I am not a COIN supporter and I have many reasons as to why I am not a supporter. In an effort to further explain why, I am opening this thread with my personal opinions and short studies in regards to COIN. Now before stating that I am 100% against COIN, I must say that I do believe that counter insurgency is possible; however I do not believe so under the current format of the FM 3-24 COIN Manual and I do not believe it is a capability that the conventional forces should focus on.
I have been told time and time again that COIN can and has been successful; however I have failed to see so in current history. El Salvador was a COIN war based off of what I read and yes it was successful in stopping the “revolutionist”, but how was that success measured? Results of a war torn, economically failed country that its biggest export is narco-terrorism into our own borders? MS-13 anyone? But before I get side tracked with the results of that war, how was that war won? What did the “Americans” do to win that war?
Well based off of what the unclassified information I have read says the Americans supplied the El Salvadorians with weapons, munitions and training and many cases advised them in the field. The El Salvadorians waged a very intensive, very bloody battle and very political war with the insurgency basically killing off the insurgency capabilities and its “USSR/Revolutionist” leadership. So in that aspects yes it was successful, however large surging conventional forces were not used, it was primarily kept out of the US media and the overall success has lead to a country left in shambles that is now imbedded with narco/AQ terrorism and is a hot bed for an insurgency that is currently taking place in the United States. So how affective has the outcome been?
Other example of this same problematic concept of COIN are seen around the world and brings me to my personal point of view on counterinsurgency. I am not looking at it from a theater of operations success, or an overall success of a campaign. I am looking at it from a strategy or otherwise strategic goal success. It’s not that we can’t stop or slow down an insurgency enough to “scream success” and back away from that theater of operations. We did this very well in Iraq, however what is the overall success in meeting our strategic goal for Iraq (a stabilized, pro-western democracy in the Middle East). Based off of the information I am getting out of Iraq by people I trust, it has failed to deliver the outcome we wanted based on the strategic goals we had set. So is it a success or a failure?
Other issues to point out; we were not 100% successful in defeating the insurgency in Iraq based off of our current COIN FM, we were greatly assisted by the sons of Iraq taking a step up to the plate and the insurgency took a step back due to the overall understanding that the US was going to pull out as soon as the country looked stable. Resulting in US forces stopping combat operations in Iraq and withdrawing combat troops. Now the insurgency has stepped back up and is currently pulling IA/IP troops into their ranks and surging their terrorism warfare efforts to further alter the stability of Iraq’s political system.
Now onto Afghanistan, we have a few Generals saying hey Iraq was a success and wanting to apply the same COIN tactics to that theater or operations to hopefully gain the same outcome. The problem is that Iraq was not truly successful, that Afghani people are different from the Iraqi people and that the warfare in Afghanistan is different from the warfare used in Iraq. Yes they both have suicide bombings, IED’s and basic terrorism. But the major difference is that the fighters in Afghanistan are better fighters, more dedicated to their cause and fighting in terrains that we cannot easily access. We did not have these problems in Iraq…
So what is the picture I am painting here? It comes down to the primary focus of the war and the strategic goals of the war. What most people fail to remember is that Iraq and Afghanistan are not “individual wars” but ongoing “theaters of operations” in a war. The “Global War on Terrorism” not the “Global War on Insurgency”. We are fighting a war against terrorist organizations and the countries that support those organization, and we should not be getting caught in this bog down of “nation building” of nations that harbor terrorist and their organizations. There is a reason why they support the organizations in the first place, there is a reason why the countries have been threats for thousands of years and nothing that we do in a 10 year span is going to change those nations.
So what is the correct doctrine? In my opinion it is counter terrorism and unconventional warfare. The use of UW assets in countries that we cannot directly engage (Iran, Pakistan, Chechnya ect) and the use of CT against countries that we can directly engage, Iraq and Afghanistan. We could also use a combination of the two in Pakistan. Getting away from the use of massive campaigns with large logistical support networks, getting away from the need of major conventional forces for long periods of time and allowing our political system and our people to see a direct result (we went in, we destroyed them, and we pulled out).
It’s not that I am stating that we should not assist other nations; I just think we should do so when they come to us and ask for it. It’s not that I am saying that our boys and girls are not doing a good job in Iraq/Afghan, it’s that I am saying we got off track on what the mission was. If COIN is going to be used use it in a capacity similar to El Salvador where large surges of conventional forces are not used. Use it in a way where the American soldier is not standing on a street on patrol of a nation he could care less about, getting his arms and legs blown off. Use it where it can be affective…
So anyway, there it is. This is my point of view and my reasoning’s. I am sure that some of you will say I am wrong and that’s fine; just realize that I did not develop my point of view over night. Although some of you may think I am retarded, I do actually study warfare and I am huge military history buff. My opinions are formed based off of my interests and studies in those areas along with my personal experiences. No I am not SOF or SF and no I am not claiming to know their capabilities outside of what an FM says. I am only spelling out my opinions for annoying “I hate COIN posts”.
I have been told time and time again that COIN can and has been successful; however I have failed to see so in current history. El Salvador was a COIN war based off of what I read and yes it was successful in stopping the “revolutionist”, but how was that success measured? Results of a war torn, economically failed country that its biggest export is narco-terrorism into our own borders? MS-13 anyone? But before I get side tracked with the results of that war, how was that war won? What did the “Americans” do to win that war?
Well based off of what the unclassified information I have read says the Americans supplied the El Salvadorians with weapons, munitions and training and many cases advised them in the field. The El Salvadorians waged a very intensive, very bloody battle and very political war with the insurgency basically killing off the insurgency capabilities and its “USSR/Revolutionist” leadership. So in that aspects yes it was successful, however large surging conventional forces were not used, it was primarily kept out of the US media and the overall success has lead to a country left in shambles that is now imbedded with narco/AQ terrorism and is a hot bed for an insurgency that is currently taking place in the United States. So how affective has the outcome been?
Other example of this same problematic concept of COIN are seen around the world and brings me to my personal point of view on counterinsurgency. I am not looking at it from a theater of operations success, or an overall success of a campaign. I am looking at it from a strategy or otherwise strategic goal success. It’s not that we can’t stop or slow down an insurgency enough to “scream success” and back away from that theater of operations. We did this very well in Iraq, however what is the overall success in meeting our strategic goal for Iraq (a stabilized, pro-western democracy in the Middle East). Based off of the information I am getting out of Iraq by people I trust, it has failed to deliver the outcome we wanted based on the strategic goals we had set. So is it a success or a failure?
Other issues to point out; we were not 100% successful in defeating the insurgency in Iraq based off of our current COIN FM, we were greatly assisted by the sons of Iraq taking a step up to the plate and the insurgency took a step back due to the overall understanding that the US was going to pull out as soon as the country looked stable. Resulting in US forces stopping combat operations in Iraq and withdrawing combat troops. Now the insurgency has stepped back up and is currently pulling IA/IP troops into their ranks and surging their terrorism warfare efforts to further alter the stability of Iraq’s political system.
Now onto Afghanistan, we have a few Generals saying hey Iraq was a success and wanting to apply the same COIN tactics to that theater or operations to hopefully gain the same outcome. The problem is that Iraq was not truly successful, that Afghani people are different from the Iraqi people and that the warfare in Afghanistan is different from the warfare used in Iraq. Yes they both have suicide bombings, IED’s and basic terrorism. But the major difference is that the fighters in Afghanistan are better fighters, more dedicated to their cause and fighting in terrains that we cannot easily access. We did not have these problems in Iraq…
So what is the picture I am painting here? It comes down to the primary focus of the war and the strategic goals of the war. What most people fail to remember is that Iraq and Afghanistan are not “individual wars” but ongoing “theaters of operations” in a war. The “Global War on Terrorism” not the “Global War on Insurgency”. We are fighting a war against terrorist organizations and the countries that support those organization, and we should not be getting caught in this bog down of “nation building” of nations that harbor terrorist and their organizations. There is a reason why they support the organizations in the first place, there is a reason why the countries have been threats for thousands of years and nothing that we do in a 10 year span is going to change those nations.
So what is the correct doctrine? In my opinion it is counter terrorism and unconventional warfare. The use of UW assets in countries that we cannot directly engage (Iran, Pakistan, Chechnya ect) and the use of CT against countries that we can directly engage, Iraq and Afghanistan. We could also use a combination of the two in Pakistan. Getting away from the use of massive campaigns with large logistical support networks, getting away from the need of major conventional forces for long periods of time and allowing our political system and our people to see a direct result (we went in, we destroyed them, and we pulled out).
It’s not that I am stating that we should not assist other nations; I just think we should do so when they come to us and ask for it. It’s not that I am saying that our boys and girls are not doing a good job in Iraq/Afghan, it’s that I am saying we got off track on what the mission was. If COIN is going to be used use it in a capacity similar to El Salvador where large surges of conventional forces are not used. Use it in a way where the American soldier is not standing on a street on patrol of a nation he could care less about, getting his arms and legs blown off. Use it where it can be affective…
So anyway, there it is. This is my point of view and my reasoning’s. I am sure that some of you will say I am wrong and that’s fine; just realize that I did not develop my point of view over night. Although some of you may think I am retarded, I do actually study warfare and I am huge military history buff. My opinions are formed based off of my interests and studies in those areas along with my personal experiences. No I am not SOF or SF and no I am not claiming to know their capabilities outside of what an FM says. I am only spelling out my opinions for annoying “I hate COIN posts”.
