Boots on the ground: calling for dominant infantry

I'm not even going to read an article with that headline. We have the most dominant, battle-tested infantry in the entire world. The problem isn't with our infantry, or our military. We don't win wars because of political ineptness. That's what needs to be fixed.
 
I read it. He makes some good points about spending more money on acquisitions that can benefit the infantry as opposed to throwing billions at high tech stuff...but I think our Army and Marine infantry units today are better trained and more combat ready than at any other time in our nation's history. Enforced social engineering may change that in the future but that remains to be seen.
 
"Better" means "more training" and training equals dollar bills. I wouldn't hold my breath on "better" infantry.
 
Meanwhile the Navy has our rates stripped.

Corpsman --> Medical Technician?

Fuck outta here.

Sad I cannot 'like' and 'agree.'

Can you hear the cry on the battlefield? "Medical technician UP!" Makes me sick....
Wait...what?
I read it. He makes some good points about spending more money on acquisitions that can benefit the infantry as opposed to throwing billions at high tech stuff...but I think our Army and Marine infantry units today are better trained and more combat ready than at any other time in our nation's history. Enforced social engineering may change that in the future but that remains to be seen.
Same here, I thought it was a good article.

It would be nice if the infantry did get a bigger piece of the funding pie. Having over strength Infantry units would be great, as injuries/normal wear and tear tend to diminish manpower. I also find it annoying that our enemy is better at utilizing available tech for their operations. The Infantry needs better lobbyists, because we are getting eaten alive by the Lockheed Martin loving POG's and the rest of their ilk. (I say this with love :p)
 
I'm at a loss. Is the writer inferring that we don't have the best, most lethal infantry the world has ever known? I would argue that we do.
 
Our limitations with our war fighting capabilities is not with our infantry. We've got great infantry. Our problems are with our enabling forces, post-conflict operations, and with the other instruments of national power not pulling their weight.
 
I would agree that the U.S. infantry is amongst the finest in the world but I am not certain that we are "dominant". Wars are won by people, not machines. We tend to rely on technology too much, particularly our armored vehicles, and this can make our forces vulnerable when that equipment fails or the enemy finds a way to defeat it. I have seen infantrymen humbled by a technologically disadvantaged adversary that understood how to use terrain to their advantage. This is not something that is unique to the infantry; this has also occurred to our most elite special operations forces.

Here are some training and technology gaps that I think could be addressed to help improve the lethality and survivability of the infantryman.

1. We have over burdened our infantrymen with layers and layers of PPE that make it difficult to maneuver quickly under fire. This problem is compounded in difficult terrain and weather conditions. This is the first thing I would like to see addressed with a technological solution. I would love to see industry come up with extremely light and flexible personal protective equipment. A set of Large SAPI plates weighs around 6 pounds. Another 2 pounds for side SAPIs. The USMC Modular Tactical Vest (which is ridiculously heavy) is 30 pounds. The Scalable Plate Carrier is 25. Add a 3 pound helmet to that mix and the average infantryman is walking around with 40 pounds of protective equipment without even factoring in the weight of ammunition and water. A five pound PPE weight reduction would have a significant effect on mobility. Could you imagine dropping 20 pounds? I'm sure someone could figure this problem out if they were sufficiently motivated ($$$).

2. I would love to see lighter and more effective individual radios. Imagine lightweight, encrypted, GPS enabled IPOD sized radio that would enable soldiers to communicate with each other and their HHQ, mark their position for battle tracking, and identify friend from foe when viewed through optics. It can be extremely challenging to determine the location of all your subordinate and adjacent units when you are under heavy fire, particularly in an urban environment. This delays the clearance of indirect and air delivered fires. Imagine a future operating environment where every combatant has individual GPS enabled battle tracking that can feed into the theater command and control systems used by every level of command post as well as aviation and artillery assets. Imagine if you could get a digital clearance of fires to back up human reporting on the ground. It would be great if every squad leader, platoon commander and JTAC had a light weight digital battle tracking display on this sleeve or maybe a tablet that could display the location of friendlies overlaid on a map or grid reference graphic. The latter may be a bridge too far because of present technology and cost but I bet apple could produce slick looking individual iBFT radios if they were motivated to do so ($$$$$$).

I understand that this could be a double edged sword if HHQ tried to jump on a team or squad net during a firefight. I've seen this a lot as it is already unfortunately.

3. I could train infantryman to shoot, move, communicate and medicate like SOF if I had the right amount of qualified instructors, ammunition, equipment, and facilities. There were huge gains in this department during the war but I have the feeling that infantry battalion budgets are going to get smaller than Rick Moranis in Honey I shrunk the Kids. Infantrymen don't need to have SOF skills but they would gain a lot from having regimental training detachments with a robust cadre of SOF veterans to run them through standardized marksmanship, communications and medical packages. I would also like to see higher quality professional military education at the E5/E6 and E7 ranks. It would be great if you could link these PME courses together somehow so that a soldier gets a bachelors degree in small wars/security studies by the time he finishes his E8 PME.

4. I would increase the minimum GT score and physical fitness standards for the infantry. The School of Infantry should look more like Ranger school than what it is now.
 
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I usually just read this forum, but I'd like to tag on two points to Teuful which were significant problems in my short time as a USMC 0302 (Infantry Officer) from 2011-2016.

1. Retention.
We were a overwhelmingly first enlistment company (and community as a whole). Squad leaders were almost entirely LCpl's or junior Cpl's. Sergeants did not exist, unless a first enlistment stud was able to pull a meritorious promotion. We only had one Sgt on his second enlistment in the company, and he'll be EASing next month. The retention rate for the battalion was abysmal, and the Squad Leader Development Program didn't seem to gain much traction. LCpl's and Cpl's can (and did) get it done, but nothing can make up for a seasoned Sergeant leading a squad. To make matters worse, if you are a junior enlisted and manage to get yourself a NJP, the chances of your re-enlistment package going through is slim to none. Hazing, tattoos, drinking, and fighting slim the ranks of those eligible to re-enlist, if they were so inclined. That shit was heart breaking to see, because I certainly did most or all of those things as a 18-22 year old.

2. Deployment cycle and training priorities.
Despite the slow down of GWOT deployments, the op tempo remained the same. Deploy for 7 months, 12 month train up, deploy for 7 months. A year may sound like a long time, but large scale exercises dictated the training cycle. As a anecdotal example, I was a Rifle Co. XO in one of the first iterations of the SPMAGTF to Iraq ISO OIR. We were granted 4-5 weeks of Company training time before being required to support a wide range of large scale exercises and certification exercises. This means you need to go from static live fire, to platoon level attacks (with a company attack perhaps squeezed in), in that 5 weeks. Mix in TCCC, comms, cross training on weapons systems, field craft, and various methods of patrolling and you can see the challenge which is presented. All of the other time was simply ate up.

LSE's are poor training venues for infantrymen in a line company. Most of it is spent sweating your balls off in the back of a AAV, waiting for fires and assaulting a poorly constructed trench line with a single green ivan target.

To make matters more challenging, new 03xx fresh out of SOI (which produces nothing close to a skilled infantryman) were sent to the BN throughout the duration of the work up. A BN doesn't become priority for manpower (new Marines and SNCO's) until D-180 from deployment date. More than likely, your team isn't established until 3 months out from deployment, at which point all small unit level training is finished due to those LSE/certification requirements

Hand held drones and Ipod sized radios are incredible tools, but until you are able to retain NCO talent and give them the time to train up their guys, the infantry will not be as good as it can be.
 
I would agree that the U.S. infantry is amongst the finest in the world but I am not certain that we are "dominant". Wars are won by people, not machines. We tend to rely on technology too much, particularly our armored vehicles, and this can make our forces vulnerable when that equipment fails or the enemy finds a way to defeat it. I have seen infantrymen humbled by a technologically disadvantaged adversary that understood how to use terrain to their advantage. This is not something that is unique to the infantry; this has also occurred to our most elite special operations forces.

Here are some training and technology gaps that I think could be addressed to help improve the lethality and survivability of the infantryman.

1. We have over burdened our infantrymen with layers and layers of PPE that make it difficult to maneuver quickly under fire. This problem is compounded in difficult terrain and weather conditions. This is the first thing I would like to see addressed with a technological solution. I would love to see industry come up with extremely light and flexible personal protective equipment. A set of Large SAPI plates weighs around 6 pounds. Another 2 pounds for side SAPIs. The USMC Modular Tactical Vest (which is ridiculously heavy) is 30 pounds. The Scalable Plate Carrier is 25. Add a 3 pound helmet to that mix and the average infantryman is walking around with 40 pounds of protective equipment without even factoring in the weight of ammunition and water. A five pound PPE weight reduction would have a significant effect on mobility. Could you imagine dropping 20 pounds? I'm sure someone could figure this problem out if they were sufficiently motivated ($$$).

2. I would love to see lighter and more effective individual radios. Imagine lightweight, encrypted, GPS enabled IPOD sized radio that would enable soldiers to communicate with each other and their HHQ, mark their position for battle tracking, and identify friend from foe when viewed through optics. It can be extremely challenging to determine the location of all your subordinate and adjacent units when you are under heavy fire, particularly in an urban environment. This delays the clearance of indirect and air delivered fires. Imagine a future operating environment where every combatant has individual GPS enabled battle tracking that can feed into the theater command and control systems used by every level of command post as well as aviation and artillery assets. Imagine if you could get a digital clearance of fires to back up human reporting on the ground. It would be great if every squad leader, platoon commander and JTAC had a light weight digital battle tracking display on this sleeve or maybe a tablet that could display the location of friendlies overlaid on a map or grid reference graphic. The latter may be a bridge too far because of present technology and cost but I bet apple could produce slick looking individual iBFT radios if they were motivated to do so ($$$$$$).

I understand that this could be a double edged sword if HHQ tried to jump on a team or squad net during a firefight. I've seen this a lot as it is already unfortunately.

3. I could train infantryman to shoot, move, communicate and medicate like SOF if I had the right amount of qualified instructors, ammunition, equipment, and facilities. There were huge gains in this department during the war but I have the feeling that infantry battalion budgets are going to get smaller than Rick Moranis in Honey I shrunk the Kids. Infantrymen don't need to have SOF skills but they would gain a lot from having regimental training detachments with a robust cadre of SOF veterans to run them through standardized marksmanship, communications and medical packages. I would also like to see higher quality professional military education at the E5/E6 and E7 ranks. It would be great if you could link these PME courses together somehow so that a soldier gets a bachelors degree in small wars/security studies by the time he finishes his E8 PME.

4. I would increase the minimum GT score and physical fitness standards for the infantry. The School of Infantry should look more like Ranger school than what it is now.



The skeptical old infantryman in me says that if they find a way to reduce the weight of one piece of gear, they'll come up with some other piece of mandatory gear that weighs even more. To balance out the Full-Load Waddle.
 
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"...To make matters more challenging, new 03xx fresh out of SOI (which produces nothing close to a skilled infantryman) were sent to the BN throughout the duration of the work up. A BN doesn't become priority for manpower (new Marines and SNCO's) until D-180 from deployment date. More than likely, your team isn't established until 3 months out from deployment, at which point all small unit level training is finished due to those LSE/certification requirements...

That is particularly unfortunate to hear because it suggests to me that little has changed in almost 50 years. I could probably fill half a page on the stuff we had to learn OJT during deployment and even after joining our unit in the field.
 
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