COIN & the use of Conventional Forces in COIN.

[Manolito]

I thought I had it then it was gone like smoke. Remember I am a 286 in a pentium world. Should we deploy COIN on our southern borders? I am going to make the jump that we are experiencing an insurgency? Would the COIN doctrine work to support the mexican gov. and fight the cartells? The cartells have groups hunting people in Arizona. I know this is small potatoes compared to the two wars going on now but I am trying to equate COIN to something I can understand.
Bill

 

[moobob]

I believe that COIN will only succeed if the supporting nation(s) have support at home. When a war escalates, i.e. Vietnam, and our casualties increase, support is lost at home. The presence of the media makes it that much worse.

Malaya is often used as an example of a successful COIN campaign. The level of external support the insurgents had in Malaya was nil compared to what the Taliban have in Afghanistan. They have safe haven in a neighboring country, as well as financial/logistical/intelligence support from at least one, if not more.

We are fighting with our hands tied behind our back. Although I believe that we could be successful, eventually, I do not believe that our country's citizens nor our civilian leadership will have the stomach for much longer.

 

[JJ sloan]

JAB, terrorism is not a form of warfare like civil war or and insurgency, terrorism is a tool to use while conducting an insurgency or civil war etc...

Most use it and it's very effective.

Iraq is a classic insurgency. Local and foreign fighters supplied by border countries trying to turn the populace against the govt in order to take control of the country. Pretty clear.
They used terror very effectively as a weapon.

One case I could have cited as a victory in COIN was Borneo, but I think it falls outside of an insurgency because that was mainly a foreign power fighting inside the allied country to overthrow/take control. Not really an insurgency because the locals weren't really involved in the fighting for the most part.

As a student of bost counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, I would have to say I agree with Pardus (reluctantly). Insurgencies are made of of three elements: (1) Underground (2) auxilliary (3) guerilla force or militant wing. The underground in Afghanistan is in the form of a shadow government and a network of subversive individuals within the government and tribal leadership. This piece plans for and executes subversive activities, e.g. propaganda, and provides direction for the militant wing (although, sometimes the two are not connected by any means in order to mitigate crosspolinization, but this is not the case in Iraq (IZ) and Afghanistan (AF)). The auxilliary is a network of individuals and cells set up to provide logistical support, e.g. hawala operators, explosive facilitators and smugglers. The French resistance was masterful at utilizing the auxilliary. The third wing is the militants. This wing can conduct attacks utilizing conventional attacks such as ambushes, as we quite often see in both AF and IZ, or those same individuals may be conducting unconventional attacks such as bombing a government building in order to terrorize the populace. Terror is simply a tool of an organized insurgency. Both AF and IZ are perfect examples of an active insurgency utilizing terror as a method for success. It is possible to have terrorism without an insurgency and vice versa, although an active insurgency campaign must include an action arm of some sort.

For an insurgency to be effective, the local populace must be largely in favor of the insurgents. Without support, the insurgents cannot recruit the auxilliary and guerilla force to carry out the missions neccesary for success. A large portion of counterinsurgency is fought from within the populace, against the center of gravity for the insurgent underground. The other portion is to find, fix and finish the leadership in order to cripple the mechanism. For conventional troops to be successful in COIN operations it is crucial that the upper echelons of command truely understand the mission. I don't believe that the majority of commanders understand, or that maybe they are more interested in politics than success. (?) Conventional soldiers are very capable of conducting COIN operations given the proper leadership and direction. SF should be the lead by conducting partner force training, host nation key leadership interaction, and planning for population interactions conducted by conventional forces. Other SOF contingencies should take the lead, as they are, in eliminating key insurgent personalities. So much is wrong with the current methods for conducting COIN operations in AF and IZ, but I don't believe that the conventional soldiers are the problem. Conventional minded commanders are. I also have to agree with Moobob, we also have to fight the COIN fight at home in order to win.

 

[pardus]

However if you look at our COIN FM3-24, it says its anything and everything... This is my big problem with COIN, they can't even define what the hell we are countering.

Again, you are blaming a perfectly fine tool because the people using it don't know how to operate it properly.

I thought I had it then it was gone like smoke. Remember I am a 286 in a pentium world. Should we deploy COIN on our southern borders? I am going to make the jump that we are experiencing an insurgency? Would the COIN doctrine work to support the mexican gov. and fight the cartells? The cartells have groups hunting people in Arizona. I know this is small potatoes compared to the two wars going on now but I am trying to equate COIN to something I can understand.
Bill

Bill, I don't think COIN would be good for the Mexican situation, (bare in mind I've given this 30 seconds of deep though lol ) The cartels aren't trying to win popular support from the people in order to overthrow the govt (unless I'm missing something). They are trying to secure supply routes to further their logistical ops. :uhh:

I think this is a case for direct action, hard and fast, fuck up anyone who is involved without mercy, break them.

You can't really seal a border but you can make it so difficult and expensive to cross that it becomes nonviable.

Ambush the hell out of it, predators, tracking teams, fighting patrols, air, boats etc...

My :2c:

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

A lot of good stuff coming out and I have some agreements and some disagreements.

1. The use of conventional forces in COIN being viable I believe to be incorrect. One of the main key pieces of COIN as it is written is Cultural Sensitivity, this is something that Joe’s are have a major lack in. This played a key factor in my time in Iraq 03 to 05; we simply did not give two shits about the culture and more over mocked at every chance we got. Even with our commanders and many NCO’s chewing ass on Joe, Joe is Joe and he will act like the arrogant American he is.

2. The overall success of a COIN operation is measured by the ability to wait for an insurgency to die out. The ability to neutralize the effectiveness of the insurgency, taking away the ability of the insurgents to fight, disrupts or cause political influence on the populations. In order for the insurgency to be waited out, requires major time and patients. That is something Americans do not have IMHO, and something that cannot be expected to receive with the use of major conventional forces. (It’s one thing to have a few ODA’s rotating in and out; it’s another to have 80k troops doing that).

3. It’s been pretty clear to me that the road to success is not nation building but cultural acceptance on our part. We cannot and will not be able to change the world; however we can change our selves. I think this area should be explored more vs the “nation building” ideology we currently use. However, I doubt that Americans will have the ability to come to a level of acceptance that allows for AQ, and their many counter parts. Thus bringing me back to the kinetic warfare “counterterrorism” to eliminate these threats, you can’t build enough schools and police check points to make those guys happy (and they don’t give two shits about anything we do for the populous).

4. I think that there is a major disconnect it what is being called an insurgency and what is being rolled up under the insurgency umbrella in Iraq and Afghanistan. As I stated before Iraq I do not believe had a true insurgency, I believe it was more of a civil war and a terrorist network AQ-Iraq. I believe Afghanistan has an insurgency the TB, but I do not think AQ falls under that same umbrella. The importance of understanding the difference is that in Afghanistan the TB is the area where I believe COIN should be applied by SF/PSY/CA. However AQ is where CT or whatever you want to call it (Kinetic warfare) should be applied. The same way that in Iraq we applied more CT towards the AQ (Iranians in my old A/O) and applied more of a COIN type doctrine with the Mahdi militia.

JJ, I appreciate your clearing some things up and please don’t take it as me arguing your expertise in the matter. I by no means have any form of the experience/expertise you have and I am well aware of that. I am only try to point out my views and my understandings however twisted they be, so that I can gain a better understanding on all aspects.
Thanks all who are putting forth their opinions and Idea’s, I am picking things up here and there. ;)