Thinking Red : Improving Intel Suppor to SF Groups
- Thread starter Marauder06
- Start date
why not use washouts from SFAS? The guys that get the 6 month invite back. 2 year min serving in the support MOS. They see whats going on in SF, after one year they can ask for a wavier to attened SFAS again in there 2nd year. I was 11B and OJT supply, I would have jumped at the chance.
I was only in Group a short time, but I never witnessed or heard about anything like what you described. I'm sorry that happened and I hope that fat bastard will soon be doing the walk of shame across the street to the nearest conventional unit. Of course the fact that he's a shitbird is probably why his fat ass is in the arms room to begin with...
At any rate, I think you may have misidentified the problem. At the end of the day, every support guy in a Group reports to someone with a tab. If the support side isn't meeting the mission, then it's up to SF to fix it. The biggest problem with SF support is not that they are treated with kid gloves, but that USASFC has not made (or is not willing to make) the investment necessary to ensure that elite operators in SF are complemented by elite enablers. Why are you guys still the only comparable SOF unit without an A&S for your support troops? (rhetorical question, not directed at you Etype) Other SOF elements have managed to do it. I recognize that SF is the largest SOF formation in the inventory and it would be expensive and time-consuming to get an enabler assessment, selection, and training program off the ground, but that's what it is going to take to fix the problem that we all seem to agree exists at the Group level.
I had two SOF assignments after leaving Group. I've seen the difference between enablers who are in a unit because they got assigned there by their branch, and those enablers who had to compete to be the unit. There is no comparison; the "needs of the Army" crowd will cumulatively always be less capable than the "varsity" enabler crowd. This has nothing to do with the operators they support, it has everything to do with how those enablers got into the unit, and what they have to do to stay there. There are always some good people in the "needs" crowd, and every once in a while you'll get a turd in the "varsity" crowd. But by screening, training, and holding people accountable, the "varsity" crowd as a group will always be better.
If SF wants enabler support to improve, then SF needs to step up, recognize the problem, and commit resources to its solution. The solution I'm advocating in my thesis isn't perfect, but it's a good start and is probably better than what we have now- it is certainly better than what we had when I was with Group. With a little more research and planning, and combining it what what USASOC and USASFC are already trying to put together on the enabler side, USASFC could create an incredible training pipeline to pair the world-class operators in SF with world-class enablers.
If it seems like I'm passionate about this subject, it's because I am. 5th Group was extraordinarily good to me, and I'm still reaping the benefits of my time there. At the same time, I'm frustrated because I know that with just a little effort, the enabler side of Group- especially the intel enabler side- could be enormously improved, and that might just save some lives on the battlefield.
I am an outsider to this topic but I have a question. What is the selection process like for these elite enablers? Is it a physical selection? At force all the Recon Marines had to take an indoc to get in regardless of where they came from, but enablers were selected based on their ability to do their jobs, not their physical performance. Of course, they are Marines so they can't be fat and 0ut of shape but their professional capabilities were weighed higher than their physical capabilities. That being said, enablers were not authorized company PT gear until they passed the indoc. We always had really good HUMINT, EOD and SIGINT support. If someone had an attitude, sucked at his job or didn't meet the standard he was given orders somewhere else.
The processes for SOF enablers trying to get to units other than SF generally include a records review, a basic assessment of physical, intellectual, and mental fitness, a demonstration of job proficiency, and an interview board. Not all units utilize all areas I just mentioned, and the specifics of each organization is protected information. The goal is to ensure that the individual has a basic level of physical and mental fitness, has no skeletons in the closet that could be detrimental to mission accomplishment, can perform his or her job at a high level, and can fit in with the culture of the gaining unit.
Unless something has changed recently, the process for intel enablers going to Group is the same needs-of-the-Army, requirements-driven process that fills the rest of the Army. A guy could go to 10th Group just as easily as 10th Mountain. MI Branch will send an individual who meets the standards of grade for the open billet, irrespective of a lot of other considerations that most of us would consider important. This means that some good people get to Group, and some pretty crummy people get there. The problem with the crummy people getting there is that they tend to stick around because they know they have it good there, and they can't function well in Big Army. Because they suck, the 18-series folks stop relying on them and start doing whatever enabler task it is themselves, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle of unmet low expectations from enablers.
I want to make clear here that I'm speaking from my own experience and am in no way trying to bash SF or intel, just to point out a problem. Moreover, my experience was limited to one Group, others may have had different experiences.
Unless something has changed recently, the process for intel enablers going to Group is the same needs-of-the-Army, requirements-driven process that fills the rest of the Army. A guy could go to 10th Group just as easily as 10th Mountain. MI Branch will send an individual who meets the standards of grade for the open billet, irrespective of a lot of other considerations that most of us would consider important. This means that some good people get to Group, and some pretty crummy people get there. The problem with the crummy people getting there is that they tend to stick around because they know they have it good there, and they can't function well in Big Army. Because they suck, the 18-series folks stop relying on them and start doing whatever enabler task it is themselves, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle of unmet low expectations from enablers.
I want to make clear here that I'm speaking from my own experience and am in no way trying to bash SF or intel, just to point out a problem. Moreover, my experience was limited to one Group, others may have had different experiences.
That sounds like a pretty good selection process. You can't bounce out non performers from group? Released for standards?
Speaking from the perspective of one Group and one Batt., you can bounce out non performers from Group. I've watched it happen. Guys are dbags and they are sent down the road to another unit. I've also seen a guy moved from the SOT-B section to supply for failing to put out. (nothing against supply)
When Group was recruiting for SOT-A at DLI the recruiters were doing an interview/PFT. Our section interviews new guys before allowing them in. Two were turned away last month. All of this seems to fall on leadership. This wasn't always the case though.
Why doesn't the SOT-A just conduct a indoc like the Radio Recon Platoon bubbas on the Marine side?
When Group was recruiting for SOT-A at DLI the recruiters were doing an interview/PFT. Our section interviews new guys before allowing them in. Two were turned away last month. All of this seems to fall on leadership. This wasn't always the case though.
Why doesn't the SOT-A just conduct a indoc like the Radio Recon Platoon bubbas on the Marine side?
The mission still gets accomplished on the shoulders of the competent guys. I think that very few people realize there is a problem, or that there is a better way of doing business. Of those few, noone is willing to put pen to paper and come up with what Mara is basically laying out for them... or build the system necessary for fixing this.
With OPTEMPO and everything else that is going on, I don't think this issue has really been anyone's priority.
Also, these support indoctrination training programs that have come and gone within the individual Groups are well intentioned, but don't do anything to solve the problem... You're still getting needs of the Army troops, for "elite" units. Certain support MOS's in Group are pretty much guaranteed to deploy with ODA's and see combat on a regular basis... You'd think this would be a bigger priority among the leadership than it has been.
Yes, I agree. And sometimes they don't even go to jump school first
. They're "selected" by their branch managers, who only look at pay grade and MOS.
You can boot enablers out of Group, but it takes the same pain-in-the-ass admin process that it takes in a conventional unit. There is no RFS because there is no standard to which they are being held, except for the general Army standard, unless it's an arbitrary standard imposed by the individual's chain of command.
This is also with a Guard unit. All of this transpired after a change in leadership happened at the company and section level.
Before....not so much
I was thinking about this thread today in church (it was a long sermon) and I think I made a fundamental error.
What I should have done either before writing this thesis, or as a part of it, is to establish the parameters to validate whether or not a problem exists in the first place. If there is no problem, then no solution is required.
I *think* there is a problem with no AST pipeline for enablers, but I'm not in charge of anything related to SF anymore and haven't been for years. Maybe the situation with enablers in Group is the way it is because the people in charge at the Group level and below want it that way; maybe enabler support is adequate as is and does not require the application of resources to develop and implement. I don't think that's the case, but I shouldn't assume.
What I should have done was survey all of the Group commanders, CSMs, S2s, MID and GSC commanders and their respective SEAs, some folks at USASFC and SWCS, and a sampling of team members and 18-series types at the company levels. Even if only half of the people surveyed responded, I would have gotten a feel for what expectations of enablers are from the people who they support, and could have relied on something more relevant than my own intuition to start building the EAST program. If I were to do it again or if someone else were to take what I've done and built on it, I'd recommend gathering quantifiable data to frame the problem first, before coming up with the solution.
I still think EAST would benefit SF enormously, but I should have checked to see what is needed first before coming up with an elaborate plan. The only thing worse than needing help is getting "help" you didn't ask for, don't want, and can't use. I've been there...
What I should have done either before writing this thesis, or as a part of it, is to establish the parameters to validate whether or not a problem exists in the first place. If there is no problem, then no solution is required.
I *think* there is a problem with no AST pipeline for enablers, but I'm not in charge of anything related to SF anymore and haven't been for years. Maybe the situation with enablers in Group is the way it is because the people in charge at the Group level and below want it that way; maybe enabler support is adequate as is and does not require the application of resources to develop and implement. I don't think that's the case, but I shouldn't assume.
What I should have done was survey all of the Group commanders, CSMs, S2s, MID and GSC commanders and their respective SEAs, some folks at USASFC and SWCS, and a sampling of team members and 18-series types at the company levels. Even if only half of the people surveyed responded, I would have gotten a feel for what expectations of enablers are from the people who they support, and could have relied on something more relevant than my own intuition to start building the EAST program. If I were to do it again or if someone else were to take what I've done and built on it, I'd recommend gathering quantifiable data to frame the problem first, before coming up with the solution.
I still think EAST would benefit SF enormously, but I should have checked to see what is needed first before coming up with an elaborate plan. The only thing worse than needing help is getting "help" you didn't ask for, don't want, and can't use. I've been there...
Brill
SOF Support
I was thinking about this thread today in church (it was a long sermon) and I think I made a fundamental error.
What I should have done either before writing this thesis, or as a part of it, is to establish the parameters to validate whether or not a problem exists in the first place. If there is no problem, then no solution is required...
I still think EAST would benefit SF enormously, but I should have checked to see what is needed first before coming up with an elaborate plan. The only thing worse than needing help is getting "help" you didn't ask for, don't want, and can't use. I've been there...
Who wrote this in post #5? ;)
You're just sayin' what everyone else is thinkin'. ALL the posts in this thread advocate SOME type of improvement to the SF support elements.
The first step is admitting you have a....
As I alluded to before, I don't think very many people out there realize that there is a problem... and there is definitely a problem. The mission still gets accomplished, and always has gotten accomplished. Your average Special Forces ODA is going to accomplish any mission with very little regard to how adequate their support is.
So, if they get a dirtbag attached, it is usually an inconvenience and not something that is going to equal mission failure. SF should have a near-guarantee that the guys supporting them are the top 10% of their field, but until SF demands that... not gonna happen.
Brill
SOF Support
Attached is a dated USMC Radio Recon Team PPT brief (in the process of getting more info) and here's a URL with some history with their selection course http://www.radioreconplt.com/history.htm
I know that NavSpecWar TacInfoOps for CTIs (a Navy 35P) have an interview, records screen, and PT test (similar to an Airborne PFT). Both USMC and USN do NOT accept first tour intel guys: must have experience before applying to their respective programs.
(Added for a different perspective how the other tactical SOF S2-type units select their people.)
I know that NavSpecWar TacInfoOps for CTIs (a Navy 35P) have an interview, records screen, and PT test (similar to an Airborne PFT). Both USMC and USN do NOT accept first tour intel guys: must have experience before applying to their respective programs.
(Added for a different perspective how the other tactical SOF S2-type units select their people.)
One of the prerequisites is "no badge hunters," lol
That looks like a very good example of a tailored AST program for intel enablers going to that particular unit. I wonder what their thruput is, how much it costs, and what the unit thinks of the program.
That looks like a very good example of a tailored AST program for intel enablers going to that particular unit. I wonder what their thruput is, how much it costs, and what the unit thinks of the program.
Brill
SOF Support
I'm on it and will let you know soonest.
You really want the best intel guys possible. Keep in mind as SF guys are mostly employed as part of JSOTF's(at least lately) that your intel support is multi service.I was the J2 supporting the 3rd group, as well as numerous coalition allies and I had a staff composed of all the services. You do need guys experienced in the employment of SOF and their requirements as well as being well versed in the threat.
