An Elite Infantry

I think instead of dick measuring contests of physical training, one should contemplate the customs and more importantly, the words. Letherneks and bootnecks. Eternally at odds? Or best frenimies.

As for you spitfire that’s pretty homosocial, posting that UK article unsolicited. Erotic, even. DADT’s been repealed, I suppose. I’m aware that both NZ and the United States broadcast medical advertising, yet not of watershed moments and your nations relation to the crown.

Perhaps you can enlighten me? Go All Blacks.
WTF did I just read? And I was just about to say nice things about Marines.
 
I didn't want to create a new thread for this so I figured this was the best place to plop it.

War stories

The first Ted Talk in this play list is by Thomas Barnett called, "Let's Rethink America's Military Strategy."

He raises several interesting points in this, however if you skip to the second half, he talks about creating two different forces, one a department of war and one of something else. Especially important in his point is the DOD currently tasks its infantrymen to do two (2) things, humanitarian assistance and then flip a switch and destroy the enemy. Those are two vastly different mission sets, yet for as long as I can remember, we ask our grunts to win their hearts and minds. Is that the job though of an infantryman? As he says around 20:00, let the Marines be Marines and kill the people who shoot at the other force As he says, "it keeps us from becoming a pussy force." Would Joe become more elite by not being tasked to conduct such a mission? I believe so, but at what cost? Can we scale down the size of the 03 and 11 force in order to fill in that "new" area and still be ready to protect America and our allies with whatever the world may throw at us? I am curious for the input of others on this.
 
I didn't want to create a new thread for this so I figured this was the best place to plop it.

War stories

The first Ted Talk in this play list is by Thomas Barnett called, "Let's Rethink America's Military Strategy."

He raises several interesting points in this, however if you skip to the second half, he talks about creating two different forces, one a department of war and one of something else. Especially important in his point is the DOD currently tasks its infantrymen to do two (2) things, humanitarian assistance and then flip a switch and destroy the enemy. Those are two vastly different mission sets, yet for as long as I can remember, we ask our grunts to win their hearts and minds. Is that the job though of an infantryman? As he says around 20:00, let the Marines be Marines and kill the people who shoot at the other force As he says, "it keeps us from becoming a pussy force." Would Joe become more elite by not being tasked to conduct such a mission? I believe so, but at what cost? Can we scale down the size of the 03 and 11 force in order to fill in that "new" area and still be ready to protect America and our allies with whatever the world may throw at us? I am curious for the input of others on this.

It's a variation of Charles Krulak's "Three Block War" that all Marines (and soldiers) end up working: warfighting, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations all within three blocks, from one spectrum seemless to another. Because these asymmetrical threats can flare up and down so fast, I am not sure a different 'force' would be beneficial. It's easier for the hammer to ramp down to hand out MREs than the peacekeeping/humanitarian force to ramp up to become a hammer. But there's a lot of room for error, misuse, and square-pegs-in-round-holes.

But it's not just the US grappling with that paradigm shift. Our esteemed Brethren to the north have also wrestled with it, as articulated in this journal article:

The Rise and Demise of the “Three Block War”
 
It's a variation of Charles Krulak's "Three Block War" that all Marines (and soldiers) end up working: warfighting, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations all within three blocks, from one spectrum seemless to another. Because these asymmetrical threats can flare up and down so fast, I am not sure a different 'force' would be beneficial. It's easier for the hammer to ramp down to hand out MREs than the peacekeeping/humanitarian force to ramp up to become a hammer. But there's a lot of room for error, misuse, and square-pegs-in-round-holes.

But it's not just the US grappling with that paradigm shift. Our esteemed Brethren to the north have also wrestled with it, as articulated in this journal article:

The Rise and Demise of the “Three Block War”


Great link!!
 
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