Highly recommend this article (really a book, it’s a long read): http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1269
I think the general strategic thoughts on Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan fall into two camps:
I’ve always leaned toward the second argument. Dr. Mason’s article is a powerful case for #1 – the wars were unwinnable from the start.
Despite his conclusions I still thought there were a number of valuable insights for proponents of view #2. Specifically the recognition we were fighting a civil war and choosing sides. The strategic implication to me is that you could have chosen the correct side – especially since in Iraq and Afghanistan their civil wars easily had more than just two sides.
I thought the first part of section I (security force ratios and failures of the ANSF) was not as strong as the other two. While both were factual the significant differences in terrain and enemy capabilities made the comparisons less applicable than the other sections in my view. I think you can find better arguments against the ANSF and GIROA in other articles. However, the second half of part I (the historical summary) was one of the best I’ve seen – really places the Afghan conflict in the proper historical perspective in a fairly short period of text. I don’t think I’ve seen it done better in another book.
Similarly, I thought the first part of section II relied too heavily on anecdotal evidence in the first part – but rebounded to be insightful and strategically cogent in later portions of the section. The clear delineation of state-building and nation-building is a point I think is continuously absent from our COIN paradigms. Similarly, I think the critical point that armies flow from states – not the other way around – puts our 3-24 nonsense in the failed ideas bin conclusively. The year-by-year analysis of Afghanistan’s future should serve as a primer to anyone executing strategic intelligence assessments.
Part III I thought made an excellent case for national policy-makers but the advice was less clear-cut for the military. While one would hope the military is not tasked to execute strategically unsound missions I don’t think that’s born out by experience. I think the military needs to look very hard at our doctrine and capabilities for a solution to the inevitable problem of restoring order or at least diminishing threats in failed or semi-failed states.
If you don’t have the time to read the whole text – just read the foreword, end of part II (year by year prediction), and appendices. This is a great read offering up some powerful points you need to address to have fully formed views on the war in Afghanistan.
I think the general strategic thoughts on Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan fall into two camps:
- The wars were an unwinnable strategic mistake. They should never have been initiated as failure was always inevitable
- The wars were winnable but bad strategy, leadership, tactics, etc. caused us to lose those wars. If the wars had been properly executed they could have been won.
I’ve always leaned toward the second argument. Dr. Mason’s article is a powerful case for #1 – the wars were unwinnable from the start.
Despite his conclusions I still thought there were a number of valuable insights for proponents of view #2. Specifically the recognition we were fighting a civil war and choosing sides. The strategic implication to me is that you could have chosen the correct side – especially since in Iraq and Afghanistan their civil wars easily had more than just two sides.
I thought the first part of section I (security force ratios and failures of the ANSF) was not as strong as the other two. While both were factual the significant differences in terrain and enemy capabilities made the comparisons less applicable than the other sections in my view. I think you can find better arguments against the ANSF and GIROA in other articles. However, the second half of part I (the historical summary) was one of the best I’ve seen – really places the Afghan conflict in the proper historical perspective in a fairly short period of text. I don’t think I’ve seen it done better in another book.
Similarly, I thought the first part of section II relied too heavily on anecdotal evidence in the first part – but rebounded to be insightful and strategically cogent in later portions of the section. The clear delineation of state-building and nation-building is a point I think is continuously absent from our COIN paradigms. Similarly, I think the critical point that armies flow from states – not the other way around – puts our 3-24 nonsense in the failed ideas bin conclusively. The year-by-year analysis of Afghanistan’s future should serve as a primer to anyone executing strategic intelligence assessments.
Part III I thought made an excellent case for national policy-makers but the advice was less clear-cut for the military. While one would hope the military is not tasked to execute strategically unsound missions I don’t think that’s born out by experience. I think the military needs to look very hard at our doctrine and capabilities for a solution to the inevitable problem of restoring order or at least diminishing threats in failed or semi-failed states.
If you don’t have the time to read the whole text – just read the foreword, end of part II (year by year prediction), and appendices. This is a great read offering up some powerful points you need to address to have fully formed views on the war in Afghanistan.
