CSAR-X

[busdriver]

SOCOM can claim the mission, that doesn't mean ACC would yield the personnel, budget, and airframes. That fight would probably go to the SECDEF level. ACC protested a move to AFSOC a few years ago. There was some arrangement like "AFSOC while deployed, ACC while at home station" or...something odd. I've seen the term "Half-SOC" used to describe the relationship.

At one point we were AFSOC, but when deployed we were still owned by the Air Component Commander, hence Half-SOC. I have no idea what would have happened long term had we remained aligned under AFSOC, but it's a moot point as Gen Moseley put us back into ACC almost overnight after a closed door meeting with SOCOM general(s). I've heard all sorts of rumors about what was said, but I have no real data.

Rescue in SOCOM/AFSOC vs ACC comes up every couple years. Personally, I think ACC is the right place, I think the issues amlove has are not a result of ACC but our own internal leadership. That said, we need to embrace the fact that being capable of conducting CSAR (at least from the aircrew side) effectively means that those same skill sets translate to a multitude of missions.

In a shrinking fiscal environment I'd be stupid to say that I only do one niche mission that has a low probability of actually happening, regardless of how important it is. Instead my message needs to be that my primary mission is X, therefore I have the following skill sets: A,B,C, so I can also accomplish missions Y&Z so I will also train to those.

 

[Blizzard]

Just read this article on the CRH in the latest edition of Air Force Magazine:
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/June 2015/Rescue’s-Future.aspx

It left me with a number of questions (most were already brought up and discussed earlier in this thread)...

* Moving to a HH-60W model. Why? How about a truly new, revolutionary platform?

* The HH-60W is not a new platform, even by the admission of it's closest supporters (even uses same engines and weapons as G model). It's not revolutionary in any way; it's an evolution. That being the case, why must it take ~6+ years before it will be declared operational? Why so long? Our procurement and development lifecycle seriously needs to be reviewed. Speed is life.
Note: the basic HH-60 airframe is already over 3 decades old, entering service in 1982. It will be nearly 40 years old before the first Whiskey model even enters service!

* This is being billed as the "new" rescue helicopter. To me, that implies, don't hold your breath for anything else for quite some time (see comment above about airframe age). Yet, as far as I can tell, this "new" model only marginally moves the needle in a positive direction for a couple areas: payload and weight - only increases gross capacity by 500 lbs., glass avionics declutter things slightly, and possibly a slightly higher hover? Hmmm.

* Contract is for 112 airplanes at at a cost of $7.9 billion. By my public school math, that's a cost of ~$70.5+M each. According to the USAF Fact Sheet, the per unit cost of the HH-60G in FY11 was $40.1M. CBA anyone?

Anyway, though the article might be of interest to those that hadn't seen it.

 

[AWP]

You get a new airframe, you get a new airframe, and you get a new airframe, everyone gets....oh, sorry, not you Rescue. You get some pseudo rebranded shyte because we spent all of our money on fixed-wing assets using a broken acquisition process.
Hugs!
ACC

 

[TLDR20]

All these acquisition threads make me remember how bad it is to work in a large bureaucracy... I don't miss it.

 

[busdriver]

- Short answer: lack of money and Moseley got fired. I may have mentioned this, but the program was originally called H-60 re-cap (ie buy more 60's) since the airframes we're flying now are falling apart due to wear and tear. The Kirtland aircraft are actually a bit scary.

- The HH-60W is a "new" aircraft, in as much as it isn't a configuration flown anywhere and the avionics integration requirements are unique. Those two things plus a deliberate decision to reduce risk makes the whole contract longer. A shorter timeline would have increased programmatic risk, which DoD acquisitions has proven to be poor at managing. But yes, the system is slow and unresponsive. Check this link out Government Money, as an example we just laid out a bunch of aircraft modifications requirements a couple months ago for FY18.

- The "next" Rescue aircraft will in theory be part of the FVL program. But that is vaporware at this point.

- There's more in the contract than just 112 aircraft, simulators as an example.

Ironically, budget problems killed the MH/HH-60D which was what the Air Force tried to buy back in the 80s. That aircraft was an integrated cockpit Hawk with a TF radar and glass cockpit.

 

[DA SWO]

You get a new airframe, you get a new airframe, and you get a new airframe, everyone gets....oh, sorry, not you Rescue. You get some pseudo rebranded shyte because we spent all of our money on fixed-wing assets using a broken acquisition process.
Hugs!
ACC

AFSOC had a hand in this one too.

That said, evolutionary designs often work well. (look at the C-130 and F-16).

 

[AWP]

AFSOC had a hand in this one too.

That said, evolutionary designs often work well. (look at the C-130 and F-16).

This first point is interesting since AFSOC doesn't own the airframes, or I've missed something. I understand about other airframes and evolution, but is the 60 right for this or a flawed stopgap with the potential to drag on for decades? The J's don't seem to like the -60 and Afghanistan has shown the a/c's limitations. Better engines can make up for some of that, but aren't better solutions out there?

Given the AF's track record of late, I'm skeptical this is the right answer. The only one the Rescue community has, but that doesn't make it "right." The guys will make it work and do what they have to as they've done for years, but that doesn't make it right. We'll have our warfighters making do because the system and shoddy leadership put them in that place.

 

[Blizzard]

The world we live in today is quite different than the world we lived in even 15 years ago. Technology advances much more quickly today. We have "competitors" building forces at a rate not seen in decades, sometimes doing so with technology gleaned from us, thus reducing their development lifecycles. What may've passed as an acceptable stop gap measure in the past isn't necessarily acceptable today or in the future.

The procurement process needs innovation and retooling to meet not only today's needs but tomorrow's needs as well in a quickly evolving world. This, of course, also requires adjustment to political and public attitudes but that's another topic. Look back in history to WWII and consider how quickly new designs were brought from ideation to operational. We need to recapture that mindset. As I mentioned previously, we live in a world where speed is life.

 

[DA SWO]

This first point is interesting since AFSOC doesn't own the airframes, or I've missed something. I understand about other airframes and evolution, but is the 60 right for this or a flawed stopgap with the potential to drag on for decades? The J's don't seem to like the -60 and Afghanistan has shown the a/c's limitations. Better engines can make up for some of that, but aren't better solutions out there?

Given the AF's track record of late, I'm skeptical this is the right answer. The only one the Rescue community has, but that doesn't make it "right." The guys will make it work and do what they have to as they've done for years, but that doesn't make it right. We'll have our warfighters making do because the system and shoddy leadership put them in that place.

CSAR-X was first run when AFSOC owned the mission. They tested the EH-101, S-92 and MH-47 with all the (recently grounded) Pave Low evaluators giving the 47 two thumbs up. Problem was the specs were written for a smaller aircraft allowing Sikorsky to successfully challenge the selection. IIRC Gates was SecDef and he made the AF jump through numerous hoops design-wise before they could start round two.
Surge ended, budgets got cut and CSAR-X lost it's money; so round three (and the easy fix) was to buy new HH-60s (with the specs written so only the 60 would qualify).
Sad really.