Operation Moshtarak

Quoted from Teufel: "Why assault the machinegun bunker if you can convince the enemy to give it to you?"

Because they will not give it to you, they will escape into PK only to return after we give up ground. Wow... this is strangely familiar. What is the point? Our country has no idea how to fight anymore.

My take is that higher's intent is not to kill Taliban, the objective is to take and hold Marjah. Afghanistan is so sensitive to collateral damage we would do more harm than good if we just rolled into the city. Besides you can't plan an operation of this size without the Taliban getting wind of it. We all know they aren't going to stay and fight thousands of CF and ANSF troops, at least this way they look like cowards for running. General Nicholson is a very smart man and I am sure he knows what he is doing.
 
My take is that higher's intent is not to kill Taliban, the objective is to take and hold Marjah. Afghanistan is so sensitive to collateral damage we would do more harm than good if we just rolled into the city. Besides you can't plan an operation of this size without the Taliban getting wind of it. We all know they aren't going to stay and fight thousands of CF and ANSF troops, at least this way they look like cowards for running. General Nicholson is a very smart man and I am sure he knows what he is doing.


When I first read that article, I could only see logic in broadcasting our intentions if we'd be able to track and target enemy forces, herd them into some kind of killbox as they withdrew from the AO, a blocking force as FF has mentioned. And UK/US SOF units apparently have been engaging Taliban leadership in and around Marjah the past few weeks. The larger plan, as you say, is not to kill Taliban and entails the emplacement of Afghan security and infrastructure personnel in the city, police, Army, government offices and all the bureaucracy that goes with it, to transform Marjah from a badguy hideout into a pro-government bastion. I hope it works. It's just that giving the enemy a chance to save themselves goes against my nature.
 
My take is that higher's intent is not to kill Taliban, the objective is to take and hold Marjah. Afghanistan is so sensitive to collateral damage we would do more harm than good if we just rolled into the city. Besides you can't plan an operation of this size without the Taliban getting wind of it. We all know they aren't going to stay and fight thousands of CF and ANSF troops, at least this way they look like cowards for running. General Nicholson is a very smart man and I am sure he knows what he is doing.

I see your point brother. The problem is that these commanders who are "very smart [men]" are following a flawed strategy because they are unsure of what to do. This strategy of chasing the enemy into Pakistan is not doing anyone any good. The people here need security, when they see the Taliban running across the border to Quetta, there is no doubt that the talibs will return even stronger. They see this as a major weakness on America's part. Showing weakness in Afghanistan is a collosal mistake! It only aggrivates the situation by encouraging the populace to support the insurgency, which is not what we want... right? It is time that someone explains the meaning of COIN to our country and explain the true meaning of COIN to our commanders and soldiers. COIN is not a light-handed approach, as the commanders of today think it is. When has there ever been a counter-insurgency that was kind and with mercy? Never. We must crush the insurgency with no remorse, for as long as it takes; there is no time limit to victory. Just the way we did in the beginning of the war, we must release the hounds. Once this is done, then it is time to be kind and merciful, not before. Sure, people are going to die and mistakes are going to be made. This is a war, it will get worse before it gets better. The enemy does not look like cowards for running, this is an American mind-set. To the people here, the Taliban looks like a growing insurgency, which has the chance to win, and when they do win they will behead everyone who has helped Americans. This tactic is extremely flawed and is born out of risk aversion, not tactical prowess!
 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/new...icity-blitzkrieg/story-e6frg6z6-1225830246589

FEW offensives have been as well advertised as the battle for Marjah, which US forces have heralded for weeks as the biggest operation of the eight-year war.
Military strategists were puzzled that the enemy was being given so much detail. But the battle launched on Saturday, local time, is as much for headlines as for territory. "What Marjah is really about is turning around the perception that we're losing," says an adviser to Stanley McChrystal, NATO commander in Afghanistan.

Taking the dusty town of Marjah was never going to be hard. Coalition forces have consistently defeated the Taliban in set-piece battles and this is the biggest display of force since the 2001 invasion.

Most fighters are thought to have melted away, leaving a few diehards and a lot of improvised explosive devices. Some reports were of as few as 50 Taliban in Marjah. Even if there were the 400 or so claimed by US officers, they did not amount to much resistance against 15,000 US Marines, British forces and Afghan troops.

"Nothing in the past eight years of combat supports the notion that the Taliban are suicidal fools," says John McCreary, a former intelligence analyst for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Many in the US intelligence community believe Marjah is about convincing Afghans that the Taliban is not invincible and impressing the sceptics back home.

"It's an attempt to retake the information war," says one officer.

"This is all a war of perceptions," said General McChrystal earlier this month. "This is not a physical war in terms of how many people you kill . . . This is all in the minds of the participants."

The assault follows a series of briefings by McChrystal that NATO forces are "turning the tide" against the Taliban, despite little evidence of this.

The briefings prompted a senior official to warn British Prime Minister Gordon Brown not to be taken in as there could be bloody months ahead.

By talking up the importance of Marjah, the US commander hopes to announce a decisive victory, achieved with a display of firepower capable of convincing Taliban foot soldiers to switch sides. He also wants to use it as a showcase for a shift in focus from killing Taliban to protecting civilians and improving governance.

The real test of Marjah is what subsequently happens to the town and its 70,000-strong population. Under the counter-insurgency strategy of "shape, clear, hold and build", the first two stages have always been fairly straightforward. But as British forces have found in Helmand, the real problem comes with holding. As soon as the foreign forces withdraw, the Afghan forces run away or do deals with the Taliban.

In this instance, British officials say, they have been training special police. An Afghan governor has been imported from Germany, and US and British advisers are standing by. "We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in," says McChrystal.

The US has millions to transform Marjah, which has no paved roads and few schools or clinics.

While Marjah will see a victory, the Taliban may well have shifted elsewhere. NATO officers say they have sealed off escape routes, but the Taliban has never taken coalition forces head-on in Helmand, preferring to stick to guerilla tactics.
 
Our country has no idea how to fight anymore.

Our country has no idea what it is allowed to do in the realm of fighting anymore.

I'd like to take the gloves of and just go medieval, if for no other reason than to remind the American People (and everybody else) what the more violent side of this COULD look like. Then maybe there'd be a greater appreciation for the care by which we actually are trying to fight this thing.
 
pardus said:
We (the ORs/enlisted ranks) have more than the capability to win this but the Officers/politicians won't let us through their cowardliness/incompetence.

All generalizations (generalisations) are false. But then again, we can't expected the "ORs/enlisted ranks" to understand or appreciate the difference. :) }:-)
 
]Consolidation and stabilisation begin on Operation MOSHTARAK[/SIZE][/B]

A Military Operations news article

14 Feb 10

Operation MOSHTARAK, the Afghan-led initiative to assert government authority in central Helmand province, has completed its first clearing operations, with 'hot stabilisation' already underway in the UK area of operations.


hquktf201001602051.jpg

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forum...[Image: SSgt Mark Jones, Crown Copyright/MOD]F Company (Fire Support) 1 Royal Welsh play their part in Operation MOSHTARAK
[Image: SSgt Mark Jones, Crown Copyright/MOD]



UK Military spokesman Major General Gordon Messenger gave a comprehensive account of events on Operation MOSHTARAK over the past 24 to 48 hours at a press briefing in London on Sunday 14 February 2010.
Maj Gen Messenger set out the context. The Regional Command (South) plan for the south of Afghanistan has three phases: Phase one was to rearrange forces around Kandahar so as to improve security around the city and its routes, so improving freedom of movement of the people. Phase two, currently underway, was focused on securing the population in central Helmand. Phase three would involve sending forces back to Kandahar to support Government influence in the city and developing the capacity of the police.
There were three reasons for signalling the operation in Central Helmand in advance. First, to give the Taliban a choice. Second, to make the population aware that the operation was about to unfold. Third, it allowed a much greater level of Afghan involvement and ownership, and subsequently Afghan participation.
Afghans had been involved early on, and at all levels. The operation was briefed to President Karzai some weeks ago, and Governor Gulab Mangal had led Shuras beforehand. Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police were heavily involved in the planning.
The Major General explained that the operations were broadly about expanding security and Afghan Goverment influence to the areas of Chah-e-Anjir, Western Babaji - otherwise known as the PEAR, Trikh Nawa, and Marjah. Without these areas being cleared, stabilisation operations in the area would have been vulnerable.
Shaping operations had begun before the start of Operation MOSHTARAK. A US Task Force had secured Five-Ways Junction and crossing points along Canal 56.

At the same time the the Household Cavalry and Danish Leopard Tanks conducted operations in the Bolan Desert to safeguard the area around Lashkar Gah and disrupt insurgents' freedom of movement to the East.

The Scots Guards had isolated key aras in South Nad Ali, and Task Force Leatherneck had conducted shaping operations to isolate Marjah and secured key lines of communication to support civilian freedom of movement.
Overnight on 12 and 13 February, 1/3/201 Afghan National Army and a Company of 1 Royal Welsh had conducted air insertion into the Chah-e-Anjir Triangle. A Company Group also of 1 Royal Welsh had gone into Western Babaji, and a combined force of ANA and USMC had conducted air assaults against multiple objectives in central Marjah.
There had been simultaneous and corresponding movements on the ground to link up with these air insertions: from the East, Coldstream Guards with 6/2/215 ANA had conducted a ground link-up operation into the Babaji 'PEAR'; a combined force of 1/3/215 ANA and 1 Grenadier Guards plus Estonian Forces had moved into the Chah-e-Anjir Triangle west of Babaji; and a combined force of ANA and US Marine Corps (USMC) had conducted a ground movement into Northern Marjah.

About the same number of troops had been inserted over ground as by air, with just under 1,000 in each of the major movements.



opmoshtaraklast24hrs1.gif


http://www.militaryphotos.net/forum...gif&alt=Briefing Slide on Operation MoshtarakOperation Moshtarak - UK briefing from 14 February 2010
[Image: Crown Copyright/MOD]



The theme for UK Forces in the past 24 hours had been consolidation.
Patrols had been sent out into the areas that the original insertions did not cover. There had been successful searches for IEDs and IED components, with the ANA and Royal Welsh finding 13 pressure-plate IEDs in one compound. Such searches were often directed and indicated by the locals.
Forces had been securing secondary objectives, such as securing crossings of canals and chokepoints.
They had also begun initial engineering work, such as bridge-building and rapid Force Protection engineering works at the bases now being established.
Finally, they were providing security for the Shuras (meetings of elders) that were taking place across the area. For example, a Shura had been held at Showal, north west of Chah-e-Anjir, yesterday attended by around 150 locals, with another even larger Shura today.
Maj Gen Messenger said that the ANA had asserted Afghan authority:
"Showall had been the seat of Taliban shadow government in the area. The Taliban flag was taken down and the Afghan National flag was put in its place."
The air element of the combined operations had been significant, but very stringent requirements were in place before air weapons could be dropped.
Maj Gen Messenger stated:
"There have been no bombs dropped in the UK area of operations, there has been no artillery fired in the UK area of operations, there have been no reports of civilian casualties in the UK area of operations."
Just one Apache Helicopter Hellfire missile had been fired in the UK area of operations. A Household Cavalry patrol was engaged by insurgents near a compound. The UK Apache helicopter fired warning shots into an open field, as was normal practice, but the insurgents had continued to fire at the patrol and so a Hellfire was used.

Maj Gen Messenger said that the operation was not short of complexity, given the aviation, ground and multinational elements, but that Commanders on the ground were very much of the view that the operation had gone according to plan.
There had been, and remained, very little Taliban interference. There had been small arms attacks from a distance which had tested the patrols, but nothing had stopped the mission from progressing or Shuras from taking place.
The local elders had expressed confidence that this was not simply a 'mowing the grass' operation, but that ANA and ISAF were here to stay. The Afghan Government were already forward, making contact and conducting Shuras. Initial interaction was done via the ANA, but Afghan Government representatives from Lashkar Gah had already come forward.

hquktf201001603421.jpg


http://www.militaryphotos.net/forum...[Image: SSgt Mark Jones, Crown Copyright/MOD]Soldiers from 1 Royal Welsh cross a waterway during the clearance phase of Operation MOSHTARAK
[Image: SSgt Mark Jones, Crown Copyright/MOD]



Maj Gen Messenger spoke of the mood of British troops on the ground:
"There is no complacency. It is not unusual for the Taliban to melt away and then come back at us once they've had time to catch their breath."
The next stage of the operations would be continued clearance and consolidation, with "hot stabilisation" called forward as local conditions permitted.
A number of stabilisation projects had already been agreed and were now underway. These would not tip the balance, the Maj Gen Messenger said, but were an important early part of showing ANA/ISAF intent to stay.
The Major General explained that initial planning had thought that the early stages of stablilisation in the UK area would be taken up with compensation claims for damage caused as a result of the operations. But this had proven largely unnecessary, and stabilisation efforts had been accelerated. "Cash for work" projects had already been indentified at local level, and would begin recruiting as early as tomorrow.
Maj Gen Messenger said that early indications were positive on the key objective of winning the support and engagement of the local population:
"[British Task Force Commander] Brigadier James Cowan is very pleased, he had just returned form the Shura when I spoke to him under an hour ago, and he senses genuinely that the population are prepared to give it a go."
"No-one is saying that the immediate stuff, useful though it is, necessary though it is, is going to be the game-changer. The game-changer is the residual security that is provided there, and continued confidence of the locals that the Afghan Government in the area is going to provide for them.

"Security first, enabling Afghan-led stabilisation over a period of months, that's the secret."
The Major General summarised his briefing:
"Everyone understands that what has happened over the last 24-48 hours is the easy bit. The hard bit, the challenge, is the enduring effort, is delivering the security which allows the Afghans to start providing for their people.
"I fully accept that the success of this operation will be judged on that, not on the last 48 hours."​
 
moshtarakmap4101.jpg

This key shows what happened during the first 24 hours of Operation MOSHTARAK: 1 Consolidation of Security. 2 UK/ Danish Forces continue to disrupt insurgent Freedom of Movement in desert. 3 Security of crossings of Canal 56. 4 Combined Force helicopter insertions. 5 US helicopter and ground insertions into Marjah

Nato-led Op MOSHTARAK is the largest counter-insurgency operations since the conflict began in 2001. 15,000 ISAF troops from Britain, Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, the US, France and Estonia have begun the clearing phase.

The operation aims to remove insurgents from areas of central Helmand previously untouched by ISAF forces. It demonstrates the Afghan Government's commitment to increasing responsibility for securing the country's future.
Objectives of Op MOSHTARAK are to improve security and freedom of movement within the main population areas of central Helmand province and are intended to:
  • secure areas routinely used by the Taliban as a base from which to launch attacks against ISAF troops and the Afghan civilian population;
  • build on the progress made by operations in 2009, which have already played a part in the gradual process of security in central Helmand;
  • help the Afghan Government take more responsibility for the security and stability of the province.
By securing these key population centres, Afghan security forces and their ISAF partners will pave the way for greater economic development and growth of governance.

Protecting the civilian population is key
This operation has been publicised in advance in order to reduce the risk to ordinary Afghans by allowing them to make arrangements to ensure their safety.
Protecting the civilian population is absolutely key to our success and is at the heart of this operation, which is designed to make both the Afghan people and our own troops safer.

http://army.mod.uk
 
I see your point brother. The problem is that these commanders who are "very smart [men]" are following a flawed strategy because they are unsure of what to do. This strategy of chasing the enemy into Pakistan is not doing anyone any good. The people here need security, when they see the Taliban running across the border to Quetta, there is no doubt that the talibs will return even stronger. They see this as a major weakness on America's part. Showing weakness in Afghanistan is a collosal mistake! It only aggrivates the situation by encouraging the populace to support the insurgency, which is not what we want... right? It is time that someone explains the meaning of COIN to our country and explain the true meaning of COIN to our commanders and soldiers. COIN is not a light-handed approach, as the commanders of today think it is. When has there ever been a counter-insurgency that was kind and with mercy? Never. We must crush the insurgency with no remorse, for as long as it takes; there is no time limit to victory. Just the way we did in the beginning of the war, we must release the hounds. Once this is done, then it is time to be kind and merciful, not before. Sure, people are going to die and mistakes are going to be made. This is a war, it will get worse before it gets better. The enemy does not look like cowards for running, this is an American mind-set. To the people here, the Taliban looks like a growing insurgency, which has the chance to win, and when they do win they will behead everyone who has helped Americans. This tactic is extremely flawed and is born out of risk aversion, not tactical prowess!

No sweat man, it's not my op after all. I'm just saying that is what I think the commanders are going for. Who knows how it will be received. I think most of the Taliban in that area are home grown to be honest, you never know, this could really work. I mean who thought the tribal awakening would ever work in Iraq? In any event General Nicholson has the ball now and who knows what constraints are being put on him. He is a phenomenal officer with a good track record when he was the 5th Marine Regiment CO in Iraq during the surge.
 
All generalizations (generalisations) are false. But then again, we can't expected the "ORs/enlisted ranks" to understand or appreciate the difference. :) }:-)

I should have been clearer, and said senior Officers/Generals in particular/Politicians.

IMO, they are more interested in their careers and job prospects outside of the Military than they are in doing the job properly and looking after their men, there are exceptions to the rule of course but I haven't seen too much evidence of it.

We are in the position we are now in Afghanistan in no small part because certain Generals after the Taliban were defeated wouldn't let their guys out to patrol etc..., gave the Taliban time to recover and return unmolested.
 
We are in the position we are now in Afghanistan in no small part because certain Generals after the Taliban were defeated wouldn't let their guys out to patrol etc..., gave the Taliban time to recover and return unmolested.

I can think of one in particular, and he picked up a third star for his efforts.
 
Top Taliban commander captured, U.S. official says


The Taliban's top military leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, has been captured, a senior administration official told CNN late Monday. This is a "huge deal," CNN National Security Analyst Peter Bergen said. "This guy ... is the number two political figure in the Taliban" in addition to being the group's top military commander.
Baradar was captured several days ago in a secret joint operation by Pakistani and American intelligence forces in Karachi, Pakistan, according to American government officials, the New York Times reported.
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/02/15/taliban.commander.captured/index.html?hpt=T1

So for the less informed is this guy a big deal or is this being hyped for the publicity value?
 
I should have been clearer, and said senior Officers/Generals in particular/Politicians.

IMO, they are more interested in their careers and job prospects outside of the Military than they are in doing the job properly and looking after their men, there are exceptions to the rule of course but I haven't seen too much evidence of it.

We are in the position we are now in Afghanistan in no small part because certain Generals after the Taliban were defeated wouldn't let their guys out to patrol etc..., gave the Taliban time to recover and return unmolested.

Concur all - well said. I'd add that there is a segment of the Civ/Mil Senior leadership apparently so desirous of CYA that any casualty yields the tactical leader a reprimand. (e.g. Battle of Wanat investigation(s)).
Not a way to run a railroad and, as I heard on a radio show the other day, sets the conditions for all sorts of internal strife within the military.
 
I would like to think we had a loose perimeter around the AO, so that when the 'warnings' went out, and the inevitable, mass exodus exfil of bad guys occurred, that we were scooping up squirters and throwing sandbags on their melons while moving them out for interrogations.

I think that would work. If we did that, I guarantee we got some valuable intel from those captured BEFORE our offensive began.

My .02 from the outside looking in.

Steve
 
The last I heard there were a half dozen firefights going on in the town and TB were infiltrating into previously cleared positions to fire on our flanks & rear. Apparently, broadcasting our battle plan weeks before the attack didn't scare enough of them away, and this is a point I'd like to make: these are tough motherfuckers. They've been fighting long enough to know scare tactics when they see them and scare tactics just piss them off and challenge them to try to kick your ass. These people are veterans of hard warfare, hard living, deprivation makes them strong, they respond and adapt. You cannot coddle these people, you cannot let up, you can't take your boot off their throat. You have to fucking kill them. Give them an opening and they will take it. Hinder your own troops with ridiculous ROE and the enemy will take advantage of it. The first and foremost principle of COIN is to kill insurgents, make it unprofitable and extremely dangerous for them to trespass in your AO. And never, never, never, ever underestimate an enemy just because he's some scrawny illiterate Third-World goat-eating peasant. There are thousands of American and British boys who've been killed by scrawny Third World peasants. Consider this: maybe, just maybe, announcing your intentions to attack weeks in advance, instead of making your enemy flee in fear, might forewarn him enough to plan and prepare a reception.
 
I've read a couple of posts here now about how we should be focusing on killing to win in COIN warfare.
Fighting is important but it is not the most important thing and should not be the focus of any COIN operation.

The fighting is done to stabilize in order to buy timeto conduct the main effort which is winning the hearts and minds of the populace of the country you are trying to secure.

You can kill all day and achieve nothing but strengthen the enemy, by resolve if not by manpower.

Don't get me wrong, we must kill but more than that we need to get the locals on our side.
 
Back
Top