Japan Ready To Become Formal Member of Five Eye's.

Some...unpopular observations.
- Is China our greatest threat or not? What's Japan's? "Enemy of my enemy" and all that.
- What vetting has taken place IRT to Japan as a whole? That's clearly not open source, but a topic to consider.
- With that said, what does our CI posture look like WRT Japan?
- Our security is trash at the moment, China has penetrated us in ways porn can never rival. Adding Japan harms us how?

I don't know if Japan is ready for FVEY, but maybe it is time to consider a new security group that encompasses nations who have more to lose than to gain by partnering w/ China.

1) China is the greatest nation state threat. Russia is a close second, Iran is at third. North Korea has potential to be higher, but I wouldn't peg them above 4th.
2) Won't discuss here.
3) Won't discuss here, except that I feel comfortable with them in ways I'm not when it comes to our other allies like France (personal experience/anecdote)
4) China has some good capabilities for sure, but I've seen that mostly against NIPR and non-TS or SCI networks, discounting encryption. Japan has the technical capacity to be secure from China, and I think with discipline (hardly lost on their culture) they can effectively safeguard things we share with them as well as current FVEY members.

Totally agree on India. At the same time, India is our best regional option to blunt the Chinese/ PK/ AFG relationship militarily and economically.

I like India- a lot. I also trust them as much as the French on topics they aren't interested in (so not much).

Another article from August. The proposed expansion includes Japan, Germany, France and South Korea. Very interesting strategic choices.

Is Seoul Prepared to Join a Five Eyes Plus Framework? | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

Why the f*** would we bring Germany and France into FVEY? Truth be told, they would be great in a framework that provides limited (VERY LIMITED) access, but French and German CI threats are far too significant to provide the necessary connections and access to reveal current FVEY capabilities. That's not classified- just fact. France invests in espionage instead of R&D, and the Germans have made it clear how they feel about US/FVEY SIGINT usage in their country.

Not to say we don't have trusted partners in each country- we do, but it would be a significant increase in risk to loss of control of information to deeply broaden access to that information.
 
Why the f*** would we bring Germany and France into FVEY? Truth be told, they would be great in a framework that provides limited (VERY LIMITED) access, but French and German CI threats are far too significant to provide the necessary connections and access to reveal current FVEY capabilities. That's not classified- just fact. France invests in espionage instead of R&D, and the Germans have made it clear how they feel about US/FVEY SIGINT usage in their country.
Exactly. FVEY infers a level of trust that neither France nor Germany seem adequately disincentivized from breaking, and any current information-sharing agreements that may already persist between them and the US seem to be risk enough.

Not to say we don't have trusted partners in each country- we do, but it would be a significant increase in risk to loss of control of information to deeply broaden access to that information.
First thing that came to mind here was the very particular language and protocols needed to close up any technical loopholes in the new agreements that could open up either country to accidental or deliberate intelligence disclosures to the other 20+ EU member states (or non-EU nations) and any hostile FIS elements embedded in them.

Not that none of that couldn't (or wouldn't) eventually end up happening anyway.
 
The Japanese--for historical and legal reasons--have always been a bit reluctant to embrace anything that smacks of militarism or that might, in the public's view, compromise civil liberties; but they've been easing into a harder stance on defense and security over the past 20 years.

I think the pros outweigh the cons in this regard. I would like to see their collective ingenuity and resourcefulness harnessed as another bulwark against the PRC, particularly as it concerns cyberwarfare and especially the PRC's advancement in the development of quantum computerization...the most significant threat IMV.

In other words, the more minds the better.


"President Xi funded a multi-billion-dollar quantum computing mega-project with the expectation of achieving significant quantum breakthroughs by 2030. He also committed billions to establish a Chinese National Laboratory for Quantum Information Sciences..."

Quantum USA Vs. Quantum China: The World's Most Important Technology Race
 
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Very interesting discussion.

To me, as someone who no longer does intel work and is not involved in the slightest with these types of issues, my first reaction was "no." Five Eyes / FVEY represents, to me, a very special relationship between the US and countries with whom we have had a sustained and meaningful relationship with after WWII. The wider we expand the network, the more likely leaks are to occur, and the "less-special" the relationship becomes. Additionally, the more people are involved in something, the less likely it is that those in the in-group will want to share, because they either 1) fear leaks or 2) their national interests are fundamentally in conflict with another partner's. This is why it is unlikely you'll see a FVEY-like relationship between say Pakistan and India.

However, having studied China, its political system, and its goals for the future, at length in my previous assignment I tend to feel that anything that makes things harder for China makes things better for the US.

Additionally, when it comes to sharing classified information, the absence of "NOFORN" (i.e. "no foreign nationals") does not mean "YESFORN." By that, I mean just because something is not classified "NOFORN" doesn't mean it gets automatically disseminated to foreign nationals in most cases. So if we let Japan into FVEY, perhaps we limit what goes out over FVEY.

But then again, the reason we have FVEY in the first place (and I remain unconvinced about New Zealand being part of the group) is to utilize the "speed of trust" to more quickly get information where it needs to go. Anything that slows that process down, IMO, isn't worth the squeeze.

Before this becomes TL;DR: I think it's worth it to have some type of special political/intelligence structure focused in the Pacific, that includes the FVEY nations as well as countries like Thailand, Japan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea, but that isn't "Five Eyes." That sends a message to China, helps build 'the speed of trust,' protects everyone's national interests, and gives us something we can dangle when we want people to partner with us instead of China.
 
Very interesting discussion.

To me, as someone who no longer does intel work and is not involved in the slightest with these types of issues, my first reaction was "no." Five Eyes / FVEY represents, to me, a very special relationship between the US and countries with whom we have had a sustained and meaningful relationship with after WWII. The wider we expand the network, the more likely leaks are to occur, and the "less-special" the relationship becomes. Additionally, the more people are involved in something, the less likely it is that those in the in-group will want to share, because they either 1) fear leaks or 2) their national interests are fundamentally in conflict with another partner's. This is why it is unlikely you'll see a FVEY-like relationship between say Pakistan and India.

However, having studied China, its political system, and its goals for the future, at length in my previous assignment I tend to feel that anything that makes things harder for China makes things better for the US.

Additionally, when it comes to sharing classified information, the absence of "NOFORN" (i.e. "no foreign nationals") does not mean "YESFORN." By that, I mean just because something is not classified "NOFORN" doesn't mean it gets automatically disseminated to foreign nationals in most cases. So if we let Japan into FVEY, perhaps we limit what goes out over FVEY.

But then again, the reason we have FVEY in the first place (and I remain unconvinced about New Zealand being part of the group) is to utilize the "speed of trust" to more quickly get information where it needs to go. Anything that slows that process down, IMO, isn't worth the squeeze.

Before this becomes TL;DR: I think it's worth it to have some type of special political/intelligence structure focused in the Pacific, that includes the FVEY nations as well as countries like Thailand, Japan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea, but that isn't "Five Eyes." That sends a message to China, helps build 'the speed of trust,' protects everyone's national interests, and gives us something we can dangle when we want people to partner with us instead of China.
This is one of those posts I’ll read a couple of times in a row, just because I figure I’ll learn something new each time I read it.
 
@Marauder06 you probably expected this question. What are your concerns with New Zealand?

Sure thing. But before I start, I want to make it clear that while I see little value in NZ being in the FIVE EYES program, I appreciate the US's relationship with NZ and I respect both the Kiwis I served with overseas, and our NZ members of this site.


For me, there are two issues: political unreliability and limited ability to contribute.

First, New Zealand was actually kicked out of the Five Eyes program in the mid-1980s and was only re-integrated in ~2009. The reason they got dropped was over a political dispute over nuclear weapons. They were out of the program for something like two decades and we all seemed to get along just fine without them. And these days, New Zealand is more in bed with China than we would like. While that last bit is strictly my opinion, I am not the only one to have it:
“I think that at some level the Five Eyes or the Four Eyes need to have a discussion about whether or not New Zealand can remain, given this problem with the political core.” source

another link related to the above

I am not throwing stones at NZ for the above actions; countries should always act in their own interests. But we also work closely with France, who we also don't trust and who isn't in FVEY. So there's plenty of room for us to continue to cooperate with NZ politically and with intel, but outside of the FVEY framework.


Shifting gears now, the next issue is one of capacity. NZ's military is full of fighters who are good partners for the US. But they are very, very small and their capabilities are very, very limited. For purposes of comparison, the US's intel budget is something on the order of $86 billion. NZ spends something like $145 million . Good intel is expensive, and NZ isn't even close to our level.

So: limited capabilities + history of unreliability + cozying up to countries we don't like =


what would you say you do here office space GIF
 
Very interesting discussion.

To me, as someone who no longer does intel work and is not involved in the slightest with these types of issues, my first reaction was "no." Five Eyes / FVEY represents, to me, a very special relationship between the US and countries with whom we have had a sustained and meaningful relationship with after WWII. The wider we expand the network, the more likely leaks are to occur, and the "less-special" the relationship becomes. Additionally, the more people are involved in something, the less likely it is that those in the in-group will want to share, because they either 1) fear leaks or 2) their national interests are fundamentally in conflict with another partner's. This is why it is unlikely you'll see a FVEY-like relationship between say Pakistan and India.

However, having studied China, its political system, and its goals for the future, at length in my previous assignment I tend to feel that anything that makes things harder for China makes things better for the US.

Additionally, when it comes to sharing classified information, the absence of "NOFORN" (i.e. "no foreign nationals") does not mean "YESFORN." By that, I mean just because something is not classified "NOFORN" doesn't mean it gets automatically disseminated to foreign nationals in most cases. So if we let Japan into FVEY, perhaps we limit what goes out over FVEY.

But then again, the reason we have FVEY in the first place (and I remain unconvinced about New Zealand being part of the group) is to utilize the "speed of trust" to more quickly get information where it needs to go. Anything that slows that process down, IMO, isn't worth the squeeze.

Before this becomes TL;DR: I think it's worth it to have some type of special political/intelligence structure focused in the Pacific, that includes the FVEY nations as well as countries like Thailand, Japan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea, but that isn't "Five Eyes." That sends a message to China, helps build 'the speed of trust,' protects everyone's national interests, and gives us something we can dangle when we want people to partner with us instead of China.
I'm not sure I agree completely. Haven't we had a special relationship with Japan since VJ Day? We wrote their constitution and have had military bases on their soil for 75 years, not to mention an enormous impact on their culture. One could say they’ve essentially been an American protectorate since 1945; and I think because of their long and close history with China they have a unique understanding of the region and its nuances. And it goes without saying they are technologically sophisticated. That’s just my gut...but your argument brings up important points that I need to think about.
 
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The CENTCOM-related distro groups diagram (FVEY, MESF, NATO, etc.) is pretty nuts. I'm pretty sure we have something similar for PACOM, but I have no idea what that would even look like.

Considering how everyone still fights over authorities and being over-protective of their own sandbox (at least in my experience), probably just as bad. :ROFLMAO:
 
The CENTCOM-related distro groups diagram (FVEY, MESF, NATO, etc.) is pretty nuts. I'm pretty sure we have something similar for PACOM, but I have no idea what that would even look like.

What I'd like to see is more of a NATO-like security arrangement for the INDOPACIFIC, more than an intel-sharing one. Any thoughts on that?
 
Shifting gears now, the next issue is one of capacity. NZ's military is full of fighters who are good partners for the US. But they are very, very small and their capabilities are very, very limited. For purposes of comparison, the US's intel budget is something on the order of $86 billion. NZ spends something like $145 million . Good intel is expensive, and NZ isn't even close to our level.

I don't disagree with you on the concerns about their government, but are you comparing a country with less than 5 million people's budget to ours?

I've had some great deployments with the kiwis. Enjoyed every bit of it. Have a couple of coins and hat with a kiwi on it from them too from some stuff i did.
 
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