SOF all set to lose more RW support - HSC-84/85 to shutdown in 2016

You don't want to lose capability, but neither side gets what it wants under the current setup.

IIRC, The are aligned under naval Air Reserve Forces, which puts them under a conventional commander; so I am sure SOCOM doesn't like having to pay for assets not under a SOF umbrella.
Likewise, the conventional Navy believes a SOF assets should be paid out of SOCOM dollars,and not the non-SOF budget.
 
You don't want to lose capability, but neither side gets what it wants under the current setup.

IIRC, The are aligned under naval Air Reserve Forces, which puts them under a conventional commander; so I am sure SOCOM doesn't like having to pay for assets not under a SOF umbrella.
Likewise, the conventional Navy believes a SOF assets should be paid out of SOCOM dollars,and not the non-SOF budget.

You are correct. SOCOM doesn't want to pay and neither does Navy. Navy has been providing free capability to SOF with these two squadrons for nearly 40 years and would officially chop them under SOCOM if SOCOM would take them. In my opinion, this is actually the best possible solution for all involved. The offer to transfer the units has already been made and subsequently declined which is, like I said before, a major mistake. Once this capability is gone, it will likely be gone forever. From Navy's point of view, since everything these units do is in support of SOF, SOCOM should share the expenses. Navy is under extreme budget pressure due to sequestration and the BCA, and doesn't view SOF support as a core Navy mission. When you're worried about losing aircraft carriers and entire airwings of aircraft and personnel (among other things), cutting RW units that are not directly supporting the fleet is a no-brainer (in the eyes of the CNO). The sad thing here is that this is a prime opportunity to add 2 squadrons (and 24 additional H-60s to SOF inventory) which are already built, for very little cost. Shortfalls in SOF RW support are already significant, as evidenced by the fact that these two conventional units support 30% of all resourced training requirements for SOF in general (they cover 70% for NSW, and 40% of MARSOC requirements).

It's important to note also that these squadrons are not like other conventional units that provide RW support to SOF. They are wholly dedicated to the mission and train exclusively to it. While deployed, they chop directly to the TSOC for OPCON (unlike other Navy RW that might support SOF operationally). Collectively, the squadrons executed 13,800+ combat flight hours in Iraq operating with the 160th, 20th/21st SOS, AC-130's, and STS under the CJSOAC supporting CJSOTF-AP. Over 50% of their hours were in support of DA's. At risk of offending a 160th bubba, these units are very much like them, minus the extensive resources (however, these units have enjoyed more abundant funding than fleet units because of reserve funding lines). Most of their training standards and TTPs are identical, they field the most senior crews, conduct training detachments all over CONUS (sometimes OCONUS), shoot over a million rounds per year from the aircraft and are the most combat experienced squadrons in Naval Aviation. There are no other units in Navy RW who come close. It's also quite likely that they are the most decorated Naval aviation community since Vietnam.

They are deployed now, supporting real-world requirements, and will have to redeploy home this spring to shut down by the end of the FY.
 
The question is who is saying no?
NavSpecWarCom or SOCOM?
Sir, I think it's Big Navy (not NSW) Vs. SOCOM. I would assume that if NSW had the resources/funding without Big Navy's help this wouldn't even be a discussion.
 
Sir, I think it's Big Navy (not NSW) Vs. SOCOM. I would assume that if NSW had the resources/funding without Big Navy's help this wouldn't even be a discussion.
If NSW wanted the assets they could work with SOCOM to get them. I can not imagine SOCOM saying no to a sea-based rotary winged asset, especially considering the background of some of the last few SOCOM Commanders.
I could also see an Army Staffer at SOCOM committing the 160th to pick up the loss.
 
Actually SkrewzLoose is correct. It is a Big Navy vs. SOCOM issue. The two 4-stars were the ones conducting final negotiations on this. Although I have nothing but the utmost admiration and respect for him, I am actually pretty disappointed with Adm McRaven here. Not 100% sure why he wouldn't pull the trigger on this but he may have been concerned about perception of Navy bias/favoritism if he had. Unfortunate because this was likely the best chance of substantive change that would benefit all. I hear (through trusted sources) that CNO was quite irritated with SOCOM's stance after attempting numerous compromises only to be told no. Especially since SOCOM was the one who raised the issue as a concern to OSD once they learned Navy was originally going to cut them in 2015. SOWT is also correct. Someone did tell OSD that SOCOM was backing off the requirement (to avoid spending MFP-11) and the 160th would pick up the slack (which they can't). And, on at least one occasion, the cost of the units was misrepresented to the Admiral portraying them as too expensive. My understanding is that staffers didn't believe the actual numbers because 84/85 were much cheaper than the 160th.

On another note, SPECWARCOM isn't exactly blameless either. My understanding is they were quite concerned about potential funding offsets to NSW should 84/85 become part of SPECWARCOM. Aside from this, there is no doubt NSW wants the assets. They will suffer the most from their loss.
 
What kind of squadron is going to be deployed on the Independence class LCS if it gets pushed into an NSW mission? VMM? HSC?
 
I don't see the LCS class being able to perform NSW missions other than providing platforms for transportation, which basically all other classes of ships do right now. For infil/exfil, I think that's what the SWCC guys are around for as far as brown water capabilities go. Maybe they'll give the LCS ships the new fucking laser thing... :rolleyes:
Also, I was wondering who trumps who in CNO Vs. Adm. McRaven at SOCOM regarding who foots the bill for the 84/85 HSC. As I said previously, I figured it would be a Big Navy/SOCOM issue, not so much NSW/SOCOM. I would imagine that if NSW had its way and saw good reason to keep the 84/85 guys around, they'd make it work with SOCOM somehow.
Homer11 , thanks for your continued input. I'm glad to know there are parts of the Navy that don't suck.
 
I don't see the LCS class being able to perform NSW missions other than providing platforms for transportation, which basically all other classes of ships do right now. For infil/exfil, I think that's what the SWCC guys are around for as far as brown water capabilities go. Maybe they'll give the LCS ships the new fucking laser thing... :rolleyes:
Also, I was wondering who trumps who in CNO Vs. Adm. McRaven at SOCOM regarding who foots the bill for the 84/85 HSC. As I said previously, I figured it would be a Big Navy/SOCOM issue, not so much NSW/SOCOM. I would imagine that if NSW had its way and saw good reason to keep the 84/85 guys around, they'd make it work with SOCOM somehow.
Homer11 , thanks for your continued input. I'm glad to know there are parts of the Navy that don't suck.

OSD is who trumps but they chose not to be directive to two 4-stars. Also, they sided with Navy's argument, leaving the ball completely in SOCOM's court. The only reason 84/85 didn't go away in 2015 is because OSD stepped in and told the two sides to work out a solution. The squadrons were funded at 66% this year while the two sides were supposed to work it out. Essentially, this turned into a game of chicken in which no one blinked and OSD then decided not to take charge. In my opinion, OSD should be looking at Defense Strategic Guidance, setting priorities and making decisions. Something they are not doing (and not only in this case). If they did this, I have no doubt they would direct one side or the other to fund the units since they missions they support are national priority missions (BPC, CT, COIN, counter-WMD, etc).

Regarding NSW, they see good reason. Before 9/11, HCS-4 and HCS-5 provided 55% of all RW support for NSW. They supported 50% of NSW DA missions in Iraq between 2003-2011. Last year HSC-84/85 (new names) supported 70% of NSW sourced requirements (there was still a shortfall). Like I said earlier though, they are not blameless here. As much as I love the SEALs, over the years they have been their own worst enemy regarding this issue (another long winded story). As much as they value the support, they have chosen to gap requirements rather than risk possible impact to their TOA. As soon as their RW support dries up though (like it did when HCS-5 was shut down in 2006), they start begging for it again. Like SOCOM, NSW wants support and they want it for free.

Bottom line at this point: unless Congress steps in, the capability will go away. Not because there is no valid requirement (the requirement is greater than ever) but because of bureaucratic BS and the fact no one wants to pay the bill.
 
LCS's got more room and more native/inbuilt ability for quick, easy, and even flat out sequestered/segregated "aft of this bulkhead is SOF land only, we're driving to this point and only looking straight forward until the Captain says otherwise" than basically any other platform in the arsenal. Plus can get in closer with less chance of adding to the Relieved commanders list due to less draft, etc.

I've never ridden on a navy bird period, AFSOC or 160th with a few regular army backscratch rides when they wanted to train high-speed and we needed a ride... they usually did a bit of in-unit trainup before we hopped a ride just because we expected more out of em. No doubt they do good work, but it does beg the question: Given the multiple army-based SOF aviation elements, does the Navy unit actually bring anything truly special that another SOC aviation unit couldn't absorb or do?

I mean, even with NAVSPECALPHABETHAIRJEL in tow at the kickoff of both parties, I didn't see a single navy RW platform period, even doing the conex shift and lift off the shitty hawk... that was the heavy hefters from you guessed it, US Army on the side...
 
Sequestration forced everyone to check their priorities and funding, so I wouldn't be surprised if it caused the Navy to re-evalute 84/85's role and funding. Sometimes a snowball needs a slight nudge to roll down that mountain.

Also, in case some of you missed it (though it is on the same page as this thread), and ignoring some of the garbage:
http://www.shadowspear.com/vb/threads/hsc-84-and-hsc-85-the-navys-160th.20759/
 
LCS's got more room and more native/inbuilt ability for quick, easy, and even flat out sequestered/segregated "aft of this bulkhead is SOF land only, we're driving to this point and only looking straight forward until the Captain says otherwise" than basically any other platform in the arsenal. Plus can get in closer with less chance of adding to the Relieved commanders list due to less draft, etc.

I've never ridden on a navy bird period, AFSOC or 160th with a few regular army backscratch rides when they wanted to train high-speed and we needed a ride... they usually did a bit of in-unit trainup before we hopped a ride just because we expected more out of em. No doubt they do good work, but it does beg the question: Given the multiple army-based SOF aviation elements, does the Navy unit actually bring anything truly special that another SOC aviation unit couldn't absorb or do?

I mean, even with NAVSPECALPHABETHAIRJEL in tow at the kickoff of both parties, I didn't see a single navy RW platform period, even doing the conex shift and lift off the shitty hawk... that was the heavy hefters from you guessed it, US Army on the side...

I worked an exercise with them (20th SFG) out of camp dawson WV. Great group of guys to work with, but that was during the bad old days where any forecast ceiling meant no NVG flying.
 
The general gist seems similar to the rapid jump of AF rescue out of AFSOC back in '05. SOCOM looks to consolidate all RW support into the 160th when given the chance. If you look at it from the perspective of minimizing overhead senior officer and staff billets it makes sense. It's actually a shame we haven't got to a point that we can have actual joint organizations.
 
LCS's got more room and more native/inbuilt ability for quick, easy, and even flat out sequestered/segregated "aft of this bulkhead is SOF land only, we're driving to this point and only looking straight forward until the Captain says otherwise" than basically any other platform in the arsenal. Plus can get in closer with less chance of adding to the Relieved commanders list due to less draft, etc.

I've never ridden on a navy bird period, AFSOC or 160th with a few regular army backscratch rides when they wanted to train high-speed and we needed a ride... they usually did a bit of in-unit trainup before we hopped a ride just because we expected more out of em. No doubt they do good work, but it does beg the question: Given the multiple army-based SOF aviation elements, does the Navy unit actually bring anything truly special that another SOC aviation unit couldn't absorb or do?

I mean, even with NAVSPECALPHABETHAIRJEL in tow at the kickoff of both parties, I didn't see a single navy RW platform period, even doing the conex shift and lift off the shitty hawk... that was the heavy hefters from you guessed it, US Army on the side...

HSC-84/85 do quite a bit of work with Army SF but not typically with Rangers (I assume you're a Ranger - hooah). Other REGNAV RW units rarely work with Army SF at all. This is one difference between units that are dedicated to SOF and those who are committed to Navy fleet requirements. What the Navy unit brings to the fight is Maritime/Navy fleet operating expertise and aircraft that are built to operate and live on ships. Pretty important now that SOF is going back to sea on AFSBs, etc. Flying and operating in the maritime environment is different from over land. Where 160th guys are certainly able to take off and land from boats, working and coordinating within Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups is the norm for Naval aviators. Navy aircraft have some additional safety features, are marinized to battle corrosion and are also equipped with rotor brake and blade fold systems that are critical while operating on ships in high winds/heavy weather or busy flight decks. Where I would expect Army bubbas to be more proficient in the mountains, Naval aviators are more proficient flying night, low light while overwater (where NVGs are almost worthless and instruments are key). AFSOC only has CV-22s now which can't operate on small boys (single spot ships) at all. The other thing that 84/85 bring are available aircraft. As I said earlier, these two squadrons provided 30% of all SOF training support last year (including 70% of NSW and 40% of MARSOC requirements). For NSW, SEALs have never faired well while trying to schedule the 160th for training. Army assets are too busy while 84/85 are co-located with NSW. Once 84/85 go away, will Army be able to absorb the load in Coronado and Norfolk? Will they also be able to send two more 4-plane dets overseas to fill the PACOM and CENTCOM requirements that 84/85 are currently filling? By all indications, the answer is no. It's not their fault, it's just numbers and requirements.
 
For the record, I don't like seeing any SOF capability go away at all... but I'm playing devil's advocate with what I'm saying.


I can understand what the HSC's in question bring to the table due to having tertiary knowledge of shipboard flight operations dynamics/complexities (various recovery equipment the 160th wouldn't have for rough sea recovery, training in in-air tethered refueling for advanced sea state operations, the chess game on a larger ship's flight deck etc... The maintenance/design aspects of Naval aircraft I was somewhat aware of as well, although flying in otherwise unforgiving but flat terrain under IFR is something I wouldn't consider a huge selling point when compared to the capabilities of the other service RW elements.

Given that the 2 squadrons, of which I am not currently privy to strength therein, were unable to cover wholly for the Naval SOF requirements and if accounts are to be correct, didn't even participate in the arguably biggest thing that NAVSPECWAR participated in in it's entire lifetime... they missed out through lack of capability or lack of ability (Due to positioning, not skill, I would hope) on the largest single "PR" event they could have used to specifically be able to remain relevant to both NSW as well as the USN as a whole.

Then there bodes the question of lift vs strength as a whole. The Army has arguably the largest SOF contingent if you consolidate SF, Ranger Regiment, and "others" and has been relying on AF/AFSOC/USA/160th for RW/FW lift to good effect for years, with larger numbers to boot when you look at overall manning. I've never specifically learned the complete manning for the Teams, but going off what open source I have seen they're short what Regiment is by a little under a thousand men... SF uses RW on occasion, but usually isn't hopscotching the fuck around like other elements due to being *usually* employed as a more area-based element versus a wider area of responsibility/effect technique like Regiment.

Through a failure of the command leaderships directly in charge/involved as well as higher commands in general that "own" them... they haven't owned them enough to where Navy covers Navy well enough that they didn't need other assets to give them a lift. I can count on one hand the number of times I personally rode on or was tasked to ride on if the need arose, AFSOC RW assets "evolution-wise" for training or specific task/duty for combat. Everything else was a 160th ride minus 2 times I can remember which were both simply elevators on Lawson where anyone with fastrope gear and the ability to hover somewhat steadily over generally level terrain would have been able to accomplish the necessary training requirements. Overseas the AF elements were used due to positioning, stateside it was to fulfill combined training objective blocks that were necessary for currency.

It seems from other peoples comments that the very Naval-oriented equipment that provides those special equipment-based features that facilitate easier naval operations are also function as a platform-dependent detriment... example being, unable to use both doors for fastroping or other related things where you can't pull off X on a USNSOF bird but can swing it on a USAFSOF/USASOF platform. The Army has the distinct advantage in terms of RW operations in that it's the bread, butter, and cheese that is allowed of them in the first place as well as having effectively been able to place SOF aviation as the pinnacle/capstone of what Army Aviation consists of.... AFSOC, from my perspective it was either the truly loony that wanted to fly helos for the USAF, or otherwise the well qualified but otherwise unknowns that might have been thrown at rotary wing in order to ensure that enough RW pilots existed. Most pilots go into the USAF to fly shit that drops bombs, not people and gear, ya know? Perhaps the Navy suffers the same overall issue as well.

In any case, it seems they are going away and there's a necessity for other elements to now pick up what slack they can. Guess NSW now will thumb more rides or swim/float/walk more. :p

What's the overall RW contingent squadron/etc strength of the USN for RW platforms that SOF would be interested in? Perhaps it might be good time to actually start stepping up the game across the board with regards to USN RW training/capability to be able to push expanding to anything that isn't ASW/resupply being a SOF tasking, and being able to step up the game with regards to those involved, higher standards etc with some equipment beefing at a date that is fiscally possible so both training and capability increase, effectively making Naval RW as a general rule hot shit?

I know Naval RW does RW insert/extract for boarding parties, VERTREP, ASW, the obvious discussion matter of anti-long-walk for NSW, and safety coverage for flight deck operations... how large a portion do they take on with regards to personnel transfers within CBG's? Obviously it would make sense that they would given a carrier can take on people from a longer distance trip on a greyhound, then branch out from the carrier via helo to effectively any ship size as necessary, flight deck to flight deck obviously being preferred. What else do they have for tasking within the fleet?

The reason I ask is because considering AFSOC and RW in general for the USAF, a large portion falls more in the SOF zone as far as either infil of troops or rescue operations, which would be inherently part of the RW boarding party infil/NSW infil/Safety operations for deck operations... ASW is ASW and a different mission unto itself as well as different equipment that's stuck on the airframe limiting it's viability for other purposes, and VERTREP is something that while not sexy, suits the well equipped but otherwise easily made "naked" platforms for maximum load transfer... I hope you get where I'm going.
 
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For the record, I don't like seeing any SOF capability go away at all... but I'm playing devil's advocate with what I'm saying.


I can understand what the HSC's in question bring to the table due to having tertiary knowledge of shipboard flight operations dynamics/complexities (various recovery equipment the 160th wouldn't have for rough sea recovery, training in in-air tethered refueling for advanced sea state operations, the chess game on a larger ship's flight deck etc... The maintenance/design aspects of Naval aircraft I was somewhat aware of as well, although flying in otherwise unforgiving but flat terrain under IFR is something I wouldn't consider a huge selling point when compared to the capabilities of the other service RW elements.

Given that the 2 squadrons, of which I am not currently privy to strength therein, were unable to cover wholly for the Naval SOF requirements and if accounts are to be correct, didn't even participate in the arguably biggest thing that NAVSPECWAR participated in in it's entire lifetime... they missed out through lack of capability or lack of ability (Due to positioning, not skill, I would hope) on the largest single "PR" event they could have used to specifically be able to remain relevant to both NSW as well as the USN as a whole.

Then there bodes the question of lift vs strength as a whole. The Army has arguably the largest SOF contingent if you consolidate SF, Ranger Regiment, and "others" and has been relying on AF/AFSOC/USA/160th for RW/FW lift to good effect for years, with larger numbers to boot when you look at overall manning. I've never specifically learned the complete manning for the Teams, but going off what open source I have seen they're short what Regiment is by a little under a thousand men... SF uses RW on occasion, but usually isn't hopscotching the fuck around like other elements due to being *usually* employed as a more area-based element versus a wider area of responsibility/effect technique like Regiment.

Through a failure of the command leaderships directly in charge/involved as well as higher commands in general that "own" them... they haven't owned them enough to where Navy covers Navy well enough that they didn't need other assets to give them a lift. I can count on one hand the number of times I personally rode on or was tasked to ride on if the need arose, AFSOC RW assets "evolution-wise" for training or specific task/duty for combat. Everything else was a 160th ride minus 2 times I can remember which were both simply elevators on Lawson where anyone with fastrope gear and the ability to hover somewhat steadily over generally level terrain would have been able to accomplish the necessary training requirements. Overseas the AF elements were used due to positioning, stateside it was to fulfill combined training objective blocks that were necessary for currency.

It seems from other peoples comments that the very Naval-oriented equipment that provides those special equipment-based features that facilitate easier naval operations are also function as a platform-dependent detriment... example being, unable to use both doors for fastroping or other related things where you can't pull off X on a USNSOF bird but can swing it on a USAFSOF/USASOF platform. The Army has the distinct advantage in terms of RW operations in that it's the bread, butter, and cheese that is allowed of them in the first place as well as having effectively been able to place SOF aviation as the pinnacle/capstone of what Army Aviation consists of.... AFSOC, from my perspective it was either the truly loony that wanted to fly helos for the USAF, or otherwise the well qualified but otherwise unknowns that might have been thrown at rotary wing in order to ensure that enough RW pilots existed. Most pilots go into the USAF to fly shit that drops bombs, not people and gear, ya know? Perhaps the Navy suffers the same overall issue as well.

In any case, it seems they are going away and there's a necessity for other elements to now pick up what slack they can. Guess NSW now will thumb more rides or swim/float/walk more. :p

No one is saying the 160th doesn't have advantages over other services. Everyone in Navy RW would readily admit that. I would've loved to have 2 doors, a fuel probe and the vast resources of the 160th. Had I possessed these in Iraq, I'm confident we would have been interchangeable in nearly every respect with the 160th (I make this statement having planned, briefed and flown numerous missions with them in combat and often times led missions with army 60's on my wing - hard to believe I'm sure, but true). If the squadrons do manage to be saved, they will hopefully transition to the newest MH-60S with 2 doors. The community will still need to fight for a probe because the Navy won't give it to them - this would be considered SOF peculiar and SOCOM would need to provide if they want us to have it.

In my opinion there is no need to pit one service against the other here. Frankly, I'm tired of it because parochialism often contributes to some foolish decisions (like this one). I try to make my comments and state facts while being non-parochial. We should all recognize that the services all have complementary capabilities and their own advantages and disadvantages. As an FYI, I'll provide a little more background about 84/85 here because from your comments, I don't think you've had the opportunity to become familiar with them specifically (not meant to be a dig, just a point of observation - if I'm wrong please correct me). Bottom line: HSC-84/85 are much different than the REGNAV HSC squadrons.

First, the fact that the squadrons weren't involved in the SOF deployment on the Kitty Hawk in my opinion, means little. They have supported other ops and back then, the squadrons were traditional reserve units with a much smaller personnel footprint and not under the SOCOM umbrella, thus not easy to task in a timely fashion (while still not part of SOCOM the community has greatly improved tasking processes since, but they are still tasked through RFF for deployments which is a slow process - there is no issue tasking them for training).

Over the last 20 years, the units supported SOF in Uphold Democracy and Desert Storm as well as provided nearly 14000 combat flight hours of support over the entirety of OIF, which I would argue (along with Afghanistan) was actually the largest effort NSW has been involved in during recent years (vs. the Kitty Hawk deployment). HCS-5 (now HSC-85) was deployed with ST-3 in Kuwait when OIF kicked off and moved forward with them to Baghdad less than 2 months later. Between them and HCS-4 (now HSC-84) they flew ~50% of the DA's conducted by NSW while also supporting SF missions over the 8 years. As part of the CJSOAC working with 3rd Bat 160th, 20th/21st SOS, the AC-130's, STS and other units, 84/85 also participated in over 50% of all of CJSOAC-supported DA missions, performing anything from Infil/Exfil, ISR, CASEVAC, CAS/CFF, or Aerial QRF (ARF) and sometimes all on the same mission (ISR and ARF were unique to us - none of the other helo players performed them). And while it sucked having one door, we often conducted infil via FASTROPE. It wasn't perfect but everybody flexed and we made it work. Luckily fuel wasn't much of an issue since we could fly longer un-refueled with our tank configuration than an Army Blackhawk and there were FARPs all over Iraq (would still love to have had a probe though).

Over the course of OIF, the squadrons grew in size and added active component personnel. Today, while they are still reserve squadrons, they can deploy dets without mobilization because their footprint is over 430 personnel each with 40% being active component (only 24% of personnel are reservists). Each squadron added 150 personnel and 4 aircraft since OIF began and are now built for continuous deployments. Their training standards are in line with the 160th, have been vetted on numerous occasions by SOCOM and are the most robust in Navy RW aviation. The aircraft at homeguard deploy regularly all over CONUS in support of SOF training requirements (something the REGNAV has no budget for). Full mission profiles are the preference and a requirement for pilot and aircrew training, the door gunners are the best and the pilots are the most experienced in the Navy.

Historically NSW has struggled for training support. Before 9/11, NSW experienced and average annual training shortfall of 33%. 81% of what they received was from Navy assets (including fleet aircraft) and only 19% from SOAR, AFSOC and others. HCS-4/5 provided 55% of all RW support to NSW from 1989-2003. In general, Army assets supported Army SF and SEALs could not get Army support. Today, NSW requirements are significantly higher and 84/85 support about 70% of their sourced requirements. Part of the issue is due to location. 84/85 are located with the NSW groups in San Diego and Norfolk and Army assets are not. Another reason it is a dumb move to let them go. To pick up the slack in the future, Army would have to send dets of aircraft to San Diego and Norfolk regularly while they're already busy as Hell. Personally, I won't be holding my breath.

Unfortunately, helicopters in general are undervalued in the Navy (similar to AF) and the SOF support mission even less so (as again evidenced by Navy not caring if SEALs or MARSOC are supported with RW - Navy views this as SOCOM's responsibility). The Navy is jet-centric and more concerned with ships and submarines over everything else, hence there is no advocate for the mission within the Navy. Truth is, the only advocates who truly understand the mission and value the 5 SOF Truths are the pilots and aircrew who fly it (and a few guys like me, who used to fly it).

Hopefully this provides better clarity about the community and some understanding that we're not talking about your typical General Purpose Forces.
 
If an O-2 was the pilot on the controls it was 100% a learning experience for him, not representative of what you should expect in the real world. You have to keep in mind, us pilot types need to learn too and part of that learning is to realize that with real live bodies jumping out of the aircraft the margin for error is much smaller.

You may be right, that whole community may suck, but I doubt it, the vertrep videos I've seen tell me otherwise. If you want organic Navy support to your ops, you will have to commit to helping them get better in training. That means training with them and giving honest, constructive feedback.

One of the SOF truths is that people and training are more important than hardware. Aviation is no different.
 
Agree on all points, my point is that this is a training issue, not a capability issue. If you want capability X, you need to commit to pay for it in training dollars..

If NSW wants an organic capability, it needs to commit to the training cost to include the basics. God knows I've done enough elevators to train ground dudes on fast rope. Don't even get me started on the waste of time airborne sniper is for me.
 
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