Holy shit. That is some eye-opening stuff.
Special ops, CIA first in, last out of Afghanistan
- Thread starter Marine0311
- Start date
Holy shit. That is some eye-opening stuff.
FWIW, I've contracted in Afghanistan since Aug. 2004 with a 20 month break from 06-08. The Olson story came to me from NCO's, Officers, and fellow contractors. The 173rd vignette is from soldiers and their JTACs.
Another blurb that some SF guys may know or have participated in. Summer of 05 or maybe 06 there was a firefight near Ghazni. An AC-130 went Winchester and was replaced by another AC-130. One or two flights of A-10's also expended all of their ordnance. There was something like 50+ KIA and no KIA Americans. An insurgency that is secure enough to have 50+ together for a meeting is hardly a weak organization operating in coalition-controlled areas.
We had a "good war" in '04. We needed more airlift, both FW and RW, MAYBE another squadron of A-10's, and that was it. ISR was probably thin, but our ground forces were good. SF was still SF and their commanders weren't balls deep in risk advoidance. Our footprints were small and we had the support of the people. PK wasn't involved and there weren't any civilian casualties to speak of. 04-05 was the turning point IMO. The 173rd was behind the power curve thanks to the 25th and we've played catch-up ever since.
Where is Olson now?
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=795
Another blurb that some SF guys may know or have participated in. Summer of 05 or maybe 06 there was a firefight near Ghazni. An AC-130 went Winchester and was replaced by another AC-130. One or two flights of A-10's also expended all of their ordnance. There was something like 50+ KIA and no KIA Americans. An insurgency that is secure enough to have 50+ together for a meeting is hardly a weak organization operating in coalition-controlled areas.
We had a "good war" in '04. We needed more airlift, both FW and RW, MAYBE another squadron of A-10's, and that was it. ISR was probably thin, but our ground forces were good. SF was still SF and their commanders weren't balls deep in risk advoidance. Our footprints were small and we had the support of the people. PK wasn't involved and there weren't any civilian casualties to speak of. 04-05 was the turning point IMO. The 173rd was behind the power curve thanks to the 25th and we've played catch-up ever since.
Where is Olson now?
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=795
Brill
SOF Support
One Percent-er.
Very interesting insight. Be safe.
I've spent it all on hookers, blow, and orphan blood.
and tat's, don't forget tat's.
BWAHAHAHA! My wife's the tattoo artist, so I guess the house payment counts?
She do piercings? 'cause I hear there is a ring in your nose so she can drag your ass around, LOL.
- Joined
- Jul 29, 2008
- Messages
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As someone from outside the SOF world and with no direct experience of A'Stan, this thread has been a top read.
Scotth
Verified Military
This thread has been a good read.
Thanks for the ~likey~ scott.
Now if we could learn the fucking lessons from the last 10 years and not repeat the fucking mistakes for the next ten.
Now if we could learn the fucking lessons from the last 10 years and not repeat the fucking mistakes for the next ten.
Brill
SOF Support
I have the grids for a bunch of gold hidden in the Libyan desert but I cannot get it out of the country. If you deposit $10,000 into my account, I'll be able to dig the gold up, convert it to cash, then return your investment 10 fold. All I need is the initial capital to get this going.
This is kind of along the lines of what I am thinking. IMHO, one of the failures in Afghanistan was failure to commet serious resources to it. Iraq is a small country and Afghanistan has never had but a fraction of the troops that it took to finnaly get the beginings of security in Iraq. Then again did we really "owe" Afghanistan a stable country and was that really the best way to get security over there. These are rhetorical questions, I don't intend to argue them at length.
Reed
The trouble wasn't too few resources but too many of the wrong ones (read through the previous pages for more of the SF guys opinions on this issue.)
Comparing Iraq to Afghanistan, with respect to what each needs/needed for us to be successful, is intellectually lazy.
If you arent interested in discussing your opinion with others why post it to begin with?
This isnt a rhetorical question.[/quote][/quote]
[/quote][/quote]
Technically I guess it wasn't a rhetorical question since I wasn't asking for dramatic effect. Trying to state that IF we were going to use CF we needed to commit enough to be effective. If you look at other COIN conflicts that used CF effectively they all used a MUCH higher ratio of soldier to citizen. The question about "owing" the Afghans a stable goverment was me acknowlging that perhaps the CF model of COIN was not what was in anyone's best interest and that I did not know eneogh to debate it either way. Not trying to be a jerk, sorry if it came off that way.
Reed
Read what I mean and not what I type damn it!!
Review the SOF commitment in the first days of the Afghan conflict.
We had this war won in the initial stages, long before CF showed up for round 1 of "Shock and Awe". Baghdad was round II, FYI.
The problem in my opinion has never been about money, resources, motivation and or good intentions. You must always have the carrot and the stick. I find this exchange very interesting and stressing. I was a CA asset and visited many villages and the people with regularity ( five to six days a week). Checking projects, assessments and developing relationships on the behalf of both SF and conventional forces in the AOR. In requesting support to secure and increase our foot print in some areas we were ignored. We shook hands with guys we knew were Taliban and or family of Taliban at meals and meetings. Passing out soccer balls, kites, food and building many things does require security. In some villages the Taliban would come right back in as soon as we departed. We had village teachers and leaders killed by insurgents shortly after our departure. Not everything involves hunting down bad guys and conducting DA. But when requested and assessed we couldn't get the right folks on target to eliminate threats to our civil populations. However it also requires synchronization of effort focusing on the desired end state and the total picture of the battle space. Many lost sight of this during my time there and command guidance directed us on frankly occasionally bait missions. As a four man CAT-A we spent allot of money, I say again allot of money (I was the team pay agent). We focused allot of energy and efforts to make life better develop sources and increase security for the locals. It wasn't sexy, glamorous or nor was it interesting to many. Hence the conventional forces wouldn't support the efforts we made many times. In the area and region I worked (Kandahar province) the insurgency was just beneath the surface. At times we were caught between the two (conventional and SF) and each with a different motive and objective. This same frustration was voiced by many of the USAID, OGA and many others with whom we interfaced. I and my team-mates and counter-parts were never happy with the conventional forces actions, intentions and methods in our area. The leadership and senior older guys in the SF community understood more clearly and embraced our efforts collectively. We departed and handed it over to the Canadians, who further refused good advice on approaches and strategy. I'm convinced as many of my friends are it cost them. I firmly believe this has always been an SF / SOF mission since it began. Yes a conventional force needs to be in place to supplement security (hold and maintain areas / regions) but not direct the entire battle space nor focus the efforts of the SF / SOF mission independently. I was in the Netherlands recently with a friend of mine who I worked with and advised on tribal matters, HA and cultural efforts. We spoke about this in depth and lament this greatly on many levels. He is now in Africa and working there with no intention of a return to A-stan. Does anyone believe men like Dostum and Sherzai will set back and do nothing? SF / SOF will be left holding the bag on this, they will as always do an excellent job despite everyone else.
Respectfully submitted
Respectfully submitted
