We wanted to kill 5000


Verified SOF
Jan 15, 2008
AJMAL AMIR KASAB, one of the terrorist gang that devastated Mumbai, was under instruction to keep killing until he died.

But the opportunity to deliver the final act of his mission was taken from him - he was the only terrorist captured alive during the 62-hour siege of the city. Kasab, 21, has since revealed chilling detail of the co-ordinated attack to his police interrogators.

The terrorist gang, thought to number as few as 10 gunmen, had planned to kill 5000 people and destroy the iconic Taj Mahal Palace hotel and the stock exchange. In the end, their murderous toll was closer to 200, and left the Taj Mahal and the Tident-Oberoi hotel badly charred and damaged.

Kasab had months of training before the attack where he was instructed in the use of military weapons and explosives. He and his fellow attackers, aged between 18 and 28, were also drilled in close quarter combat.

An Australian witness, Ray Lacey, who saw the attackers in the foyer of the Taj Mahal, said they were highly disciplined and did not waste bullets.

Kasab told investigators they were instructed to conserve their ammunition so they could sustain their attack for as long as possible. "I have done right. I have no regrets."

Kasab told interrogators that most of the volunteers for the suicide mission spoke Punjabi. They were given false identities and were discouraged from interacting with each other beyond what was barely necessary.

The meticulous planning for the terrorist mission took more than a year, investigators say. The preparations for the atrocity began in a remote mountain camp in Muzaffarabad, in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Associates of the terrorists are understood to have carried out a detailed reconnaissance four months ago. The mission included the covert acquisition of ships and speed boats and careful study of the tides to allow some of the attackers to enter the city from the Arabian Sea under the cover of darkness.

Kasab told police the attackers had spent time memorising the various targets.

According to the Telegraph newspaper in London, the terrorists were taught marine commando techniques such as beach landings at another camp at the Mangla Dam, located on the border between Pakistan-administered Kashmir and India's Punjab province.

Kasab was quoted as saying that once their training was complete his team of four travelled to the garrison town of Rawalpindi, where they were joined by another six terrorists, who had been trained at other camps close by.
It was in Rawalpindi that the 10-man team were briefed in detail with digitised images of their prospective targets - the Taj Mahal and Oberoi Hotels, the Jewish Centre and Victoria Terminus railway station. Each member of the team memorised street names and routes to each location. Kasab told his interrogators that most of the targeting information came from a reconnaissance team that had selected the targets earlier in the year.

From Rawalpindi the team moved to the eastern port of Karachi, where they chartered the merchant ship MV Alpha and headed for Mumbai.

It was during this crucial phase, as the cargo ship headed into the Arabian Sea, the terrorists appeared to almost lose their nerve. The Indian Navy was very active, Kasab was quoted as saying, boarding foreign vessels and searching their holds. The terrorists thought their plan might be compromised, so on November 15 or 16 the teams used their inflatable speed boats to hijack a fishing boat, the Kuber.

Indian media reported Kasab was one of four terrorists who entered Mumbai with fake identities, posing as overseas students.

They booked into the Taj Mahal hotel four days before the attack and allegedly stockpiled weapons and explosives.

There is great anger in India that a small group of terrorists could mount a siege that paralysed the city for nearly three days.

Yesterday the politician responsible for counter-terrorism, the Home Minister, Shivraj Patel, resigned. He has been under pressure for months following a spate of attacks in big Indian cities since May. He resigned amid allegations that authorities received recent warnings that Mumbai was vulnerable to attack from the sea.

Police believe attacks at the Leopold cafe, popular with tourists, and at CST station may have been diversions to provide cover as other members of the gang stormed their two main targets: Mumbai's two luxury Hotels, the Taj Mahel and Trident-Oberoi.

Kasab was pictured, with assault rifle in hand, entering the CST railway terminal where he and another terrorist fired indiscriminately into the packed terminal.

Kasab and his accomplice, Abu Dera Ismail Khan, also shot dead three of Mumbai's top policeman including Anti-terrorism chief, Hemant Karkare.

Kasab was captured at the Girgaum Chowpatty Naka in Mumbai while he was trying to escape in a car he had taken from its owner. Kasab, understood to speak fluent English, told police he was trained to "kill to the last breath".
This is happening in the USA today people, open your eyes and use your 2nd amendment rights to arm yourself, least you be a target or allow others to be killed because you aren't armed!

Vigilance & Preparation!
There may be a few still running around loose. Great.


"Indian security forces are officially claiming that ten militants – nine of whom were killed and one caught alive – were behind a coordinated terror attack that claimed nearly 200 lives.

However, the hijacked Indian fishing boat used by the gunmen to approach Mumbai, the crew of which were also slaughtered, had equipment for 15 men on board when it was discovered adrift off the city shore – suggesting that several gunmen could still be at large.

"Fifteen jackets were found, 15 toothbrushes even," one police source said. "That more men were involved, is possible."

INDIA received warnings from US intelligence in October of a possible terrorist attack "from the sea" on targets in Mumbai, CNN and ABC News reported today.

Unnamed US intelligence officials told ABC they had warned their Indian counterparts in mid-October of a potential attack "from the sea against hotels and business centers in Mumbai".

One intelligence official even mentioned specific targets, including the Taj hotel, the TV news service said.

CNN said Indian sources confirmed that US officials warned them twice of a possible attack on Mumbai.

About ten gunmen landed in rubber dinghies on the beaches of Mumbai on Wednesday and wreaked havoc with automatic weapons and hand grenades, in a 60-hour assault that killed at least 172 people, including two Australians, and injured close to 300.

Indian intelligence officials told ABC News that on November 18 they intercepted a satellite phone call to an address in Pakistan used by the leader of the Lashkar e Taiba terrorist group, revealing a possible sea-borne attack.

The group is believed to be behind the bloody Mumbai attacks.

US officials also said US intelligence has been tracking prepaid SIM cell phone cards recovered from the Mumbai terrorists, which has led them to a "treasure trove" of leads from Pakistan and several possible connections to the United States, ABC reported.

They said one of the SIM cards may have been purchased in the United States.

No further details were provided because of the ongoing investigation, ABC reported.
This is happening in the USA today people, open your eyes and use your 2nd amendment rights to arm yourself, least you be a target or allow others to be killed because you aren't armed!

Vigilance & Preparation!

Its happening everywhere. But this is chickenshit. Wait til these motherf*ckers get a suitcase nuke.
Its happening everywhere. But this is chickenshit. Wait til these motherf*ckers get a suitcase nuke.
A few years ago there was a ex Soviet General who not only repeatedly stated that these small nukes had been sold, but gave the serial numbers associated with them. These SAD's require some technical maintenance, so many feel that initial obvious dangers have most likely passed. However, this doesn't mean that a number of the technologies within these devices haven't been backward engineered. With a growing list of these types of "tid-bits" of information, is there really any wonder why this last week that Homeland Security issued a press release stating that there was a extremely high probability of a WMD attack within the US within the next 4 to 5 years?

There is effectively no defense against a Mumbai type of attack other than a successful counterintelligence program and/or a well armed public. Few NY'ers realize that a little more that 10 years ago US counterintelligence foiled (among others) Ramsey Yousef's plan to do the exact same Mumbai style attack on New York City.
Great point Ben, and yes I remember Ramfucker Yousyphilis and his plans.

It's going to happen here, give it time, mark my words, people in the know, know it.

Once more for prosperity...

Vigilance & Preparation!
Abdul Qadeer Khan ran a network from Pakistan selling nuclear weapons technology, gas centrifuges and uranium hexifloride to Iran, Libya and North Korea. And to God knows who else. He confessed, was pardoned by Musharaff and the US hasn't capped this bastard but should have.
Oh yeah, forgot to mention the 66 pound block of uranium confiscated near Bogota 8 months ago.

Amazing what juicy tidbits pop up on captured FARC laptops. They can run to fucking Ecuador but they can't hide.
Q&A: South Asia security expert discusses terrorist attacks in Mumbai

Stanford Report, December 4, 2008
Q&A: South Asia security expert discusses terrorist attacks in Mumbai

Paul Kapur

The small band of terrorists who attacked Mumbai last week killed nearly 200 people, wounded several hundred more and stoked tensions between India and Pakistan. The attacks have brought attention to the countries' long-simmering dispute over Kashmir and the diplomatic balancing act the United States must play between the nuclear-armed neighbors. They also expose major flaws in India's national security and highlight Pakistan's ineffectiveness in dealing with terrorist groups.

Paul Kapur, a faculty affiliate at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and an associate professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, is an expert on international security in South Asia. He's the author of Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, and his work has appeared in journals such as International Security, Security Studies, Asian Survey and Asian Security.

In an interview with Stanford Report, Kapur discussed the group that was likely behind the attacks and how he expects the situation to unfold.

American and Indian officials say there's evidence linking the attacks to members of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Who are these people, and what would be their motivation for hitting Mumbai?

Lashkar-e-Taiba is one of a number of militant groups that have been fighting against Indian control of Kashmir. India doesn't control all of Kashmir but controls part of it, including the Kashmir valley, which is especially prized.

These types of groups have been active since the late 1980s. There was a spontaneous—and mostly indigenous—uprising against Indian rule in Kashmir as the result of Indian ineptitude and malfeasance. The Pakistanis took advantage of the situation and got involved with the insurgency and started backing militant organizations with arms and training and financial and logistical support. It was an opportunity on the Pakistani side. By supporting the insurgency, they could potentially get the territory from India and bleed Indian resources.

What does that say about Pakistan's responsibility for the attacks?

There does seem to be strong evidence that Lashkar-e-Taiba was involved, and the attackers did come from Pakistan. But that doesn't mean the Pakistani government was directly involved with this operation. My guess is they probably weren't.

Events like this show that the Pakistani government is either unable or unwilling to quash militancy within its territory and to stop terrorists from using Pakistani soil to launch attacks on its neighbors.

Even if the Pakistani government now is not directly pulling the strings of these groups, the groups exist largely because of Pakistani support in the past. So now the genie is out of the bottle. The big danger is that a group like this could trigger an Indo-Pakistani crisis and conflict without the direct involvement of the Pakistani government.

What does this mean for relations between India and Pakistan? Do you expect India will launch a military response?

It's certainly possible. If you think about the last time there was a major Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis, it was after a failed attack on the Indian parliament—also involving Lashkar-e-Taiba—back in 2001. That attack failed. About five people died, and it was over in the space of a morning. Nonetheless, the Indians were so outraged that they mobilized about 500,000 troops along the international border, and there was a major standoff that lasted almost a year.

That was—in my view—a lot less provocative than Mumbai. This attack killed almost 200 people, wounded hundreds more, lasted almost three days and targeted the financial hub of India. There's going to be a lot of pressure domestically for the government to act in a forceful way.

The unfortunate thing is that things were getting better between the two sides. Since that last crisis in 2001-2002, a peace process had begun and there was really a thaw in Indo-Pakistani relations. Kashmir had actually gotten more stable, and the general sense was that the regional trajectory was a positive one. Ironically, it may be that some of that progress is what motivated the Mumbai attacks. Part of the goal of an operation like this would certainly be to derail improving relations in the region.

Both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons. How will that factor into how the countries deal with each other?

Nuclear weapons will create incentives for the two countries—even in the event of a crisis—to behave somewhat cautiously so the situation doesn't spin out of control. But the problem is that nuclear weapons also greatly reduce the margin for error. In the event of a miscalculation, the cost could be catastrophic.

America is an ally of both these countries and has relied on the Pakistanis to combat the Taliban along the border with Afghanistan. What's at stake for American diplomacy in this situation?

It's very tricky. The U.S. relies on Pakistan as a major ally in the war on terror. We've been pressuring the Pakistanis to pay attention to the northwest frontier and the border with Afghanistan and get that area under control. One thing the United States does not want to see is an Indo-Pakistani conflict, which draws Pakistani forces away from that mission in the northwest and back to the east to combat the Indians. From the standpoint of U.S. goals in Afghanistan, it would take resources away from that struggle, and so the United States very much wants the current situation to be resolved in a way that doesn't involve a major confrontation.

The problem is that it's going to be hard for the U.S. to say to the Indians, "Hey, you shouldn't retaliate against these guys," because this is exactly the argument that the United States makes in justifying its own retaliation against terrorists. If a country is unable or unwilling to keep its territory from being used to launch terror attacks, then U.S. leaders have claimed to have the right to go in and deal with the situation.

There are reports that India received warnings about the possibility of terrorist attacks on Mumbai. What did government officials do with that information, and why wasn't more done to beef up security and counterterrorism measures?

It's not clear that they did anything. They may have ratcheted up security for a short time and then let it return to normal levels. One of the things that's going to come out of this in the weeks and months ahead is an examination of the effectiveness of the Indian security services. Obviously, there's a huge intelligence failure here. But at a tactical level, it took almost three days to get a handful of terrorists out of three or four buildings. It wasn't a shining moment. The Indian security forces bravely did their job. But in terms of their effectiveness, my sense is that there were some pretty serious shortcomings.