Rethinking COIN. We need something new.

so basically, what you just said was 'start over' [2001] when SpecOps was actually running the show and killin mofos needed kiln, winning the GWOT while the Tal was on the run...

That is it, small numbers of specially trained SME dudes doing what they know how to do. Using FID and UW to fight a war from with in and allowing the Afghani people to win their own freedom.

NOT

Conventional “Shock & Awe” we come in take the ground; kill anybody who is around at the time. Kick some ass and hand it over to the people who we just killed a bunch of and say here is your freedom. Now go make it work!

This is why I say conventional forces have no business in COIN operations. The notion that conventional is need to help for security of that ODA or to do what FID is supposed to accomplish (Afghanis fighting for their own freedom) goes against the whole strategic purpose of SF/CA/PSYOP fighting a COIN war.

This also limits the ability of media involvement as well as allowing the ODA’s to control what is being seen back in the USA (Afghanis fighting to win their freedom) and not US Soldiers winning it for them. Leaving a positive notion in the USA public and gain support and not the other (Time lines for with draw).
 
We need some sneaky, manipulative, street smart strategy with these fuckers. :2c:
Some Good cop, bad cop, or something.
 
None of us here are naive enough to think that fucking half-assed measures or a half-assed committment will win a war, especially one in a place like Afghanistan.
Exactly, yet I believe that's what's happening At Home...or starting to happen, at least.
 
so basically, what you just said was 'start over' [2001] when SpecOps was actually running the show and killin mofos needed kiln, winning the GWOT while the Tal was on the run...

The 'Afghan Template' would have worked in both AO's, until CONVENTIONAL 'Shock and Awe' took place...:uhh:



:cool: :2c:



Well, y'know RB, I can sit back here and chew the cud and spit out opinions, of which I probably have too many, and take my shots about a place I've never been to...and nothing I tap out here on my little ergonomic keyboard means do-do squat to the boys and girls at the sharp edge.

All I can opine is this: If our objective was to kill OBL/AQ and Taliban, disrupt their operations to the point where they became ineffective, ally ourselves with the various mujh clans and sub-clans who could help us achieve this objective, then, yes...let SpecOps teams run the show, back them up with whatever they need and have at it. The only problem is, now our objective has changed. Now it's Big Industry.

I feel like I'm running around in circles with my posts on this thread. A few more pages and I may end up 180 degrees from where I started out.
 
One thing I want for our troops is more support in the media and in politics...no matter WHICH direction we choose. If we stay...understand why we're staying, and...if we leave...also understand why. Hearts and minds at home, as well as in theatre.

More public understanding of COIN maybe, and what's attempting to be accomplished would help...some clear cut realistic objectives (and success reaching them)...that will help even a liberal congressman believe in this as a "good war" again.

Right now it's a vague war, in a far away country to most people...and all we see on the news is IED losses, and bad news.
Publicize some REAL successes! ASAP, or public support (and then congress) will soon dry up. (IMHO)
 
That is someone else's .02...

Poor wording on my part. Apologies.

Interesting... but what are your thoughts? Don't be scared.

Thanks but I wouldn't want to disrupt the discussion by adding my inexperienced views on the table. I just wondered if you guys may have read the PDFs and how you view the author's POV.

However, I do have a question: Is the war in Afghanistan still considered a COIN op considering that many conventional troops on the ground?

Thanks.
 
If you're going to pipe up, pipe up completely. Either you're right and we agree, you're wrong and get instructional criticism regarding your viewpoint (and learn something), or you're wrong and hard headed and the lesson is lost.
 
Well, I am open for a lot of schooling on these things. Fact is, I have been following this thread and I seem to get comparison's about COIN vs conventional war in every other post.

My question above stems from the thought of 'Has NATO truly defined this war as a COIN op or not?'. True, there are a lot of considerations to make like winning hearts and minds but when there are more conventional guys out patrolling with ANA and getting killed by Taliban using unconventional tactics, you have to wonder if the majority of the boots on the ground are trained to deal with these types of threats.
 
My question above stems from the thought of 'Has NATO truly defined this war as a COIN op or not?'. True, there are a lot of considerations to make like winning hearts and minds but when there are more conventional guys out patrolling with ANA and getting killed by Taliban using unconventional tactics, you have to wonder if the majority of the boots on the ground are trained to deal with these types of threats.
Good question IMHO. Good folks here, to answer that. We've discussed training issues before, and always have some good info/suggestions for improvement. :2c: Can ALWAYS use more ($$$) training troops on the ground. 151 qualification rounds, then into combat, and such.
 
new food for the mind...:2c:
 

Attachments

  • countersurgency - the role of paramilitaries.pdf
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  • what is the role of negociations when countering an insurgency.pdf
    350.9 KB · Views: 2
  • rethinking the challenge of counterinsurgency warfare.pdf
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  • shadow wars - an analysis of counterinsurgency warfare.pdf
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  • Role of Airpower for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and FATA -Federally Administered tribal ar.pdf
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Dear warriors
Please feel free to check the Oman's file...
My € .02
 

Attachments

  • the six pillars of influence how insurgents organizations manipulate governments populations and.pdf
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  • bing west counterinsurgency in Iraq.pdf
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  • pseudo operations and counterinsurgency - lessons from other countries.pdf
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  • training indigenous forces in counterinsurgency-A tale of two insurgencies.pdf
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  • COIN oman.pdf
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five others studies. :2c:
 

Attachments

  • the past as prologue- A history of Us counterinsurgency policy in Colombia 1958-66.pdf
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  • head we win.pdf
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  • subversion and insurgency.pdf
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  • understanding proto insurgencies.pdf
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  • malay muslim insurgency in southern thailand.pdf
    297 KB · Views: 1
Here we go ! Promise I will stop soon :2c:
 

Attachments

  • Military Ethics in counterinsurgency-A new look at an old problem.pdf
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  • Military leadership preparedness to meet counterinsurgency requirements.pdf
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  • collateral damage and counterinsurgency doctrine.pdf
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  • indigenous force and sanctuary denial - enduring counterinsurgency imperatives.pdf
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Those are the last files under 1mb
have a good read
My €.02
 

Attachments

  • soldier have to eat soup together for a long time.pdf
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  • culture and effects-based operations in an insurgency.pdf
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  • an analysis of the indian government s counterinsurgency campaingn in jamnu and kashmir.pdf
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  • the fall of the taliban regime and its recovery as an insurgent movement in afghanistan.pdf
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  • french ground force organizational development for counterrevolutionary warfare between 1945 an.pdf
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Miss time to read all?:)
:2c:
 

Attachments

  • principles imperatives and paradoxes of COIN.pdf
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  • 28 articles fondamentals of company level counterinsurgency.pdf
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  • insurgency in Iraq - a historical perspective.pdf
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iraq
 

Attachments

  • counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003-2006.pdf
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  • losing the population - the impact of coalition policy and tactics on the population and the ira.pdf
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  • rumors in iraq- a guide to winning hearts and minds.pdf
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  • united states coin doctrine and implementation in iraq.pdf
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Figure I'd post in this thread instead of posting a new one...

They are talking about adding about 44,000 troops to condunct counterinsurgency or adding about 15,000 to conduct "counterterrorism plus".

Isn't that ass backwards?
 
more studies:)
 

Attachments

  • counterinsurgency in Pakistan - Learning from India.pdf
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  • coin strategies to deny recruitment od adolescent males in the southern philipines.pdf
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