...and the generals are asking for more time?
The gist of my original thinking was that COIN at the outset is a significant challenge, even for the experts. And that a central element of COIN is time. And if that critical element--time to succeed--is removed, COIN as a doctrine becomes less viable. It becomes, for lack of a better analogy, like CAS without enough gas to get to the target. You can drop a few bombs along the way but the mission does not get accomplished. And given the public attitude that has prevailed since Vietnam, the impatience with long campaigns, it is now almost a given that COIN operations will not be given the time they need to succeed.
John Q. Voter, and perhaps more importantly, John Q. Liberal--who's currently running the show and who's ignorance about things military is almost a point of pride--is saying, hmmm, we've been fighting in Afghanistan for almost nine years already...and the generals are asking for more time?
Karzai is under fire. He'll probably win the election but he is rapidly losing credibility. Pick up Rashid's Descent into Chaos which has a pretty good roll-up of Karzai's success, failures, strengths, and shortcomings.
I think I can safely speak for the rest of my Brothers in saying that none of us got that vibe from you.
Crip
A
arizonaguide
Guest
Thank you Free. Will do.
And also MUCH agree with what 7point said above about not being a criticism of SF in any way. I hope my questions don't come across that way either.
:2c:
This is so true these days. We need to build support with GOOD news back home somehow.
We're losing the media war here back home.
I think that we were... lucky... that someone like GEN Petraeus was put in charge of Iraq. His ideas were not typical of other senior guys. The fight in Afghanistan is an SF fight. Conventional troops are necessary for firepower and while the indig Army is developing, but SOF, specifically SF, should be in command.
It makes zero sense to me that U.S. Army SF are considered the subject matter experts on UW/FID/COIN, but are not in charge of the theater. GEN McChrystal might be an excellent officer, but he still spent the vast majority of his career in units with kinetic, "Kill Our Enemies/GTFO" missions. (nice acronym btw)...
SF is woefully underrepresented in the senior GO ranks. It makes 100x more sense to me to get a career SF officer up the ranks and put in charge of the entire fight. I have no illusions that a SF GO is going to magically solve all the problems there, but after the initial UW campaign, it seems like there's been a square peg, round hole approach to filling the top command billet there. It's more of an Army culture thing I guess...
It makes zero sense to me that U.S. Army SF are considered the subject matter experts on UW/FID/COIN, but are not in charge of the theater. GEN McChrystal might be an excellent officer, but he still spent the vast majority of his career in units with kinetic, "Kill Our Enemies/GTFO" missions. (nice acronym btw)...
SF is woefully underrepresented in the senior GO ranks. It makes 100x more sense to me to get a career SF officer up the ranks and put in charge of the entire fight. I have no illusions that a SF GO is going to magically solve all the problems there, but after the initial UW campaign, it seems like there's been a square peg, round hole approach to filling the top command billet there. It's more of an Army culture thing I guess...
Stop being so logical. ;)
"taking HUMINT from higher echelons and putting them down for direct support at the company level would help a lot. Also the newer concept of creating a position for a 35F or a COIST (Company Intel Support Team) creates a atmosphere of purpose for patrols going out. Allowing the COIST members to work for the S2 and the Humint team to be workign for the S2X would allow for a focus of requirements in most AOs."
You can say THAT again and again until someone with sufficient Pay grade hears it...
I read this http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/07/28/cias-phoenix-program-flies-again/ and must say I agree. Wondering what you guys thoughts are? I think that with minor changes it would do a hell of a lot of good. Replace the Vietnamese National Police with A'stan Army/Police that have been trained properly in UW and set them loose with SF advisors, and a CI/HUMINT team attached to every unit. Also, allow them to run cross border operations whenever necessary. "Anyone" that doesnt like it or wants to protest about their "National Sovereignty" could get their aid cut by 75% immediately (or roll with the program)
You can say THAT again and again until someone with sufficient Pay grade hears it...
I read this http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/07/28/cias-phoenix-program-flies-again/ and must say I agree. Wondering what you guys thoughts are? I think that with minor changes it would do a hell of a lot of good. Replace the Vietnamese National Police with A'stan Army/Police that have been trained properly in UW and set them loose with SF advisors, and a CI/HUMINT team attached to every unit. Also, allow them to run cross border operations whenever necessary. "Anyone" that doesnt like it or wants to protest about their "National Sovereignty" could get their aid cut by 75% immediately (or roll with the program)
BravoOne, I agree completely with your first paragraph. As for the last part about cutting aid and cross border ops, that is a sticky point. You can only do so much of that before other nations make us out to be the political bad guy. I wish we could pursue a strictly military focused war, but we cannot forget about the political and economic (another term for political, except you get right to the point and talk about $$$) pieces.
A
arizonaguide
Guest
So, with a National Government that is rapidly losing credibility...how do we build (upon that) an infrastructure that is trusted by the populace? Is THAT not the basis of current COIN? Just askin. How do we "win" this?
7
7point62
Guest
That's the question, isn't it?
We win it through COIN/UW/CW/CA, political pressure, intrigue, arty, close air, terminal guidance, drone attacks, Paki cooperation, American public support, tons and tons of fuckin money and more money after that plus a dedicated iron-hard inflexible committment to see the job through for the next ten years at least.
None of us here are naive enough to think that fucking half-assed measures or a half-assed committment will win a war, especially one in a place like Afghanistan.
so basically, what you just said was 'start over' [2001] when SpecOps was actually running the show and killin mofos needed kiln, winning the GWOT while the Tal was on the run...
The 'Afghan Template' would have worked in both AO's, until CONVENTIONAL 'Shock and Awe' took place...:uhh:
:cool: :2c:
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