Army: 6 New Security Force Assistance Brigades

[Topkick]

He’s not wrong though. It’s great that the SF trained some ANA in 2002 but conventional forces cobbled together training teams to train the ANA and IA for the other 15 years (and counting) while SOCOM focused on creating indigenous raid forces. This unit makes a lot of sense given the past two years of GWOT. Future wars will almost certainly require our conventional forces to train partner forces. We should create units to do that for us so we don’t have to Frankenstein units together like we’ve done for 16 plus years. That’s what the SFAB does.

Why wouldn't conventional forces train conventional forces? They don't need a tab and beret to do that. SFAB seems like a solid plan but like any other conventional unit, the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia indentifies what you do.

 

[Teufel]

Why wouldn't conventional forces train conventional forces? They don't need a tab and beret to do that. SFAB seems like a solid plan but like any other conventional unit, the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia indentifies what you do.

Infantry units have several mission essential tasks. Train indigenous forces is not one of them.

 

[Topkick]

The infantry has several mission essential tasks. Train indigenous forces is not one of them.

Army MiTT teams have been made up of conventional troops, to include Infantry, since the early years of the GWOT. This seems to be just a continuation of MiTT in a more structured way. They can and do train IA, which is conventional. I can't speak on ANA.

 

[Teufel]

Army MiTT teams have been made up of conventional troops, to include Infantry, since the early years of the GWOT. This seems to be just a continuation of MiTT in a more structured way. They can and do train IA, which is conventional. I can't speak on ANA.

I really don’t know what you are trying to argue. MiTT was bad because it robbed units of key personnel to create ad hoc teams to perform a critical mission they weren’t really trained to do. The SFAB solves this problem for future conflicts.

My service does not issue tabs and berets so I don’t personally care about that decision but I completely understand why many do.

 

[x SF med]

Found it interesting that in the Army times interview with GEN Milley he stated;

“Special Forces does not train the Afghan National Army. They don’t train them now. They never have. Same thing in Iraq,” he added. “There’s a reason for that. One, that’s way beyond the capacity of Special Forces. It’s also beyond the skill set.”

In 2002 3rd SFG (A) was training the first ANA.....

Army chief dispels rumors, misconceptions about SFAB berets, tabs

"...To train, advise, organize and assist indigenous forces in their fights against oppressive governments..." Gen Milley does not know the basic tenets of SF... clownshoes.

 

[Raksasa Kotor]

Goddamnit.

A function within AFSOC snagged the rights to the brown beret 2-3 months ago, they're in production and hit the streets in January.

 

[Topkick]

I really don’t know what you are trying to argue. MiTT was bad because it robbed units of key personnel to create ad hoc teams to perform a critical mission they weren’t really trained to do. The SFAB solves this problem for future conflicts.

My service does not issue tabs and berets so I don’t personally care about that decision but I completely understand why many do.

No argument. I wrote in my OP that SFAB seems like a solid plan. My point was that the Army could just give them a shoulder patch , like they do all other units.
No need for a beret and tab. Sorry if I wasn't clear.

 

[Marauder06]

Army MiTT teams have been made up of conventional troops, to include Infantry, since the early years of the GWOT. This seems to be just a continuation of MiTT in a more structured way. They can and do train IA, which is conventional. I can't speak on ANA.

I agree that this seems like MiTT 2.0 . Not inspiring a lot of confidence.

 

[Il Duce]

I feel like there's a great Duffleblog headline awaiting us about 'SFAB Cultural Appropriation'

 

[Teufel]

I agree that this seems like MiTT 2.0 . Not inspiring a lot of confidence.

Except that these Soldiers are manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish that mission. Embedded/Military Training Teams were created to fill a gap that SOCOM could not or would not fill. This mission set will likely be an enduring requirement in the future and requires a permanent solution.

 

[Marauder06]

Except that these Soldiers are manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish that mission. Embedded/Military Training Teams were created to fill a gap that SOCOM could not or would not fill. This mission set will likely be an enduring requirement in the future and requires a permanent solution.

MiTTs were also manned, trained and equipped for security force assistance. The problem IMO isn't who is doing the training, it's who is being trained.

I think that the Army is preparing for a problem that it wants to have, rather than the problem it does have. The problems we face in Iraq and Afghanistan and Syria aren't military problems, they are political/ideological/institutional ones. If we want to make a difference there we need to start standing up brigades of economists, lawyers and LEOs, under the aegis of the State Department, not taking away our very limited Army combat brigades to support a TTP that we've seen time and time again simply does not work.

We already have too much on our plate as it is. What's coming off to support the 16 weeks of language training and the 6 weeks of SFAB training and all of the other stuff that they haven't thought of yet but are going to need to train on to make this work? How are they going to do language sustainment? What languages are they even going to train on? And what happens to all of that great training and SFAB experience when people PCS back into the Big Army? Or are we standing up a new SFAB MOS where people stay for their whole careers? And if we're going to do that, maybe we stand up a whole new branch, joint/combined/interagency. Because that's what it's going to take to make this work.

And what's going to happen to these fancy SFABs when some manpower-draining contingency like Iraq crops up in the future (looking at you, North Korea)? We don't have a draft, most of America is too fat, too dumb, or too criminal to join, and no matter how we fight in the future, we're going to need thousands of people on the ground. It would be better to designate one brigade per division as the DRB-S, the Division Ready Brigade-SFAB like you have the DRB for contingencies. That way they can stay sharp on basic soldier skills and prep for the SFAB mission just like they would any other contingency.

Bottom line, our general purpose forces are GPF for a reason. The kind of half-assed over-specialization envisioned for SFABs is not likely to increase lethality, survivability, or mission accomplishment. In fact, it will probably have the opposite effect.

This is a bad idea, already poorly executed.

 

[ThunderHorse]

The SFAB concept seems to be more like Hollow/Caretaker unit structures built for expansion in war time. You know, an actual high intensity conflict that we'll need to have a major expansion. You have 6 BDE's worth of Staff's ready to go and stand up. But since we cut units all of the time and give their footprints to someone else, where are these guys going?

 

[Il Duce]

MiTTs were also manned, trained and equipped for security force assistance. The problem IMO isn't who is doing the training, it's who is being trained.

I think that the Army is preparing for a problem that it wants to have, rather than the problem it does have. The problems we face in Iraq and Afghanistan and Syria aren't military problems, they are political/ideological/institutional ones. If we want to make a difference there we need to start standing up brigades of economists, lawyers and LEOs, under the aegis of the State Department, not taking away our very limited Army combat brigades to support a TTP that we've seen time and time again simply does not work.

We already have too much on our plate as it is. What's coming off to support the 16 weeks of language training and the 6 weeks of SFAB training and all of the other stuff that they haven't thought of yet but are going to need to train on to make this work? How are they going to do language sustainment? What languages are they even going to train on? And what happens to all of that great training and SFAB experience when people PCS back into the Big Army? Or are we standing up a new SFAB MOS where people stay for their whole careers? And if we're going to do that, maybe we stand up a whole new branch, joint/combined/interagency. Because that's what it's going to take to make this work.

And what's going to happen to these fancy SFABs when some manpower-draining contingency like Iraq crops up in the future (looking at you, North Korea)? We don't have a draft, most of America is too fat, too dumb, or too criminal to join, and no matter how we fight in the future, we're going to need thousands of people on the ground. It would be better to designate one brigade per division as the DRB-S, the Division Ready Brigade-SFAB like you have the DRB for contingencies. That way they can stay sharp on basic soldier skills and prep for the SFAB mission just like they would any other contingency.

Bottom line, our general purpose forces are GPF for a reason. The kind of half-assed over-specialization envisioned for SFABs is not likely to increase lethality, survivability, or mission accomplishment. In fact, it will probably have the opposite effect.

This is a bad idea, already poorly executed.

I'm also skeptical of the utility of these units - and the strategy that underpins them. But, I'm not sure if I'm as comfortable saying it's not a gap - or that it's impossible to train these types of units to do this job.

It just feels like to me we're doubling-down on a tactical/operational solution that didn't work in Iraq and Afghanistan. We're saying 'no, no - if we just do it right it will work' - which I think we've also said about the failed COIN doctrine.

There absolutely - IMO - is a need to be able to stand up a HN military force capable of defending it's borders and maintaining internal security. I think not only do Iraq and Afghanistan show that need but we've got 2nd and 3rd world countries all over the place that likely have the same requirements. Further, I think we do have a gap in our capability as an Army/DoD to provide the means to assist in the formation of those forces.

My issue is I'm not sure training at the BN/BDE level is where those forces have failed. As I think you alluded to - if you don't have the political and institutional structures to recruit, man, train and equip those types of forces somebody taking over a portion of the BN/BDE level training isn't going to fix the problem - as it clearly didn't do in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Further, if you were in a situation where the government had the ability to recruit, man, and pay a conventional force - just lacked the training ability to forge individual and collective skills at the BN/BDE/DIV level - is this the force that is best to accomplish that task? When we wanted to build large numbers of those types of units (WWII) we didn't build them from scratch then drop in a bunch of advisors or cadre. We gave them solid doctrine, an individual/collective training pipeline, then invested our experienced cadre into collective training exercises. I understand this is not WWII but how is language training, scoring better than average on your PT test, and wearing a culturally appropriated beret going to give you the ability to institutionalize those skills? Would a Soldier like that even qualify to be cadre at a CTC or instructor at TRADOC - i.e. be given 20% of that responsibility for our own forces?

I think it just gets back to the old bromide you used to tell me as a LT 'the enemy doesn't reinforce failure - why should we?'

 

[Marauder06]

The great personal irony of this situation for me is if I don't retire this summer as planned, I'll probably be in one of these brigades.

 

[Topkick]

The great personal irony of this situation for me is if I don't retire this summer as planned, I'll probably be in one of these brigades.

This may cause more people to retire sooner.

 

[Marauder06]

This may cause more people to retire sooner.

I kind of think it will be the opposite. This is the Army's shiny new object and I think people will be jumping for the opportunity. People will definitely be jumping for the $5k bonus.

 

[Totentanz]

We already have too much on our plate as it is. What's coming off to support the 16 weeks of language training and the 6 weeks of SFAB training and all of the other stuff that they haven't thought of yet but are going to need to train on to make this work? How are they going to do language sustainment? What languages are they even going to train on? And what happens to all of that great training and SFAB experience when people PCS back into the Big Army? Or are we standing up a new SFAB MOS where people stay for their whole careers? And if we're going to do that, maybe we stand up a whole new branch, joint/combined/interagency. Because that's what it's going to take to make this work.

To add to the above, we (perhaps not as a nation, but certainly as a government) have a history of trying something, making less-than-acceptable progress, then moving the goalposts until we can just declare victory where we sit, rather than actually conducting an honest evaluation of where we are, where we should be (and where we can be realistically within current constraints), and what's required to get to where we need to be.

I might be overly cynical, but I'm having trouble finding faith that when the dust settles, the Army will be conducting this mission the way they have described it.

 

[Topkick]

I kind of think it will be the opposite. This is the Army's shiny new object and I think people will be jumping for the opportunity. People will definitely be jumping for the $5k bonus.

I hope you are right but those crusty vets who have seen or been a part of MiTT may not want to stick around for it.

 

[Teufel]

MiTTs were also manned, trained and equipped for security force assistance. The problem IMO isn't who is doing the training, it's who is being trained.

I think that the Army is preparing for a problem that it wants to have, rather than the problem it does have. The problems we face in Iraq and Afghanistan and Syria aren't military problems, they are political/ideological/institutional ones. If we want to make a difference there we need to start standing up brigades of economists, lawyers and LEOs, under the aegis of the State Department, not taking away our very limited Army combat brigades to support a TTP that we've seen time and time again simply does not work.

We already have too much on our plate as it is. What's coming off to support the 16 weeks of language training and the 6 weeks of SFAB training and all of the other stuff that they haven't thought of yet but are going to need to train on to make this work? How are they going to do language sustainment? What languages are they even going to train on? And what happens to all of that great training and SFAB experience when people PCS back into the Big Army? Or are we standing up a new SFAB MOS where people stay for their whole careers? And if we're going to do that, maybe we stand up a whole new branch, joint/combined/interagency. Because that's what it's going to take to make this work.

And what's going to happen to these fancy SFABs when some manpower-draining contingency like Iraq crops up in the future (looking at you, North Korea)? We don't have a draft, most of America is too fat, too dumb, or too criminal to join, and no matter how we fight in the future, we're going to need thousands of people on the ground. It would be better to designate one brigade per division as the DRB-S, the Division Ready Brigade-SFAB like you have the DRB for contingencies. That way they can stay sharp on basic soldier skills and prep for the SFAB mission just like they would any other contingency.

Bottom line, our general purpose forces are GPF for a reason. The kind of half-assed over-specialization envisioned for SFABs is not likely to increase lethality, survivability, or mission accomplishment. In fact, it will probably have the opposite effect.

This is a bad idea, already poorly executed.

The military training teams, in my experience, were cobbled together from across the force with no selection process of any kind, given training that ranged from “figure it out as you go” to a few months of formal training, and given an incredibly complex mission to accomplish. I think the real shortfall did not occur at the squad or platoon level but rather at the brigade and higher level, especially with regards to logistics and operational planning.

 

[Marauder06]

To add to the above, we (perhaps not as a nation, but certainly as a government) have a history of trying something, making less-than-acceptable progress, then moving the goalposts until we can just declare victory where we sit, rather than actually conducting an honest evaluation of where we are, where we should be (and where we can be realistically within current constraints), and what's required to get to where we need to be.

I might be overly cynical, but I'm having trouble finding faith that when the dust settles, the Army will be conducting this mission the way they have described it.

Good points.

A lot of the ideas for the SFAB brief well but are impossible to implement. The company that @Il Duce and I were in was the linguist company for the Second Infantry Division in Korea. To get the kind of language proficiency one needs to actually be useful in that language takes something on the order of 16 months, not 16 weeks. And once you achieve proficiency, you have to maintain it or you'll lose it. Language maintenance consumed a large portion of our training week. When I commanded the support company in 5th Group, the language proficiency expected of the SF soldiers was 0+/0+, and even then some couldn't sustain it because they were consumed with all of the other tasks expected from them.

And even if you train someone up to a usable degree, will it be a usable language? OK, so you train someone in Arabic. Maybe Egyptian dialect. Is that going to be helpful when they get sent into Pakistan? No? So why bother with it at all?

Kill the SFAB idea, make the training a school that confers an ASI (additional skill identifier), assign individual brigades the SFAB mission on a rotating basis.