Loosely based on a recent article in my local paper:
You're in command of an Army unit in Afghanistan. Part of your unit's overall campaign strategy, dictated from GEN Petraeus on down, involves pursuing a counterinsurgency, or COIN program. You find out through the NCO support chain that one of your subordinate commanders does not support the COIN concept, to the point where he has directed his subordinates to not even use the term in his presence. This commander instead prefers a more "kinetic" counter-guerilla approach, and his unit has the record for the most enemy KIA- and most friendly KIA and WIA (i.e. losses suffered by the unit, not blue-on-blue fratricide).
The commander in question controls some of the most volatile battlespace in Afghanistan. The unit's OPTEMPO remains high, but so do the number of complaints from local Afghans and Afghan officials.
What action, if any, do you take in this situation?
You're in command of an Army unit in Afghanistan. Part of your unit's overall campaign strategy, dictated from GEN Petraeus on down, involves pursuing a counterinsurgency, or COIN program. You find out through the NCO support chain that one of your subordinate commanders does not support the COIN concept, to the point where he has directed his subordinates to not even use the term in his presence. This commander instead prefers a more "kinetic" counter-guerilla approach, and his unit has the record for the most enemy KIA- and most friendly KIA and WIA (i.e. losses suffered by the unit, not blue-on-blue fratricide).
The commander in question controls some of the most volatile battlespace in Afghanistan. The unit's OPTEMPO remains high, but so do the number of complaints from local Afghans and Afghan officials.
What action, if any, do you take in this situation?