Operation Barbarossa 1941, Germany's Defensive Campaign in the East...?

[pardus]

I have just found out about the planned Soviet invasion of western Europe in 1941 "Operation Groza".

This is fascinating and goes against everything I have previously heard. But does answer a couple of questions, i.e. why did Hitler invade Russia 2 years before the Wehrmacht was fully prepared for a major war.
It also raises very interesting questions, was Rudolf Hess's fight to the UK done in order to convince/warn the British that Stalin was about to invade Europe and Germany had to react, and needed the British to come to a peace agreement with Germany. Hitler knew a war on two fronts was a no go, but he did it anyway. Does this new evidence explain why?

‘The Nazi command succeeded in forestalling our troops literally two weeks before the war began.’ General S. P. Ivanov, Chief of the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR, 1974.

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v20/v20n6p59_Michaels.html



This is Viktor Suvorov's book presentation at the United States Naval Academy on October 7, 2009.

In Hitler's talk here (Amazing recording BTW!) in around the 6:50 mark he states that "Molotov departed with the decision to begin a war" and "the demands that man brought up were clearly aimed to rule, Europe in the end"

 

[Gunz]

It is fascinating.

 

[AWP]

I have to find to concept of Russia attacking Germany to be a bit humorous. I'll watch the videos later, but given the state of Russia's military at that time and the narrow front on which Germany would have to fight I question the efficacy of such an invasion. The one plus is that Germany wouldn't make the grand encirclements and mass surrender possible so the Soviets would have more men...and maybe an issue of fuel reserves. The Air Force would still be massacred. With a few exceptions their tanks were inferior. Red leadership was still decimated and the personalities who led the Soviet Army were unknown quantities. The Soviets would have to steamroll the Germans through numbers alone otherwise the inevitable German counterattack would be as bad as the initial invasion. It may have been counterproductive because if Germany's on the defensive it would mobilize the entire nation and really kick production into overdrive.

 

[Gunz]

Hitler used a supposed imminent invasion of Germany by the Soviets as his pretense for Barbarossa, much as he used similar pretences for his past aggressions. That was his standard MO. Given the mistrust between Germany and the Soviets, and the Soviets and everybody else, Zhukov and his staff probably had plans in the files for war with Hitler, but I don't think the Soviets were near to being able to implement it. If it had been as imminent as this theory suggests, you'd think Russian forces along the border wouldn't have crumbled quite as quickly as they did.

As far as Hitler giving the go before the Wehrmacht was fully prepared, he'd just conquered Western Europe in record time and had no reason to fear a counterattack from that direction, not for a year or two. And flushed as he and his General's were with over-confidence, he decided to gamble on surprise to help this massive operation in the East. And it almost succeded.

I think some Russian historians would like to revision the events of the summer of '41 and that may be a motive behind some of this. Their struggle to endure and eventually overcome the German invaders is epic enough, I think, to eclipse any shame they might feel over having been caught with their pants down.

 

[AWP]

FWIW, Wiki has an interesting section on Zhukov's page:

From 2 February, as the Chief of the General Staff, and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Zhukov took part in drawing up the "Strategic plan for deploying of the Soviet Union in the case of war with Germany and its allies."[24] The plan was completed no later than 15 May 1941. In this document, one paragraph states:
Germany is mobilizing most of its army to the border and actively building its reserves. That fact warns us that a surprise attack may take place. In order to prevent this, I suggest it is necessary to take the strategic initiative against the Third Reich in any case, including forestalling the enemy and deploying a pre-emptive offensive against the German units when we definitely verify the time when they will attack. We must ensure they have no time to prepare in order to create an advantage in combat power.[citation needed]

Some researchers conclude that, on 14 May, Soviet Minister of Defense Semyon Timoshenko and Zhukov suggested to Joseph Stalin a preemptive attack against Germany through Southern Poland. Soviet forces would occupy the Vistula Border and continue to Katowice or even Berlin (should the main German armies retreat), or the Baltic coast (should German forces not retreat and be forced to protect Poland and East Prussia). The attacking Soviets were supposed to reach Siedlce, Deblin, and then capture Warsaw before penetrating toward the southwest and imposing final defeat at Lublin.[25]

Historians do not have the original documents that could verify the existence of such a plan, or whether Stalin accepted it. In a transcript of an interview on 26 May 1965, Zhukov stated that Stalin did not approve the plan. However, Zhukov did not clarify whether execution was attempted. As of 1999, no other approved plan for a Soviet attack had been found.[26]

During 1930–1940, with the approval of Soviet leaders, Soviet artists and writers created fictitious works about a Red Army invasion of German territory. Such approval may have caused a misunderstanding that the offensive had been accepted. This misunderstanding was exploited by extremists, who believed that the Soviet Union should attack. Consequently, many people argued that Stalin had ruled it out. However, the Soviet counter-blows against the German invasion seem to have been some kind of preemptive offensive deployment.[27][28] Zhukov did not mention such plans in his memoirs.[29] According to Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, the war-game defeat of Pavlov's Red Troops against Zhukov was not known widely, but the victory of Zhukov's Red Troops against Kulik was widely propagandized, thus creating a popular illusion about easy success for a preemptive offensive.[30]

Zhukov predicted that the Soviet-German war could not be avoided and that the Red Army needed to build independent motorized and tank units to satisfy the new conditions of the expected war. His suggestions, however, were not accepted by Soviet leaders. When war broke out, the harsh reality of the battlefield painfully proved the correctness of most of Zhukov's ideas about the role of tanks and motorized units in modern warfare.[31]

If the above is to be believed, a Soviet defecter, Viktor Suvorov, is the primary architect of the preemptive invasion. It almost reads like our Rainbow warplans in the US: a plan that wasn't executed and existed as a contingency. That wouldn't be uncommon at all, planning for the "what ifs."

 

[pardus]

I will be very interested in further Soviet documents being uncovered in future. Though I think they way things are going it might be optimistic to believe the Russians will allow the Soviet records to be thoroughly examined.

Hitler used a supposed imminent invasion of Germany by the Soviets as his pretense for Barbarossa, much as he used similar pretences for his past aggressions. That was his standard MO. Given the mistrust between Germany and the Soviets, and the Soviets and everybody else, Zhukov and his staff probably had plans in the files for war with Hitler, but I don't think the Soviets were near to being able to implement it. If it had been as imminent as this theory suggests, you'd think Russian forces along the border wouldn't have crumbled quite as quickly as they did.

As far as Hitler giving the go before the Wehrmacht was fully prepared, he'd just conquered Western Europe in record time and had no reason to fear a counterattack from that direction, not for a year or two. And flushed as he and his General's were with over-confidence, he decided to gamble on surprise to help this massive operation in the East. And it almost succeded.

I think some Russian historians would like to revision the events of the summer of '41 and that may be a motive behind some of this. Their struggle to endure and eventually overcome the German invaders is epic enough, I think, to eclipse any shame they might feel over having been caught with their pants down.

An offensive posture is quite different to a defensive one.
If the Soviets were in position to attack, being preempted by the Germans would've been disastrous. All of the Soviet equipment would have been forward deployed, likely not in particularly protected positions. The Soviet frontline would have been easily penetrated and encirclement and destruction of vast amounts of forward positioned troops, equipment and supplies would've been easily done.

I'm not convinced this new information is accurate, but it certain throws into question some of the "known facts" we've all excepted over the years.

 

[Gunz]

An offensive posture is quite different to a defensive one.
If the Soviets were in position to attack, being preempted by the Germans would've been disastrous. All of the Soviet equipment would have been forward deployed, likely not in particularly protected positions. The Soviet frontline would have been easily penetrated and encirclement and destruction of vast amounts of forward positioned troops, equipment and supplies would've been easily done.

I can't argue with that. :wall: It makes sense.

Still, this imminent Soviet offensive is pretty contrary to everything I've ever read. Even with years of Communist info-hoarding, it just seems unlikely to me that a plan this big, involving the better part of the Soviet Army, could have remained a secret this long.

 

[AWP]

I can't argue with that. :wall: It makes sense.

Still, this imminent Soviet offensive is pretty contrary to everything I've ever read. Even with years of Communist info-hoarding, it just seems unlikely to me that a plan this big, involving the better part of the Soviet Army, could have remained a secret this long.

If Stalin "nyeted" the idea and then suffered catastrophic losses weeks later...you'd think this Khruschev or others would out the plans as Stalin's memory/ reputation were obliterated; one more nail in the coffin. The only possible reason (minus Russian paranoia which could well be THE reason) to sit on these plans is to protect the war hero generals involved. It really wouldn't make sense years after the end of the Cold War unless we're back to saving face.

Of course, with all of the "WTF" moments in WWII, "skin of the teeth" operations and issues, this would be one drop in a large bucket.

 

[SpitfireV]

The Russians don't release anything related to anything though. They had a short period in the early 90s where they allowed access to archives but that was quickly squashed. Now nothing is released. At all.