Fire All the Generals and Replace Them with the Captains?

Marauder06

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http://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...21a234-9802-11e3-afce-3e7c922ef31e_story.html

"Most of the colonels and generals leading the Army were trained to fight World War III against the Soviets; most of the captains and majors have trained and fought against al-Qaeda, Sunni militias and the Taliban. Unfortunately, few colonels and generals have, in practical terms, been able to adapt their 1980s and ’90s training to the needs of today’s warfare.

The best evidence for this is that we didn’t win in Iraq and haven’t won in Afghanistan. Military journalist Thomas E. Ricks has argued that America’s generals and colonels have been largely responsible for these failures. Small, transient battlefield successes — the Sunni Awakening in Iraq and partnering with militias in Afghanistan to defeat Taliban groups — were largely products of enterprising junior officers: perceptive lieutenants, captains and occasionally majors. In the past three years, those officers have been promoted to captains, majors and lieutenant colonels — and now they’re the ones on the chopping block."
 
LOL I think I made this argument 5-6 years ago on here.

I wouldn't fire all, but just about anyone O6 and up, minus a few GO's like my former Btn Cdr.

Something else to keep in mind, is we are still going to need a major conventional warfare capability if we ever get tied into something with Russia, China, NK, etc. However, I am not sure where our current fleet of 60+ year old Generals will fit with that either.

Patton and MacArthur were exceptional generals for their much older ages of the times. I think that was the exception and not the norm. Throughout history the most successful commanders were younger, normally in the 30-45 year range. But that's another topic in itself.
 
The author makes some good points and some that I disagree with. New blood is good but experience can't be beaten.
Like JAB says, we cannot abandon a strong conventional capability, that would be shortsighted, stupid and virtually suicidal for the nation.
You must plan and train for current and future conflicts, not ones in the past (though the lessons from those must be retained!).

The younger captains, majors and lieutenant colonels did not, for the most part, grow up in a country or a military where being gay was automatically seen as disgraceful; they are also more readily able than prior generations to imagine women in combat. Empowering officers who can help solidify such changes will boost morale and enhance the Army’s fighting capability, especially at a time of austerity and decreased training opportunities.

The above quote I think is a ridiculous statement. In a time of downsizing, austerity and decreased training opportunities we need people who will help integrate gays and women because that will increase moral and fighting capability? What? How? :-/ :rolleyes:
 
I wouldn't just slash O's, I'm sure your Senior NCO's are like ours and the majority are prime retirement age. No offense to them but there as been and still are a lot of great "young" leaders waiting for a spot to move up the ladder.
 
While I think he makes some excellent points, he barely even plays lip service to a massive factor that has driven the recent OSBs and ESERBs: the disproportionate personnel strength of certain year groups over others and the long-term career implications of dealing with that. I'm not saying that the Army is moving on the best track in dealing with this in terms of personnel management and retention. But to suggest any plan that doesn't address that fact (such as dismissively saying "just promote some captains" without even suggesting a framework for making it happen) is driving without a map; you'll see what's immediately in front of you, but nothing past that.
 
The best evidence for this is that we didn’t win in Iraq and haven’t won in Afghanistan. Military journalist Thomas E. Ricks has argued that America’s generals and colonels have been largely responsible for these failures.

I have to disagree in part with this statement. I believe the statement above would be more accurate had it been directed towards the civilian government (lawyers and politicians). Had we been able to put some WWII tactics into these conflicts, then "hearts and minds" would only play into it after we demoralized and wiped out our enemies. Instead we are more worried about collateral damage and pussy-footing around these countries that don't play by the rules we have to abide by. The higher level officers have to bend to the will of the politicians because well, they'll be out of a job extremely quick if they go against the flow.

It's not to say that some of the decisions coming from these Generals and Colonels aren't coming from left field, but I don't think it all rests on their shoulders. I think do think there are a lot of good comments from everybody so far, but I think a majority of the blame comes from the civilian leadership that needs to let the military run the military.

I do like where he is going with his article though.
 
I have to disagree in part with this statement. I believe the statement above would be more accurate had it been directed towards the civilian government (lawyers and politicians). Had we been able to put some WWII tactics into these conflicts, then "hearts and minds" would only play into it after we demoralized and wiped out our enemies. Instead we are more worried about collateral damage and pussy-footing around these countries that don't play by the rules we have to abide by. The higher level officers have to bend to the will of the politicians because well, they'll be out of a job extremely quick if they go against the flow.

I think this sort of statement and way of thinking is very tempting for the military (Army especially) but is very dangerous. To me this is a part of the Vietnam narrative the Army loved so much - 'we didn't do anything wrong, it was the civilian government.' We've fought in Iraq for 8+ years and in Afghanistan for over a decade - so far. I don't think the Army can afford not to take responsibility and look critically at the way we fought. Something an officer said to me when I was a LT really resonates 'the great and terrible thing about the Army is nobody gives a fuck how hard you tried - you either took the objective or you didn't.' Our job is to fight and win the nations wars. Anytime we're not able to do that we've got to take a brutally honest look at ourselves and start fixing things - or we risk becoming a hollow force as policy-makers consider us useless or too expensive an option to maintain.

I find Ricks' narrative about promoting junior people and firing the generals (except for his favorites, and he's got crappy judgment there in my view) is much too simplistic but at least it's a start. I think all good changes come with leaders accepting responsibility - not fault, responsibility.
 
I think this sort of statement and way of thinking is very tempting for the military (Army especially) but is very dangerous. To me this is a part of the Vietnam narrative the Army loved so much - 'we didn't do anything wrong, it was the civilian government.' We've fought in Iraq for 8+ years and in Afghanistan for over a decade - so far. I don't think the Army can afford not to take responsibility and look critically at the way we fought. Something an officer said to me when I was a LT really resonates 'the great and terrible thing about the Army is nobody gives a fuck how hard you tried - you either took the objective or you didn't.' Our job is to fight and win the nations wars. Anytime we're not able to do that we've got to take a brutally honest look at ourselves and start fixing things - or we risk becoming a hollow force as policy-makers consider us useless or too expensive an option to maintain.
Sir, winning a war is simple in theory (demoralize your enemy into quitting before you do, using various tools at your disposal - weapons, psychology, etc). When you are handcuffed and can not utilize all of your tools effectively, it is much more difficult to demoralize the enemy, take an objective, win the war, etc. While it does happen, the military does not handcuff the military most of the time.
 
Sir, winning a war is simple in theory (demoralize your enemy into quitting before you do, using various tools at your disposal - weapons, psychology, etc). When you are handcuffed and can not utilize all of your tools effectively, it is much more difficult to demoralize the enemy, take an objective, win the war, etc. While it does happen, the military does not handcuff the military most of the time.

But what if that's your mission? MacArthur made the same argument in Korea - if only Truman would let me attack mainland China - as did the Joint Chiefs in the Cuban Missile Crisis - invade Cuba, it's the only way. As Clauswitz (sp?) said some version of 'war is an extension of politics' it is still the case. The mission of the military is to win within constraints. If our argument in the Army is going to be 'if you use us, let us do whatever we want' I think there's a good chance Army funding gets cut to zero. Because in that case who would use us for anything?
 
I wonder what the thoughts are regarding the length of time it takes a great leader to achive rank and position, and the adverse affect of that leader being grinded down by the system. Say we have an outstanding leader with potential to lead well above the current rank and position he/she is allowed to hold. As an Army are we loosing that leadership by keeping them grounded to a lower position? What are the affects of taking a great leader and forcing them into staff positions, or positions under bad leaders? Will that leader become better from it, or will they simply hit that wall and say fuck it?

I think it goes much deeper than simple "from an older era of warfare". I think the system as a whole is faulted at its core. 60+ year old men are not "Warriors" their grandfathers. They are institutionalized to a system and IMO, unable to break the mold of the norm. When they attempt to do so, it looks like shitty ACU uniforms and stupid berets. My$.02
 
As one of the younger officers he references, I couldn't agree more with this. I've come very close to my limit of the amount of BS I can take from people who are so far detached from the reality of the conflicts we are engaged in and the people who are fighting in these (and future) conflicts. I recently got pulled from a tactical-level job to the staff level in the AOR. The problems faced out on the "front" lines and the problems focused on at the HQ level couldn't have been more different. The ridiculous ideas floating around that HQ by senior-ranking colonels and Lt Cols dropped my jaw more than once.

But it's not just on the officer side. It's SNCOs too. When you have senior enlisted leaders who seem to care more about what patches an individual wears, or how a person's pants are bloused (not that they are bloused but HOW they are bloused) than issues that can actually make our break our mission here, it's quite telling of a systemic problem that is contributing to our lack of rousing success and to our service-wide (and most likely DoD-wide) disgruntled state. One quick example (and this is admittedly a frivolous one that has little to nothing to do with my overall point): I had just returned from a convoy mission and checked into my office to catch up on emails. A SMSgt sitting in the office looked over at me and asked what flag I was wearing on my combat shirt. A major sitting in the office looked at the SMSgt with disbelief and said "That's the original flag of the United States..." The SMSgt followed that up with "Well, is that authorized?"

Coincidentally, one of our big lines of effort in Afghanistan is to either replace or wait out older ANA leaders and appoint younger officers, groomed and trained by us instead of the Russians to take their place. Maybe it's time we do the same in our own ranks?
 
But what if that's your mission? MacArthur made the same argument in Korea - if only Truman would let me attack mainland China - as did the Joint Chiefs in the Cuban Missile Crisis - invade Cuba, it's the only way. As Clauswitz (sp?) said some version of 'war is an extension of politics' it is still the case. The mission of the military is to win within constraints. If our argument in the Army is going to be 'if you use us, let us do whatever we want' I think there's a good chance Army funding gets cut to zero. Because in that case who would use us for anything?

The only thing I take exception to in your argument is bolded and red. I have a hard time believing this would be the case, although I wouldn't be blindsided hearing it from a few people. Good points made all around.
 
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