Japanese Threat To Oceania

[pardus]

Brushing some cobwebs off this thread!

I'm really glad to see the USA and NZ exercising together again!
When I was last in NZ I was told by several people how they had armed US Soldiers patrolling the streets of the city I'm from during a large international exercise there.

I'd be remiss to not mention that despite the falling out in the 80's, NZ still remains the USA's base for Antarctic operations.

 

[Flagg]

I've seen some US uniforms about in the last year, 2 of my guys got the chance to jump in on an EX up north about 12-18 months ago with the USMC and had some good training, got a lift in an Osprey, TXT'd from the Marines ranges about how big and awesome they were, and had an even better time out and about on local leave.

The only "bad" thing I heard was one of the RF fellas(amongst a section that was up for the same EX) jokingly complaining about being stuck in the worst spot of an overstuffed Marine amphibious vehicle by a broken exhaust and everyone taking the piss out of him because it turned him black.

I've also seen some bling on the walls that tells me even though we weren't tight in some ways, we were discretely carrying on in other ways. ;)

The best bit for me personally was taking the family to see the "Battle of the Bands" tour between USMC Band, Pacific going up against the NZ Army band.

Awesome…..especially the part where the 3 war Marine(WWII, Korea, Vietnam) widower who married a Kiwi lady and has lived in NZ for a long time was treated like a rock star by the Marines in their dress blues.

Great show they put on(and an even better marketing/advertising/hearts&minds effort) to signify the changing relationship.

There's a bit the USMC Band does where they come to attention before playing that is SO snappy the whole crowd goes "ooooOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOoooooo". :)

The show I attended was a packed house of about 600 and everyone left with a raging case of Semper Fi.

Good stuff.

 

[AWP]

While Australia and New Zealand were without a doubt vital both to the US Navy and the outcome of the rest of the war, the testimony of Japanese officers are very clear that the reason the Japanese Navy did not invade prior to Coral Sea conflict was because of the reach of the B-17 bombers- which could potentially complicate the desired invasion or even cripple it, and the greater urgency for the Japanese command to consolidate and defensively fortify the islands they had already taken. Thus the invasion of Australia was not viable, and the plans were shelved.
In summary, it seems plainly clear, both through circumstantial evidence vis-à-vis the extensive preparation and groundwork, and also through testimonial evidence after the war, that what prevented the invasion from coming to fruition was the offensive threat of the American carrier forces.

If we're going to necrothread...

Reading Shattered Sword recently, the invasion of Australia was covered by the authors. Some points:
- The Japanese advance was faster than they planned and so they hadn't seriously considered what to do afteer Java and Malaysia fell.
- The Japanese Army and Navy couldn't agree on a strategy. The Army started the war in China and was loathe to pull any men from that theater. The Navy's Special Landing Teams (analogous to our Marines) were small in number.
- Thus the Army didn't have the manpower to conquer Australia and actively blocked the Navy's efforts to expand the war. They lacked the manpower and logistics. Japan neglected to build a tanker and cargo fleet. Even a win at Midway wouldn't allow them to invade Midway or sustain a force even if they could capture the island. Australia would be no different.
- The compromise of invading PNG was reached, but the Army wasn't enthusiastic about the plan because it was focused on China and the IJN on the US Navy. That, along with some arrogance or "victory disease" on the part of the Japanese, led to the Battle of the Coral Sea and invasion of PNG.
- Coral Sea was a disater for the IJN. The loss of a light carrier was inconsequential, but the damage to Carrier Division 5 (Shokaku and Zuikaku, the IJN's newest and largest carriers) reduced Kido Butai's offensive power at Midway.
- Yamamoto wasn't the genius we think him to be. He made several critical strategic and tactical errors, the Navy's participation in Coral Sea among them.
- The B-17's effectiveness was greatly overstated by the Japanese. In practice, using a B-17 in an anti-shipping role is pure folly. Of all of the bombers at Midway, the B-17's scored zero hits against IJN carriers, even when attacking from below 3,000 feet. One was low enough it strafed a carrier and killed a few of the exposed anti-aircraft crews. Bomb damage though was zero. The 5th AF's medium bombers were the real threat, particularly once they adopted skip bombing and "gunship" versions of the B-25 and A-20.
- Australia wasn't seriously considered by the Japanese Army because of manpower and logitical issues. Hindsight's 20/20, but the threat to Australia was more our creation than actual fact. The best the Japanese could hope for was to maybe occupy a slice of Australia, but even the Army could see that wasn't feasible. Rather, occupying PNG, Somoa, Fiji, etc. would allow them to isolate Australia.
- Because of the divide between the Army and Navy, the Japanese esentially fought two wars in the Pacific.

 

[JBS]

If we're going to necrothread...

Reading Shattered Sword recently, the invasion of Australia was covered by the authors. Some points:
- The Japanese advance was faster than they planned and so they hadn't seriously considered what to do afteer Java and Malaysia fell.
- The Japanese Army and Navy couldn't agree on a strategy. The Army started the war in China and was loathe to pull any men from that theater. The Navy's Special Landing Teams (analogous to our Marines) were small in number.
- Thus the Army didn't have the manpower to conquer Australia and actively blocked the Navy's efforts to expand the war. They lacked the manpower and logistics. Japan neglected to build a tanker and cargo fleet. Even a win at Midway wouldn't allow them to invade Midway or sustain a force even if they could capture the island. Australia would be no different.
- The compromise of invading PNG was reached, but the Army wasn't enthusiastic about the plan because it was focused on China and the IJN on the US Navy. That, along with some arrogance or "victory disease" on the part of the Japanese, led to the Battle of the Coral Sea and invasion of PNG.
- Coral Sea was a disater for the IJN. The loss of a light carrier was inconsequential, but the damage to Carrier Division 5 (Shokaku and Zuikaku, the IJN's newest and largest carriers) reduced Kido Butai's offensive power at Midway.
- Yamamoto wasn't the genius we think him to be. He made several critical strategic and tactical errors, the Navy's participation in Coral Sea among them.
- The B-17's effectiveness was greatly overstated by the Japanese. In practice, using a B-17 in an anti-shipping role is pure folly. Of all of the bombers at Midway, the B-17's scored zero hits against IJN carriers, even when attacking from below 3,000 feet. One was low enough it strafed a carrier and killed a few of the exposed anti-aircraft crews. Bomb damage though was zero. The 5th AF's medium bombers were the real threat, particularly once they adopted skip bombing and "gunship" versions of the B-25 and A-20.
- Australia wasn't seriously considered by the Japanese Army because of manpower and logitical issues. Hindsight's 20/20, but the threat to Australia was more our creation than actual fact. The best the Japanese could hope for was to maybe occupy a slice of Australia, but even the Army could see that wasn't feasible. Rather, occupying PNG, Somoa, Fiji, etc. would allow them to isolate Australia.
- Because of the divide between the Army and Navy, the Japanese esentially fought two wars in the Pacific.

Very, very interesting post. Two things I take away:

1. the actual threat to Australia and NZ can be argued as authentic, or as a creation of American propaganda. The author of Shattered Sword holds the opinion that threats were exaggerated or altogether American propaganda. I'm persuaded otherwise. Exaggerated- perhaps- but still authentic.

2. "That, along with some arrogance or "victory disease" on the part of the Japanese..." I find that phrase very interesting and I'd love to read more about the role of hubris in the formation and success rates of military strategy. I wonder where we draw the line between "audacious / daring" and arrogance. I'd suspect the difference is going to be (as some here would automatically reply) the quality of - and ability to analyze- intelligence.

Could make a great thread.

 

[AWP]

Very, very interesting post. Two things I take away:

1. the actual threat to Australia and NZ can be argued as authentic, or as a creation of American propaganda. The author of Shattered Sword holds the opinion that threats were exaggerated or altogether American propaganda. I'm persuaded otherwise. Exaggerated- perhaps- but still authentic.

2. "That, along with some arrogance or "victory disease" on the part of the Japanese..." I find that phrase very interesting and I'd love to read more about the role of hubris in the formation and success rates of military strategy. I wonder where we draw the line between "audacious / daring" and arrogance. I'd suspect the difference is going to be (as some here would automatically reply) the quality of - and ability to analyze- intelligence.

Could make a great thread.

The threat to Austalia seemed real enough at the time. Until May 1942 the Japanese went wherever and did whatever they wanted. The Army knew it couldn't take or hold the continent; it lacked the manpower. Any Japanese designs on Australia were by staff officers or wishful thinking, but no serious plans were ever considered. The Japanese had no real strategy for post Java/ Malaysia, so from Coral Sea/ PNG onward they were making it up as they went along.

"Victory disease" was used by the authors of Shattered Sword, but I'm unsure if that phrase is used elsewhere. The Japanese had done what it set out to do and believed they were unstoppable. Despite the Philippines taking longer and more manpower than it planned, the Japanese military still had this belief that its troops were unbeatable. This partially explains their tactics on Guadalcanal. Some IJN estimates even thought up to 5 US carriers would be present at Midway, yet the Japanese sent 4. They simply had no concept of defeat because they had never lost.

 

[Gunz]

..."Victory disease" was used by the authors of Shattered Sword, but I'm unsure if that phrase is used elsewhere. The Japanese had done what it set out to do and believed they were unstoppable. Despite the Philippines taking longer and more manpower than it planned, the Japanese military still had this belief that its troops were unbeatable. This partially explains their tactics on Guadalcanal. Some IJN estimates even thought up to 5 US carriers would be present at Midway, yet the Japanese sent 4. They simply had no concept of defeat because they had never lost....

The Japanese had a lot of strange notions about fighting that stemmed from Bushido, the samurai warrior's code. And it screwed them up. For instance, they neglected to provide sufficient escorts for their convoys (the lifeline of any island nation) because escort duty was seen as demeaning; the proper place for any naval officer in the IJN was on the bridge of a warship engaged in battle. It wasn't until late in the war when US subs were decimating the Japanese merchant fleet that somebody figured it might be a good idea to swallow some of that samurai arrogance and pride. But by then it was too late.

The Marines on Guadalcanal grew contemptuous of the fighting skills of the Japanese soldier. At the Ilu river, they slaughtered the Japanese, who continued to charge across open ground, standing upright in close packed groups, screaming, waving swords. "Whoever told these dumb bastards they were soldiers?" in the famous words of one Marine...and the soldiers who were slaughtered were considered some of Japan's best. The Banzai charge...a ridiculous waste of life, a hold-over from samurai days. It had no place in an age of automatic weapons. Again, it wasn't until later in the war when the high command forbid suicidal charges and ordered defenders to dig in and fight to the last man.

And another odd trait in Japanese warfare of the period was their inflexibility...and their penchant for complicated battle plans that required synchronized maneuver on the part of numerous elements, plans that looked brilliant on paper but had no chance in hell of coming off because they tended to neglect basic tactical and logistical considerations. Terrain. Weather. Communications. Ammo. Food. And once things started to unravel, their rigid adherence to doctrine prevented them from improvising and adapting to a rapidly changing battlefield.

 

[AWP]

The Japanese had a lot of strange notions about fighting that stemmed from Bushido, the samurai warrior's code. And it screwed them up. For instance, they neglected to provide sufficient escorts for their convoys (the lifeline of any island nation) because escort duty was seen as demeaning; the proper place for any naval officer in the IJN was on the bridge of a warship engaged in battle. It wasn't until late in the war when US subs were decimating the Japanese merchant fleet that somebody figured it might be a good idea to swallow some of that samurai arrogance and pride. But by then it was too late.

The Marines on Guadalcanal grew contemptuous of the fighting skills of the Japanese soldier. At the Ilu river, they slaughtered the Japanese, who continued to charge across open ground, standing upright in close packed groups, screaming, waving swords. "Whoever told these dumb bastards they were soldiers?" in the famous words of one Marine...and the soldiers who were slaughtered were considered some of Japan's best. The Banzai charge...a ridiculous waste of life, a hold-over from samurai days. It had no place in an age of automatic weapons. Again, it wasn't until later in the war when the high command forbid suicidal charges and ordered defenders to dig in and fight to the last man.

And another odd trait in Japanese warfare of the period was their inflexibility...and their penchant for complicated battle plans that required synchronized maneuver on the part of numerous elements, plans that looked brilliant on paper but had no chance in hell of coming off because they tended to neglect basic tactical and logistical considerations. Terrain. Weather. Communications. Ammo. Food. And once things started to unravel, their rigid adherence to doctrine prevented them from improvising and adapting to a rapidly changing battlefield.

You are on the money with your last paragraph. The Navy in particular was very guilty of complex plans with many moving parts. They never really learned their lesson even after Midway. Look at the naval battles around the PI in 44-45.

I disagree with your premise behind the lack of an ASW capability. While that and prestige (Why should I command a destroyer when I can command a battleship?) played a role the Japanese were guilty of other greater sins. I think foremost, and they did this throughout the war as well*, is that they projected their doctrine or capabilities upon the US. For example, the IJN considered subs to act as scouting vessels. Despite the experience of the UK (and obvious parallels to Japan), the IJN never considered convoy raiding to be a sub's main focus. They were still viewed as scouts and why worry about ASW when the enemy is sending scouts after you? They tied their hands by assuming we would use our sub force int he same manner as the IJN. Their second great failing is that they assumed the war would be short-lived, another reason they had no long term plans. You don't have to devote finite resources to ASW if the war will be over in a year. They weren't behind us in technology because they were stupid, near-sighted, buck-toothed savages, but because they believed with one or two decisive battles our will to continue the fight would crumble. Hence they didn't concernt hemselves with sonor or radar until it was too late. Radar was just entering the fleet in June 1942, though none of the ships had it at the battle, unlike the American navy. Japanese naval doctrine was built around sending a massive blow at long range, hence aircraft without armor or self-sealing fuel tanks. The IJN could launch and recover a strike before our ships could close the distance which was part of the plan.

* - We've done it too. Our historians tend to look at what the other guy did or didn't do by basing their actions on ours. Carriers in the UK, USA, and Japan were all different with different strengths and weaknesses (particularly the air groups), so we tend to assume that carrier operations are the same the world over and that isn't the case. Look at Soviet and UK carriers in the 80's when compared to the US. The former have a very limited offensive capability whereas our carriers are the backbone of our navy. Ships of the same classification don't have the same capabilities and people tend to forget that.

 

[JBS]

Just ordered Shattered Sword.

Looks like an awesome read.

 

[Gunz]

I disagree with your premise behind the lack of an ASW capability. While that and prestige (Why should I command a destroyer when I can command a battleship?) played a role the Japanese were guilty of other greater sins. I think foremost, and they did this throughout the war as well*, is that they projected their doctrine or capabilities upon the US. For example, the IJN considered subs to act as scouting vessels. Despite the experience of the UK (and obvious parallels to Japan), the IJN never considered convoy raiding to be a sub's main focus. They were still viewed as scouts and why worry about ASW when the enemy is sending scouts after you? They tied their hands by assuming we would use our sub force int he same manner as the IJN. Their second great failing is that they assumed the war would be short-lived, another reason they had no long term plans.

I probably gave too much emphasis on dignity. But as you say it did play a role. IJN sub captains were more prone to go after warships than merchant vessels or transports. I wonder what would've happened had they mounted wolfpack-style tactics on convoys to Australia and NZ?

Yamamoto, who had spent considerable time in the US, was well aware of our industrial potential. And he knew that Japan would have to deliver a crushing blow to our Navy within the first 6 months if they were to force us to the negotiating table. And that's the real delusion. The admiral was savvy enough to realize that once our industry got on a war-footing, Japan's free ride would be over--but he and many others in the IJN held on to this fantasy idea that America would want to negotiate a settlement once her naval power was crippled in the Pacific. And the easy victories Japan enjoyed from China through Singapore (Victory Disease) only helped to cloud their vision and perpetuate unrealistic assumptions. As you say, no long-term plans. They figured if they stung us bad enough we'd leave their Co-East Asia Prosperity Sphere alone and go away to fight the Germans.

(BTW Free, has Shattered Sword delved into the problems with the exploder on the American Mark 14 torpedo? The saga is akin to that of the M16 controversy of the Vietnam War.)

 

[AWP]

(BTW Free, has Shattered Sword delved into the problems with the exploder on the American Mark 14 torpedo? The saga is akin to that of the M16 controversy of the Vietnam War.)

Briefly. One of the many books I've plowed through in the last few years had a much better write-up of that saga, but I forget which one. Sword covered it enough to provide the reader with some familiarity, but not an in depth explanation.

IIRC, one somewhat ironic contribution of our sub force was an early attack led a destroyer to depth charge it. After holding the sub down, once the carriers left its area, the DD then took off at high speed to rejoin the fleet. One of our air groups spotted that ship's wake and then flew down that azimuth, thus discovering the carriers.