How to Fix the Army

[Marauder06]

Second part in the series:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/post...de_4_star_slots_and_end_the_regimental_system

Institutional

• Downgrade all Army general-level commands to LTG commands. CSA and VCSA would be only 4-star generals in the Army. Army Generals serving in COCOMs could be 4-star. Doing so would help empower the CSA as the commander of the Army. The Army is roughly 60 percent the size it was in the Cold War, but with near-same institutional structure and greater rank structure. If there is concern that 3-star corps commanders could not work for 3-star major commanders, it worked well in WWII. There just needs to be a pecking order of 3-star generals. They will know and they will understand and being the professionals they are they will work together. This would greatly assist in streamlining the Army structure. For every star there is a needed staff of military and civilians to provide staff work. This reduction would greatly streamline the Army and would make it more efficient, taking out layers of bureaucracy.
• Downgrade existing Army special staff billets from LTG to MG, example Dir Army budget to MG, etc. Leave principle Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 to G8 alone. Other services may have to do same in order for Army to compete in the Pentagon.
• Now that the National Guard Bureau has a 4 star seat on the JCS, insist that the NG replace "U.S. Army" on the uniform with "Guardsman." They are now close to the 6th service. As such, reduce or eliminate Title 10 support to the NG. All NG budgetary and personnel issues should be Title 32.
• Refer to Soldiers by rank and not pay grade, not all Sergeants are Sergeants; PV1/2 are Privates, SSGs are Staff Sergeant, MSGs are Master Sergeant, etc, and LTCs are Lt Colonel and Colonel (06) are Colonel. Refer to no one as a pay grade. It is disrespectful to do so. No professional wants to be called by or referred to as a pay grade.
• Expedite soldier valorous awards so that heroism is recognized rapidly. Over three years to award a MoH is absolutely ridiculous, especially in this information age with fast moving communications. Sgt. Basilone, WWII USMC, along with three others, received his MoH 7 months after his action while still serving in the area of operations and they had no internet. The latest USMC award of the MoH took two years to approve. Even that is too long. If it is the veracity of the action that they are concerned about, I think history will tell you that war stories get more questionable with age. Go with the witness statements at the time of the action, not months later. They will be more accurate.
• Assess the necessity for the manning of the Acquisition Corps (AC) with senior officers as is currently staffed. May be wrong here but the AC seems terribly top heavy. This must be a product of industry only wanting to deal with GOs or senior officers, otherwise lower level officers could easily accomplish the task. Do all those contracting GOs count in the AC and what do contracting commands command?
• Acquisition Corps (AC) officers should not be the requirements generators for developing systems. A tanker should develop a new tank rather than an AC officer who wears Infantry brass from a long ago experience. An AC officer wearing MI brass should not be the principle developer for Infantry weapons systems. There are many, many examples of how this should not be done. Knowledge and hands-on experience are the key ingredient in developing new materiel, not knowledge of programmatics. Build in the programmatic experts into the system but not at the requirements generation level.
• What does the regimental system do for our Army? Either give it a function or eliminate it. It means little to most Soldiers. Only value I see is to give some old General, Colonel or Sergeant Major some honorary position in his waning time.
• Since 75th Ranger Regiment is not an Infantry Regiment do not allow Infantry personnel in that organization to declare 75th Infantry as a regimental affiliation. But, if we eliminate the Regimental system from a personnel perspective, don't have to worry about this. This may only be applicable to officers as most enlisted men in 75th Ranger Regiment stay in that organization until they are very senior.
• Re-instill drill and ceremonies so that units can at least have confidence in unit abilities to conduct a pass in review at ceremonies. Oh, and when supervised properly, it is a tremendous discipline builder and junior NCO developer, but most officers don't know that. It is a great way to instill confidence in NCOs and discipline in Soldiers. A lost trade I think . . . unfortunately, and still needed.
• Settle on a uniform set and let it alone. There are great frustrations in the Army the last several years over this. In particular, the combat uniform has seen 4 versions in 10 years and they still can't get it right. The dress uniform is a real joke, especially the Class B uniform. Even the GOs gripe about it. 2 CSAs agocould have stopped it but he did not. His predecessor made so many horrific decisions about everything, especially uniforms, that the Army has been unstable ever since. I guess the bottom line on uniforms is there are no standards. Think CSA Dempsey was on his way to fix all those items but he was there only a very short time. He would have fixed it.

 

[Brill]

• Now that the National Guard Bureau has a 4 star seat on the JCS, insist that the NG replace "U.S. Army" on the uniform with "Guardsman." They are now close to the 6th service. As such, reduce or eliminate Title 10 support to the NG. All NG budgetary and personnel issues should be Title 32.

WHAT
THE
PHUK
?

 

[DA SWO]

Mech is Armored, no real difference really. Stryker's are nice and fast, but the Bradley offeres alot more capability in protecting the ground forces, and sustained fire support.

That's why I said do away with Mech and just make them Armored Divisions.

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

That's why I said do away with Mech and just make them Armored Divisions.

I guess, Mech is Armor; the divisions are no different as far as I am aware of. I thought you meant get rid of Mech Infantry (i.e. Bradley or APC), and that was why I responded the way I did. The term “Mech” is normally used to describe armor mounted Infantry or Cav scouts (i.e. you ask what kind of infantry unit were you in? I would say I was Mechanized “Mech” Infantry in 1st Cav, etc). I don't see why they could not do away with the term "Mech" though, I am sure a few former paratroopers assigned to 1st Cav would appreciate it. lol It's like filth rolling off their tung when they state "Mech" lmao.

 

[DA SWO]

Responses in the article.
1st-Why is this in Foreign Policy, that's like AUSA printing a paper on making the State Department relevant.
2-What is his backgrouns vis-a-vis the Army?

Second part in the series:

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/post...de_4_star_slots_and_end_the_regimental_system

Institutional

• Downgrade all Army general-level commands to LTG commands. CSA and VCSA would be only 4-star generals in the Army. Army Generals serving in COCOMs could be 4-star. Doing so would help empower the CSA as the commander of the Army. The Army is roughly 60 percent the size it was in the Cold War, but with near-same institutional structure and greater rank structure. If there is concern that 3-star corps commanders could not work for 3-star major commanders, it worked well in WWII. There just needs to be a pecking order of 3-star generals. They will know and they will understand and being the professionals they are they will work together. This would greatly assist in streamlining the Army structure. For every star there is a needed staff of military and civilians to provide staff work. This reduction would greatly streamline the Army and would make it more efficient, taking out layers of bureaucracy.

Agree, except for Theater Commanders; those are Joint Billets and should remain as a 4-Star. Again, do away with either the numbered Armies or Numbered Corps Hq's.

• Downgrade existing Army special staff billets from LTG to MG, example Dir Army budget to MG, etc. Leave principle Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 to G8 alone. Other services may have to do same in order for Army to compete in the Pentagon.

Agree, but all the downgrading have to be adopted DoD wide (like the last downgrade pushed through by (former) Sec Def Gates.

• Now that the National Guard Bureau has a 4 star seat on the JCS, insist that the NG replace "U.S. Army" on the uniform with "Guardsman." They are now close to the 6th service. As such, reduce or eliminate Title 10 support to the NG. All NG budgetary and personnel issues should be Title 32.

Disagree-Total Force works because we all meet the same standard, plus NGB has more political pull then DA, and DA/DAF would lose battles on a daily basis. Further more, Title 10 is the go to war title, title 32 Soldiers/Airmen assume Title 10 status when performing DoD missions. FWIW-That 4 Star Seat is a non voting seat (like being a Representative from DC or PR).

• Refer to Soldiers by rank and not pay grade, not all Sergeants are Sergeants; PV1/2 are Privates, SSGs are Staff Sergeant, MSGs are Master Sergeant, etc, and LTCs are Lt Colonel and Colonel (06) are Colonel. Refer to no one as a pay grade. It is disrespectful to do so. No professional wants to be called by or referred to as a pay grade.

Agree, AF could implement this too.

• Expedite soldier valorous awards so that heroism is recognized rapidly. Over three years to award a MoH is absolutely ridiculous, especially in this information age with fast moving communications. Sgt. Basilone, WWII USMC, along with three others, received his MoH 7 months after his action while still serving in the area of operations and they had no internet. The latest USMC award of the MoH took two years to approve. Even that is too long. If it is the veracity of the action that they are concerned about, I think history will tell you that war stories get more questionable with age. Go with the witness statements at the time of the action, not months later. They will be more accurate.
• Agree, but I am concerned that a mandated timeline would result in downgrades rather then approvals. . This has become a Company Level or below fight, and the guys in charge have a hard time not being "in the fight". I also think the Military as a whole have no clue what above and beyond means. The Award System is soo broken that mediocrity gets the same end of tour as the stellar performer. The system is geared towards the FOBBIT, and not the guys/gals actually pulling triggers.
• Assess the necessity for the manning of the Acquisition Corps (AC) with senior officers as is currently staffed. May be wrong here but the AC seems terribly top heavy. Probably is, for the reason stated in the next sentence. This must be a product of industry only wanting to deal with GOs or senior officers, (you think the President of Boeing wants to deal with a Captain or Major?) otherwise lower level officers could easily accomplish the task. Do all those contracting GOs count in the AC and what do contracting commands command? Contracting Commands command the Soldiers that serve in those organization, silly statement that detracts from the article.
• Acquisition Corps (AC) officers should not be the requirements generators for developing systems. A tanker should develop a new tank rather than an AC officer who wears Infantry brass from a long ago experience. An AC officer wearing MI brass should not be the principle developer for Infantry weapons systems. There are many, many examples of how this should not be done. Knowledge and hands-on experience are the key ingredient in developing new materiel, not knowledge of programmatics. Build in the programmatic experts into the system but not at the requirements generation level. I doubt if AC Officers develop requirements, AF AC Officers put requirements to paper, requirements that come from the operational AF. I seriously doubt that the operational Army isn't involved in stateing requirements that the AC Officers then put out as RFP's. Further more, the Branch Insignia is not that relevant; the real power brokers are the DA Civilians (GS/SES types) that run the system. Uniformed Soldiers serve as managers, not doers. The people at the various Test Commands are (or should be) responsible for designing a Test Matrix that determines if a system meets the mission requirements. Faulty testing=faulty gear.
• What does the regimental system do for our Army? Either give it a function or eliminate it. It means little to most Soldiers. Only value I see is to give some old General, Colonel or Sergeant Major some honorary position in his waning time. I must associate with some strange people then, my former/retired friends are proud of the Regiments they served in, so I don't understand this. Ask former members of the 173 Abn Bde if they are pround of their Regiment.
• Since 75th Ranger Regiment is not an Infantry Regiment do not allow Infantry personnel in that organization to declare 75th Infantry as a regimental affiliation. But, if we eliminate the Regimental system from a personnel perspective, don't have to worry about this. This may only be applicable to officers as most enlisted men in 75th Ranger Regiment stay in that organization until they are very senior. ??? Penis Envy?
• Re-instill drill and ceremonies so that units can at least have confidence in unit abilities to conduct a pass in review at ceremonies. Oh, and when supervised properly, it is a tremendous discipline builder and junior NCO developer, but most officers don't know that. It is a great way to instill confidence in NCOs and discipline in Soldiers. A lost trade I think . . . unfortunately, and still needed. ???, Traditions are important, except the Regimental Tradition? D&C is a great garrison/peacetime activity, but concentrate on go to war.
• Settle on a uniform set and let it alone. There are great frustrations in the Army the last several years over this. In particular, the combat uniform has seen 4 versions in 10 years and they still can't get it right. The dress uniform is a real joke, especially the Class B uniform. Even the GOs gripe about it. 2 CSAs agocould have stopped it but he did not. (Which CSA is he talking about?) His predecessor made so many horrific decisions about everything, especially uniforms, that the Army has been unstable ever since. I guess the bottom line on uniforms is there are no standards. Think CSA Dempsey (?? Funny, guy says we need to address people by Rank and not Pay Grade, then refers to GEN Dempsey as CSA Dempsey) was on his way to fix all those items but he was there only a very short time. He would have fixed it.

 

[DA SWO]

Ouch!
AFA E-mail this morning said the Guard was getting a seat at the JCS Table. Bad move by NGB, avoidable had DA and DAF treated the Guard?reserve as full players.

 

[reed11b]

While there are some good points in this article, and several not so good ones, my main disappointment is that he fails to acknowledge the BIG challenges the Army has. Those challenges are Personnel system, Readiness, Training and Acquisition. The Army’s failures on these issues stem from a WWII manning philosophy and a belief that it is actually even possible to be both 100% deployable and 100% trained. There are several others who have approached these issues in writing far better than I ever could, but basically, when you constantly have new personnel ETSing, or off at individual schools and you bring in new equipment piecemeal, a unit never gets far beyond rehashing basic skills.
I really like the idea of bigger brigades working on a rotational readiness plan. X months on train up. During this time personnel are locked into the unit (unit should be over strength) and promotions are merit and ability based. In other words the team leader at the beginning of the train up may be a rifleman by the end of it, if he is not capable of doing the job. Same for officers. This is followed by X months of on alert/deployment. Again personnel are locked in. The rotation ends with X months of rest/refit. This is the time when new personnel can be brought in, current member can elect to leave for advancement opportunities or for perceived better work environments, individuals go to schools, etc. This will allow units to be far better at their mission tasks and provide a much better work environment for soldiers and soldier families.
I like longer initial training and I like more UNIT training and less individual training. I know the theory is train the trainer, but how many of you have served in units were somebody has been offered schools as a reward, and they never bring much of that skill set back to the unit? And offering airborne school to a new private in a NG mechanized unit as a licky-chewie is beyond retarded and a waste of training. money, period.
Acquisition changes are better addressed by folks smarter than me.
Reed
P.S. If the above bloggers comment on the NG were to ever come to reality, the rumbling noise you would hear would be the mass exodus of the NG. Also, perhaps he fails to realize that the Army reserve has NO combat units.