CSAR-X

@amlove21 @busdriver
Why treat it as a new program if thy just went the HH-60 route?
Why not just say we are buying new 60's to replace the older birds?
At one point that was actually the plan, I can only guess that politics and the AF's apparent inability to run a successful competition led us down the current path.

The CSAR-X was the AF's number 2 acquisition priority at one point, meaning we can dream big. Not so much the case with CRH, which almost didn't happen. Actually back in Jan the plan was to SLEP the 60G, staff didn't think there'd be money for new iron. That's the crux of the problem, the current fleet has aircraft well past design life in flight hours. Some of the oldest birds actually started out as alpha models before being converted. In the current fiscal environment, there were only two options: SLEP or buy more 60M's. The only reason I think the CRH is the better plan is if we SLEP'd the 60G, our SPO would be running that program and I have zero faith in our SPO; ref those stupid ass seats they bought.

When I say 60 sized cabin (minus the aux tanks) being about right, I'm referring the the smallest cabin I think is acceptable as my min requirement is the ability to self-SAR. Bigger is fine, with the caveat it needs to be survivable in a radar environment. The bigger you make the radar cross section, the more robust you have to make your countermeasures. As an example if I'm going to rely on a jammer to defeat radar threats I have to have a high enough jam to signal ratio, the larger the aircraft the larger the signal so I need a more powerful jam amplifier which requires larger generators, more weight, bigger aircraft, etc. It's kind of like the Lotus sports car philosophy vs the Lamborghini philosophy.

The reality of the situation is that the ideal recovery vehicle for CSAR doesn't exist, and since we'll never have the money to one-off design our own aircraft we'll always be beholden to tagging onto Army designs. The same issue meant AFSOC had to tag onto the Marine design for the MV-22. If I was king for the day, we'd have a vertical lift aircraft that was pressurized, could cruise at 250 knots in the mid 20's with some RCS reduction measures, with a radar jammer and the ability to sustain at least 4g and standoff weapons with requisite sensor. I want an A-10 that can hover like a helo. Like I said, pipe dream.

@amlove21 I know we said we'd not go too far down the PR doctrine nerd hole, but part of my point needs some explaining. We're tasked with PR for the air component, a sub set mission of that is CSAR (more specifically the AF's chosen methodology for conducting air component PR) so PR is recovering isolated people, CSAR is the gaggle of aircraft swirling overhead a downed fighter pilot in a major conventional war. I intentionally didn't talk about the team in that sentence. It's the dichotomy of the AF Rescue community, my hardest/ highest threat mission that drives my aircraft design is conversely one of the simplest missions for the team. There are of course exceptions to that very general statement (BAT21b was recovered by a ground team) but when ground dudes wonder what the hell is going through the aircrew guys heads, it can usually get traced back to what's my most demanding mission, and what's yours?

I fucking hate the Rescue Triad term, it's ridiculous and pigeon holing. By its very nature it makes us all single mission "platforms." In an era where multi-mission is the name of the game, we're making ourselves irrelevant in the joint environment.

As to the CROs commanding larger Rescue units, I'm still a bit floating in the breeze as to what I think the correct answer is. I'm adamantly against CROs commanding flying squadrons, but that's rooted in my belief that a squadron commander needs to lead from the front and fly. Once you get to the group and especially the wing level I'm basically agnostic. Once a guy is at the O-6 level he should be able to understand and lead Airman, period. If that means we deploy as separate squadrons, so be it. But that goes back to deploying as tiny units, pigeon holed into a single role. And clearly I'm at the point where I don't have well defined thoughts anymore so I'll close this post.
 
When I say 60 sized cabin (minus the aux tanks) being about right, I'm referring the the smallest cabin I think is acceptable as my min requirement is the ability to self-SAR. Bigger is fine, with the caveat it needs to be survivable in a radar environment. The bigger you make the radar cross section, the more robust you have to make your countermeasures. As an example if I'm going to rely on a jammer to defeat radar threats I have to have a high enough jam to signal ratio, the larger the aircraft the larger the signal so I need a more powerful jam amplifier which requires larger generators, more weight, bigger aircraft, etc. It's kind of like the Lotus sports car philosophy vs the Lamborghini philosophy.

As a non-aviator and from a purely perfromance standpoint, what's wrong with the MH-47G for PR? The RCS is higher than a -60? Faster, greater range, larger cabin, higher ceiling (hover height or whatever it is called)...

I don't have to be a PJ to see the -60's limitations. The PR mission appears to have out run the -60's design.
 
As a non-aviator and from a purely perfromance standpoint, what's wrong with the MH-47G for PR? The RCS is higher than a -60? Faster, greater range, larger cabin, higher ceiling (hover height or whatever it is called)...

I don't have to be a PJ to see the -60's limitations. The PR mission appears to have out run the -60's design.
@busdriver Ill internalize your full response for a bit longer as well- but I think it's neither OPSEC nor incorrect to say that neither helo (46/47/60/53) nor tilt rotor (22) is going anywhere in any sort of CDO environment. Specific very limited "what if" sort of examples? Sure, nothing is absolute. But the overwhelming answer to that question is, "Not until we take care of the threats", and not "We can operate in spite of those threats."

Much seems to be made of the RCS of this airframe vs that, I guess that's das macht nichts to me, considering none of them are going to stealthily sneak into a truly capable IAD threat.

That's why we (TRT) have a host of other insertion options- HAHO/HALO, the new ground recovery vehicle in it's test phase, etc. And I am not repeat *not* saying the answer is unilateral AF ground force, because that's as much a foul as anything else. We would still need support- but that support exists and we use it often.
 
As a non-aviator and from a purely perfromance standpoint, what's wrong with the MH-47G for PR?

The MH-47G is faster with a lot more power for high altitude operations. From what I've been told the RF jammer is quite good, but I've seen no proof. The IR signature is very hot, even with suppression and it relies on the DIRCM exclusively. The larger size also means it's slower getting into the LZ, basic physics and all. That said it could work, there are always ways to work around limitations. However, as of now there is no requirement to justify that large of an aircraft, which means no justification for the much higher operating costs.
 
@busdriver But the overwhelming answer to that question is, "Not until we take care of the threats", and not "We can operate in spite of those threats."

Anyone who penetrates a MEZ without support without a good reason is just being silly. That said, many of those threats are notoriously difficult to find. Likewise the level of vulnerability drives how much support is needed and how long it has to work to get the desired effect. A bigger aircraft could definitely work, but before we jump whole hog into the biggest helo we can find we need to actually define what is needed, with specifics based on assigned roles and responsibilities.
 
So I had written a couple responses and sat on them, but after re-reading them they were a little tangental and not exactly related to the thread. So, instead, I boiled it down to questions, because the whole CSAR-X issue is the unanswered questions and it logically follows that these questions in fact lead me to believe that the project isn't a great idea or even well thought out. Keep in mind- I don't speak for anyone but myself on this one, however, these are mostly mine and some general gripes/complaints/issues the career field (CRO/PJ) have in general w/ the current platform.

So, in no specific order-
  • We have stated there are 'no requirements' for a larger or different AC. Where are those requirements listed? And from where did those requirements come? Using what prediction of future conflict? In what theater? With what threat picture?
  • Why was the 60M the 'only option'? What about not replacing helos at all? What about making enough upgrades for survivability of the fleet and then 'waiting for the FVL program'? If we have this program (FVL), and it is indeed coming, why spend money on the Mike model? What are we going to do with this new fleet of Mike models once the FVL does come on line? Outside of Rescue, TES, and the Weapons school, is there an AF user group for Mike models we are now going to discard for this new widget fleet of AC? Are the nuke guys or the PAG going to be pushing Ferrari's when all they need are minivans?
  • Why is there the perception that 'we are here to pick up fighter pilots in a conventional war'? Is this in line with GA 2021 or PR 2020 mission statements? (This seems to be more of a question for a discussion of PR, but since it seems to be a perception that drives materiel solutions, it's due examination.)
  • This one operates on a certain assumption- that we both agreed that anyone pushing into a MEZ without support is foolish, and that no rotary wing (tilt rotor or otherwise) is able to do so in an IAD/CDO environment- but if we allow that assumption, why are we even valuing the previous question's validity? If that isn't our mission, and we aren't able to operate in said environment unilaterally anyway then why do we valuate that perception enough to spend the money?
Anyway, that's just off the top for the CSAR-X. Any insight would be appreciated!
 
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Why develop a vehicle if your organic airframe can't deliver and recover said vehicle?
Well, 1st, we have an organic airframe that can deliver it- the 130. The GAARV is meant to be airdropped. It's listed as "capable to load on 47's and 53's", but stuff like gross weight and equipment + team (not to mention space) would only be realistic via the 47 (which would be very, very tight. I'd have to see it) or 130's.

2nd, you most likely wouldn't recover it to anything. The idea goes like this- CDO/MEZ/IAD environment. TRT drops in w Vehicle, executes rescue, bombs back to friendly link up (or close enough to be recovered) by either large and heavily armored ground force or to some sort of friendly control (be it a firebase, embassy, or some other 'safe zone'). Sure, this could be airfield for 130's (take vehicle with us) or helicopters (vehicle gets destroyed/left depending on situation). In the event that our own guys come and pick us up, team and target board small helicopters and leave vehicle. "Recovery and re-utilization" wasn't criteria for the vehicle, I suppose.

And finally- we are developing this vehicle because there is a capability gap. We needed penetration into an IAD/CDO environment for that 'most dangerous mission', or the deep rescue where the helos we have can't go. We don't have an airframe that does it, so we got a vehicle that does. It's an answer that isn't very palatable to some, especially those in the Rescue community.
 
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Some of the PR doctrine stuff won't be news to you, but I've included it in case others don't know. Also, just one guy's opinions as well:
  • We have stated there are 'no requirements' for a larger or different AC. Where are those requirements listed? And from where did those requirements come? Using what prediction of future conflict? In what theater? With what threat picture?
The original CSAR-X requirement did call for a larger helo, but all the increased capabilities were dropped for CRH. I have no idea why we even bothered with a "competition." The program used to be called HH-60G re-capitalization, in other words buy more of the same to replace the worn out airframes.
  • Why was the 60M the 'only option'? What about not replacing helos at all? What about making enough upgrades for survivability of the fleet and then 'waiting for the FVL program'? If we have this program (FVL), and it is indeed coming, why spend money on the Mike model? What are we going to do with this new fleet of Mike models once the FVL does come on line? Outside of Rescue, TES, and the Weapons school, is there an AF user group for Mike models we are now going to discard for this new widget fleet of AC? Are the nuke guys or the PAG going to be pushing Ferrari's when all they need are minivans?
SLEPing the current fleet presents the problem of old ass airframes and our terrible SPO would no-doubt screw up the SLEP (same guys that fielded those seats, MARS and a CORS cable that apparently was never rated to let a person clip into it).

That said your point is not lost on me, I worry that having relatively new aircraft will make it that much harder to pickup the FVL as soon as possible. Either way, FVL-Medium is planned to start rolling out in the early 2030's, so the youngest SLEP'd aircraft would be 33 years old, which is where our oldest birds are today. But I alluded to it earlier, SLEP was the plan back in December of last year, no one thought CRH would survive sequestration.

Ironically enough, the missile site dudes have actively been trying to get Blackhawks for awhile.
  • Why is there the perception that 'we are here to pick up fighter pilots in a conventional war'? Is this in line with GA 2021 or PR 2020 mission statements? (This seems to be more of a question for a discussion of PR, but since it seems to be a perception that drives materiel solutions, it's due examination.)
It's coming from Joint PR doctrine, mainly that each component is responsible for it's own PR. Since we're the air component, that primarily means picking up air component guys, and the most dangerous mission for the air component is MCO. In other words picking up fighter/bomber guys, with the belief that if you can do that mission you should be able to handle the rest.

It's not a perfect outlook for aircraft acquisitions to cover the range of military operations, but it's the one that prevails among many.

I'm not familiar with either of the future mission statements you mentioned, but I do know the PR core function master plan is about the most confusing thing I've ever tried to read.
  • This one operates on a certain assumption- that we both agreed that anyone pushing into a MEZ without support is foolish, and that no rotary wing (tilt rotor or otherwise) is able to do so in an IAD/CDO environment- but if we allow that assumption, why are we even valuing the previous question's validity? If that isn't our mission, and we aren't able to operate in said environment unilaterally anyway then why do we valuate that perception enough to spend the money?
It's not just rotary wing, it's everything. No aircraft goes into an IADS unsupported. That said, we can operate in an IADS with the correct support. Yes it requires the correct circumstances, much like driving the GAARV into that environment would require the correct set of circumstances.

The entire argument is also faced with the reality of our budget situation. Back in 2006, I think the H-47 was actually the best choice based on the lowest risk to get us something fielded quickly, not the ideal aircraft in my opinion but none of them were. But, the AF screwed up the acquisition process and we're where we are today.

So our choices today were: SLEP in the hopes of FVL and risk program delays in the next gen aircraft. Or by new build 60's and risk not being able to jump on the FVL bandwagon early. Realistically the only other option would have been the AFSOC plan, which has issues with even lightly contested LZs and is very bad at high/hot environments.
 
ETA:Busdriver posted as I was typing.

Caveat: I have been retired/out of the acquisitions business for many years, and am going off (a probably faulty) memory.

So, in no specific order-
  • We have stated there are 'no requirements' for a larger or different AC. Where are those requirements listed? And from where did those requirements come? Using what prediction of future conflict? In what theater? With what threat picture?
IIRC the original ORD did ask for more cabin room, that's why Sikorsky used their model 92 for their bid submission.
That's also why Eurocopter thought they were competitive.
I think we would have HH-92's on the ramp today had AFSOC not screwed the pooch selecting a winner.

  • Why was the 60M the 'only option'? What about not replacing helos at all? What about making enough upgrades for survivability of the fleet and then 'waiting for the FVL program'? If we have this program (FVL), and it is indeed coming, why spend money on the Mike model? What are we going to do with this new fleet of Mike models once the FVL does come on line? Outside of Rescue, TES, and the Weapons school, is there an AF user group for Mike models we are now going to discard for this new widget fleet of AC? Are the nuke guys or the PAG going to be pushing Ferrari's when all they need are minivans?
The final ORD was what? the 5th or 6th iteration of the original?
I think the requirements kept getting weaker and the HQ AF folks saw the Army get new 60's without any Congressional pushback, so the final ORD (again IIRC) was essentially a UH-60 with AF mods.

Just a guess, but you are owned by ACC, and despite HQ statements, ACC if fighter centric and nothing emerges from ACC unless you can show how it benefits the fighter community.

Why is there the perception that 'we are here to pick up fighter pilots in a conventional war'? Is this in line with GA 2021 or PR 2020 mission statements? (This seems to be more of a question for a discussion of PR, but since it seems to be a perception that drives materiel solutions, it's due examination.)
!

Finally a few random comments:

The original ORD/selection was essentially staffed by AFSOC H-53 crews; guys who were losing their ride with the retirement of the PAVE LOW and the AF desire not to be involved in the SOF rotary wing mission. I have on good source that a lot of folks thought HH-47 could pony into the SOF arena and they'd be "back in the business".

There was a lot of HQ head scratching when the HH-47 was announced as the winner.

Eurocopter and Sikorsky both filed protests, Eurocopter's protest was thrown out (more on that later) and Sikorsky's accepted.

Sikorsky claimed they did not submit the H-53 because the ORD was for a medium helicopter and the H-53 and H-47 were "Heavy" helo's. That was accepted.

Eurocopter was disqualified because they were having design/QC issues and the selectors did not think they could meet the timeline (probably a correct assessment.

As the selection process was nearing the end, AF issued and ORD for a HH-1 replacement. That ORD was staffed/shelved. We then staffed/shelved a Joint ORD (JORD) for a Navy/AF HH-1/HH-60/SH-60 replacement.

IIRC the Navy eventually went with their MH-60 to replace most, if not all, of their 60's.

The AF then restarted (twice?) the CSAR-X with requirements getting dumbed down with each revision. The final revision was such that Eurocopter didn't even bid (IIRC) as it written (pretty much) to reflect a H-60 requirement.

We had a chance (when the war was hot) to get a good compromise between a smaller aircraft favored by Pilots (per Busdrivers posts) and a larger cabin favored by the PJ's.

The program was essentially doomed when AFSOC mis-managed it, and Sikorsky won their protest.

Again, I've been retired for a few years, and may have forgotten a few facts. Likewise I am sure the ORD changed a few times after I left, but I believe my comments are pretty spot on regarding the acquisitions process. My time as an Acquisitions Officer was (thankfully) short, but I learned a lot during that time.
 
SOWT, that's pretty close to what I heard back in my co-pilot days. Basically the AF didn't calculate life cycle costs in the manner they said they would, if they had the 47 would have dropped down multiple pegs as it's a very expensive helo to operate. That said, in my opinion it was actually canceled by Gates and Young because they were of the opinion that it was a gold plated single mission platform. Too bad, whichever aircraft ended up getting selected would have been a very cool aircraft.

Incidentally, I realize my posts have been a bit schizo. I've tried to provide some insight into what I think is the thought process up at staff and amongst pilots as well as provide my own personal opinions, if that's muddying the waters I apologize.
 
And finally- we are developing this vehicle because there is a capability gap. We needed penetration into an IAD/CDO environment for that 'most dangerous mission', or the deep rescue where the helos we have can't go.
Seriously, I really really want to drive the GAARV. But I'd think it would be way more useful in a tyranny of distance situation, like Africa which is a logistical monster to try support PR across.

Not saying there's no place for extended ground operations in night one of a big war scenario, but speaking in generalities that's every bit as risky and situation specific as helo rescue with limited support within an IADS.
 
Well, 1st, we have an organic airframe that can deliver it- the 130. The GAARV is meant to be airdropped. It's listed as "capable to load on 47's and 53's", but stuff like gross weight and equipment + team (not to mention space) would only be realistic via the 47 (which would be very, very tight. I'd have to see it) or 130's.

"Recovery and re-utilization" wasn't criteria for the vehicle, I suppose.

And finally- we are developing this vehicle because there is a capability gap. We needed penetration into an IAD/CDO environment for that 'most dangerous mission', or the deep rescue where the helos we have can't go. We don't have an airframe that does it, so we got a vehicle that does. It's an answer that isn't very palatable to some, especially those in the Rescue community.

I was semi-rhetorical with my question, but I understand where you're coming from. I figured the 130 could drop it, but how does it go back? A specific mission allowing it to ground recover? Okay, got it. Then I see where recovery wasn't a criteria for the vehicle (or maybe it was, but low on the list and you're being facetious which I understand) and the program loses me. A high-speed vehicle we'll dump if needed? I guess I shouldn't be surprised given the disposable nature of the MRAP's and M-ATV's here in Afghanistan.

I'm smart enough to know you're hosed the second you require assets outside of the Wing, hence my original comment. I also recall Rescue's..."issues" during Desert Storm. AFSOC won't come off a -22 unless forced and the staffing required is almost cost and time prohibitive unless executed well in advance. "One team, one fight" usually means someone's getting raped, you know? Maybe I'm naive, but I think a RQW should be reasonably self-sufficient, particularly given Big Blue's "warm" support for the mission...
 
...entire post...
Fair enough. I don't think there is a right/wrong in this conversation- but sheesh. The amount of "not great" calls in the last 4-5 years of this thing has been monumental.
I was semi-rhetorical with my question, but I understand where you're coming from. I figured the 130 could drop it, but how does it go back? A specific mission allowing it to ground recover?
My b. I totally missed the rhetorical part! Don't think of it as "a specific mission to ground recover", more like, "you guys are balls deep in threat rings- if we drop you and the vehicles, can you use the vehicles to get the hell out of there and closer to 'not so many threat rings'? Ok, then let's do this." It's just another tool for flexibility, that's all.
I'm smart enough to know you're hosed the second you require assets outside of the Wing, hence my original comment. I also recall Rescue's..."issues" during Desert Storm. AFSOC won't come off a -22 unless forced and the staffing required is almost cost and time prohibitive unless executed well in advance. "One team, one fight" usually means someone's getting raped, you know? Maybe I'm naive, but I think a RQW should be reasonably self-sufficient, particularly given Big Blue's "warm" support for the mission...
This. Twice. And once in the morning on Sunday.
Incidentally, I realize my posts have been a bit schizo. I've tried to provide some insight into what I think is the thought process up at staff and amongst pilots as well as provide my own personal opinions, if that's muddying the waters I apologize.
No worries, you're good. Plenty of insane people on this board. At least you can spell...
Seriously, I really really want to drive the GAARV. But I'd think it would be way more useful in a tyranny of distance situation, like Africa which is a logistical monster to try support PR across.

Not saying there's no place for extended ground operations in night one of a big war scenario, but speaking in generalities that's every bit as risky and situation specific as helo rescue with limited support within an IADS.
Me too! We are barely allowed to say the word until test ok's it and fields it. Can't wait, that thing is a beast.

That sort of environment- Africa/extended surface ops- is exactly where it would be most useful. Team bombs out 5-600 miles away, drops, recovers, and starts on the way back to meet AC package moving towards them (although slower). It definitely has uses in more intense scenarios, but that would be the main one.
 
Maybe I'm naive, but I think a RQW should be reasonably self-sufficient, particularly given Big Blue's "warm" support for the mission...
Late to this, I know. I agree with the first part, but we run into roadblocks within our own leadership. We have money issues and leaf eater issues. Discussion of adding more offensive weapon capabilities to the helos/130s results in rolled eyes. Even discussing advanced tactics usually results in some kind of comment about it just being too hard. When in reality we just train inefficiently.

The second part is entirely dependent on what type of war we're fighting. I think we've come a long way from Desert Storm, back then TAC was training to fight WW3, recovering dudes was almost a foregone conclusion. I do get pissed off when I read Gen Glosson's comments about how AFSOC conducted CSAR.

That said, CSAR and PR have gained a lot of attention lately. The shock of the potential loss of the A-10 has made the rest of the CAF realize they may not have that security blanket much longer and everyone else may have to step up a bit. A friend reports from the latest Red Flag, multiple times O-6s would ask "that sounds good, tell me more about your CSAR plan?" That's a bit of a paraphrase, but the intent was clear that everyone needs to get on board with a larger awareness of PR.
 
Late to this, I know. I agree with the first part, but we run into roadblocks within our own leadership. We have money issues and leaf eater issues. Discussion of adding more offensive weapon capabilities to the helos/130s
The second part is entirely dependent on what type of war we're fighting. I think we've come a long way from Desert Storm, back then TAC was training to fight WW3, recovering dudes was almost a foregone conclusion. I do get pissed off when I read Gen Glosson's comments about how AFSOC conducted CSAR.
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Doctrinally and logically, we both know that PR is conducted primarily as a subset of DA inside of the 9 tenets of SOF. I'm in this with you. However, saying an AFSOC General is wrong in saying they conducted CSAR (and that should say PR) is like saying the unit that picked up O'Grady "wasn't doing CSAR" because we don't approve of their personnel, methods, or exfil platform.

THIS is the issue. It's process oriented (ACC) and product oriented (AFSOC/EVERYONE ELSE).

The DoD says- "Bring everyone home, all the time, no matter what. Leave no stone unturned. Americans, dead or alive, come home."

ACC says- "Let's go get those that need help- as long as we can do it on OUR aircraft, in OUR command, with only OUR crews, under OUR rules."

I am in no way throwing down a gauntlet here. But I want to make this publicly clear- I don't give a shit how people return to their families. Marines, AF, Army- I dont care. And I mean that to the core of my being. I mean it to mean, "I will set aside my ego, my team, my friends, my very self- if it means that IP comes home."

At this point- I don't feel as if my command shares that view.
 
Doctrinally and logically, we both know that PR is conducted primarily as a subset of DA inside of the 9 tenets of SOF. I'm in this with you. However, saying an AFSOC General is wrong in saying they conducted CSAR (and that should say PR) is like saying the unit that picked up O'Grady "wasn't doing CSAR" because we don't approve of their personnel, methods, or exfil platform.

THIS is the issue. It's process oriented (ACC) and product oriented (AFSOC/EVERYONE ELSE).

The DoD says- "Bring everyone home, all the time, no matter what. Leave no stone unturned. Americans, dead or alive, come home."

ACC says- "Let's go get those that need help- as long as we can do it on OUR aircraft, in OUR command, with only OUR crews, under OUR rules."

I am in no way throwing down a gauntlet here. But I want to make this publicly clear- I don't give a shit how people return to their families. Marines, AF, Army- I dont care. And I mean that to the core of my being. I mean it to mean, "I will set aside my ego, my team, my friends, my very self- if it means that IP comes home."

At this point- I don't feel as if my command shares that view.
Would it it help if SOCOM recognized PR or CSAR as a specific SOF mission. Would that move PJ's out of the ACC? It seems to be a SOF mission in most NATO countries. My 2 cents.
Reed
 
Would it it help if SOCOM recognized PR or CSAR as a specific SOF mission. Would that move PJ's out of the ACC? It seems to be a SOF mission in most NATO countries. My 2 cents.
Reed

SOCOM can claim the mission, that doesn't mean ACC would yield the personnel, budget, and airframes. That fight would probably go to the SECDEF level. ACC protested a move to AFSOC a few years ago. There was some arrangement like "AFSOC while deployed, ACC while at home station" or...something odd. I've seen the term "Half-SOC" used to describe the relationship.
 
Sorry, not what I meant. AFSOC was assigned CSAR in support of DS. Buster Glosson (CENTAF Director of Plans) was a Vietnam vet and expected AFSOC to throw helicopters at every rescue opportunity, despite the CAOC not apportioning the appropriate assets to actually give the helo/team guys the support they needed to actually do that. CSAR in Desert Storm by Darrel Whitcomb is a great read. There was certainly many other issues with rescue in DS.

I think part of the CSAR vs CSAR thing comes from AFDD-1, basically "CSAR" is the TTPs used to recover an isolated person. Which is somewhat ridiculous, since logically you would think if you're searching and rescuing someone in combat =CSAR. Likewise you could take the CSARTF template and use it to conduct a direct action mission, just wouldn't be the best technique to do it. Likewise in your example of Scott O-Grady, the basic way the Marine corps TRAP model works in my understanding is basically using an air assault template to rescue a dude, so there really isn't much search. It also plays back to service mindset, AF CSAR tends to be very air centric, because the predominance of assets are air assets. The Marine corps is a very ground centric organization, so an assault mindset. That said, I've worked with Marines recently and their views on TRAP are much closer to the AF CSAR model than in times past.

All that said, I agree that I don't really give a shit who actually goes and does the mission as long as it is the best solution for the guy isolated on the ground.
 
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