Boots on the ground: calling for dominant infantry

[Devildoc]

I would agree that the U.S. infantry is amongst the finest in the world but I am not certain that we are "dominant". Wars are won by people, not machines. We tend to rely on technology too much, particularly our armored vehicles, and this can make our forces vulnerable when that equipment fails or the enemy finds a way to defeat it. I have seen infantrymen humbled by a technologically disadvantaged adversary that understood how to use terrain to their advantage. This is not something that is unique to the infantry; this has also occurred to our most elite special operations forces.

Here are some training and technology gaps that I think could be addressed to help improve the lethality and survivability of the infantryman.

1. We have over burdened our infantrymen with layers and layers of PPE that make it difficult to maneuver quickly under fire. This problem is compounded in difficult terrain and weather conditions. This is the first thing I would like to see addressed with a technological solution. I would love to see industry come up with extremely light and flexible personal protective equipment. A set of Large SAPI plates weighs around 6 pounds. Another 2 pounds for side SAPIs. The USMC Modular Tactical Vest (which is ridiculously heavy) is 30 pounds. The Scalable Plate Carrier is 25. Add a 3 pound helmet to that mix and the average infantryman is walking around with 40 pounds of protective equipment without even factoring in the weight of ammunition and water. A five pound PPE weight reduction would have a significant effect on mobility. Could you imagine dropping 20 pounds? I'm sure someone could figure this problem out if they were sufficiently motivated ($$$).

2. I would love to see lighter and more effective individual radios. Imagine lightweight, encrypted, GPS enabled IPOD sized radio that would enable soldiers to communicate with each other and their HHQ, mark their position for battle tracking, and identify friend from foe when viewed through optics. It can be extremely challenging to determine the location of all your subordinate and adjacent units when you are under heavy fire, particularly in an urban environment. This delays the clearance of indirect and air delivered fires. Imagine a future operating environment where every combatant has individual GPS enabled battle tracking that can feed into the theater command and control systems used by every level of command post as well as aviation and artillery assets. Imagine if you could get a digital clearance of fires to back up human reporting on the ground. It would be great if every squad leader, platoon commander and JTAC had a light weight digital battle tracking display on this sleeve or maybe a tablet that could display the location of friendlies overlaid on a map or grid reference graphic. The latter may be a bridge too far because of present technology and cost but I bet apple could produce slick looking individual iBFT radios if they were motivated to do so ($$$$$$).

I understand that this could be a double edged sword if HHQ tried to jump on a team or squad net during a firefight. I've seen this a lot as it is already unfortunately.

3. I could train infantryman to shoot, move, communicate and medicate like SOF if I had the right amount of qualified instructors, ammunition, equipment, and facilities. There were huge gains in this department during the war but I have the feeling that infantry battalion budgets are going to get smaller than Rick Moranis in Honey I shrunk the Kids. Infantrymen don't need to have SOF skills but they would gain a lot from having regimental training detachments with a robust cadre of SOF veterans to run them through standardized marksmanship, communications and medical packages. I would also like to see higher quality professional military education at the E5/E6 and E7 ranks. It would be great if you could link these PME courses together somehow so that a soldier gets a bachelors degree in small wars/security studies by the time he finishes his E8 PME.

4. I would increase the minimum GT score and physical fitness standards for the infantry. The School of Infantry should look more like Ranger school than what it is now.

Excellent post, and my insight. RE: #1. PPE and deuce gear (is it even still called that??): Half the new stuff I got, didn't fit. I had to cut, tape, and modify. Or I chucked it into the closet and went to a surplus store. But, yeah, the PPE made me feel like EOD.

RE: #2. Radios? I was a corpsman. My stuff was heavy enough, then added batteries for comms. Lighter, better would be nice. I am not smart enough to say what would be better for the bigger picture.

RE: #3. Quality training. With people leaving and joining the platoon it was hard enough just to stay competent. Add training, certifications, and exercises that @yarles87 mentioned, and "good" fundamental training just wasn't happening.

RE: #4. Dudes were coming out of SOI in not SOI shape. My window to see this was very narrow, and a long time ago, so I don't know if my perception is based on a specific timeframe or leadership influence, a sign of the times, or what. When I was a reservist I had been assigned to branch clinic. I hated branch clinic, so I traded to do med support at SOI. I could not tell a qualitative difference in the level of fitness between SOI students and MCT students.

 

[OpenSkies]

. Imagine if you could get a digital clearance of fires to back up human reporting on the ground. It would be great if every squad leader, platoon commander and JTAC had a light weight digital battle tracking display on this sleeve or maybe a tablet that could display the location of friendlies overlaid on a map or grid reference graphic. The latter may be a bridge too far because of present technology and cost but I bet apple could produce slick looking individual iBFT radios if they were motivated to do so ($$$$$$).

I think that the battle tracking for JTACs could be a possibility and would be extremely useful. With new technologies like this: (Helmet Could Sync Imagery Between JTACs, Pilots - Kit Up!) coming out for JTACs helping them to more quickly and more accurately put ordnance on targets something like a tracker of all friendly units along with that would significantly boost a JTACs effectiveness.

 

[Red Flag 1]

MOD HAT ON:

 

[yarles87]

Done and Done. Apologies.

 

[Red Flag 1]

= .

 

[TLDR20]

I think that the battle tracking for JTACs could be a possibility and would be extremely useful. With new technologies like this: (Helmet Could Sync Imagery Between JTACs, Pilots - Kit Up!) coming out for JTACs helping them to more quickly and more accurately put ordnance on targets something like a tracker of all friendly units along with that would significantly boost a JTACs effectiveness.

You are out of your depth.

 

[Marauder06]

The skeptical old infantryman in me says that if they find a way to reduce the weight of one piece of gear, they'll come up with some other piece of mandatory gear that weighs even more. To balance out the Full-Load Waddle.

I think that's borne out in the history of warfare. "Oh, you made x lighter? Great, here's some more y."

 

[Il Duce]

But your rucksack is filled with 200lbs of LIGHTWEIGHT gear!

 

[Teufel]

1. Retention.
We were a overwhelmingly first enlistment company (and community as a whole). Squad leaders were almost entirely LCpl's or junior Cpl's. To make matters worse, if you are a junior enlisted and manage to get yourself a NJP, the chances of your re-enlistment package going through is slim to none.

2. Deployment cycle and training priorities.
Despite the slow down of GWOT deployments, the op tempo remained the same. Deploy for 7 months, 12 month train up, deploy for 7 months. A year may sound like a long time, but large scale exercises dictated the training cycle.

To make matters more challenging, new 03xx fresh out of SOI (which produces nothing close to a skilled infantryman) were sent to the BN throughout the duration of the work up. A BN doesn't become priority for manpower (new Marines and SNCO's) until D-180 from deployment date.

@yarles87, these are great points. The Marine Corps infantry has been a largely first enlistment organization for a long time. I deployed to Iraq with LCpl squad leaders in 2004. Granted it took three or four years to pick up Corporal and combat sparks professional growth. Additionally, the Marine Corps was shedding personnel during this time to meet our post GWOT manning limits.

It's very hard to combat the zero defect mentality when the Marine Corps is sharply reducing the number of re-enlistments available to young Marines. I'm not saying it's right but it's important to understand why things happen if you want to change them. There are a ton of guys who want to re-enlist and significantly less boat spaces for re-enlistment. A board of SNCOs and officers will review the myriad packages to determine which Marines get to stay in service. Most of these guys, if not all, have other jobs that they have to juggle or put on hold while they sit on this board. They will not spend a lot of time reviewing any particular package and it's much easier to separate all the NJPs into the "nope" pile. It isn't impossible to get these young war dogs promoted though. http://havokjournal.com/culture/recon-marine-wasting-warrior-culture/ I got Frank retained and promoted with two DUIs as well as two other Marines. All three Marines took Division CG waivers. I had to expend a significant amount of golden bullets to make that happen but it was worth it. I believe that it is an officer's responsibility to find problems in the "system" and do everything in their power to fix them. This appear out of reach as a young platoon commander but becomes more feasible the longer you stay in. Notice I didn't say it gets easier. It never gets easier unfortunately.

The deployment cycle is challenging. The Marine Corps had to justify our numbers during the budget and manning cuts. This is why the Marines went all in on crisis response. This has second and third order effects on when Marines show up to a battalion. I was a Recon Battalion operations officer during this time frame and I can tell you that this problem was one of the top priorities at the Division HQ. I hope they have ironed this out by now. They will fix it eventually.

Good comments, thanks for sharing them. You should post more.

 

[yarles87]

@yarles87, there are great points. The Marine Corps infantry has been a largely first enlistment organization for a long time. I deployed to Iraq with LCpl squad leaders in 2004. Granted it took three or four years to pick up Corporal and combat sparks professional growth. Additionally, the Marine Corps was shedding personnel during this time to meet our post GWOT manning limits.

It's very hard to combat the zero defect mentality when the Marine Corps is sharply reducing the number of re-enlistments available to young Marines. I'm not saying it's right but it's important to understand why things happen if you want to change them. There are a ton of guys who want to re-enlist and significantly less boat spaces for re-enlistment. A board of SNCOs and officers will review the myriad packages to determine which Marines get to stay in service. Most of these guys, if not all, have other jobs that they have to juggle or put on hold while they sit on this board. They will not spend a lot of time reviewing any particular package and it's much easier to separate all the NJPs into the "nope" pile. It isn't impossible to get these young war dogs promoted though. http://havokjournal.com/culture/recon-marine-wasting-warrior-culture/ I got Frank retained and promoted with two DUIs as well as two other Marines. All three Marines took Division CG waivers. I had to expend a significant amount of golden bullets to make that happen but it was worth it. I believe that it is an officer's responsibility to find problems in the "system" and do everything in their power to fix them. This appear out of reach as a young platoon commander but becomes more feasible the longer you stay in. Notice I didn't say it gets easier. It never gets easier unfortunately.

The deployment cycle is challenging. The Marine Corps had to justify our numbers during the budget and manning cuts. This is why the Marines went all in on crisis response. This has second and third order effects on when Marines show up to a battalion. I was a Recon Battalion operations officer during this time frame and I can tell you that this problem was one of the top priorities at the Division HQ. I hope they have ironed this out by now. They will fix it eventually.

Good comments, thanks for sharing them. You should post more.

@Teufel Thanks for the reply, and much credit to you for getting Frank a chance to stay in the community.

The issues you mentioned were certainly behind the curtain for me, and I fought as hard (along with my 1stSgt) as I knew how to try to afford a few guys the opportunity to stay in. One case in particular, which led to a good Marine 0311 from rough beginnings getting administratively separated, affected me deeply and was a major factor in clicking "No" on the career designation button. Such is life, I guess.

Guys want to deploy, and it's not necessarily the op-tempo which was frustrating. It was the minimal amount of time allocated to conducting company training (i.e. focusing on basic skills to squad level). Like I said, no one is getting better below the company staff and fire support team during a large scale exercise.

I'm glad these items are on the radar of division/MEF. When @Teufel tags on his stars and takes 1stMarDiv, I have no doubt things will change.

 

[Teufel]

But your rucksack is filled with 200lbs of LIGHTWEIGHT gear!

Let's be honest, the bulk of that weight is water, batteries and ammunition. It's hard to reduce the weight of water and ammunition unfortunately.

@Teufel

Guys want to deploy, and it's not necessarily the op-tempo which was frustrating. It was the minimal amount of time allocated to conducting company training (i.e. focusing on basic skills to squad level). Like I said, no one is getting better below the company staff and fire support team during a large scale exercise.

I saw brand new Marines BZO their weapons before assaulting Range 400. That's far from ideal. I know that the MEF and Division have overlaid their large scale exercises on top of each other to try to remedy that problem.

 

[Gunz]

True. For us ammo was all you could carry and then some. Nobody bitched about personal ammo load.

It's the other stuff. Don't get me started.

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

Only thing wrong with today's Infantry is the restrictive ROE and political hypocrisy that plegues the leadership on the military and civilian side. Training can always be better, lighter-faster-longer and more lethality is always talked about. The truth is, you cut American grunts loose, and they will fuck some shit up. Enemy forces, local bar, your sisters prom, etc.

 

[Gunz]

Only thing wrong with today's Infantry is the restrictive ROE and political hypocrisy that plegues the leadership on the military and civilian side. Training can always be better, lighter-faster-longer and more lethality is always talked about. The truth is, you cut American grunts loose, and they will fuck some shit up. Enemy forces, local bar, your sisters prom, etc.

Your first point is anchored by 50 years of the same old shit, re ROE and politics.

 

[Teufel]

Your first point is anchored by 50 years of the same old shit, re ROE and politics.

I understand that ROE is a bitter topic for infantrymen. It certainly was for me when I was a platoon commander. Easing ROE in a counter insurgency can open up the way for easy victories at the tactical level victories and bitter failures at the operational and possibly strategic level.

Political games can make it hard for the grunts on the ground to do their jobs successfully. I don't think these were the biggest shortcoming I witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan though. Our military was designed to defeat enemy conventional forces but was tasked with restoring security, rebuilding a broken state and developing governance. The military should take the lead in the first task but I believe there are other organizations that are better suited for the others. Unfortunately none of those organizations stepped up to the plate after the invasion of Iraq and the department of defense was left trying to figure out a task it was not prepared for or trained to assume.

 

[Gunz]

I understand that ROE is a bitter topic for infantrymen. It certainly was for me when I was a platoon commander. Easing ROE in a counter insurgency can open up the way for easy victories at the tactical level victories and bitter failures at the operational and possibly strategic level.

Political games can make it hard for the grunts on the ground to do their jobs successfully. I don't think these were the biggest shortcoming I witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan though. Our military was designed to defeat enemy conventional forces but was tasked with restoring security, rebuilding a broken state and developing governance. The military should take the lead in the first task but I believe there are other organizations that are better suited for the others. Unfortunately none of those organizations stepped up to the plate after the invasion of Iraq and the department of defense was left trying to figure out a task it was not prepared for or trained to assume.

True. COIN at ground level requires a tactical sophistication and political finesse on the part young NCOs and officers who are out there at the sharp edge. And those are the guys who don't always have the authority to make decisions that, say, DoS or USAID reps can. But if the DoS or USAID guys stay in the Green Zones and never venture out, what's a platoon commander to do? All he can do is request, right? And as far as ROE, I agree with you, it does makes a difference whether or not you kill the right people or the wrong people. It can come back and bite you in the ass hard. The Russians found that out in a big way in Afghanistan.

Even with all that, sir, I think ROE can be so restrictive as to be dangerous. I thought we had it bad back in my war, but it's nothing compared to that of our recent conflicts. As a spectator it seems to me that you guys have to call a JAG lawyer before you pull the trigger.

 

[Teufel]

True. COIN at ground level requires a tactical sophistication and political finesse on the part young NCOs and officers who are out there at the sharp edge. And those are the guys who don't always have the authority to make decisions that, say, DoS or USAID reps can. But if the DoS or USAID guys stay in the Green Zones and never venture out, what's a platoon commander to do? All he can do is request, right? And as far as ROE, I agree with you, it does makes a difference whether or not you kill the right people or the wrong people. It can come back and bite you in the ass hard. The Russians found that out in a big way in Afghanistan.

Even with all that, sir, I think ROE can be so restrictive as to be dangerous. I thought we had it bad back in my war, but it's nothing compared to that of our recent conflicts. As a spectator it seems to me that you guys have to call a JAG lawyer before you pull the trigger.

Platoon commanders should not be building governance. They should be improving the security situation. I believe that company and battalion leadership had a role in this but for the most part this was a brigade and higher task in the GWOT.

I deployed numerous times to Iraq and Afghanistan between 2004 and 2011. My Marines and I never encountered a situation where we were not allowed to eliminate a threat. You demonstrate hostile act and hostile intent and you die. Self defense is always paramount. Granted, I understood the ROE, trained my Marines appropriately and backed them up when the time came. I'm sure some other commanders did not approach things the same way I did. As with most things in Afghanistan, experiences may vary.

 

[Diamondback 2/2]

18 year old hard dicks, who spent half a years worth of training to break and kill shit will never be able to meet the political and cultural requirements of COIN. I don't care how good the leaders are and how diciplined the unit is. Infantry is not a scalpel, it's the sledgehammer. If the leadership used Infantry for what it is meant for (find, fix, close with and destroy) and stopped trying to come up with secondary missions (be a beat cop in a police action), shit would work alot better. Do you want your grunts hard charging killers, or do you want 18 year old kids making split second decisions that have possible strategic implications?

Personally IMO, use that young grunt for the built up aggressive ass kicker he is, train him to break and kill and release his ass when it's needed. Leave the hearts and minds and handing out soccer balls for the guys on their second/third enlistment who volunteer and take on the training to be that warrior/diplomat.

That all said, it's gonna be a girl power world shortly enough, so why are we even debating a stronger more robust infantry any damn way.

$.02

 

[Gunz]

18 year old hard dicks, who spent half a years worth of training to break and kill shit will never be able to meet the political and cultural requirements of COIN. I don't care how good the leaders are and how diciplined the unit is. Infantry is not a scalpel, it's the sledgehammer. If the leadership used Infantry for what it is meant for (find, fix, close with and destroy) and stopped trying to come up with secondary missions (be a beat cop in a police action), shit would work alot better. Do you want your grunts hard charging killers, or do you want 18 year old kids making split second decisions that have possible strategic implications?

Personally IMO, use that young grunt for the built up aggressive ass kicker he is, train him to break and kill and release his ass when it's needed. Leave the hearts and minds and handing out soccer balls for the guys on their second/third enlistment who volunteer and take on the training to be that warrior/diplomat.

That all said, it's gonna be a girl power world shortly enough, so why are we even debating a stronger more robust infantry any damn way.

$.02

Bro, you are spot on. And this is why you don't take, say, a Battalion Landing Team of Marine infantry and try to turn them into Peacekeepers (as in Beirut), or make them put red wooden blocks into their magwells (as at III MAF in Danang), or give them nuanced secondary missions requiring specialized training and knowledge. Well said.

 

[Devildoc]

Bro, you are spot on. And this is why you don't take, say, a Battalion Landing Team of Marine infantry and try to turn them into Peacekeepers (as in Beirut), or make them put red wooden blocks into their magwells (as at III MAF in Danang), or give them nuanced secondary missions requiring specialized training and knowledge. Well said.

I know this is what we want to see with infantry, but at least with the Marines, the handwriting has been on the wall regarding "the strategic corporal" and GEN. Krulak's three-block war.

It will be more and more kinetic and dynamic and less and less "normal" infantry tactics.