Okay, the idea that AD is better, more capable or more competent than NG because AD “does it full time” is not true at all IMHO. It may have been true before or at the very beginning of the war. However, over the last decade the NG has become a very capable force within the current force structure. The AD Army would not be able to go to war under our current deployment scheme without the NG. The AD Army knows they need a competent force to call on, and that is why the NG structure, training and equipment have grown so much over the past decade. Now this is geared towards conventional forces and not SOF. I lack any experience working with SOF units out side of supporting a few missions and some training aspects. Nothing of which is worth using as any form of judgment on the generalizations of capabilities between the AD or NG special ops forces. So any of you SOF guys reading this, please do not take this as my opinions about SOF or anything to do with SOF. I am speaking to the conventional side of the house….period.
Some of the issues:
Unit manning (strength/ under strength issues): is a big draw back of the NG, it primarily comes from the way the NG recruits and assigns new recruits. In the NG there is not a DEP, once you sign and swear, you are now assigned to a unit. That unit plugs you into the MTO-E and carries you as duty position filled. In other words some units would hand you a uniform and have you fall into a platoon before you ever got a ship date to BCT/AIT. In theory it is a good thing, the unit gets to prep you and make sure you are ready before you go to BCT/AIT. The other theory is that it screws up the manning rosters and shows units at strength or at deployable strength, when the unit is in fact not at strength and has several recruits who need to attend BCT/AIT before they can become a deployable asset. Another issue is broke dick 30 year E5/E6’s who hold slots trying to gain a better retirement. This is IMHO the most ate the fuck up problem in the NG, a non-deployable person holding a slot of rank, that keeps capable soldiers from being promoted and also reducing manning strength numbers when it comes time to SRP for deployment.
Training: The training NG receives is top notch, and IMHO better than most AD units get (most, not all). Over the course of the past decade, the NG was pretty damn smart. They took their returning soldiers, kept volunteers on title 10 orders to train up the next NG units to deploy. Basically each deploying unit got the most up to date, lessons learned, and TTPs. This has continued to grow into something that is just unbelievable to see. For me as someone who did the 6 month AD integration train up (sucked balls). To then come back and be one of the retuning vets training the new deploying units. To go back through a train up that had been broken down to a 52 day science and deploy, it was pure amazement. The two big events that brought me to the conclusion that NG training was better than AD was, 1) when I was tasked to go training and OC/T AD units as a NG trainer, and 2) when I got to see NG and AD training together in Kuwait and NG soldiers performances were far exceeding that of the AD soldiers. Up until 2010 (not sure if it is still happening or not) my NG/RC unit was providing designated marksman training for the 82nd Airborne Div….
Leadership: I think this is very complex and extremely hard for me to point out leadership down falls for the NG. Mainly because a lot of the problems stemming from leadership in NG are also effecting AD. I think the best way for me to break it down is by ranking:
JRNCO- I believe the NG has better E5-E6’s because they are normally older, more experienced, generally with prior service in AD or multiple deployments. They tend to bring tactical and technical proficiency than what I have seen from AD. Now this is not to discredit the AD E5/E6’s because I have met great ones in both branches, but with a generalization I have seen better junior leadership in the NG. Keep in mind, most E5/E6’s in the NG have 10-15 years experience vs the 3-9 years of AD.
SRNCO- the AD has much better senior NCO leadership IMHO. Most of the E7-E9’s I worked with in the NG were lost like a bastard on father’s day. Not all, but again with generalizations, AD has much better senior NCO’s.
JR Officers- my experience with O1-O3’s has been pretty much hit and miss. I would say that most of the PL’s were the same from AD or NG. Company CO’s was pretty much the same as well, however the best company commander I had was a AD O3, assigned to a NG company on deployment. I would say however in general the NG and AD junior officers are about even in leadership skill.
Field Grade- I’ve only had one good O5 btn commander, and that was on my first deployment. By far one of the best btn CO’s I have ever worked for. That said I would say that I have also had some run-ins with shitty O4’s on the AD side. I also have some prejudice against 3BCT 1st Cav from my first deployment. However, the Cav is hardly the unit to make a general comparison of AD. I would say that AD and NG are about even in field grade leadership; however, I think AD has better field grade officers in general.
Flag- I think both the AD and NG is ate up with stupid at this level and I don’t feel any of the star wearers on either side are worth the pay they were receiving. Excluding the very few, that tend to not make it above division command.
Capabilities: I think the NG is much better at peace keeping operations, disaster response and general security operations than their AD counterparts. I think AD has proven that they are exceptional at conducting force on force invasions, maneuver warfare and heavy armored conventional warfare. As for full spectrum warfare (COIN) I think both AD and NG conventional force suck equally at it.
My experience 1st Deployment (OIF 03-05 Full Spectrum Operations):
My battalion 1-153 INF (Light) was taken from our parent 39th Infantry Enhanced Brigade and attached to 3BCT 1st Cav. A battalion from the 3BCT was in return sent to the 39th. That’s a light NG battalion being assigned to an AD Mech Brigade, and a Mech AD battalion being assigned to a NG Light Brigade. It sounds pretty crazy and it was, but it worked out fairly well.
We (the NG battalion) started our training 6 months prior to deploying; our battalion trained under 3 BCT, following the AD training schedule. This was a total waste of time, we basically conducted all of our own training as a battalion, did not interact with 3BCT or any of the units we were supposed to work with. Imagine being a NG battalion on FT Hood, never training there, never interacting with other units there, and more or less being banished from the AD unit you were supposed to fall under. Think how difficult it is just to lay on a range when you did not have the post SOP’s, etc. Meanwhile when it came time for unit validation, our battalion validated on time and was the only unit in 3 BCT to do so (i.e. the other AD battalions had trouble validating, took longer time). Anyway, to keep this short we met all of our pre-deployment validations, did a JRTC rotation and had no issues.
As we got to our A/O in Baghdad, we started to conduct our right seat/left seat with an AD battalion from 1st Armored Div. These guys freaking hated us (NG has no business here, etc, etc). Our first tell-tell of how ate up of a unit we were replacing was a simple PCI/PCC. These AD soldier did not check their troops more than a head count, did not even have a patrol roster and our Btn CO basically refused to allow us to go out with these guys until they un-fucked themselves. That’s pretty sad, when you have a NG Btn commander telling an AD unit to get their shit right before you take his boys out on a patrol. Anyway we got through the BS and finely took over the sector. Once in place we had several issues sent up to 3BCT that were more or less turned down because the AD battalion we replaced did not do it that way. My platoon got hit with VBIED at a check point that was not hardened because of how AD did things. We took 1 KIA and 3 WIA, because the very ForcePro assessment/ recommendations we turned in 30 days prior was turned down by an AD brigade. Needless to say we (our battalion) started going around 3BCT to get things we needed, or when the AD vs NG problems put out soldiers in un-necessary jeopardy. Not the best thing to do, but about the only thing you can do when an AD brigade had no fucking clue.
Now the comparison of our NG Btn to our AD Btn counterparts during this deployment is not fair. Our Btn was better equipped due to our “enhanced brigade” status, our training was not the same and we tended to be hard charges due to the unique leadership we had in this specific Btn. Needless to say however, our Btn did perform much better than the other AD Btn’s assigned to 3BCT 1st Cav during that deployment. Some specifics:
TF 1–153rd conducted over seventy raids, 8,280 patrols and 1,440 traffic control points during its deployment, resulting in 120 insurgents captured and numerous Rocket Propelled Greanades (RPGs), explosives, and weapons captured. The task force’s effectiveness was reflected in a captured arms dealer’s refusal to bring shipments of heavy weapons into Karradah for fear of capture in one of the many traffic control points established by the task force. The task force was also responsible for securing numerous high value assets (HVAs) located in its area of responsibility, including the Japanese, South Korean, Kuwait and Polish Embassies, Baghdad University, and the World Health Organization.
In June 2004, the task force participated in a cordon and search operation which resulted in the discovery and disarming of a large improvised explosive device (IED) emplaced to kill the Japanese Charge d ‘Affairs, and the capture of the individuals responsible for its emplacement. In January 2005, the task force responded to a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI) headquarters. The attack resulted in thirteen dead and over fifty wounded Iraqi civilians. Company A and the task force Quick Reaction Force (QRF) cordoned the area against further attack and immediately began rendering aid to wounded Iraqis. The task force later assisted SCIRI as they conducted a force protection assessment and emplaced barriers to harden the facility. Mr. Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, the head of the party later thanked General Casey for the task force’s quick response and assistance. In total, the task force was attacked by twelve VBIEDs, twenty seven IEDs, forty seven indirect fire attacks, and fifty three attacks by small arms.
C/1-153 IN also conducted numerous combat operations on Haifa Street in Zone 8S that resulted in the capture of 114 insurgents, and numerous RPGs, mortars, and explosives. The battalion also trained Company A, 302nd Battalion of the Iraqi National Guard to company proficiency. Company A, 302d later acquitted itself well in intense, sustained combat operations on Haifa Street. The task force also implemented over $5.6 million in community improvement projects and projects to restore essential services in Karradah. The money was spent to provide the greatest economic stimulus possible to the Karradah District and resulted in the creation of over 2,000 temporary jobs.
TF 1-153 INF captured six division targets and contained or disrupted fifteen Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks in their sector. The battalion worked to suppress indirect fire attacks on the International Zone during the Transfer of Iraqi Sovereignty and weekly Iraqi National Congress meetings. The 1–153rd commander, LTC Kendall Penn also worked closely with the Karahda District Counsel to oversee over six million dollars of infrastructure and community improvement projects in the battalion's area of operations.
Not to damn shabby for a bunch of weekend warriors… We were the only NG Btn to be awarded the Presidential Maritoriues Unit Citation out of our Brigade. That’s not to say much, but being the bastard NG child of an AD BCT, it was at least something.
Some other little tid-bits, many of our guys to include myself were put in for several awards B Star with V and S Star, non of of them being approved except for our KIA’s. Meanwhile, many of the AD soldiers in other Btn’s received B & S Stars for actions not as significant. AD commanders keeping less capabale NG soldiers in their place maybe? That’s another topic I am not going to get into, it is what it is…
I can go on and on and on, I’ve trained both NG and AD soldiers, I have served under both NG and AD units, I have gone through the ringer for my country as a National Guard Soldier and anyone who wants to call me less capable than or say my service was less effective than an AD soldier can kiss my ass.
