The End of SF/SOF?

BloodStripe

Marine
SOF Support
Joined
Feb 27, 2014
Messages
4,712
Location
CONUS
SSMP
Military Mentor
http://observer.com/2014/12/luke-somers-and-the-end-of-the-special-forces/

Before I comment on this piece, does anyone know of any operational experience for Captain Andrew Peek? I don't want to be quick to dismiss him when he may have far greater insight to A LOT more than I do, but this piece seems to be out in left field. Has he actually led a team (even of traditional grunts), or is his experience from behind a desk sipping coffee?

And when enough not-special disasters pile up, like the fall of Crimea or Ramadi, people are going to start to notice.

Anyone who has ever been there or done that will know that there are calculated (and uncalculated) risks in any mission. "No plan survives first contact" is a rather well known quote. It exists because often times, even the best thought plan can change at a blink. The ability to adapt and overcome those moments is what separates the good from the bad. Those men on that mission to rescue American Luke Somers acted with far more professionalism than Peek gives credit for. Yes, controlling every aspect of an operation is ideal and would make for a great movie. But this is not CoD or Act of Valor. In real life, shit happens. What transpired after Luke is murdered is just as important as the beginning and the middle.

His idea that only SOF troops are sexy and professional are also way off merit. Yes, traditional members of the military have acted in a unprofessional manner at times, but the actions of a few do not represent the majority. There are countless stories of members not having to "sit down and drink three cups of tea with tribal elders".





On a side note, Luke Somers shares a name with a Ranger. Luke Sommers ring a bell anyone?
 
The interchangeable way the author uses the terms "Special Forces" and "Special Operations" shows his real ignorance. Imagine if the U.S. no longer had a hostage rescue capability. It would be a social and political disaster. For some reason, new media, some policy makers, and members of the public believe doing those national-level rescues is easy. That is unfortunate because it is a perfect storm of intelligence, weather conditions, environment, and timing. A lot can go wrong, but over the last decade and a half, many of them have gone right.

This article is garbage.
 
Peek's bio:
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Authors/Andrew-L-Peek

Andrew L. Peek is a combat veteran and doctoral candidate at The Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, where he teaches political theory and strategic studies. Previously, as a U.S. Army intelligence officer, he served as strategic advisor to the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan and later as an intelligence officer for U.S. special operations forces. He also served as the national security advisor for two U.S. senators and contributed to U.S. law and policy towards Iran, Lebanon, and Tibet. He has written for The National Interest Online, Real Clear Politics, and others. He received his A.B. from Princeton and a master’s from Harvard.

For a guy with his educational pedigree the article reads like ass. I've seen better work from high school seniors. Some of us have done better while using an iPhone and at the very least we're factually correct.

beginning-clown-guide-to-clown-shoes_10_3212206175.jpg
 
He should know better. His whole premise is flawed, his conclusion ludicrous. And I didn't much care for his crack about "desecrating corpses on YouTube." It was piss. Just like his article.
 
Last edited:
I resurrected this thread only because I came across another of Mr. Peek's articles.

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Opinion/2015/06/09/Battle-Midway-Ruined-War-Against-ISIS

First, the history. Although by 1944 the war’s outcome was never in doubt, if all efforts failed the Soviet Army would eventually have crushed the Reich by itself. Victory at that point was a national and industrial effort, and would belong to the countries with the most steel plants and masses of citizens under arms.

Midway was different. It was not a national effort but instead a battle of individuals, a rickety shootout by a few highly trained people under extremely confused conditions, and — incredibly — the underdog won. There’s no reason the United States, with a second-string commander, green troops and two-and-a-half aircraft carriers, should have been able to defeat the Japanese with their four carriers and the most experienced planes, pilots and admirals in the world.

Had Japan annihilated the rest of the Pacific Fleet carriers, it would have taken Midway. With land-based planes on Midway, it would have taken Hawaii. With Hawaii…well, who knows? Maybe San Francisco, maybe Alaska. Maybe pause in the Pacific and knock out the British in India. And then maybe peace, under a new Pax Japania.

For someone with his background he knows little about history. To be fair he is on track...with a 1960's historical interpretation devoid of any scholarly research.

I'm not saying everyone should discount this guy, but I'm discounting this guy's opinions.

Clownshoes.
 
I think I get what he is saying, albeit poorly. Or perhaps I'm filling in the gaping blanks he is leaving. I don't know. SOF is not a solution to problems in and of itself. Our military and government has a tendency to focus on head hunting bad guys. We have all seen it in OIF/OEF, I have done it myself. HVI hunting is great but it has to be supported with a comprehensive government approach if we want true mission success. I think what he is saying is that our political leadership are using SOF raids and drone strikes as a yardstick to measure how successful their foreign policy is or isn't.

"During the 2012 election campaign, President Obama repeatedly cited the bin Laden raid as one of the indicators that his foreign policy was working. That, plus the reported increase in (loosely) pinpoint drone strikes in places like Pakistan, made it look like somebody was finally winning this thing."

Successful raids are exactly that. Raids that successfully took out someone that needed to be taken out for whatever reason. They are only one aspect of policy and I don't know what our our policy makers are doing aside from taking a lot of credit for what a handful of guys wearing multicam and NVGs are doing. Our military, specifically SOF, are taking out high level targets and our general purpose force is providing security afloat and ashore. What is our government doing? Not much from what I can see. Especially when we often appoint ambassadors based on their campaign contributions and not their qualifications.

I think that his other point that people are taking umbrage at, the failed Yemen raid, is not a criticism against SOF but rather to point out that SOF forces, like all military forces, can fail no matter how professional, competent and elite they are. That's just how the world works. Sometimes the god of war smiles on you, sometimes he doesn't. We here all know this but I would agree with him that our national policy makers see SOF as a magic wand that can be applied to any problem successfully. That attitude will eventually over-extend folks and put them at unnecessary risk. Just my opinion. We tend to be a community that does not like to say no.

I may be off mark, what do you guys think?
 
I think we are missing a bit of context here. Who has been claiming that the Yemen raid is indicative of failed foreign policy? I certainly never heard it. But without a quote, link, or some reference to the controversy, it's hard to figure out what he's arguing against. The first half of his piece is right on the mark: policymakers have fetishized SOF for the last decade, and the Obama administration especially has used their operations as a metric for determining foreign policy success. @Teufel pointed this out. Peek accurately cited the bin Laden raid as the poster child for this poblem. What he didn't do, however, was make any sort of logical connection between this UBL/yardstick point and and the Yemen raid. Are critics pointing to it as an example of FP failure? Are the operators themselves being blamed? What's the argument?

The title of the piece is problematic, but that was probably put in by the editor. I wouldn't lay the blame for that one on Peek's feet.

Here's his LinkedIn profile, if anyone is interested: https://www.linkedin.com/pub/andrew-peek/27/b78/16
He claims that he was the "personal advisor" to COMISAF on "special operations, intelligence, Pakistan...hostage rescue, direct action, and indigenous defense issues" as a reserve intel officer of three years. Going by his pictures, he was a 1stLt at the time. He's obviously incredibly well-educated, but that claim is a little specious.
 
Last edited:
Sometime ago I read an article on "Close quarter battle". My curiosity peeked, the "Operators" pictured displayed "USACAPOC" patches and were CA personnel. One of which was the author of said article. That article reminded me of this write up (the subject line of this thread) immediately. Both have the same level of topical depth & expertise on the given subject matter, which appears to be poor at best.
 
If you're missing a post and have to ask "why" then please contact me. I don't want to see that sort of crap again.
 
Back
Top