That seems like a reasonable hypothesis - organic air/ground task forces are superior to Joint integration of air/ground capabilities. But, I can't think of any examples in the last 20 years where a Marine-pure unit out-fought or was better suited than an Army/Air Force element. It seems like the sort of thing some SAMS folks would be all over - or even Joint planners in justifying the expense of each of the capabilities.
I don't have strong emotions about it. I'm proud to be in the Army but no other services' accomplishments make me feel like serving in the Army is then less. However, I think the case is an interesting one when the superiority of the USMC seems to be taken as gospel by a lot of folks - but doesn't seem to be born out by the way we actually fight wars. I think
@Florida173 is exactly right about the operational/strategic considerations by the Joint Staff on most conflicts.
I think
@Teufel is absolutely right about differences in culture, mindset, and organization. I'd just be curious on how one really measures what is the 'best' way to organize for ground combat - since there are such stark differences. If the USMC really does it better - cheaper, more effective - why not shift the Army into doing it that way too?
To your first paragraph, I agree. I don't think it's an issue of 'out-fought' or 'better-suited,' at all.
To your second paragraph, any perception of superiority is downhill consequences of a massive and well-run PR campaign born out of WWII, when the Corps literally fought for its existence. Problem is (for some), the Corps continued to perpetuate the mythos, and why not? They do some things better, some things worse, almost all things differently. You wanna see a microcosm of this very argument? Let corpsmen and medics have a go at it. But the Corps has the best PR team, historically with Madison Ave experience.
To your last paragraph, there is a
YUGE difference, in mindset, culture, and organization. As previously mentioned, the whole do-more-with-less-look-at-us-always-underfunded argument plays well within the organization; it's like a rallying cry. I certainly don't know the best metrics for measure 'best' either, and I am not sure that's the way to go. Different, yes. Best, maybe, maybe not, depends on the mission. I don't know why the Army can't shift into that mindset, but one reason is that it can't think in terms of 'small' and 'flexible.' I mean, how many bases does the Army have? The Marines have essentially two major ones, Lejeune and Pendleton, and a handful of smaller ones. The Army can't put it's forces to sea quickly without major planning and organization; it's just what the Marines do. Lejeune and Pendleton are 30 minutes from a place to embark.
To
@Teufel's point, the internal information campaign is phenomenal. Tell your people simultaneously you are underfunded and underloved and have to fighter harder than anyone while at the same time you are the best fighting force on the planet. It's brilliant, and it works.
Whether the claim of the Marines being 'elite' is certainly debatable, most of the ammunitions for the claim comes from the history, the legend of the boot camp experience, and it's PR program. Together they are pretty formidable wall to penetrate.