Zero Returns to the Skies over Japan

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The first Japanese owned Zero flew in Japan recently. Given their rarity, this is very cool.

A6M Zero Flies Over Japan

Earlier today, legendary Reno Air Racing pilot, Skip Holm flew a restored Mitsubishi A6M Zero over Japan. Although it is not the first former WWII-era Japanese aircraft to do so in the intervening seventy odd years since the end of the war, it is the first time a Japanese-owned example has gone aloft in that period, and this may have set a major new precedent in Japanese aviation policy. It should be noted that a couple of American-owned examples have made brief flying tours of Japan; most notably the former Planes of Fame Museum of Flying’s A6M Zero back in 1978 and again in 1995.
 
I've always wondered how much longer Japan could have continued the air war had they used their pilots more in the U.S. model of sending experienced pilots home to train new recruits, instead of sending them up until they were pretty much killed. Obviously they could have never turned the tide, as they simply couldn't match the U.S. in replacing lost ships, but how more effective could they have remained with a healthy mix of experience and better trained recruits? Agreed, it's very interesting to see a Japanese owned Zero flying over Japan again. I can only imagine the thoughts and memories this would bring up in the mind's of veterans on both sides.
 
I've always wondered how much longer Japan could have continued the air war had they used their pilots more in the U.S. model of sending experienced pilots home to train new recruits, instead of sending them up until they were pretty much killed. Obviously they could have never turned the tide, as they simply couldn't match the U.S. in replacing lost ships, but how more effective could they have remained with a healthy mix of experience and better trained recruits? Agreed, it's very interesting to see a Japanese owned Zero flying over Japan again. I can only imagine the thoughts and memories this would bring up in the mind's of veterans on both sides.

I don't think it would have mattered. They could maybe delay the end until '46, but once our sub program (particularly the torpedo issue) started rolling (the IJN also had lackluster ASW capabilities) their raw material imports couldn't support the war. Shattered Sword (I have a review in the Books section) and Hastings' Retribution (or Nemesis in the UK) both laid out Japan's bleak and ultimately futile case. I think the US built more fleet carriers in 1943 than Japan built before and during the war combined. We fielded roughly 100 carriers of all types during the war with good, but not great pilots. The Japanese intake system was meant for quality, not quantity, while the US system wanted masses of "good enough" aviators. I vaguely recall something about one class of Japanese naval aviators had 6 graduates and in the US it was dozens and dozens more per class.

I think late '42/ '43 would have mattered the most under your scenario. We'd have killed them off and placed far more men in the air than they could in 1944. Once the Essex class showed up, Japan was doomed.
 
They were doomed. No matter what.

I see your point @BuckysBadger24 but given the spirit of Bushido experienced combat pilots would've cut their own guts out rather than go back to the rear to be instructors. That would have been low duty to a samurai.
 
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They were doomed. No matter what.

Pathetic really, when you look at their arrogance, their tactical inflexibility, the constant deception between Army, Navy, government, Emperor and populace. It's to their credit, I think, their amazing fortitude, that they lasted as long as they did. Because in the end, bravery and a willingness to die was all that was keeping them going.

Even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki there were a lot of Japanese in high places who were willing to sacrifice 20 million people just to be able to go out in a blaze of glory...even if it meant the complete annihilation of the Japanese race.

I see your point @BuckysBadger24 but given the spirit of Bushido experienced combat pilots would've cut their own guts out rather than go back to the rear to be instructors. That would have been a disgrace for a samurai.

But does a delay, possibly until '46 as @Freefalling mentioned, also delay the dropping of said A-Bombs. Truman was under quite a bit of scrutiny and pressure when it came to dropping the bombs as it was. If they get delayed those months, I wonder if the invasion of Japan gets put back into the forefront, as Truman loses more and more support on the issue. Obviously there isn't a doubt that the Allies were going to win, invasion of the mainland or not. But the cost in lives as well as Japan effectively not existing as a country or race, and the Soviet Union already pushing hard into China, our influence as it stood after the war would have to be called in to question. The Soviet's get that much more of a foothold in China who loses much, if not all, of its bargaining chips against the USSR, and the U.S. is pretty much left with only Australia as a key ally in the South Pacific, and little in the way of a valuable foothold in the region.
 
But does a delay, possibly until '46 as @Freefalling mentioned, also delay the dropping of said A-Bombs. Truman was under quite a bit of scrutiny and pressure when it came to dropping the bombs as it was. If they get delayed those months, I wonder if the invasion of Japan gets put back into the forefront, as Truman loses more and more support on the issue.

An invasion was always at the forefront. When the bombs came along with gave us a Plan B, but had they failed we'd have still invaded. A delay slowing our progress across the Pacific merely delays the invasion and without Saipan/ Tinian dropping the bomb becomes a moot point. The Soviet bastards didn't declare until Aug 8, two days after Hiroshima. If we're delayed I question if the Soviets jump in at all. Stalin was profoundly bitter at our "delay" in invading Europe. FDR kept saying we could invade in 42, then 43, and finally we went in 44 partially at Stalin's urging. Our war in the Med. (necessary, but almost its own thread) pissed off Stalin because he saw us doing very little while his country was bled dry. I think a delay keeps him out of the war with Japan. His paranoia and loss of life in the "Eastern" Front would have kept him at home

Where it gets interesting is Lemay and some Navy brass thought Japan would surrender that winter. The subs and B-29 mining campaign (another story) strangled the Home Islands. The potential for starvation that winter was very high. I doubt Japan would surrender, but stranger things have happened.
 
King and Lemay advocated quarantine and starving the Japanese. Some projections took Japan out to the late 40s before they would have surrendered because of quarantine. The chiefs got on board with the bomb, King begrudgingly, and hedged their bets that if the Japanese saw the power of the bomb and thought we had many such bombs, they would surrender.

We tried to get the USSR into the war in the Pacific to take the heat off us earlier, but as pointed out, they were very cool to that idea until August. Their list of demands for participating was quite high, partially as referenced above Uncle Joe was pissed because we did not provide a second front in Europe to get Germany off his back when we said we would. The Med was really England's deal, pushed very heavily by Churchill, et al., whom we tried very much to dissuade and get re-engaged back in Europe (specifically, southern France).
 
I guess the way I was looking at it is with the the rest of the Allies putting their full might into Japan, a great opportunity opens for the Soviets to roll in to China under the pretense of clearing out any remaining Japanese forces still in country. The Chinese were hardly in a position to successfully stop them, and the Red Army, even after their campaigns against the Germans on the Eastern European front, was at a solid strength, with strong manufacturing capabilities. It would appear to be a golden opportunity to tighten a noose on China's neck, while simultaneously eliminating American influence in that part of the world, as we slug it out on the Japanese mainland for an untold amount of time. I don't know that Stalin would have had any qualms about sacrificing as many Red Army soldiers as was deemed necessary to get that upper hand on Soviet influence throughout the rest of the world.

Of course, the "conventional" firebombing of Japan, mixed with Japan's actually ability to still make effective war at that point, as well as the possibility that Truman still drops the bombs whether a delay affects U.S. invasions on the last of the island chains or not, is a lot of ifs. The more we talk about it, of course, the more Japanese pilots having a serious delay on the war to that extent seems harder to believe, but the problem certainly wasn't in their aircraft. The Zero is a pretty solid testament to that.
 
I think the Med. was more important that Stalin realized, or wanted to realize, at the time. Hitler is pretty much the only thing slowing Rommel from running into all the Middle Eastern oil Germany would need. Hitler was simply obsessed with destroying the Soviet's, the Romanian oil fields were a great excuse to begin doing it. Rommel was steam rolling the Allies in the Med. and North Africa. Had he been allowed to continue, Germany would be one hell of a manufacturing problem. But as Ff said, this is all information for a separate discussion. Discussion of one almost always leads into another.
 
the problem certainly wasn't in their aircraft. The Zero is a pretty solid testament to that.

Yes and no. The speed, maneuverability, and range performance over US aircraft was partially because of Bushido. They built an offensive aircraft without self-sealing tanks or armor. Additionally their 20mm wing cannon were limited in ammunition. They could do more in a fight if they controlled the fight. US aircraft from start to finish, even to this day, could take a beating while dishing out impressive amounts of damage. Look at most nations during WWII, they either used 30-ish caliber rounds or 20-30mm. The US used the Ma Deuce in everything and lots of it. By '43 all of our frontline fighters had 6 .50 cals with the P-47 sporting 4. Hell, we had B-25 gunships with a theoretical 14 forward firing .50 cals (most used less) with A-20, B-26, and PV-1/2 variants carrying 5-8 in the nose alone.

The Zero was a very capable fighter, but once we discovered how to beat it the Japanese never recovered. By then her best pilots were dead and their training system as you've pointed out simply sucked.
 
Yes and no. The speed, maneuverability, and range performance over US aircraft was partially because of Bushido. They built an offensive aircraft without self-sealing tanks or armor. Additionally their 20mm wing cannon were limited in ammunition. They could do more in a fight if they controlled the fight. US aircraft from start to finish, even to this day, could take a beating while dishing out impressive amounts of damage. Look at most nations during WWII, they either used 30-ish caliber rounds or 20-30mm. The US used the Ma Deuce in everything and lots of it. By '43 all of our frontline fighters had 6 .50 cals with the P-47 sporting 4. Hell, we had B-25 gunships with a theoretical 14 forward firing .50 cals (most used less) with A-20, B-26, and PV-1/2 variants carrying 5-8 in the nose alone.

The Zero was a very capable fighter, but once we discovered how to beat it the Japanese never recovered. By then her best pilots were dead and their training system as you've pointed out simply sucked.

Hard to argue that. "Stick as much firepower in it as possible" was certainly one of America's unparalled advantages over every Axis country during the war. Looking at your points, I suppose my earlier wondering about what effects the war being delayed would have had, would have had more ground if I started at the Battle of Midway, instead of Japanese pilots later in the war. Had they finished off our carriers, when they still had a relative upper hand, maybe a delay until at least '46 would have been more likely, irregardless of what Japan changed in the training and deployment of its pilots. I'm just going round and round now though.
 
But does a delay, possibly until '46 as @Freefalling mentioned, also delay the dropping of said A-Bombs. Truman was under quite a bit of scrutiny and pressure when it came to dropping the bombs as it was. If they get delayed those months, I wonder if the invasion of Japan gets put back into the forefront, as Truman loses more and more support on the issue. Obviously there isn't a doubt that the Allies were going to win, invasion of the mainland or not. But the cost in lives as well as Japan effectively not existing as a country or race, and the Soviet Union already pushing hard into China, our influence as it stood after the war would have to be called in to question. The Soviet's get that much more of a foothold in China who loses much, if not all, of its bargaining chips against the USSR, and the U.S. is pretty much left with only Australia as a key ally in the South Pacific, and little in the way of a valuable foothold in the region.

I don't think Truman would ever have delayed using the bomb. Why would he? Once we had it and knew it would work there was no reason to not use it. Objections to using the bomb were few because of the intense secrecy surrounding it.
 
Saipan made us seriously consider using the bomb. Okinawa almost guaranteed we'd use it. Once we saw them fighting to the end, to include civilians and their participation and suicides, we were all but forced to use them.
 
I think the Med. was more important that Stalin realized, or wanted to realize, at the time. Hitler is pretty much the only thing slowing Rommel from running into all the Middle Eastern oil Germany would need. Hitler was simply obsessed with destroying the Soviet's, the Romanian oil fields were a great excuse to begin doing it. Rommel was steam rolling the Allies in the Med. and North Africa. Had he been allowed to continue, Germany would be one hell of a manufacturing problem. But as Ff said, this is all information for a separate discussion. Discussion of one almost always leads into another.

Stalin wanted the second front in Europe, not the Med. He made that pretty clear. FDR promised him we would do it but the Brits dragged their feet, partially because the Limeys had a hard-on for Italy and the Balkans. Ike and the US believed that the Med was a British thing because of their desire to "reimperialize" some of the Baltic states and a burning desire t chase the Germans into the Alps. Ike nixed that idea, seeing a Nazi guerrilla war fought in the Alps over many years.

Contrary to popular history, the US and Britain really did not have a very cohesive strategy and were often at odds about goals and objectives.
 
I don't think Truman would ever have delayed using the bomb. Why would he? Once we had it and knew it would work there was no reason to not use it. Objections to using the bomb were few because of the intense secrecy surrounding it.

Once Truman was briefed in about the bomb he went all-in. Most of the chiefs supported it; King did not but concede that it could end the war faster than the quarantine-and-starvation route. Sec of War Stimson was really hesitant as well as he could see the problems of eventual nuclear proliferation.
 
Truman got a kick out of hinting to Stalin at Potsdam that we had "a powerful new weapon." That was right after he got the word that the tests were successful. I bet Harry would've liked dropping a few Stalin's way.
 
Truman got a kick out of hinting to Stalin at Potsdam that we had "a powerful new weapon." That was right after he got the word that the tests were successful. I bet Harry would've liked dropping a few Stalin's way.

Yup. FDR had a pretty cordial relationship with Stalin, believing that like with everyone else in the US, he could get Stalin to do anything once they established a friendship and common ground. That was part of FDR's blindsides is that he thought he was always more charming than he was and that his charm would always prevail.

Truman on the other hand, was really skeptical of the Russians and really saw them for what they were. He did not trust Uncle Jo any further than he could throw him.
 
Stalin wanted the second front in Europe, not the Med. He made that pretty clear. FDR promised him we would do it but the Brits dragged their feet, partially because the Limeys had a hard-on for Italy and the Balkans. Ike and the US believed that the Med was a British thing because of their desire to "reimperialize" some of the Baltic states and a burning desire t chase the Germans into the Alps. Ike nixed that idea, seeing a Nazi guerrilla war fought in the Alps over many years.

Contrary to popular history, the US and Britain really did not have a very cohesive strategy and were often at odds about goals and objectives.

The Brits still relied heavily on India as a source of income so keeping the Suez out of German hands was a big deal for them. The US thought it could invade France in '42 and believed the UK wanted us in the Med to prop up the British Empire. As we learned so painfully in N. Africa, our military wasn't even close to prepared for an invasion of Europe in '42 or '43, so the Med helped us learned combined arms and joint operations. Even late in the war Churchill pushed for an invasion of the Baltics, but I think that was driven by the desire to keep Eastern Europe out of Stalin's hands. FDR was dying and still enamored with Stalin, so Stalin took advantage of him at Yalta. FDR made some key mistakes, but his views on Stalin were the worst.
 
FF, very cogent post. The more I read about the British leadership in WWII, the less impressed I am. They most definitely wanted things their way, and usually at our expense.

Ike referred to the North African and Med campaigns as good practice for the invasion of Europe and really solidified his leadership structure, which I really think minimized loss of life in Europe (i.e., sacking his friend in the N African campaign, protecting Patton, rearranging staff).

Yeah, Stalin really railroaded FDR, I wonder how much was FDR's guilt in not opening the second front earlier. Stalin really played on that. Also FDR never believed the intel about the Russian involvement in the Katyn massacre, refusing to believe they would be involved. And once word of Soviet atrocities leaked out with regard to Eastern Germany, he just looked away.
 
Yeah, Stalin really railroaded FDR, I wonder how much was FDR's guilt in not opening the second front earlier. Stalin really played on that. Also FDR never believed the intel about the Russian involvement in the Katyn massacre, refusing to believe they would be involved. And once word of Soviet atrocities leaked out with regard to Eastern Germany, he just looked away.

I hate to say it this way, but really though, why wouldn't FDR look the other way? I don't agree with FDR not questioning the Soviets when these massacres came to light, but I can also see how inter ally fighting could become a liability when they were that close to the finish line in FDR's mind. Not to mention Germany is just coming off the largest counterattack in the war in the Bulge, when they were thought all but defeated, and the Allies by that point were uncovering concentration and death camps all over Eastern Europe and Germany. I think the last thing the American populace wanted to hear about at that time was how their supposed "ally" was slaughtering Germans in Eastern Europe. The same Germans who, as was coming to light, were slaughtering pretty much every non-German east of Berlin.

As was previously said by you all, FDR's concessions at Yalta were probably enhanced by his liking of Stalin, and Stalin laying the guilt on thick about the second front. But even if the U.S. wanted to do nothing more, was it even realistic for the Western Allies to open a European front until at least mid to late '43? Had we just sat still and built up forces and materiel' during '42, maybe an invasion at the beginning of '43 would have been possible. But how much would the country stand for that inaction, let alone a struggling England, who quite frankly would have most likely been leveled off without U.S. support? I think helping the British in the Med. and North Africa helped appease them, as well as helped the U.S. in getting their feet wet in fighting the Wehrmacht as @Devildoc said, which in the beginning was pretty much a disaster. It also allowed the U.S. to say "hey, we're killing Germans" to the Soviets, whether it was on the shores of Europe or not. I think that in itself is better than saying "hey, we're working on the European invasion, it takes time", while the Soviets are fighting for their literal survival. An immediate invasion of Western Europe immediately in '42, if it was even possible, probably ends in unmitigated disaster. Quite frankly, I don't think Stalin was listening to that argument at Yalta, even if FDR actually wanted to push the case. Stalin was always going to push the literal slaughter of his country by Germany until Stalingrad turned the tables, as the ace up his sleeve, to get what he wanted and would simply lie about the rest (Poland comes to mind).
 
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