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That's about as feasible as a nuke on Raqqa.
Army to Cut LRSC/ LRSD Units
- Thread starter AWP
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ThunderHorse
Verified Military
Yeah...well how things should work and do work are always completely different you know.
My unit was, in effect, in enemy territory 24/7 and we were often the eyes-on for more conventional forces. We could give early warning of larger VC/NVA units infiltrating through our TAOR toward the Danang rocket belt; but most of the time the 12 of us took the fuckers on because we could pull the chain on steel rain and nape and Cobra gunships. There are many types of terrain, not just jungle, where vehicles can't go, where there are no roads, where the enemy is hidden in caves or tunnels, where they can't be detected by air/space assets...where boots are the only way in. American war at ground-level still comes down to men with rifles, frags, guts and terminal guidance.
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I still mourn the loss of capability, but am warming to @Etype's argument. LRS may have played some role in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its validity lies in a static environment. The nature of our doctrine doesn't support static operations, but a blitzkrieg (Sorry, "Air Land Battle" or WTF we call a blitzkrieg these days). I'm curious how often they were employed during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Most commanders didn't use them as intended anyway. The Indiana guys worked as PSD's during their deployment. I'm sure they did some LRS work, but it wasn't the bulk of their deployment. Their maneuver commander didn't know how or wouldn't deploy them as designed. The 25th ID's LRS in Afghanistan 2004 ran missions, but not always. They also hopped from region to region and never built up a solid understanding of their operating environments. One team lamented moving from Kandahar to Nangahar (solid book title, hmmm) which are about as different as you will see there.
Like cav scouts, LRS wasn't used as designed...but the cav scouts remain. Meh.
Most commanders didn't use them as intended anyway. The Indiana guys worked as PSD's during their deployment. I'm sure they did some LRS work, but it wasn't the bulk of their deployment. Their maneuver commander didn't know how or wouldn't deploy them as designed. The 25th ID's LRS in Afghanistan 2004 ran missions, but not always. They also hopped from region to region and never built up a solid understanding of their operating environments. One team lamented moving from Kandahar to Nangahar (solid book title, hmmm) which are about as different as you will see there.
Like cav scouts, LRS wasn't used as designed...but the cav scouts remain. Meh.
The only reason LRS only works in "static" environments is from when we replaced the "P" with the "S". Self inflicted by the risk adverse big army.
As many of you know, I am a huge fan of history and am convinced that most the answers to our current problems can be answered by reflecting on the past. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shaped the way we look at war in the modern era but keep in mind that these were conflicts between a modern military force and a significantly less advanced opponent. Iraq and Afghanistan didn't have the technology, training or mass to compete with the coalition forces assembled to invade them. I do not believe we would be able to generate nearly as much momentum against a near peer enemy. Additionally, the proliferation of anti-access area denial (A2AD) weapons is already changing the way we look at our current and future operating concepts. We were able to conduct "blitzkrieg" attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan because we were able to secure large APOD/SPODs and slowly build up supplies and personnel in nearby countries prior to the invasion. What happens when enemy forces can easily strike our staging bases with cheaply acquired, precision guided, long range missiles, mortars and rockets? I think it will much more difficult to mass forces in the future and we may have to rely on numerous smaller entry points to build mass. I think that ground reconnaissance has a role to play in a prolonged conventional war with a near peer enemy and I think it also valid against a hybrid threat that relies on modern technology and irregular tactics.
That being said, it would appear to me that the conventional Army relies on armored and SOF for their reconnaissance requirements. It's hard to develop a bonafide ground reconnaissance capability when you don't have a cradle to grave military specialty, significant funding and advanced training opportunities. I firmly believe that the requirement exists but you can't answer that requirement if commanders are unwilling to employ units properly.
A buddy of mine has some pretty awesome pictures of him running around on a dirt bike with a MP5-SD in 2003. They worked quite a bit before and during the invasion.
I agree, LRS can and has been very mobile in the past. And we shouldn't forget the secondary capabilities they bring, BDA, Infrastructure security, personnel recovery, etc.
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18th Abn Corps LRS guarded the gold from the Central Bank of Baghdad, then was PSD for the MNF-I commander.
ThunderHorse
Verified Military
Scouts are Scouts, sucks the long range brethren are getting the axe. Reconnaissance units not being used effectively is at the BDE, DIV and Combatant Commander level of accountability.
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