Yep, Him not me.
I didn't go in until D+5. I wasn't a seasoned, coolguy, intel pro like RetPara....
Just a dumbshit specialist three weeks out of jump school.
Urgent Fury/25oct83
- Thread starter EATIII
- Start date
Yep, Him not me.
I didn't go in until D+5. I wasn't a seasoned, coolguy, intel pro like RetPara....
Just a dumbshit specialist three weeks out of jump school.
30 Sep '83
If it makes you feel any better, I was in the Army for 2 1/2 years before I went.
EATIII, I graduated a few weeks before you did - 30 Sep - in time to go.
RIP all who were lost
Second on the R.I.P
I wish I could of gone, 250 + Jumps and still basic Wings. Alla Willing, that will change in May after 2 other schools, Man Are we Old! But still under good canopy;):eek::doh:
Full canopy is always good!
RetPara
SOF Support
Been think about this for a week now. I had left the 82nd less than a year before after getting back from opening Sinai MFO as the S2 NCO for 1\505.
We started planning for UF about a week out. It stayed pretty close hold at the Corps and Div level. Meanwhile 1st and 2nd Batt were in their planning cycle. I think about 50 people from Division and Corps combined were in the planning cells.
OPSEC reached a whole new level of anal retentiveness for this. There had been a October surprise being planned for October of '81 after the failed rescue in Iran that previous April. In August; Jack Anderson had blown it in his Washington Merrygoround column. The paper had come out in the early hours of one weekday morning. By 0800 the planning for the op had been shut down, burned, shredded, and halted. YEARS later I learned that it was a member of the JCS that leaked it to Anderson. Thats how fucked up it was going to be.
Bear in mind for all of this; it was 1983. JSOC had not existed for two years yet. USSOCOM was not even a concept paper yet. Joint Ops were in their infancy as what I will put forth here will show.
Our lack of holdings list for Grenada was a LOT longer than what we knew. Communications from the island was pretty sparse as the New Jewel Movement (NJM) that was running the government had pretty much cut off a lot civilian comms and there was little news ever coming out.
What little had come painted a picture of a Maoist Marxist government developing with serious and violent infighting. That lead to the imprisonment and execution of some of the original leaders of the revolution. The medical students and faculty were very unsure of what would happen next. The 'government' was showing very unstable and violent tendencies.
About the 20th(?) of October the CIA inserted a female operator with a radio via commercial transport. She spent more time on the run in a evasion mode than reporting.
What we did know that the hills overlooking Point Salinas had SU23's. The Cubans that were building the airport were thought to be a Cuban Army Engineer Battalion. Because of OPSEC, even within the intell community, not all the assets that could of been used to collect were not pointed there.
So the conventional area studies process and examination of of everything continued. I think 3 days out the preliminary GO was given by President Reagan. So people started moving. The 82nd was alerted for and EDRE the next week with some rolling stock and arty tubes being moved to the railhead. Other units started moving. What I have never understood is while 1st Batt went with available strength, 2nd Batt came in their Spec Ops config leaving the majority of their young troops at Fort Lewis.
Forty eight hours out a SEAL insertion by small boat went really wrong losing a number of SEALs to bad weather at sea. The lost ones remains were never recovered.
On the 24th the final GO order was given so that the Navy Task Force could close on the Island.
On the 25th the events are pretty well known. We had three TV sets setup in the conference room where the planning cell was working. One of my favorite memories is Bryant Gumbal on the Today show (back when it was important) getting a note handed to him. The total look of stupefaction and bewilderment was a delight to behold...
Fort Bragg the morning of the 25th was in a conniption that likes of which had not been seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis. As near as I can tell the TA50 and ammo trucks made it to Green Ramp with the 'take what you want, but carry what you take' ammo issue and NQA TA50 DX\uniform issues.
The 325 was on DRF1 and 2. The reactivation of the Regiments in the Army was just starting and the 325th was scheduled for November. But one Bn of the 325 was 'fenced' for MFO deployment later that year. The 2nd Brigade Commander wanted to reconstitute the Regiment in combat, but it didn't happen.
Meanwhile the fighting was starting on the Island. We were starting to get reports of a LOT of Blue-on-Blue airstrikes and the like. This was passing the 'first real joint combat op since Nam' expectation of friction. I had developed a rep as 'the map guy' after what I did to get maps for Sinai. What was then called the Defense Mapping Agency had a contingency support plan for quick strikes like this. They can produce pre packed Bn and Bde packages of 1:25\1:50K maps. For OPSEC reasons we knew that DMA had not been turned on to support the Op. We knew that 82nd that printed a map with an arbitary grid printed by the Topo Engineer Bn supporting 18thABC. Turns out these were NOT the same maps the Rangers went in with. Making some phone calls I found out the Marines had their own local product. The Air Force was also using their OWN maps, which were actually JOG's. A visit that night from of the Dark Side really put this all together. They confirmed calls for fire were consistently impacting off target. A half page summary got carried to the Corps command group with a synopsis getting a flash transmission on all the nets that night. DMA got turned on with maps getting in sector 36 hours later.
I got pegged to be the NCOIC of the captured weapon, equipment, and docs section on the island. Spent a month on the island tracking and cataloging stuff with a Major from G2 and three other troops from the 319th. I had a 'I Was There' column from that published in Soldier of Fortune in '89. What we found down there was freaking incredible. Besides all the junked Lee-Enfields and British crown weapons, was case on case of brand new SKS's and AK's still in the factory crates. We also recovered M16's and M3's lost in Vietnam. Eventually we shipped enough ammo off the island to completely weight out C141's for four days. Gen Ferris, the CG on the island, basically said the bird don't roll unless the Major or I initialed the manifest. We also filled a cargo ship with vehicles and towed weapons. Since its been 25 years I can also say at the Cuban commo shack up the hill from Cuban barracks... we recovered a LOT high speed sensitive commo stuff that the Rangers had NOT shot the shit out of....
On a personal note my wife and I had not been married for eight months yet when this went down. It does not come up as one her high points in the marriage... even now.
We started planning for UF about a week out. It stayed pretty close hold at the Corps and Div level. Meanwhile 1st and 2nd Batt were in their planning cycle. I think about 50 people from Division and Corps combined were in the planning cells.
OPSEC reached a whole new level of anal retentiveness for this. There had been a October surprise being planned for October of '81 after the failed rescue in Iran that previous April. In August; Jack Anderson had blown it in his Washington Merrygoround column. The paper had come out in the early hours of one weekday morning. By 0800 the planning for the op had been shut down, burned, shredded, and halted. YEARS later I learned that it was a member of the JCS that leaked it to Anderson. Thats how fucked up it was going to be.
Bear in mind for all of this; it was 1983. JSOC had not existed for two years yet. USSOCOM was not even a concept paper yet. Joint Ops were in their infancy as what I will put forth here will show.
Our lack of holdings list for Grenada was a LOT longer than what we knew. Communications from the island was pretty sparse as the New Jewel Movement (NJM) that was running the government had pretty much cut off a lot civilian comms and there was little news ever coming out.
What little had come painted a picture of a Maoist Marxist government developing with serious and violent infighting. That lead to the imprisonment and execution of some of the original leaders of the revolution. The medical students and faculty were very unsure of what would happen next. The 'government' was showing very unstable and violent tendencies.
About the 20th(?) of October the CIA inserted a female operator with a radio via commercial transport. She spent more time on the run in a evasion mode than reporting.
What we did know that the hills overlooking Point Salinas had SU23's. The Cubans that were building the airport were thought to be a Cuban Army Engineer Battalion. Because of OPSEC, even within the intell community, not all the assets that could of been used to collect were not pointed there.
So the conventional area studies process and examination of of everything continued. I think 3 days out the preliminary GO was given by President Reagan. So people started moving. The 82nd was alerted for and EDRE the next week with some rolling stock and arty tubes being moved to the railhead. Other units started moving. What I have never understood is while 1st Batt went with available strength, 2nd Batt came in their Spec Ops config leaving the majority of their young troops at Fort Lewis.
Forty eight hours out a SEAL insertion by small boat went really wrong losing a number of SEALs to bad weather at sea. The lost ones remains were never recovered.
On the 24th the final GO order was given so that the Navy Task Force could close on the Island.
On the 25th the events are pretty well known. We had three TV sets setup in the conference room where the planning cell was working. One of my favorite memories is Bryant Gumbal on the Today show (back when it was important) getting a note handed to him. The total look of stupefaction and bewilderment was a delight to behold...
Fort Bragg the morning of the 25th was in a conniption that likes of which had not been seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis. As near as I can tell the TA50 and ammo trucks made it to Green Ramp with the 'take what you want, but carry what you take' ammo issue and NQA TA50 DX\uniform issues.
The 325 was on DRF1 and 2. The reactivation of the Regiments in the Army was just starting and the 325th was scheduled for November. But one Bn of the 325 was 'fenced' for MFO deployment later that year. The 2nd Brigade Commander wanted to reconstitute the Regiment in combat, but it didn't happen.
Meanwhile the fighting was starting on the Island. We were starting to get reports of a LOT of Blue-on-Blue airstrikes and the like. This was passing the 'first real joint combat op since Nam' expectation of friction. I had developed a rep as 'the map guy' after what I did to get maps for Sinai. What was then called the Defense Mapping Agency had a contingency support plan for quick strikes like this. They can produce pre packed Bn and Bde packages of 1:25\1:50K maps. For OPSEC reasons we knew that DMA had not been turned on to support the Op. We knew that 82nd that printed a map with an arbitary grid printed by the Topo Engineer Bn supporting 18thABC. Turns out these were NOT the same maps the Rangers went in with. Making some phone calls I found out the Marines had their own local product. The Air Force was also using their OWN maps, which were actually JOG's. A visit that night from of the Dark Side really put this all together. They confirmed calls for fire were consistently impacting off target. A half page summary got carried to the Corps command group with a synopsis getting a flash transmission on all the nets that night. DMA got turned on with maps getting in sector 36 hours later.
I got pegged to be the NCOIC of the captured weapon, equipment, and docs section on the island. Spent a month on the island tracking and cataloging stuff with a Major from G2 and three other troops from the 319th. I had a 'I Was There' column from that published in Soldier of Fortune in '89. What we found down there was freaking incredible. Besides all the junked Lee-Enfields and British crown weapons, was case on case of brand new SKS's and AK's still in the factory crates. We also recovered M16's and M3's lost in Vietnam. Eventually we shipped enough ammo off the island to completely weight out C141's for four days. Gen Ferris, the CG on the island, basically said the bird don't roll unless the Major or I initialed the manifest. We also filled a cargo ship with vehicles and towed weapons. Since its been 25 years I can also say at the Cuban commo shack up the hill from Cuban barracks... we recovered a LOT high speed sensitive commo stuff that the Rangers had NOT shot the shit out of....
On a personal note my wife and I had not been married for eight months yet when this went down. It does not come up as one her high points in the marriage... even now.
Damn... Thank you for putting pen to paper, so to speak, RetPara.
RetPara
SOF Support
But there's more. After the 2nd Bde got on the ground the Div Cmd arrived. This was followed by chunks of the Div Arty and 3rd Brigade. It would seem MG Trobaugh was going to bring the entire Division down. The Division keep building up and bringing more and more into the airhead without expanding it. The Ranger Bns go home. Finally the Chief of Staff of the Army shows up to meet with the 82nd CG. Basically the 82nd was in their airhead while the Marine MAB was running around all over the island. The CSA was on the ground for about 10 hours. Next day the Division breaks out of the airhead. The 1\505 did a movement to contact out the main road from the airfield. They had Dragons in over-watch with Bn and Co mortars leap frogging as the Bn moved. About a half mile past the arms\ammo\logistics depot the Bn took fire from a sniper. Between the mortars, Dragons, laws, and M203's the house the fire came from was leveled in seconds.....
Meanwhile back at Fort Bragg... most of the company supply Sgt's were left in the rear to 'push' supplies... As soon as the 325 was on the receiving end of a single incoming round.... supply accountability went to 'combat rules'. Basically that meant everything up to and including vehicles could be written off...... :eek:
So every supply sgt up and down Ardeenes street immediately cleared their property shortage list with the magic words... 'COMBAT LOSS'. Now that was all good and well.... till the 407th S&S tried to write off a 2.5 ton truck that had never been manifested to go to the island.... that brought in CID.
Then some people and vehicles got rotated back from the Island... and brought back some AK47's.... some asshole sold one to drug dealers!!!! A Cuberland Co Sheriff's car got made into a collander by one. Well that brought a whole change in attitude and latitude for troops coming back.
Then there was the rocket scientist in a rear detachment in Division who brought back a frag from Green Ramp to the barracks. He was sitting in his room playing pull the pin out, put the pin in. (The pins are actually made of brass so they won't spark.) Then he was called to another detail. So he put the frag on a shelf and slammed his room door shut. Five seconds later it opened up.... from the inside. This is one troop that did not ETS with a Good Conduct Medal.
Meanwhile back at Fort Bragg... most of the company supply Sgt's were left in the rear to 'push' supplies... As soon as the 325 was on the receiving end of a single incoming round.... supply accountability went to 'combat rules'. Basically that meant everything up to and including vehicles could be written off...... :eek:
So every supply sgt up and down Ardeenes street immediately cleared their property shortage list with the magic words... 'COMBAT LOSS'. Now that was all good and well.... till the 407th S&S tried to write off a 2.5 ton truck that had never been manifested to go to the island.... that brought in CID.Then some people and vehicles got rotated back from the Island... and brought back some AK47's.... some asshole sold one to drug dealers!!!! A Cuberland Co Sheriff's car got made into a collander by one. Well that brought a whole change in attitude and latitude for troops coming back.
Then there was the rocket scientist in a rear detachment in Division who brought back a frag from Green Ramp to the barracks. He was sitting in his room playing pull the pin out, put the pin in. (The pins are actually made of brass so they won't spark.) Then he was called to another detail. So he put the frag on a shelf and slammed his room door shut. Five seconds later it opened up.... from the inside. This is one troop that did not ETS with a Good Conduct Medal.
Interesting stuff ! Thanks, RetPara
Scotth
Verified Military
Awesome recounting of the events RetPara. Thanks for sharing
Force Structure
RetPara,
It may seem like that but after talking with key players on both staffs I can tell you that it was a matter of lift AND available forces. C/1-75 got chopped to JSOC to support the Richmond Hill Prison mission. Without C Co in the 1st Batt force structure, they were able to bring the young PVTs/PFCs from A and B Co, essentially full companies. Plus they were allocated 7 C-130's (three MC-130s and four C-130s). Two of which were for the JCU (A Co).
2nd Batt was allocated 5 birds (two MC-130s and three C-130s). Because of the lack of lift and Hagler's insistance on bringing his whole Bn, his staff had to trim down the units. So all untabbed and quite a few tabbed PVTs/PFCs/SPCs got left at the ISB (HAAF).
Typically platoons from 2nd Batt were the most experienced 15 Rangers from that platoon, including MG/RTO/medics. Plus they pillaged their RIP cadre to augment the platoons. There were a lot of pissed off, tabbed Rangers who got left behind.
Both Batts went with the Spec Ops config for runway seizure and hostage rescue. That's why quite a few of the 1st Batt Rangers carried MP-5s (C/1-75 brought almost their entire allotment of MP-5s and carrying their M16A1s broken down in their rucks) and both Batts brought their gun jeeps.
Thanks again for that other thing we spoke about the other day.
Talk to you soon,
Mooch
RetPara,
It may seem like that but after talking with key players on both staffs I can tell you that it was a matter of lift AND available forces. C/1-75 got chopped to JSOC to support the Richmond Hill Prison mission. Without C Co in the 1st Batt force structure, they were able to bring the young PVTs/PFCs from A and B Co, essentially full companies. Plus they were allocated 7 C-130's (three MC-130s and four C-130s). Two of which were for the JCU (A Co).
2nd Batt was allocated 5 birds (two MC-130s and three C-130s). Because of the lack of lift and Hagler's insistance on bringing his whole Bn, his staff had to trim down the units. So all untabbed and quite a few tabbed PVTs/PFCs/SPCs got left at the ISB (HAAF).
Typically platoons from 2nd Batt were the most experienced 15 Rangers from that platoon, including MG/RTO/medics. Plus they pillaged their RIP cadre to augment the platoons. There were a lot of pissed off, tabbed Rangers who got left behind.
Both Batts went with the Spec Ops config for runway seizure and hostage rescue. That's why quite a few of the 1st Batt Rangers carried MP-5s (C/1-75 brought almost their entire allotment of MP-5s and carrying their M16A1s broken down in their rucks) and both Batts brought their gun jeeps.
Thanks again for that other thing we spoke about the other day.
Talk to you soon,
Mooch
So true, my 1SG who just got out was one of those from 2nd BATT. Side note, after less than a year of leaving he is now coming back in:doh:
Absolutely an amazing history lesson. Thanks to all who contributed and rest in peace Rangers.
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