For the record, I don't like seeing any SOF capability go away at all... but I'm playing devil's advocate with what I'm saying.
I can understand what the HSC's in question bring to the table due to having tertiary knowledge of shipboard flight operations dynamics/complexities (various recovery equipment the 160th wouldn't have for rough sea recovery, training in in-air tethered refueling for advanced sea state operations, the chess game on a larger ship's flight deck etc... The maintenance/design aspects of Naval aircraft I was somewhat aware of as well, although flying in otherwise unforgiving but flat terrain under IFR is something I wouldn't consider a huge selling point when compared to the capabilities of the other service RW elements.
Given that the 2 squadrons, of which I am not currently privy to strength therein, were unable to cover wholly for the Naval SOF requirements and if accounts are to be correct, didn't even participate in the arguably biggest thing that NAVSPECWAR participated in in it's entire lifetime... they missed out through lack of capability or lack of ability (Due to positioning, not skill, I would hope) on the largest single "PR" event they could have used to specifically be able to remain relevant to both NSW as well as the USN as a whole.
Then there bodes the question of lift vs strength as a whole. The Army has arguably the largest SOF contingent if you consolidate SF, Ranger Regiment, and "others" and has been relying on AF/AFSOC/USA/160th for RW/FW lift to good effect for years, with larger numbers to boot when you look at overall manning. I've never specifically learned the complete manning for the Teams, but going off what open source I have seen they're short what Regiment is by a little under a thousand men... SF uses RW on occasion, but usually isn't hopscotching the fuck around like other elements due to being *usually* employed as a more area-based element versus a wider area of responsibility/effect technique like Regiment.
Through a failure of the command leaderships directly in charge/involved as well as higher commands in general that "own" them... they haven't owned them enough to where Navy covers Navy well enough that they didn't need other assets to give them a lift. I can count on one hand the number of times I personally rode on or was tasked to ride on if the need arose, AFSOC RW assets "evolution-wise" for training or specific task/duty for combat. Everything else was a 160th ride minus 2 times I can remember which were both simply elevators on Lawson where anyone with fastrope gear and the ability to hover somewhat steadily over generally level terrain would have been able to accomplish the necessary training requirements. Overseas the AF elements were used due to positioning, stateside it was to fulfill combined training objective blocks that were necessary for currency.
It seems from other peoples comments that the very Naval-oriented equipment that provides those special equipment-based features that facilitate easier naval operations are also function as a platform-dependent detriment... example being, unable to use both doors for fastroping or other related things where you can't pull off X on a USNSOF bird but can swing it on a USAFSOF/USASOF platform. The Army has the distinct advantage in terms of RW operations in that it's the bread, butter, and cheese that is allowed of them in the first place as well as having effectively been able to place SOF aviation as the pinnacle/capstone of what Army Aviation consists of.... AFSOC, from my perspective it was either the truly loony that wanted to fly helos for the USAF, or otherwise the well qualified but otherwise unknowns that might have been thrown at rotary wing in order to ensure that enough RW pilots existed. Most pilots go into the USAF to fly shit that drops bombs, not people and gear, ya know? Perhaps the Navy suffers the same overall issue as well.
In any case, it seems they are going away and there's a necessity for other elements to now pick up what slack they can. Guess NSW now will thumb more rides or swim/float/walk more.
No one is saying the 160th doesn't have advantages over other services. Everyone in Navy RW would readily admit that. I would've loved to have 2 doors, a fuel probe and the vast resources of the 160th. Had I possessed these in Iraq, I'm confident we would have been interchangeable in nearly every respect with the 160th (I make this statement having planned, briefed and flown numerous missions with them in combat and often times led missions with army 60's on my wing - hard to believe I'm sure, but true). If the squadrons do manage to be saved, they will hopefully transition to the newest MH-60S with 2 doors. The community will still need to fight for a probe because the Navy won't give it to them - this would be considered SOF peculiar and SOCOM would need to provide if they want us to have it.
In my opinion there is no need to pit one service against the other here. Frankly, I'm tired of it because parochialism often contributes to some foolish decisions (like this one). I try to make my comments and state facts while being non-parochial. We should all recognize that the services all have complementary capabilities and their own advantages and disadvantages. As an FYI, I'll provide a little more background about 84/85 here because from your comments, I don't think you've had the opportunity to become familiar with them specifically (not meant to be a dig, just a point of observation - if I'm wrong please correct me). Bottom line: HSC-84/85 are much different than the REGNAV HSC squadrons.
First, the fact that the squadrons weren't involved in the SOF deployment on the Kitty Hawk in my opinion, means little. They have supported other ops and back then, the squadrons were traditional reserve units with a much smaller personnel footprint and not under the SOCOM umbrella, thus not easy to task in a timely fashion (while still not part of SOCOM the community has greatly improved tasking processes since, but they are still tasked through RFF for deployments which is a slow process - there is no issue tasking them for training).
Over the last 20 years, the units supported SOF in Uphold Democracy and Desert Storm as well as provided nearly 14000 combat flight hours of support over
the entirety of OIF, which I would argue (along with Afghanistan) was actually the largest effort NSW has been involved in during recent years (vs. the Kitty Hawk deployment). HCS-5 (now HSC-85) was deployed with ST-3 in Kuwait when OIF kicked off and moved forward with them to Baghdad less than 2 months later. Between them and HCS-4 (now HSC-84) they flew ~50% of the DA's conducted by NSW while also supporting SF missions over the 8 years. As part of the CJSOAC working with 3rd Bat 160th, 20th/21st SOS, the AC-130's, STS and other units, 84/85 also participated in over 50% of all of CJSOAC-supported DA missions, performing anything from Infil/Exfil, ISR, CASEVAC, CAS/CFF, or Aerial QRF (ARF) and sometimes all on the same mission (ISR and ARF were unique to us - none of the other helo players performed them). And while it sucked having one door, we often conducted infil via FASTROPE. It wasn't perfect but everybody flexed and we made it work. Luckily fuel wasn't much of an issue since we could fly longer
un-refueled with our tank configuration than an Army Blackhawk and there were FARPs all over Iraq (would still love to have had a probe though).
Over the course of OIF, the squadrons grew in size and added active component personnel. Today, while they are still reserve squadrons, they can deploy dets without mobilization because their footprint is over 430 personnel each with 40% being active component (only 24% of personnel are reservists). Each squadron added 150 personnel and 4 aircraft since OIF began and are now built for continuous deployments. Their training standards are in line with the 160th, have been vetted on numerous occasions by SOCOM and are the most robust in Navy RW aviation. The aircraft at homeguard deploy regularly all over CONUS in support of SOF training requirements (something the REGNAV has no budget for). Full mission profiles are the preference and a requirement for pilot and aircrew training, the door gunners are the best and the pilots are the most experienced in the Navy.
Historically NSW has struggled for training support. Before 9/11, NSW experienced and average annual training shortfall of 33%. 81% of what they received was from Navy assets (including fleet aircraft) and only 19% from SOAR, AFSOC and others. HCS-4/5 provided 55% of all RW support to NSW from 1989-2003. In general, Army assets supported Army SF and SEALs could not get Army support. Today, NSW requirements are significantly higher and 84/85 support about 70% of their
sourced requirements. Part of the issue is due to location. 84/85 are located with the NSW groups in San Diego and Norfolk and Army assets are not. Another reason it is a dumb move to let them go. To pick up the slack in the future, Army would have to send dets of aircraft to San Diego and Norfolk regularly while they're already busy as Hell. Personally, I won't be holding my breath.
Unfortunately, helicopters in general are undervalued in the Navy (similar to AF) and the SOF support mission even less so (as again evidenced by Navy not caring if SEALs or MARSOC are supported with RW - Navy views this as SOCOM's responsibility). The Navy is jet-centric and more concerned with ships and submarines over everything else, hence there is no advocate for the mission within the Navy. Truth is, the only advocates who truly understand the mission and value the 5 SOF Truths are the pilots and aircrew who fly it (and a few guys like me, who used to fly it).
Hopefully this provides better clarity about the community and some understanding that we're not talking about your typical General Purpose Forces.