Special ops, CIA first in, last out of Afghanistan

[goon175]

That was me, about seven, eight years ago. I was certain I'd be the only kid on my block without a combat patch, because I was sure the war(s) would be over before I could get in the game. It's funny what I thought was important when I was young.

It's funny you bring that up. I tried to get my parents to let me graduate H.S. a year early, I was convinced that if I didn't leave as soon as possible I was going to "miss the war". I also skipped hiking the Appalachian Trail before I went in as well. I was really big into backpacking and kayaking in high school, and completing the AT was gonna be my last big achievement before entering the military. I had it planned out down to the day, where my food drops were gonna be, water points, refit points, everything. Pretty much all I had to do was by the airline ticket out there. I still regret to this day not doing it, but hindsight is 20/20.

 

[AWP]

To clarify my first post: I'm not suggesting that an ODA CDR take over an infantry BN. I used that as an example to show that 18A's are perfectly capable of running a conventional unit that is OPCON'ed to them. I wouldn't expect the 18A to be involved in all of the details of a conventional unit chopped to them, but they are capable of utlizing those conventional units. It isn't like you'd chop an infantry BN to a SigO running a CSSB. You COULD, but that SigO would be so lost about the capabilities of the infantry under his/ her command as to cause problems. You wouldn't have such a restriction with an SF/ infantry marriage.

On SF "divisions": Again, I wouldn't argue to make the Groups a division-sized asset. I'm talking about the CJSOTF and really the whole war if it were scaled back to such a level. What I meant was that there have to be SF qualified GO's out there who could run the war. A two-star former 18A and two one stars under him, at least the Ops commander should be a former 18A, and then your regional JSOTFs run by O-6's. All of the flavors of SOTF's right now are augmented like a porn star's boobs and at times are even spread across Groups. You have SF BNs forming the core of a SOTF (or a Group HHC for higher ecelons), but all have conventional augmentees attached to them for the deployment. I cut my teeth on the old school method of waging war, Mongolian Horde at the Fulda Gap scenarios, no computers and certainly no networked computers, message formats where a commander couldn't be verbose with orders and so ODAs were given a wide amount of latitude in how they operated, a small support to shooter ratio (less than 2:1), etc.

War has changed. It isn't that the old model can be thrown out, but it is now an option rather than the standard. Hmm....didn't they add a fifth SOF Truth to cover that?

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

I'm still wondering how it is that you are involved in an SOF discussion at all.

The discussion is about SOF and CF and I’m giving my input from a CF point of view.

Everyone of your posts defends the conventional position and you were never in an SOF unit to begin or even end with.

No RB, my posts do not support CF and my not serving in a SOF unit has nothing to do with what I posted...

We are not saying get rid of CF or even that SF should be in charge of conventional. SOF is a totally different mindset, SOF vs. conventional here is not the issue, the decisions that were made in the early days is the issue. WTF.

I never made that an issue, I was posting to the fact that CF will not be willing to turn over their commands to SOF and that it’s crazy to think they would, or should. I can't help the past (i.e. CF supposedly taking over SOF missions, etc), but looking towards the future I think SOF should take control of the war after the major CF withdraw. I gave my opinion on how CF should be utilized in the future after the major force withdraw (i.e. logistic support, QRF, etc), in that I see that is the best way SOF will gain support from CF without having CF vs SOF problems (again that I did not bring up in this thread)...

 

[Rabid Badger]

Apologies out to JAB and didn't mean to ruffle Conventional feathers.

The war could've [IMHO] had a much different and faster outcome if we'd been allowed to do our jobs and been given more time.

RIP to all those who gave the ultimate sacrifice for our freedoms.

 

[Ravensfan9090]

You know, I am sure I could be very wrong about this. But when you change from SOF operating in Afghanistan...from what I remember it was one of the best executed operations ever. However, when you transfer over to conventional forces do the Afghan people start to think it's more of a total occupation when it really isn't?

 

[Marauder06]

You know, I am sure I could be very wrong about this. But when you change from SOF operating in Afghanistan...from what I remember it was one of the best executed operations ever. However, when you transfer over to conventional forces do the Afghan people start to think it's more of a total occupation when it really isn't?

I think that's exactly what happened- the mission changed from "blowing up bad guys" to "nation building." Nation building on the order of what was needed in Afghanistan is outside the capability of SOF. Many other missions which probably would have had the same end result are inside SOF's mission set and capabilities.

With the benefit of hindsight, I think a lot of us would look back and say we would have been a lot better off with a SOF-centric, SF-led longterm, small scale operation in Afghanistan. A big push to punish and attrit the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and then maybe getting further in bed with the Northern Alliance or whomever else we could buy off/partner with to ensure AQ couldn't come after us again. Augmenting a CJSOTF with airpower and intel, and convincing them that they need a professionalized staff that includes highly competent enablers, could probably have gotten us to exactly the same point we will be in 2014 with a lot less cost in terms of bodies, money, and materiel.

 

[Ravensfan9090]

I think that's exactly what happened- the mission changed from "blowing up bad guys" to "nation building." Nation building on the order of what was needed in Afghanistan is outside the capability of SOF. Many other missions which probably would have had the same end result are inside SOF's mission set and capabilities.

With the benefit of hindsight, I think a lot of us would look back and say we would have been a lot better off with a SOF-centric, SF-led longterm, small scale operation in Afghanistan. A big push to punish and attrit the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and then maybe getting further in bed with the Northern Alliance or whomever else we could buy off/partner with to ensure AQ couldn't come after us again. Augmenting a CJSOTF with airpower and intel, and convincing them that they need a professionalized staff that includes highly competent enablers, could probably have gotten us to exactly the same point we will be in 2014 with a lot less cost in terms of bodies, money, and materiel.

I think you are right. Then you have an issue of shifting priorities from Afghanistan over to Iraq. Mind you, I am sure the guys in Afghanistan were doing their job right, but then you have the massive devotion of forces into invading Saddam Hussein. Forcing democracy onto anther country seems un-democratic in itself.

What doesn't make sense to me is this idea of "spreading democracy." It's the same thing as containing communism. You can't do it unless the people there want it. Sure SOF kicked the crap out of the Taliban 2001/2002 but now there seem's like a Vietnam-like situation where we tried to counter the Vietcong, but the south Vietnamese were for Ho Chi Minh from the start. Korea was the only example where a specific population favored democracy in the south.

 

[Brill]

It's funny you bring that up. I tried to get my parents to let me graduate H.S. a year early, I was convinced that if I didn't leave as soon as possible I was going to "miss the war". I also skipped hiking the Appalachian Trail before I went in as well. I was really big into backpacking and kayaking in high school, and completing the AT was gonna be my last big achievement before entering the military. I had it planned out down to the day, where my food drops were gonna be, water points, refit points, everything. Pretty much all I had to do was by the airline ticket out there. I still regret to this day not doing it, but hindsight is 20/20.

Dust off those plans man and let's hit that shit this year! SP tryouts for our reality show takeover!!!

 

[goon175]

Ha, if only I could take more than one week of leave at a time!

 

[TLDR20]

I am going to put my two cents in here. There would have absolutely less bloodshed if it was a SOF war. True, however ray is because our prescence would have been felt in what 10% of the country. Why fight us when you can go a two day drive away and get left the fuck alone.

 

[Brill]

I am going to put my two cents in here. There would have absolutely less bloodshed if it was a SOF war. True, however ray is because our prescence would have been felt in what 10% of the country. Why fight us when you can go a two day drive away and get left the fuck alone.

Cback, I'm not a UW guy but an intel weenie so the doctrine is still new to me.

Curious how SOF would hold territory though? Seems that combat advised HN forces COULD clear an area but once they withdraw/move on, insurgent factions would move back in. How could this be prevented without CF setting up COPs/FOBs and conducting presence patrols?

Seems to me the key to effect the battle field the HN locals must be brought in and BELIEVE their future is directly linked to US/HN. It doesn't seem as if the local Afghans want us there but rather just want to be left alone to determine their own future.

Was the original mission to deny, disrupt, and destroy AQ's ability to use AF as a staging area or regime change in AF?

 

[TLDR20]

^what he said, SOF forces can NOT hold the kinda territory neccesary to keep the TB from gaining ground. It isn't possible. If every ODA in SF was there it wouldn't be possible. CF are necessary. Those FOBs allow for more freedom of operations for the locals and SF. I stayed out of this but if bravado is the reason we think this should be our war, we are wrong as two boys fucking in church on Sunday. I am all for the ability of twelve guys to go in and do terrific things. But those infantry privates buy that land and own it monopoly style.

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

That is a bit of a double edge sword, the more CF used to secure areas/zones, the more opportunity the opposing forces has to attack in smaller groups with the “long war” network type effectiveness. Limiting the CF foot print allows the opposing force to group in mass, and that opens the door to use a larger CF-QRF to go in destroy/disrupt it, and then pull out to allow HN forces to maintain the security. Even in Iraq, we saw and used this type of warfare with great effectiveness (i.e. Fallujah, Mosul, Najaf, etc).

Using a large contingency of CF-QRF to come in and kill/break shit but immediately turn it over to HN forces, keeps the foot print small and keeps that “occupation” feeling reduced. I think it would a lot more effective than taking ground and attempting to hold it, pissing of the HN population, giving OPFOR a diverse target selection, losing our soldiers, and spending retarded amounts of money to sustain it all.

 

[Rabid Badger]

Cback, I'm not a UW guy but an intel weenie so the doctrine is still new to me.

Curious how SOF would hold territory though?

We don't/didn't hold terrain.We show the local populace how to do it for themselves. THAT is a small part of the UW concept.

We had the trust of the local Imams/tribal leaders and were showing THEM how to hold terrain and showing THEM the importance of the will to fight for what THEY believed in, freedom from Taliban brutality, THEN we gave the Afghans nation building with bulldozers, tanks, and conventional Big Army. [Not Big Army's fault as BA doe what BA does]

It was at that point that we lost all trust we fought hard to develop.

 

[TLDR20]

We don't/didn't hold terrain.We show the local populace how to do it for themselves. THAT is a small part of the UW concept.

We had the trust of the local Imams/tribal leaders and were showing THEM how to hold terrain and showing THEM the importance of the will to fight for what THEY believed in, freedom from Taliban brutality, THEN we gave the Afghans nation building with bulldozers, tanks, and conventional Big Army. [Not Big Army's fault as BA doe what BA does]

It was at that point that we lost all trust we fought hard to develop.

I def agree with this. However now that we have gone that route we cannot go back. That is unfortunate but a fact.

 

[Rabid Badger]

I def agree with this. However now that we have gone that route we cannot go back. That is unfortunate but a fact.

and with that statement I believe it's CF's onion to peel to catch up to SOF in the operational environment.

"Shock and Awe" may work in some environments but the AO's that SA works in are situationally different.

Patience is the SOF virtue and CF, IMO needs to learn that lesson now that we're in the 21st century. The CF cold war mentality is dead.

 

[TLDR20]

and with that statement I believe it's CF's onion to peel to catch up to SOF in the operational environment.

"Shock and Awe" may work in some environments but the AO's that SA works in are situationally different.

Patience is the SOF virtue and CF, IMO needs to learn that lesson now that we're in the 21st century. The CF cold war mentality is dead.

Could not agree with you more.

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

I would say that in order for CF to develop that type of patience, they would have to shift away from the daily-monthly-quarterly data/statics in calculating progress and success and use an annual-biannual-5 year data/statics calculation system. One of the main problems with CF being inpatient is the statistical reports demanded by higher levels who want to “know where we are at”. Battalion and company commanders being required to continually show some form of progress statistically and when they are lacking in it, they attempt to make up for it in a hurry.

I would also say that deployment lengths would have to increase dramatically (probably around the 2 year mark) in order avoid the changes in leadership styles and mission focus. A CF unit showing good results within an A/O over a 2 year period is a sign of success and would hold the incoming unit leadership to maintaining or exceeding that performance. It would most likely cut down on the incoming unit trying to reinvent the wheel.

Finley I would say that in order to do away with the inpatience of CF, we would have to be clear with the US Gov and the American people that this type of war could take several decades to become successful and that commitment from both the people and Gov would need to be unwavering. Having a we have been there for 5 years now “what’s taking so long” mentality won’t work, and that is exactly what we currently have.

I do think the that Afghanistan can stand on its own with SOF, and without the use CF. But I also believe it would be at the cost of several more fine SOF soldiers lives, and me personally as one of the American people, I am not sure it is worth it in the long run.

 

[DA SWO]

One of the problems (IMO) was going into Iraq before Afghanistan was finished. Rummy didn't want a bigger Army, so we froze forces in Afghanistan, and they became priority 2. I can't remember which Gen was in charge, but we essentially tied ourselves to the FOB/MOB and didn't wander about. This allowed the TB to move back in, change (slightly) their M.O. and the result is today's operating environment.

We should have finished Afghanistan.

I also think Iraq would have happened sooner if 9/11 attacks hadn't happened.

 

[AWP]

Then you have an issue of shifting priorities from Afghanistan over to Iraq. Mind you, I am sure the guys in Afghanistan were doing their job right,

Some were not, see below.

I can't remember which Gen was in charge, but we essentially tied ourselves to the FOB/MOB and didn't wander about. This allowed the TB to move back in, change (slightly) their M.O. and the result is today's operating environment.

Then Major General Eric T. Olson did that. 25th ID had Afghanistan, all of it, in 2004-2005. The division staff ran the war and one brigade held RC East while another held RC South. They had some OPCON'ed Guard units involved with them to be sure, but the bulk of conventional forces were 25th ID. I think they were making some progress until the wheels fell off in Iraq and the 25th ID BDE in country (The Stryker BDE if I recall) was taking a number of casualties. Olson didn't want families to see them losing men in two wars so he quietly put out an order restricting operations to within a few miles (I'm told no more than 10) from their FOBs/ COPs.

I'll say it again in case a few of you are shaking your heads: he deliberately restricted combat operations in Afghanistan IOT avoid casualties and bad press/ morale.

I'd heard rumblings that the 25th ID staff held a dim view of SF as a whole, I even heard a couple of captains blasting SF, but didn't see any widespread behavior; I also wasn't on the JOC floor or roaming the halls of their HQ. 3rd, 7th, and 1st Groups were in country during that time and they could maybe speak to that a little better than I.

The 173rd relieved the 25th ID in the spring of 2005. Some of their tales are epic. Huge trains of mules moving in broad daylight, 50+ bad guys meeting, stuff like that. The NCOs I spoke to didn't have any kind words to say about the 25th's "performance."

The guys on the ground were giving their all, but their leadership failed them and it failed us. Iraq being what it is and draining resources away from OEF-A, I don't see the 25th making a great deal of headway, but they could have at least held the status quo in country at the time. in 04-early 05, units were finding weapons caches left over from the Soviet/ Civil war eras. By the summer, they were uncovering small to modest-sized caches of new weapons and ammo.

The Taliban did a "Rope-a-Dope" on us.

We gave them this war, handed it to them on a platter.