Special Ops wearing down Taliban

[surgicalcric]

... If that type of reasoning was true then wars would never end...

Today we are engaged in a conflict (not limited to Afghanistan) fighting a variety of people for a variety of reasons which transcends nations and persons and as such is much more complicated that wars against nation states.

It is a gross oversimplification to compare WW-II -and the enemies faced then- to the enemy faced today. I wish it was that simple...



ETA: clarity in my post

 

[Etype]

There are more people at work in Afghanistan than just the Taliban, and Iraq was even worse. There's a laundry list of players and an even longer list of motivations. To say 'Taliban' and 'ideologoical' to describe the enemies in Afghanistan is like saying 'germs' and 'common cold' to explaining the enemies of health.

 

[JJ sloan]

No hard feelings at all.

This is not my thought, it is one of the tenets of COIN.
I have read FM 3-24 and didn't see it mentioned there which I find curious.
Even a cursory look into past COIN campaigns will show you ample evidence of this.

I will point you to the campaign in Dhofar in the 70's and the bush war in Rhodesia.

Your other points about securing the populace and separating them from the insurgents is of course correct, as is killing the enemy but that does not disregard what I stated earlier.

Intelligence is more valuable than a good body count and the best intelligence comes from the horses mouth.

Noted.
I read an article about adusting the trigger on my Remington 700 last week. I am now a gunsmith.
I didn't fight in Dhofar or Rhodesia. I have ample experience in Afghanistan.
On your final point I agree.

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

I didn't fight in Dhofar or Rhodesia. I have ample experience in Afghanistan.

I think this is one of the major issues here, experience. The bush wars, Viet Nam and many many other wars are completely different from the current war. Nobody will disagree with Iraq being different than Afghanistan, but yet everyone brings up all of these wars when discussing COIN in Afghanistan. Everyone seems to be an expert and everyone seems to know the right strategy, but the only people who could possibly know are the people boots on ground doing the damn thing.

Its no secret as to how I feel about COIN and it use in Afghanistan, but what I have come to terms with (with a few kicks in the ass from you guys doing the damn thing) is that my personal opinion meaning absolutely nothing. I lack the experience in Afghanistan and there for I am nothing more than cheer leader on the side lines screaming defense when you have the ball in your hand. ;)

As for the purpose of this thread, I glad to read that you guys are killing the enemy of our nation and doing it well. Keep up the good work gentlemen, your countrymen are proud of you…

 

[pardus]

Noted.
I read an article about adusting the trigger on my Remington 700 last week. I am now a gunsmith.
I didn't fight in Dhofar or Rhodesia. I have ample experience in Afghanistan.
On your final point I agree.

You seem to be hinting in a few of your posts that I'm an arm chair warrior when it comes to COIN.
I spent 6 years in the New Zealand Infantry, training in COIN, my instructors included several Vietnam Vets and in one case in NZ a Rhodesian vet.
I then spent a year in Africa learning from Rhodesian SOF vets, I'm still involved with some of those people, some of which are helping to re write the way the US Military is going to conduct itself in the future.

So whatever your experience is in COIN (which I'm sure is extensive) don't make the mistake of thinking your club is the only one in town playing this game.

I think this is one of the major issues here, experience. The bush wars, Viet Nam and many many other wars are completely different from the current war. Nobody will disagree with Iraq being different than Afghanistan, but yet everyone brings up all of these wars when discussing COIN in Afghanistan.

Because if you knew about COIN you'd realize that it is a doctrine, A doctrine that can be applied in any location regardless of terrain.

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

Whatever you say Pardus. :cool:

 

[Etype]

We should just mass produce AWD like they mass produce SF to help all the conventional guys fight the asymmetric fight.
Done deal, we win, who wants lunch?

 

[surgicalcric]

I think this is one of the major issues here, experience. The bush wars, Viet Nam and many many other wars are completely different from the current war. Nobody will disagree with Iraq being different than Afghanistan, but yet everyone brings up all of these wars when discussing COIN in Afghanistan. Everyone seems to be an expert and everyone seems to know the right strategy, but the only people who could possibly know are the people boots on ground doing the damn thing…

Iraq is different but the fundamentals still apply to both.

Furthermore, if we were discussing COIN as it applies to Iraq -which I am more than happy to do- we would be citing Viet Nam, Rhodesian bush wars, the insurgency in Indonesia and East Timor, Colombia, El Salvador, etc as doctrine as well.

JAB...I will leave you with a quote from an insurgency in Malaya circa 1952:

The shooting side of this business is only 25 percent of the trouble; the other 75 percent is getting the people of this country behind us. The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people. -General Sir Gerald Templar

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

Crip, I respect your view on this and I am not attempting to have the COIN argument again. You guys have the training, experience and knowledge. I am nothing more than a dumb grunt that spent 10 years playing the big Army game and who is looking forward to putting it behind me. My post was an attempt at a complement to you and the many other SOF types who have been doing the killing. Nothing more and nothing less, I appreciate the work you men are doing and wish you all the best and god's speed in doing it.

 

[Manolito]

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2909.pdf
I have no experience in COIN nor in Iraq or AStan. I am fascinated in your thoughts that the other wars are not like AStan or Iraq. I wouldn't even think of arguing the point. What I do believe is we would make a mistake to not thoroughly understand history before undertaking a war strategy.
I pray every night that you are right and this is not a second Viet Nam with the exact ending we had then.
History tells me to try and push a 20th century doctrine on a people that can't read or write is an energetic undertaking.
2011 holds a lot of unpaid bills for the US and it will take a great deal of resolve for the American liberal to stay the course.
Respectfully,
Bill

 

[AWP]

I guess I'm not smart, because all of this focus on doctrine has me confused. Our doctrine is irrelevant if we're sending the wrong guys and gals out to execute it. Aerospace engineers can tell me a plane's going to fly, but if I put a forklift driver in the cockpit things are going to be ugly.

As a whole, our military doesn't "get it" and all of the doctrine in the world won't make up for the wrong people in the wrong positions, poor leadership, and little to no education.

 

[surgicalcric]

...As a whole, our military doesn't "get it" and all of the doctrine in the world won't make up for the wrong people in the wrong positions, poor leadership, and little to no education.

Exactly.

Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare-Hy Rothstein is excellent reading for those interested in why things are the way they are. He puts words to those things people have known for a while but couldnt put their finger on it.

 

[TheSiatonist]

As a whole, our military doesn't "get it" and all of the doctrine in the world won't make up for the wrong people in the wrong positions, poor leadership, and little to no education.

Aw fuck. Can't you guys nominate the right people for leadership positions or something?

Personally, I think this problem exists in ALL armed forces and I can only wish for the day when all this politicking would stop so you guys have the right people running the war.

This is just my 0.02.

 

[AWP]

Aw fuck. Can't you guys nominate the right people for leadership positions or something?

Personally, I think this problem exists in ALL armed forces and I can only wish for the day when all this politicking would stop so you guys have the right people running the war.

This is just my 0.02.

Regarding positions: You cannot send Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Infantry, and Armor LT's and CPT's off with minimal training and expect them to be an effective "tip of the spear" in COIN.

 

[DA SWO]

I guess I'm not smart, because all of this focus on doctrine has me confused. Our doctrine is irrelevant if we're sending the wrong guys and gals out to execute it. Aerospace engineers can tell me a plane's going to fly, but if I put a forklift driver in the cockpit things are going to be ugly.

As a whole, our military doesn't "get it" and all of the doctrine in the world won't make up for the wrong people in the wrong positions, poor leadership, and little to no education.

Leadership gets it; they don't want to believe it, so they ignore it.

Last thing these tank driving, fighter piloting, boat drivers want is a bunch of uncooth, semi-sophisticated SOF guys in charge of anything.
Yes, I am serious. Guys are more concerned with N Korea then the taliban/AQ-yet we are engaging the latter on a daily basis.

 

[Marauder06]

Guys are more concerned with N Korea then the taliban/AQ

That might be because AQ doesn't have nukes* and isn't backed by China ;)






*yet

 

[TheSiatonist]

*yet

Now there's a scary thought.

 

[surgicalcric]

Leadership gets it; they don't want to believe it, so they ignore it...

I disagree slightly here. Leadership gets that their role (large footprints and commands) would be minimized if those who do "get it" were to have the lead. They ignore us because it doesn't fit the mold they are comfortable with, attrition warfare.

This can be seen clearly through the events shortly after 9.11 when the CinC and SoD asked for a plan to attack and destroy AQ and the TB. The senior leadership wanted nothing to do with a UW concept because it didn't put "enough" of them on the ground. The plan to use SF was a CIA plan that the Chiefs of Staff laughed at but had nothing to counter it. If memory serves me according to the plans put forth by the the Chiefs of Staff it would take a couple months to get troops on the ground because of their not being CSAR elements etc in theater and the CIA plan was to have their guys and 5th Group on the ground in a matter of days-to-weeks.

 

[x SF med]

We seem to be missing the fact that region currently called Afghanistan has been the crux of tribal/internicene warfare for about thousands of years. Russia, France, England, Turkey, The Mongols, even Alexander could not subdue the area for any period of time. The Kush is steeped in the practical knowledge of conducting an insurgency - be it local, tribal, regional or larger...

How do we teach the majority of our soldiers and leaders the myriad tribal/clan mindsets, how do we place them into the situation so that they understand the constantly switching dynamic in the low level political dealings that lead to the larger shapeshifiting politics of the region - allegiances chane - almost on a daily basis - and these allegiances change based on things as basic as the Maslow heirarchy of needs - shelter, food, clothing, protection.... We are trying to introduce Western thought into a region that needs people sent in that understand the thinking currently (albeit, in our view medieval) in control of the region.

A Low Intensity Conflict / UW/FID Mission should be the base for COIN in Afghanistan - it will take years/ decades... there is no quick fix, no immediate change, no magic pill to erase thousands of years of self protection in the form of clan/tribal politics and warfare that is now fueled by outside groups who look, speak, act and believe very similarly to the indigineous people.

Technology may not always win over the will of the people - these guys are fighting for their homes, and are being supported by people more similar to them than us, maybe we need to focus on getting inside, and starting some change there, instead of from the outside. Not to say the internal and external forces driving the 'jihad' should be ignored, but a two pronged attack could be more effective.

Sorry - but even to me this sounds like a basic lecture of the political significance of the capabilities of US Army Special Forces.

I'll shut up now.

 

[x SF med]

Hey, Crip.... we overlapped a little in our posts - timing and points... imagine that...